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VOLUME X

Jain Philosophy (Part I)

EDITED BY
DALSUKH MALVANIA & JAYENDRA SONI

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PREFACE

I wish to begin by offering my profound thanks to Dalsukh Malvania, who over thirty years ago agreed to take on the onerous task of editing this first Volume of the Encyclopedia to be concerned with Jain philosophy. Unfortunately he was unable to complete the task, and Jay Soni has agreed to assist by writing the Introduction and providing expert advice. Shortcomings of this Volume should not, however, be ascribed to either Malvania or Soni; they are entirely my own.

Since it has recently been questioned, perhaps a word of explanation about the intended scope of coverage in Volumes of the Encyclopedia, which may go some way towards answering questions that may arise about the works chosen for summation in the present Volume. According to a policy that was announced in the very first edition of Volume One, the Bibliography is "intended to provide an account of works of Indian philosophical literature which are (1) of philosophical interest throughout; (2) theoretical rather than purely practical in their intended function, and (3) polemical or at least expository in a context where defence of one view among alternatives is appropriate." Readers of previous Volumes will appreciate that out of respect for those whose personal preference is for a given philosophical system I have refrained from using these strictures to preclude the appearance of favorite works which may not hew precisely to these three requirements. Some beloved works, for example, consist essentially of advice to the aspirant for liberation. To use the the three requirements listed above to exclude such favored texts would have unduly offended those readers and made the Volume somewhat less useful to them. It seems thus wisest to exercise the policy stated above in a relaxed manner, enabling inclusion of borderline cases favored by the system's followers.

One or two words recapitulating my policies on a couple of matters. Standardization of translations of technical terms, which we have followed in this and previous Volumes, may cause the style of exposition to appear cramped and

otherwise difficult to read; even possibly misleading renditions may occur in a few cases. The problem comes about as a result of the tension between two aims I have tried to follow, one to provide an accurate (although not always standard) rendition of the term where it occurs, and the other to use the same translation of the Sanskrit term throughout if this is at all possible. I apologize for any problems that may have been caused by my intentions in this matter.

In order to make the summaries less prolix I have followed a fairly strict policy in the present Volume (I have been working toward it in previous Volumes). The chosen English rendition of a technical Sanskrit term is given (in Sanskrit, not in Prakrit) at the first occurrence of that term. The Sanskrit term, and its chosen translation (or, in a limited number of cases, alternative translations) appear in the Glossary-Index, which should be used to remind the reader of the Sanskrit term, or range of terms, that is being rendered through the English word provided.

My thanks, once again, to Christine Keyt for her generous help in all sorts of matters having to do with this computer age, and for her assistance in making it possible to keep the Bibliography up to date and available through the Internet (at http://faculty.washington.edu/kpotter). Readers wishing to keep up with the literature on their favorite philosopher, school or topic are invited to avail themselves of this information.

Karl H. Potter
February 18, 2004

ABBREVIATIONS

BCE = before common era
CE = common era
E = pages of the edition chosen for the present work
GOS = Gaekwad's Oriental Series
h = *hetu* (the term)
Kapadia 1947 = H. R. Kapadia, Introduction to GOS 105 (Baroda 1947)
no. = number
op. cit. = previously cited
p = *pakṣa*
s = *sādhya*
sp = *sapakṣa*
T = pages of the translation chosen for the present work
vp = *vipakṣa*

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

By Jayendra Soni

What is Jainism? Jainism is a word derived from "Jaina" or "Jain", which in turn is derived from the Sanskrit word *jina*, literally meaning "conqueror". In the Jaina tradition a *jina* is a unique human being who, through severe ascetic discipline, has conquered, overcome or broken the bonds of the passions which bind one to worldly life and values, and who teaches the basic doctrine of nonviolence. A *jaina* or Jain is one who follows this and other teachings of a *jina*, and for the ascetics, being a Jain means one who strives to lead a lifestyle on the model of a *jina*. Since the life and teachings of a *jina* serve as a bridge or ford (*tīrtha*) to cross over beyond the stream of worldly existences, a *jina* is also called a maker of such a ford, a *tīrthaṅkara*. The Prakrit term *niggaṇtha* (*nirgrantha* in Sanskrit), literally "free from bonds," was originally used to designate such a person and the ascetics of the tradition.

Jainism as it has survived to this day is traced back to the life and teachings of the *jina* Mahāvīra (literally, the "Great Hero"), whose given name was Vardhamāna. However, in the Jain tradition Mahāvīra is not the only *jina* and his position and significance has to be seen in the light of the Jain conception of time. Time is seen as a wheel which beginninglessly and endlessly rotates of its own accord. The wheel of time has twelve spokes which represent the different eras of time on a cosmological scale, each era being made up of thousands of years. The twelve eras are divided into two equal half-periods of the downward motion (*apasarpiṇī*) and the upward motion (*utsarpiṇī*) of the wheel of time, with six eras in each. According to the tradition twenty-four *jina*s are born as human beings in each half period of cosmological time, in the third and fourth eras of each. In the present downward motion of the time-wheel Vṛṣabha was the first and Mahāvīra, who was a contemporary of Gautama Buddha, the last *jina*. Scholars ascribe undoubted historicity to Mahāvīra and his predecessor Pārśva, the twenty-third *jina*, who lived

about 250 years earlier. It is in this sense that Mahāvīra is not the founder of Jainism, but rather a reformer who based his life and teachings on those of his predecessor (e.g., adding one more "great vow" to Pārśva's four for the ascetics). Unlike the Buddhist view that the Buddha set in motion the law of beings and things with his first sermon as recorded in the famous *Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra*, the Jains believe that the law of beings and things is eternal and has always been so, with Mahāvīra resuscitating the basic doctrines of the tradition.

A moot question is: In what sense can persons like Mahāvīra (or the Buddha or the Upaniṣadic thinkers) be regarded as philosophers? Nothing of what Mahāvīra taught (as with the Buddha too) is available in his original words, his life and teachings being redacted finally by others into a canon several centuries after his death. Even Mahāvīra's dates are a matter of debate, although there is clear evidence that Mahāvīra was the Buddha's contemporary, some time between the sixth and fourth centuries B.C.E. Mahāvīra can be regarded as a philosopher in the sense that his life, teachings, ideas and concepts moulded the philosophical activity of the thinkers in the tradition since then. Mahāvīra serves as a model not only for achieving the goal of enlightenment which he himself realized, the goal of *nirvāṇa* or *mokṣa* which is common to Buddhism and Hinduism as well, but also as a model for insightful thinking about human nature, life and the world.

Everything that comes under the rubric of Jainism encompasses a vast area, because through the influence of Mahāvīra and his teachings the Jains have made major contributions in all fields of learning ranging from philosophy to literature, from rules governing religious thought and practice to temple architecture. Jainism is an indigenous, inalienable and well-represented part of Indian thought, of Indian art and literature, in short of Indian culture. This point is significant to note because, especially as far as the contribution of Jain philosophy is concerned, independent studies of specific themes are relatively few compared to what

has been done in Hinduism and Buddhism. Whereas it is impossible to deal with Jain philosophy in a vacuum and to fully comprehend its significance without recourse to corresponding developments in Buddhism and Hinduism, the reverse is no less true. Several intricate philosophical problems remain obscure without an adequate understanding of Jain philosophy, e.g., the innumerable references to *anekāntavāda*, the famous doctrine of manifoldness, which is a small, albeit basic, part of Jain thought. One is led to ignore the fact that Jain philosophy has made other contributions apart from the *syād-* and *naya-vāda* aspects of *anekāntavāda*, e.g., insightful deliberations concerning *dravya, guṇa* and *paryāya* (substance, quality and mode). This volume on Jainism will make it evident that throughout its history Jain thinkers have kept pace with equal developments in Buddhism and Hinduism.

Ontology and Metaphysics

Implicitly or explicitly, Jain thinkers trace back the inspiration for the source of their philosophical ideas ultimately to the essence of Mahāvīra's teachings, and the earliest source for Mahāvīra's ideas are the canonical works of the tradition, from which the thinkers drew. This is not the place to discuss the complex issue of the Jain canon. Suffice it to say that both the major groups of Jains, the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, have groups of texts which they regarded as sacred because they contain Mahāvīra's basic teachings. These canonical works make laborious reading especially because of their repetitive nature (obviously based on an oral tradition); whatever is philosophically relevant in them has to be extracted out of a huge volume of material on a wide range of topics, such as the conduct of the monks and nuns and general rules for ascetics. In other words, Mahāvīra's teachings are scattered all over the canon in an unsystematic manner.

Whereas a systematic study of the philosophical

elements in the works of the Jain canon is undoubtedly a fruitful undertaking, such a study will be a restricted endeavor insofar as one will be hard-pressed to link it to later philosophical activity. A case in point is *anekāntavāda*. This famous doctrine of manifoldness, often erroneously taken as a synonym for Jain philosophy as a whole, is based on Mahāvīra's method of seeing the truths concerning all objects of inquiry from particular standpoints or perspectives. Later thinkers developed this basic idea into an elaborated systematic theory in such a way that the link to the canonical works either becomes lost or is blurred. The case is similar to taking the works of Bādarāyaṇa for Vedānta or Jaimini for Mīmāṃsā as a source, instead of directly dealing with the Vedic texts for the development of the philosophy in the respective traditions. The question then is: are there comparable works in the Jaina tradition?

The first attempt to present Jain philosophy in the form of the classical Sanskrit *sūtras* of the other schools of Indian philosophy was done by Umāsvāti (also called Umāsvāmi) in his so-called pro-canonical work *Tattvārthasūtra* (also called *Tattvārthādhigamasūtra*). Indeed, there have been early successful attempts to deal with Jain philosophy in a similar manner in the Prakrit language as well, for example, by Kundakunda and Siddhasena Divākara. There is no conclusive dating of these pioneer thinkers in the Jain tradition, the last of whom belonged to the fifth or sixth century CE. Summaries of their works are dealt with below in this volume; hence it is not necessary here to deal with Jain ontology and metaphysics in detail in this Introduction. Rather, an attempt is being made here, with reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, to deal with a basic problem related to these aspects of philosophy, namely, with the terms *tattva* and *padārtha* which are used for both the basic ontological and the metaphysical categories. The first question is whether there are seven (Umāsvāti) or nine (Kundakunda) such categories.[1]

Seven or Nine Basic Categories?

In the enumeration of the seven (*sapta-*) *tattva* and the nine (*nava-*) *padārtha* in Jainism it is clear that *tattva* and *padārtha* are both used to refer to the fundamental categories which constitute Jain ontology and metaphysics. These terms feature prominently in Indian philosophical texts from very early times. The word *tattva* is derived from the neuter pronominal *tat* with the suffix *-tva*, which may be added to any noun base. The neuter abstract substantive *tattva* thus formed bears the dictionary meanings of "true or real state, truth, reality, a true principle", including "that-ness and such-ness".[2] The term *padārtha* literally means "the meaning (*artha*) of a word (*pada*)," or "that which corresponds to the meaning of a word", and, therefore, "a thing or material object". It is from these meanings that the term is also used to denote a category and hence one can speak of a contextual relation between *tattva* and *padārtha*.

Reality is stated to be constituted of seven categories by Umāsvāti in *Tattvārthasūtra* I.4 (this is the version that is mostly quoted in works on Jainism): *jīvājīvāsrava-bandha-saṃvara-nirjarā-mokṣās tattvam*. In his *Pañcāstikāya* 108 Kundakunda enumerates the following nine *padārthas* (the passage is in Prakrit; we give here Amṛtacandra's Sanskrit translation): *jīvājīvau bhāvau puṇyaṃ pāpaṃ cāsravas tayoḥ saṃvara-nirjara-bandhā mokṣaś ca bhavabhāvanti te arthāḥ*. The word *arthāḥ* is to be understood as *padārthāḥ*, as is clear from Amṛtacandra's commentary when he says, after repeating each term in his commentary, that these are the names of the nine *padārthas* (*...iti navapadārthānāṃ nāmāni*). This sequence of the terms is repeated in Kundakunda's *Samayasāra* 13, and the subsequent chapters there dealing with each category corresponds exactly to this sequence.[3]

Apart from the two additional categories supplied by Kundakunda, his sequence is different from that of Umāsvāti's, with the category *bandha* appearing before the last and *puṇya*

and *pāpa* inserted after the two ontological categories of *jīva* and *ajīva*. In his commentary to the *Tattvārthasūtras*, the *Sarvārthasiddhi*, Pūjyapāda is aware of the difference between the seven and nine categories. It is useful to see what he says in the relevant section of his commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* I.4.[4]

"...All fruits are experienced by the soul. So the soul (*jīva*) is mentioned first in the *sūtra*. The non-soul (*ajīva*) is mentioned next as it is of use to the soul. Influx (*āsrava*) is included next as it concerns both the soul and the non-soul. Bondage (*bandha*) is added next, as it follows influx. As there is no bondage for one who practises stoppage, stoppage (*saṃvara*) is mentioned after bondage in order to indicate that it is the opposite. Dissociation proceeds after stoppage, and hence it (*nirjarā*) is mentioned after stoppage. As liberation is attained at the end, it (*mokṣa*) is mentioned last."

"Here merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*) must be included, as others have spoken of nine categories. No, it is not necessary to include these, as these are implied in influx and bondage. If it were so, the mention of influx, etc. is unnecessary, as these are included in soul and non-soul. No, it is not unnecessary. Here liberation is the main theme of the work. So it must be mentioned. And that (liberation) is preceded by the cycle of births and deaths. Influx and bondage are the main causes of transmigration. Stoppage and gradual dissociation are the chief causes of liberation. Hence these are mentioned severally in order to indicate the chief causes and effects. It is well-known that the particulars implied in the general are mentioned separately according to needs. For instance, '*Kṣatriyas* have come, Suvarṇa (a *kṣatriya*) also (has come)'."

If Umāsvāti's and Kundakunda's dates could be determined precisely it would shed a great deal of light as far as the development of the ideas here are concerned. Under the circumstances one can only note the two different traditions. However, one more point may be discussed in the context

here. Pūjyapāda, who was quoted above, belonged to the Digambara tradition of Jainism, as did Kundakunda as well (Umāsvāti is regarded by both Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras as being one of their own). It is obvious that Pūjyapāda knew Kundakunda's works and, as is clear from the quotation above, he was aware of the tradition of the nine categories of reality. True, he was commenting on the *Tattvārthasūtra* and he had to use the text as handed down by the tradition. What is puzzling, however, is that he did not defend his tradition when he had the opportunity to justify Kundakunda's enumeration in his commentary. Why does he not go into further details regarding the sequence of the categories? Rather, he sees the inclusion of *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the list as "unnecessary". Indeed, such speculation does not change the matter, but any detailed occupation with the texts automatically raises these issues.

To conclude this section, it may be said that Umāsvāti's enumeration seems more "logical" if one takes into account the role of karma as soon as the *jīva*, the soul, becomes associated with *ajīva*. The association is responsible for an inflow of matter which then, in the form of karma, binds the soul. The inflow of karma can be stopped and, further, all karmas can be completely obliterated gradually, which means that the soul attains liberation. However, without explicitly mentioning *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the *sūtra* itself Umāsvāti leaves little room for the ethical role of these categories in the context of the ascetic discipline. To explicitly mention them, as Kundakunda does, would highlight their role for the aim of liberation, a role that is in any case accepted *a priori*.

Perhaps the reason why Umāsvāti does not mention *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the *sūtra* itself is because karma is not explicitly mentioned, it being implicit in *āsrava*, the inflow of karma. But then these would be implicit in Kundakunda's work as well, which also does not mention karma explicitly, but includes *puṇya* and *pāpa* in the list of the basic categories. So the question, which we can hardly answer but nonetheless

pose, would be why he does so. As for Kundakunda's sequence in which *bandha* appears at the end before *mokṣa*, it may be said that this is deliberate in order to highlight the soul's liberation from the bondage of karma. In other words, *mokṣa*, the goal, comes after the *bandha* that exists before it.

Epistemology

The Jain contribution to philosophy in general, and to epistemology in particular, is often underestimated, if not completely ignored. Jain thinkers also drew from a common pool of ideas (like the assumption of suffering as a characteristic feature of human existence, knowledge of reality as crucial for liberation and the possibility of liberation), and they couched these ideas in accordance with their own ontology, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. In each of these branches of philosophy the Jains have made significant contributions to the history and development of Indian philosophy as a whole. Here an attempt is made to show that Jain epistemology not only has its own history and differences that go with it in certain respects depending on the thinker concerned, but also to demonstrate that the Jains did not lag behind in keeping up with the mainstream concerns in Indian philosophy.[5]

The presentation of basic Jain epistemology here is based on selected aspects of the problem in the original words of a selected number of thinkers: Kundakunda, quoting from his *Pravacanasāra*, Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*, and Māṇikyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha*. They are chosen for their systematic clarity and because they are early thinkers who are generally regarded as authoritative by the Jain tradition. Other thinkers like Siddhasena Divākara (fifth century), Akalaṅka (eighth century) and Vidyānandin (ninth century) have also made significant contributions but their views will be referred to only in passing--to enter into a critique of the interesting details of difference and to make comparisons would go far

beyond the scope of what can be done here.

A few words regarding the beginnings of Indian epistemology on the whole may not be out of place in order to show that the Jain tradition was not isolated in the Indian tradition and that its views did not evolve in a vacuum.

On the beginnings of Indian epistemology

The desire for knowledge which basically reflects a philosophical inclination is traceable in the *Ṛgveda* in a general way in what sounds like inquisitive questions, for example, about the origin of existence and about what can be known. Indeed, they reflect the beginnings of constant questioning and the desire to know the answers, an attitude which makes the ground fertile and prepares the field for further philosophical thought and activity. Suffice it for the point made here to refer to the famous hymn of *Ṛgveda* X, 129. Even though doubts have been raised about the authenticity of certain philosophical ideas in this work, the interpolations are certainly "very early" and depict an intrinsically philosophical attitude even in the earliest records of Indian thought.

By the time of the composition of the *Upaniṣads* the questions became more direct and systematic in the sense that, for instance, they show a specific desire for an understanding of the nature of the self (*ātman*). Moreover, especially in the *Upaniṣads* after the sixth century BCE and in the *sūtra* literature from the period shortly before the beginning of our common era, the direct or indirect mention of different views becomes usual. Particularly in the commentaries on the *sūtra*-works the explicit mention of Buddhist and Jaina views becomes standard, signifying an interesting and lively debate among the different schools of thought. The history of Indian philosophy goes hand in hand with the emergence and history of such a debate among all the representatives of different schools of thought and, with it, the necessity of dealing with

epistemological categories. The contribution of Jainism here is perhaps also uniquely based on the Jains' attitude of collecting and copying all kinds of literature for the sake of knowing the other views.[6]

The emergence of philosophical debate in India, not only in the commentarial literature to the basic works of each school, but also in the form of organized public contests, contributed greatly to a sharpening of the philosophical tools and to setting down rules of debate which had to be strictly adhered to in the courts, where the debates mostly took place. That epistemology has been a favorite topic from very early times is evident from a work on Indian medicine (perhaps in the first century of our era, but the ideas were surely in vogue even earlier) compiled by Caraka in his *Carakasaṃhitā*. The author (in *Carakasaṃhitā* 3, 8) advises medical practitioners to debate with others because discussion increases the zeal for knowledge, clarifies knowledge, increases the power of speech, makes one famous, removes doubt and establishes the truths already learned. Moreover, one can learn new things in a discussion, especially when, carried away with the zeal of the discussion, the other person discloses information which would otherwise be kept secret. In this very early period in the history of Indian debate it was also recognized that a discussion, which forms the basis of a debate, can be of different kinds, and Caraka distinguishes two kinds, one that is "friendly" and one that is "hostile".[7] In view of their extreme emphasis on nonviolence the Jains were probably exemplary debaters well-acquainted with their subject matter.

Caraka's list contains forty-four items which the physician should have a command over before accepting an invitation to enter into a debate. A cursory glance at a few terms out of this list would suffice for the point made here about the imporance of epistemological terms:[8] (1) dispute (*vāda*), (2) substance (*dravya*), (3) quality (*guṇa*), (4) movement (*karman*), (5) generality (*sāmānya*), (6) particularity (*viśeṣa*), (7) inherence (*samavāya*), (8) thesis

(*pratijñā*), (9) statement of the proof for the thesis put forward (*sthāpanā*), (10) the opposite statement of the opponent (*pratiṣṭhāpanā*), (11) reason (*hetu*), (12) application (*upanaya*), (13) conclusion (*nigamana*), (14) rejoinder (*uttara*), (15) example (*dṛṣṭānta*), (16) tenet (*siddhānta*), (17) communication (*śabda*), (18) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (19) inference (*anumāna*), (20) tradition (*aitihya*), (21) comparison (*aupamya*), (22) doubt (*saṃśaya*), (23) the purpose one follows (*prayojana*), (24) going astray (*savyabhicāra*), (25) inquiry or desire to know (*jijñāsā*), (26) ascertainment (*vyavasāya*), (28) the origin as a means to infer the beginning (*sambhava*), (29) the questionable (*anuyojya*), (30) the unquestionable (*ananuyojya*), (31) the question (*anuyoga*), (32) the counter-question (*pratyanuyoga*), (33) defect of speech (*vākyadoṣa*), (34) excellence of speech (*vākyapraśaṃsā*), (35) quibble (*chala*), (36) fallacy (*ahetu*), (37) lapse of the right time (*atītakāla*), (38) objection (*upālambha*), (39) rejection of the objection (*parihāra*), (40) abandonment of the thesis (*pratijñāhāni*), (41) admission of the opposite thesis (*abhyanujñā*),[9] (42) incorrect reason (*hetvantara*), (43) missing the point (*arthāntara*), and (44) reasons for defeat (*nigrahasthāna*).

The list becomes more compact later and especially when the Nyāya school, whose favorite topic was epistemology, includes them as a starting point for all the themes it deals with in its basic work. Sixteen terms are listed at the beginning of the *Nyāyasūtra* which are interesting to note here in order to show their relation with the emergence of philosopical debate in India, and for their special emphasis on epistemological issues: (1) the instruments of true cognition (*pramāṇa*), (2) the objects of true cognition (*prameya*), (3) doubt (*saṃśaya*), (4) purpose (*prayojana*), (5) example (*dṛṣṭānta*), (6) tenet (*siddhānta*), (7) members of the argument (*avayava*), (8) deliberation (*tarka*), (9) conclusion (*nirṇaya*), (10) disputation (*vāda*), (11) debate (*jalpa*), (12) wrangling (*vitaṇḍā*), (13) fallacious reasons (*hetvābhāsa*),

(15) false objections (*jāti*) and (16) reasons for defeat (*nigrahasthāna*).

Each school accepted a fixed number of instruments or means of true cognition, each of which yields a particular kind of correct awareness, and for the major schools of Indian philosophy the number ranges from one to six. So, for example, the materialist accepts only perception as the most important and reliable instrument of knowledge, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika school accept inference as well, the Sāṃkhya school accepts verbal testimony or scriptural authority in addition to perception and inference, etc. There are certain implicit conditions on the basis of which the number of means of cognition were accepted by each school. At least four conditions need to be fulfilled: (a) the awareness which one cognitive instrument furnishes must be *new* and not attainable by any other means; (b) one means of cognition may aid another in making a particular awareness possible but the means of cognition in question should *not be reducible to another*--so, e.g., when perception aids inference, as in inferring fire by seeing the smoke in the distance, the understading gained cannot be reduced to that obtained by perception alone; (c) the cognition obtained through one particular instrument of true cognition should not be contradicted by another instrument; (d) the accepted cognitive instrument should *appeal to reason* and, in the case of verbal testimony or scriptural authority, for example, one's understanding of the revealed truth must appear *probable* and be made intelligible in terms of human experience; otherwise such a means of cognition will fail in its purpose.[10]

Jain thinkers did not lag behind in their concern with epistemological issues, and the relevant literature from the beginning of our era evinces this. What their basic epistemology is, will be seen with special reference to Kundakunda, Umāsvāti and Māṇikyanandin.

Jaina epistemology

The Jain tradition rests on one fundamental fact that is epistemologically significant, namely, that human beings are in a position to be omniscient and that this view is based on the teaching of omniscient beings who have taught their basic ideas after having become enlightened through a strict ascetic discipline. Their teachings are regarded as reliable and authoritative and every basic idea concerning ontology, epistemology and ethics is traced back to a tradition started by such authoritative beings.[11]

It must be noted that epistemological issues are in fact inalienably connected with the metaphysics and ontology of a particular school. What is the intrinsic nature of the things of the world which are open to human knowledge? How can one define the subject, the knower? What is the nature of cognitive instruments like sight and hearing? All these questions are basic to the concern with epistemology. It is also a well-known fact that, apart from the materialists, the Cārvākas, the teaching of each school is aimed at liberation (*mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*) and each has its own view of the world, an account of which forms part of the discipline which leads to the goal. Jainism made its own unique contribution to this mainstream development by also occupying itself with the basic issues concerning the nature of knowledge, how knowledge is derived and in what way knowledge can be said to be reliable. For the Jains as well the concern with epistemological issues also served two main functions: it provided the basis for an intelligible discourse on matters of common, everyday experience and, secondly, even if indirectly, it demarcated this area from what constitutes knowledge of ultimate reality.

Explaining how errors occur in human cognition was included in the epistemological theories and it is not often noticed that epistemology dealt with theories of error as well as of truth. Indeed, the success of a theory of valid cognition is commensurate with the success with which error in our

cognition is also explained. In other words, granted that we can err in our cognition, a theory of cognition should also be able to explain the source of this occurrence, or at least be in a position to account for it. This point is implicit when at the very beginning of his *Parīkṣāmukha,* Māṇikyanandin says "the proper ascertainment of an object arises out of a valid cognitive instrument (*pramāṇa*), the contrary of this happens when it is erroneous" (*Parīkṣāmukha* 1).[12] In his *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* I. 1. 7 Hemacandra says that error "is a cognition which definitely takes a thing to be what it is not."

One superficial relation between Jain ontology and Jain epistemology is that just as there are only two fundamental ontological categories, the principles of sentience and nonsentience (*jīva* and *ajīva*), there are only two basic instruments through which we can know thngs, in a direct way (*pratyakṣa*) and in an indirect way (*parokṣa*). For the Jains the principle of sentience intrinsically possesses unlimited qualities of bliss and energy and, without the detrimental influence of matter, is omniscient. The association of the soul with the insentient principles hinders its capabilities and therefore human beings possess limited knowledge. Unique to Jainism is that direct knowledge in fact takes place through the soul.[13]

On the basis of the twofold classification of a direct and an indirect means of knowledge, an intricate theory concerning the fundamental principles or categories (*tattva*, supplied below) is built up. The first systematic presentation of it in the classical *sūtra*-style was given by Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* I, 6-31 and his presentation is regarded as authoritative by all Jains. Kundakunda's views expressed in the Prakrit language are also looked upon with great respect for his pioneering attempts.

The sentient principle is responsible for the fact that cognition takes place at all and hence for the Jains knowledge takes place in the soul; when the soul is freed or isolated from the influence of matter it has *kevalajñāna* (omniscient

knowledge, which beings like the Jinas have attained). In the case of the concern with epistemology in the context of human cognition it is necessary in Jainism to clearly understand the context in which the following terms are used: *jñāna, pramāṇa* and *naya*. Further, the theory of manifoldness (with its two fold aspects of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*) also has to be seen in an epistemological context because it is concerned with cognizing things. The theory of manifoldness, however, applies in a different context: it is concerned with particular standpoints (*naya*), like the common, the general, or the practical standpoint from which an object may be perceived, and the seven kinds of statements or predications that may be made about an object, where it is said that depending on the perspective (*syāt*) an object can be said to exist, not to exist, etc. What the theory of manifoldness does not do is discuss the instruments of true cognition in the Jain tradition.

The word *jñāna,* which is regularly translated as "knowledge", is used in Jainism in the context of absolute knowledge which can be had only by beings liberated from the detrimental effects of matter in the form of karma clinging to the soul. In other contexts the word *jñāna* is used to mean any cognition. We shall reserve the word "knowledge" for absolute knowledge in order to avoid confusion. Knowledge, as we shall use the term, is by definition true. A cognition (*jñāna*) that is true is termed a *pramā*; a cognition that is not true is an *apramā*.[1] An epistemological theory (*prāmāṇyavāda*) deals with all these three aspects--absolute knowledge, true and false cognitions. The Jains say that there are two general kinds of instruments of true cognition, three direct (one of these

[1](Editor's note:) It is in keeping with these points that we have chosen, in the summaries that follow, to render the term *pramāṇa,* standardly translated as "instrument of knowledge", as "instrument of true cognition" when speaking of Jain beliefs. Where the context is the views of those professing a different philosophical school we have retained the usual translation.

being absolute knowledge) and two indirect ones. The objects cognized (*prameya*) are the seven basic categories of Jaina metaphysics. Both cognition and knowledge take place in the soul.

It seems that Kundakunda is the first independent thinker of the post-canonical period who dealt with epistemological issues. In this context his *Pravacanasāra*: ('Essence of the Scripture') is an insightful work, regarded as one of his philosophical masterpieces. The three sections of the work clearly show the issues he deals with: cognition, the objects of cognition, and conduct. It is interesting to see how he deals with some aspects of epistemology which have become part of the tradition, so that it can also be evident how the problem was thematised differently in the later period.[14] Here are selected passages from that work that appear to deal with knowledge:

"He who has manifested pure consciousness and is free from...karmic dust, has become self-sufficient; and fully comprehends the objects of cognition." (1, 15)

"The soul is co-extensive with knowledge; knowledge is said to be co-extensive with the object of knowledge; the object of knowledge comprises the physical and non-physical world; therefore knowledge is omnipresent." (1, 23).

"The knower who is beyond sense-perception, necessarily knows and sees the world neither entering into nor entered into by the object of knowledge, just as the eye sees the objects of sight." (1, 29).

"He who knows is knowledge; the self does not become a knower with knowledge (as an extraneous instrument). The very self develops knowledge, and all the objects stand (reflected) in the knowledge." (1, 35).

"Perception of things through a foreign agency is called *parokṣa*, indirect or mediate; whatever is perceived by the soul alone is *pratyakṣa*, direct or immediate" (1, 58).

"The object of knowledge is made up of substances, which are said to be characterised by qualities, and with

which, moreover, are (associated) the modifications; those who are deluded by modifications, are false believers" (2, 1).[15]

"That is called a substance which is endowed with qualities and accompanied by modifications and which is coupled with origination, destruction and permanence without leaving its nature" (2, 3).

"According to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise" (2, 23).

This random selection of the basic aspects of the problem in Kundakunda's own words has been supplied so as to demonstrate how the treatment of the theme is different for Umāsvāti. One of the basic differences is that Umāsvāti explicitly enumerates the different instruments of true cognition that are grouped under the rubrics of the direct and the indirect.

In *Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 6 Umāsvāti says that true cognition can be obtained through *pramāṇa* and *naya*, and goes on to say (in 1, 9-12) that it is obtained through the five kinds of *pramāṇa* and that of these the first two, the sensory and scriptural, are indirect cognitive instruments, and the rest, clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience are direct cognitive instruments. This list is not only much more differentiated and explicit than Kundakunda's, but it also presents the characteristically Jain view since then. Sensory awareness is defined as being indirect, whereas all other schools regard it as the only direct means of cognition; what the Jains regard as direct cognitive instruments do not at all feature as such in the other schools.[16]

In elaborating the Jain view Umāsvāti continues to say that synonyms for sensory awareness are remembrance, recognition, 'induction' and 'deduction', all of which are caused by the senses and the mind (*Tattvārthasūtra* 1, 13-14). Scriptural knowledge, which is based on sensory cognition, is of two, several or twelve kinds (20), depending on which scriptural texts are regarded as authoritative. The range of

sensory and scriptural cognition extends to all the six substances (souls and the five insentient substances), but not in all their modes (20). Divine and infernal beings possess clairvoyance; if the karma which hinders this kind of cognition is obliterated, or if its influence is neutralised, then animals and human beings too can have it (21-22), and through it all entities that have form can be known (27). Telepathy is of two kinds, distinguished on the basis of purity and infallibility (23-24), and its range is infinitely greater than that of clairvoyance (28). The scope of omniscience, on the other hand, extends to all substances in all their modes simultaneously (29). Sensory cognition, scriptural cognition and clairvoyance are explicitly referred to as means of cognition which can also be erroneous (31).

Māṇikyanandin begins his treatment of epistemology in his *Parīkṣāmukha* by saying that "*pramāṇa* is valid knowledge of itself and of things not proved before" (1, 1),[17] going on to say that the validity of *pramāṇa* "rises from itself or through another (*pramāṇa*)" (1, 13). After referring to the basic kinds of cognition as direct and indirect in keeping with the tradition (2, 2) he says that direct cognition is awareness "which is clear" (2, 3), with clearness meaning an "illumination without any other intermediate knowledge or illumination in details" (2, 4). Direct cognition is then divided into two kinds: one that is current in everyday life and which is partially clear (2, 5), and the other which is "supreme", not dependent on any sense organ, and is devoid of any kind of obstruction (2, 11). The indirect means of cognition consists of memory, recognition, logic, inference and scriptural testimony (3, 2). These are then defined and the final three chapters of the work deal respectively with universals and particulars, the results of inference and, finally, the fallacies of inference.

One of the notable differences regarding the specific instruments of true cognition that are direct is given by Akalaṃka when dealing with sensory perception. It was seen above that for Umāsvāti direct perception, which takes place

in the soul, occurs through clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience and that sensory knowledge and scriptural knowledge are indirect. According to Akalaṅka's classification direct knowledge is basically of the two kinds which Māṇikyanandin takes over from him, namely, direct knowledge which takes place through the senses and cognition which takes place through memory, which is regarded as synonyous with remembrance, recognition, 'induction' and 'deduction'. In another classification Akalaṅka identifies memory together with sensory perception as one kind of direct knowledge, and distinguishes it from other kinds of direct knowledge not derived through the senses, namely clairvoyance, telepathy and omniscience. The differences are not merely a matter of classification. In view of the high regard and impact his views have in the Jain tradition (inspiring masters such as Vidyānandin and Māṇikyanandin) a detailed study and further research of Akalaṅka's works is still needed to assess their epistemological implications in the context of the Jaina view as a whole.[18]

The relation between epistemology and logic needs special mention here. These two areas are closely linked in the Indian tradition because logic in India primarily involved an investigation into the validity of inference which, in turn, is regarded as an instrument of true cognition. The occupation with abstract, logical ideas related to inference was a favorite topic of the Nyāya school and Jain thinkers adopted its language and method, using natural language, not symbols, to present their abstract ideas.[19]

It was said above that the Jain theory of manifoldness also serves an epistemological function insofar as it concerns cognition of things. The theory has come down to us in the two related aspects of *nayavāda* and *syādvāda*. Here an attempt is being made to deal with an issue related especially to the latter, again by comparing references to it in Kundakunda and Umāsvāti (who refers to it indirectly, as will be seen below).[20]

Kundakunda on *syādvāda*

Three works by Kundakunda are especially praised as philosophical masterpieces: *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, *Pravacanasāra*, and *Samayasāra*. These works are all in Prakrit and they contain not only one of the earliest interpretations of *syādvāda* but also give one a good impression of how the Prakrit language was used to express philosophical ideas. For his ideas related to *anekāntavāda* reference will be made only to Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra* and *Pañcāstikāyasāra*.

In his *Pravacanasāra* 2. 22-23 Kundakunda says:[21]

davaṭṭhiena savvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭieṇa puno
havadi ya aṇṇam aṇaṇṇaṃ takkāle tammayattādo (22).
(*dravyārthikena sarvaṃ dravyaṃ tat paryāyārthikena punaḥ*
bhavati cānyad anyat tatkāle tanmayatvāt (p. 144).

"All substances are nondifferent from the substantial viewpoint, but again they are different from the modificational viewpoint, because of the individual modification pervading a substance for the time being" (p. 394).

atthi tti ya ṇatthi ya havadi avattavvam idi puṇo davvaṃ
pajjāyeṇa du keṇa vi tak ubhayam ādiṭṭham aṇṇaṃ vā (23).
(*astīti ca nāstīti ca bhavaty avaktavyam iti punar dravyam*
paryāyeṇa tu kenāpi tad ubhayam ādiṣṭam anyad vā (p. 146).

"According to some modification or the other it is stated that a substance exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise" (p. 394).

The last point is repeated in Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra* 14:

> *siya atthi ṇatti uhayaṃ avattavvaṃ puṇo ya tattidayaṃ*
> *davvaṃ khu sattabhangāgaṃ ādesavaseṇa saṃbhavadi*
> (14).
> (*syād asti nāsty ubhayam avaktavyaṃ punaś ca tattritayam*
> *drayaṃ khalu saptabhaṅgam ādeśavaśena saṃbhavati*)
> (p. 9).

"According as *dravya* is viewed from different aspects of reasoning it may be described in the following propositions: (1) perhaps it is; (2) perhaps it is not; (3) perhaps it is both (is and is not); (4) perhaps it is indefinable; (5) perhaps it is and is indefinable; (6) perhaps it is not and is indefinable; and (7) perhaps it is and is not and is indefinable" (p. 9).

Although Kundakunda does not use the word *anekāntavāda* two points are noteworthy here: the word *naya* is used with reference to an object depending on the standpoint which emphasizes it as a substance (*dravya*) or a mode (*paryāya*). Secondly, Kundakunda explicitly mentions sevenfold predication (*syādvāda* or *saptabhaṅgī*) in *Pañcāstikāyasāra* 14, and again in 72 of the same text where it is stated that the soul (*jīva*) "is capable of admitting the sevenfold predication" (p. 61), namely, that the soul is capable of grasping the nature of an object in all its aspects at once. On the basis of what Kundakunda says above, it cannot be decided whether *naya* or *syāt* has priority. Hence, it seems they would have to be taken together, as the one being implicit in the other.

Umāsvāti on *syādvāda*

It is noteworthy that although the word *syāt* appears in the canonical literature, and Kundakunda uses it too, it does

not feature in the first Sanskrit work presenting Jain philosophy in the traditional *sūtra* style, namely, Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*. Commentators on the *Tattvārthasūtra* regard *syādvāda* as being "implied"[22] in that text's 5. 32 (31 in the Śvetāmbara version) *arpitānarpitasiddheḥ* ("The contradictory characteristics are established from different points of view",[23] see below under Pūjyapāda). In *Tattvārthasūtra* 1. 33 (34 in the Śvetāmbara version) Umāsvāti mentions only the standpoints (*naya*), not statements, assertions or predications that may be made about an object of investigation, each of which is qualified by the word *syāt*. They are the standpoints which reflect the common or non-distinguished (*naigama*), general or collective (*saṃgraha*), practical (*vyavahāra*), etc., positions from which an object may be ascertained. The word *naya* in the canonical literature also refers to two other contexts, with reference to *vyavahāranaya* and/or *niścayanaya*,[24] or to the two standpoints with reference to *dravya* and *paryāya* mentioned above. In other words, when dealing with the word *naya* one has to distinguish three contexts in which it is used: 1. with reference to *dravya* and *paryāya*; 2. with reference to *vyavahāranaya* and/or *niścayanaya* (the latter being synonyms of the *śuddha-* or *paramārthika-naya*), and 3. with reference to *naya* in the context of *naigama, saṃgraha*, etc.

In order to better understand the difference between Kundakuṇḍa and Umāsvāti on *syādvāda* we have also to take recourse to the commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, because the *sūtra* alone is too brief for any comparison.

Anekāntavāda in two commentaries on the *Tattvārthasūtra*

Pūjyapāda is generally believed to have belonged to the fifth or sixth century and to have been a renowned grammarian.[25] His philosophically celebrated work is the *Sarvārthasiddhi* which, for the Digambaras, is the first commentary on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*. The following are

references to the problem under discussion, taken from S. A. Jain's translation of the work.[26] He translates (on pp. 157-158) Pūjyapāda's commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* 5.32/31 *arpitānarpita-siddheḥ* ("The contradictory characteristics are established) from different points of view" in the following way; here the key word to be noticed is *anekānta*--it has already been stated that *syādvāda* is regarded as being implicit in this *sūtra*, since Umāsvāti does not mention it anywhere in his *Tattvārthasūtra*: "Substances are characterized by an infinite number of attributes (*anekāntātmakasya vastunaḥ*). For the sake of use or need, prominence is given to certain characteristics of a substance from one point of view, and prominence is not given to other characteristics, as these are of no use or need at the time. Thus even the existing attributes are not expressed, as these are of secondary importance (*anarpita*). There is no contradiction in what is established by these two points of view. For instance, there is no contradiction in the same person Devadatta being a father, a son, a nephew and so on. For the points of view are different. From the point of view of his son he is a father, and from the point of view of his father he is a son. Similarly with regard to his other designations. In the same manner, substance is permanent from the point of view of general properties. From the point of view of its specific modes it is not permanent. Hence there is no contradiction. These two, the general and the particular, somehow, are different as well as identical (*kathaṃcid bhedābhedābhyām*). Thus these form the cause of worldly intercourse..."

Although Pūjyapāda uses the word *anekānta* here in the commentary, the sevenfold statements with the word *syāt* are not given as we find them in Kundakunda. Even though it is important that the word is explicitly used, it is puzzling that he does not make any reference to the use of *syāt*. Pūjyapāda belongs to the Digambara tradition and certainly lived after Kundakunda whom all Digambaras revere profoundly. If indeed this *sūtra* of the *Tattvārthasūtra* really "implies"

syādvāda one would have expected Pūjyapāda to have clinched the opportunity to mention the *saptabhaṅgī*, easily taking it over from Kundakunda (as he does in the case of *dravyārthikanaya* and *paryāyārthikanaya*, see fn. 27).

With regard to the word *naya* Pūjyapāda explains it in his commentary to the *Tattvārthasūtra* in two places: in 1. 6 and in 1. 33/34. 1. 6 (p. 9) says: *pramāṇa-nayair adhigamaḥ* "Knowledge (of the seven categories) is attained by means of *pramāṇa* and *naya*." A part of his commentary on this *sūtra* is, in Jain's translation (p. 10): "...it has been said that '*pramāṇa* is a comprehensive view, whereas *naya* is a partial view'. *Naya* is of two kinds, *dravyārthika* and *paryāyārthika*. The former refers to the general attributes of a substance, and the latter to the constantly changing conditions or modes of a substance. *Bhāva nikṣepa* must be ascertained by the standpoint of modes, and the other three by the standpoint of substance.[27] For the latter refers to general characteristics. That which has the substance as its object is the standpoint of substance. That which has the mode as its object is the standpoint of modes. Both the substance and the mode are ascertained by *pramāna* (comprehensive knowledge)."

The other place where Pūjyapāda has to comment on *naya* is at *Tattvārthasūtra* 1. 33. In the Digambara version this closes the first chapter of the *Tattvārthasūtra* and represents 1. 34 of the Śvetāmbara version, with the difference that the Śvetāmbara version has only the first five *nayas*, omitting *samabhirūḍha* and *evaṃbhūta nayas*. The Śvetāmbara version closes the chapter with *sūtra* 35, which, for the full understanding of *nayas* acording to the Śvetāmbaras, has to be read together with 1.34 which merely enumerates the five *nayas*.[28] In the Digambara version Umāsvāti enumerates the seven *nayas* in 1. 33: *naigama, saṃgraha, vyavahāra, ṛjusūtra, śabda, samabhirūḍha, evaṃbhūta*, namely, the standpoints which are generally discussed in Jainism.

On 1.33, where the seven *nayas* are enumerated, Pūjyapāda says (Jain's translation pp. 41ff.): "The general and

specific definitions (*sāmānya-viśeṣa-lakṣaṇaṁ*) of these (seven *nayas*) must be given. First the general definition. Objects possess many characteristics. *Naya* is the device which is capable of determining truly one of the several characteristics of an object (without contradiction) from a particular point of view It is of two kinds, namely statements which refer to general attributes of a substance and those which refer to the constantly changing conditions or modes of a substance. *Dravya* means general or common, a general rule or conformity. That which has these for its object is the general standpoint (*dravyārthika naya*). *Paryāya* means particular, an exception or exclusion. That which has these for its object is the standpoint of modifications (*paryāyārthika naya*). Their specific definitions are given now. The figurative standpoint (*naigama naya*) takes into account the purpose or intention of something which is not accomplished..." The commentary then continues explaining each of the *nayas*, and thereby ends the chapter. From this it seems that Pūjyapāda is the only one who uses the word *anekānta* with a clear hint of the sense in which the term came to be applied as a synonym for the Jaịn approach with its epistemological significance. The word *naya* is used both with reference to *dravya* and *paryāya* and with reference to the seven beginning with *naigama, saṃgraha,* etc.

As is known, the Śvetāmbaras believe that Umāsvāti himself wrote a commentary on his *Tattvārthasūtra* and it is now necessary to see what, if any, reference to *anekānta* there is in Umāsvāti's commentary on the *sūtras* which Pūjyapāda comments on above.[29]

Tattvārthasūtra 5. 32 (*arpitānarpita-siddheḥ*) corresponds to 5. 31 of the Śvetāmbara version for which Sukhlalji gives two interpretive translations: "Each thing is possessed of a number of properties; for as viewed from the standpoint adopted and as viewed from another standpoint it proves to be something self-contradictory" and "Each thing is liable to be a subject matter of usage in various ways; for usage is accounted for on the basis of *arpanā* and *anarpanā*--that is, on the basis

of a consideration of chief or subordinate status depending on the desire of the speaker concerned."[30] The context here is existence (*sat*) which has already been defined as being characterized by origination, destruction (or disappearance) and permanence (5. 30/29: *utpāda-vyaya-dhrauvya-yuktaṃ sat*). In his commentary Umāsvāti begins by saying that there are three kinds of existence as characterized in the *sūtra*, all of which are eternal insofar as they occur continually. Each of these may be established through *arpita* or *anarpita*, which he equates with the practical (*vyavahārika*) and the non-practical (*avyavahārika*).

The commentary continues with an explanation of what existence means on the basis of this classification, in which he mentions, for example, *dravyāstika, utpannāstika* and *paryāyāstika*, existence as a substance, as origination (namely, as a particular object) and as a modification. Although Umāsvāti uses neither the word *naya* nor *anekānta* here, it is clear that that is intended, namely, that the nature of an object or existence as such can be ascertained depending on the standpoint from which one approaches the subject, i.e., on the basis of what is given a primary or secondary significance.

Umāsvāti's commentary on *Tattvārthasūtra* 1.6 is relatively short, in which *pramāṇa* is said to be of two kinds, indirect and direct, and that the *nayas* (7 or 5 for the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras respectively), *naigama*, etc., will be discussed later, i.e., in 1. 33 (34 in the Śvetāmbara version, see above).[31] There is nothing else significant for the context under discussion here. In Umāsvāti's commentary on the *sūtra* mentioned above the word *anekānta* does not appear, although it seems easy to read this into it. Hence, although neither Kundakunda nor Umāsvāti uses the word *anekānta* explicitly, it is evident that the theory is implicit in their ideas.

Differences between Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on *anekāntavāda*

The significant difference between these two thinkers lies in detail. Kundakunda explicitly uses the word *syāt* in the context of the five statements given in *Pravacanasāra* 2. 23 and seven in *Pañcāstikāyasāra* 14 that can be made about an entity. Umāsvāti, on the other hand, does not use the word *syāt*. The word *naya* is used in different contexts by them: Kundakunda uses *naya* with reference only to *dravya* and *paryāya* in the stanzas considered above (and these are also used by Pūjyapāda in his *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattvārthasūtra* 1. 6), whereas Umāsvāti uses it in the context of the well-known *nayas* (*naigama*, etc., 7 or 5). In the context of *pramāṇa* in 1. 6 there is no reference to *dravya* nor to *paryāya* in Umāsvāti's commentary, although it is found in Pūjyapāda's *Sarvārthasiddhi*.

As for the word *anekānta* itself, in the sense in which it can be associated with the theory of manifoldness unique to the Jains, it seems that Pūjyapāda was the first person to explicitly use it so. By the eighth century, however, the theory was undoubtedly already established in this sense, as is evident in Akalaṅka's works.

Ethics

Jain ethics or the moral code of conduct is identical with the religious duties prescribed for the "fourfold community" of Jains encompassing the monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen. Preeminence for the Jain code of conduct is given to the rules for the ascetics, the monks and nuns, with the entire ethics evolving out of it as a pattern of behavior for the laity as well.[32] Throughout the history of Jainism the ascetic way of life has been expected to be emulated by all Jains, on the model depicted in the biographies of the Jinas themselves, especially Mahāvīra. The emphasis on asceticism

was so strong that even the so-called "lesser vows" (*aṇuvrata*) for a pious life as a Jain layperson have their roots in the prescriptions given by Mahāvīra for the "great vows" (*mahāvrata*) of an ascetic.

The five great vows ascribed to Mahāvīra can be seen as a summary of Indian asceticișm as a whole which has been practised in India since ancient times. The first and foremost of these is nonviolence (*ahiṃsā*) which entails total abstinence in thought, word and deed from injury of any kind to all life forms. The rule also includes not causing anyone to commit violence, nor to approve of it in any way. Since the whole of nature is seen as impregnated with life, i.e., inhabited by souls, extreme care has to be exercised not only in the contact with plant and animal life forms but also with those in earth, water, fire and air. The other "great vows" are: to abstain from lying, correlated with which is eschewing violent or harmful speech; not to take what is not given; to lead a life of celibacy; and to renounce attachment to the objects of the world, i.e., to renounce possession of property. How these rules for the ascetic are adapted with necessary changes for the laity will be seen below. A few points regarding the first ethical rule of nonviolence may be appropriate here, since the rule can be seen as the basis for the others as well, and as being ultimately based on Jain metaphysics.

For the rationale behind the first rule of nonviolence it is noteworthy that in one important canonical text the teaching is clearly based on self-reflection and self-experience, and then is projected onto all other living beings: "...exactly as it is not nice to me if I am wounded, struck, threatened, beaten, hurt, hit hard or killed with a stick, a bone, fist, a clod of earth or a potsherd--(yes) even if just a hair of mine is pulled out I feel vividly the injury which causes me suffering and fear of it--so too, know this, all higher beings, all plants, all lower animals, all other living beings if wounded...or killed with a stick..., indeed even if just a hair of theirs is pulled out, feel vividly the injury which causes them suffering and fear of

it. If one has recognized this, then (it is certain that) no higher being, no plant, no lower animal, no other living being may be beaten, commanded, subdued, strained (or) killed. Truly I say: the venerable saints who were, who are and who will be, they all say, they speak, proclaim, explain the following: no lower animal, no plant, no other living being may be beaten, commanded, subdued, strained or killed. This is the pure, constant, eternal teaching proclaimed by those who know, because they understand the world. In this way a monk renounces violence against living beings (untruth, unallowed acquisition, sexual intercourse and) ownership."[33]

The same text also makes it evident that the emphasis on nonviolence is based on or arises out of the actual occurrence of violence in everyday life, even in its subtle forms. In other words, it seems that the very occurrence of violence justifies the attempt to renounce it. It is quite revealing that many of the thirteen kinds of violence enumerated in the text entail aspects of human behavior that can be relevant even today when reflecting on a code of moral action: Violent deeds arise out of: (1) purposeful violent deed, (2) purposeless violent deed, (3) militant violent deed, (4) accidental violent deed, (5) a violent deed through an optical illusion, (6) an act that occurs in untrue speech, (7) in unallowed acquisition, (8) in (a bad) mood, (9) in pride, (10) in doing wrong to friends, (11) in deception, (12) in greed, (13) in prescribed action.[34] Each of these types of violence is then discussed in detail to make evident the seriousness with which the practice of nonviolence is advocated. Even though it may not be explicitly stated in the text itself, the reflections on eschewing violence because one oneself feels pain seem to imply the corollary: you yourself are indeed the creature which you think may be beaten, taken in command, strained, controlled or killed. In other words, violence begets violence and one thereby endangers one's own being.

The moral code of conduct for the laity, as already stated, is based on that for the ascetic. Ascetic life obviously

has priority in terms of what Jainism sees as the ideal of human behavior based on the lives of the Jinas themselves. It is for this reason that the ascetic vows are mirrored in the rules for what the laity should do to exemplify an ethical life. The first rule of nonviolence, together with not making another commit violence nor of approving of it in any way, applies to the laity as well. The layperson is expected to obey this rule as far as possible, in any case to keep in mind the ascetic ideal. Hence a livelihood which involves unnecessary destruction of life, like hunting or an occupation which involves excessive use of fire, should be avoided. The rules of not lying (including avoiding violent or harmful speech) and not stealing apply just as well to the laity as to the ascetics. The vow of celibacy is of course relaxed for lay people, with sexual contact restricted to the married partner. However restraint here is enjoined as a special virtue for the householder. There are several other "lesser vows" for the layperson as a guide to ethical behavior and reference may be made here to only a few more: nonattachment to property and possessions and the aim of leading a simple life; religious giving or donation; eschewing excessive and unnecessary travel; fasting on auspicious days of the Jain calendar.[35]

The history of Jainism evinces a very close symbiosis between the ascetics and the laity. The ascetics do not cook, and rely on the householder for their daily subsistence, and the laity require the ascetics for their religious teaching and advice. The confession of ethical transgressions is a code of conduct which applies to both groups. Special acts of atonement through penance are then prescribed for religious purification.[36] The aim is to reduce or even completely annihilate the karmic effect of an infringement.

It was stated above that the Jain emphasis on nonviolence is based on its metaphysics. The basics of Jain metaphysics have been dealt with above, in which the concept of karma plays a central role for the understanding of the basic categories or fundamental principles. Ethical life is aimed

at attaining freedom from the influence of karma, which obstructs the proper and adequate manifestation of the powers of the soul. Since violence is responsible for the maximum amount of karma that can be accumulated by a soul, and since liberation is possible only when all the karmas are completely destroyed or annihilated, the task is reduced through avoidance of violent deeds. The answer to the question associated with ethics, then, about what should be achieved through a moral code of conduct with nonviolence as its supreme rule, is liberation (*mokṣa*). This goal is echoed right at the beginning of his work by Umāsvāti in his *Tattvārthasūtra* 1.1: "right faith, right knowledge and right conduct (together) constitute the path to liberation." Since the "right conduct" presupposes the supreme rule of nonviolence the often used axiom "nonviolence is the highest religion" serves as a summary of Jaina ethics.

The liberation that can be achieved is not a sudden break from the fetters caused by karma but a gradual process of purifying karma's detrimental influence on the soul. In this "path to liberation" the soul goes through a series of fourteen "quality stages" (*guṇasthāna*), with the possibility of relapse to a lower stage depending on the inner attitude.[37] It is in this context that the reference to proper conduct in thought, word and deed becomes particularly significant.

The extremeness with which nonviolence is expected to be followed by all Jains is balanced and contrasted by the extremeness with which self-control and self-mortification is expected to be carried out for liberation, just as all the Jinas themselves did. In other words, the softness towards others is to be as extreme as the hardness of the discipline on oneself, both being undertaken with a calmness exemplified by the Jinas. Two extremes are implicit here: great care towards other beings and extreme self-abnegation, self-sacrifice and self-denial as an ascetic discipline. The ascetic way of life, even if implemented by householders, is not regarded as an act of violence, despite its extremeness.

The issue of "voluntary or religious death" which is unique to Jainism also comes under the rubric of ethics. Its occurrence has been recorded in inscriptions throughout the history of Jainism and has been practised even in contemporary times. This kind of death, which can be chosen by both ascetics and laity, is a death that literally makes "the physical body and the internal passions emaciated" (*sallekhanā*; Pūjyapāda on *Tattvārthasūtra* V.22), and often serves to accelerate the death process already in progress. Jainism contrasts this death with suicide, which it eschews because passions such as "attachment, aversion, or infatuation" are involved in suicidal death. By virtue of its excellence this passionless death, this "inviting or pursuing death" performed under strict conditions and observation, is regarded as the most effective ascetic practice to rid the soul of the binding passions and to terminate an ethical life.

Jainism (and Buddhism) shows how a religious, virtuous and ethical life is possible without the idea of a creator God to whom one can turn as one ultimately responsible for the human condition. Models for ethical life in Jainism are provided by the biographies of the twenty-four Jinas, the conquerors of the passions, of whom Mahāvīra was the last. Even though the Jinas are worshipped as divine beings, just as Hindus worship their gods, the tradition represents the Jinas as illustrious human beings who, through their extreme asceticism, gained an insight into the nature of reality, on account of which they are regarded as omniscient beings. Their lives serve as a guiding principle and, according to tradition, an emulation of their virtues leads one to the same goal of liberation which they themselves achieved.

THE JAIN CANON

Karl H. Potter

Despite the vast collection of literature concerned with Jainism, understanding of much of its history and literature appears still uncertain and debatable. Under the circumstances, we can only report some of the most recent accounts of the early history of Jainism and its thought, and of the texts which are now taken by all or at least many Jains to constitute its basic texts. What follows in this section is not intended in the least as even a summary introduction to Jainism, but merely represents an understanding of what constitutes the background to the philosophical texts contained in the body of our volume. It depends to a large extent on a recent (at the time of writing) introduction to Jainism, the Second Edition of Paul Dundas' readable *The Jains* (London and New York, 2002) (referred to in the footnotes here as Dundas 2002).

It is standard to take Mahāvīra, the Jina (6th-5th BCE) as the founder of Jainism, but the Jains own understanding is that Mahāvīra is only the last of eighteen *tīrthaṅkaras* (lit. "fordmakers"), the first of which was Ṛṣabha and the most recent was Pārśva. It seems likely that the historical Mahāvīra must have lived contemporaneously with Gautama the Buddha, although along with the Buddha's Mahāvīra's dates are not entirely certain. Also uncertain is where Mahāvīra was born. He is supposed to have had as his given name Vardhamāna, though he is not referred to under that name in the earliest texts.[38]

We eschew trying to reconstruct Mahāvīra's life from the traditions and references in the literature. Indeed, given the orientation of the present Volume toward philosophy all that is really relevant is that, like the Buddha, after a period of thirteen years living the life of an ascetic--during which he is supposed to have met Makkhali Gosāla the Ājīvika, who was also one of the Buddha's early teachers--Mahāvīra achieved enlightenment, termed "complete knowledge" or "omniscience"

(*kevalajñāna*), in a field--location unknown--tilled by a farmer called Sāmāga. He then proceeded to preach and began to gather followers (*gaṇadharas*), who are said to have numbered eleven in all, although there is no reference to them in the earliest literature. The most important of these followers was Indrabhūti Gautama, about whom stories developed that are dear to the heart of Jains through the ages.[39]

Mahāvīra's teachings were not written down, and can perhaps best be gleaned from passages in the oldest of the Jaina scriptures, the *Ācārāṅga* and the *Sūtrakṛtāṅga* (for which see below). Essentially, they are that the world results from ignorance, frustration and pain caused by karma. Actions (*karman*) bring about rebirth. Freedom from karma, and thus from rebirth, can only arise for one who adopts the life of a wandering mendicant and, acquiring the right approach to the world, learns to abstain from worldly actions through overcoming his passions. But these early passages do not try to give a precise account of the relationship between action and rebirth, nor do they provide even an inkling of what we find in later scriptures, a vast cosmography and the development of metaphysical categories and philosophical analysis of them. Rather, they center around the insistence on the practice of compassion toward and noninjury to all living beings.[40]

We have not as yet located the founding figures of Jainism within the subcontinent. There are, of course, voluminous accounts of the lives of the Tīrthaṅkaras and of Mahāvīra in particular. He is traditionally held to have been born in Vaiśālī in what is modern Uttar Pradesh, and Pārśva is held to have made the Nirgrantha religion popular there. Mahāvīra himself is held after his enlightenment to have visited various places in eastern India, especially in Bihar but probably in western Bengal and into Orissa. In any case Jainism clearly spread into Bengal soon after Mahāvīra's lifetime. By 250 B.C.E. Jains are found in the Panjab and Gujarat. Jain inscriptions are found in Mathurā dating from

200 B.C.[41]

Little to no historical evidence is available for the lengthy period between 200 B.C. and 400 A.D., when the earliest of the texts surveyed in our Volume are assumed to date from. Some time during that period, however, there must have occurred the split, that has bulked so large in Jaina history, between the Digambara and Śvetāmbara sects, since the evidence about our earliest texts so clearly poses the problems that distinction raises for us. It is not known when this split occurred, although there are plenty of legends and assumptions bruted about concerning it. Asim Kumar Chatterjee reports that "although the Digambaras claim a hoary antiquity for their religion, no Digambara record earlier than AD 300 has so far been discovered. The earliest Śvetāmbara work that refers to the formal separation of the Digambaras from the original *saṃgha* is the *Āvaśyakaniryukti* (c. AD 200)."[42]

As their names suggest, the most evident contrast between members of the two sects was that while the Śvetāmbaras preferred to wear white (*śveta*) clothing the Digambara's espoused nudity, i.e., were "space" (*dig*)-clad. Further distinctions are sparse but important. Dundas succinctly writes: "Śvetāmbara monks and nuns wear robes (an upper and a lower garment) and they use a bowl into which alms are deposited and from which they eat. They believe that women can attain spiritual deliverance without being reborn in a male body and that the *kevalin*, the fully omniscient being, experiences hunger and needs to take physical nourishment. Fully initiated Digambara monks, on the other hand, wear no clothes at all (this does not apply to Digamabara nuns) and do not use an alms bowl, eating their food from the cupped hands. They reject the authority of the Śvetāmbara scriptures, as well as the possibility of deliverance for women and the omniscient being's need for food."[43]

A third sect, whose incipience is likewise uncertain but appears to have been current in India until as late as the

twelfth century, were the Yāpanīyas, though their importance for the philosophical literature is confined to earlier part of the first millennium. "The Yāpanīyas, inscriptional references to whom start to appear from the early medieval period, occupied an interstitial position between the Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras, with the latter viewing them as heretics. Digambara in outward appearance, the Yāpanīyas seem to have compromised over the wearing of clothes when in contact with their lay supporters. Moreover, they also accepted the authority of the Śvetāmbara scriptures and the only full-length writings on doctrinal matters by a Yāpanīya writer which have survived defend the Śvetāmbara views about deliverance forwomen and the eating of food by the omniscient *kevalin*."[44]

Another important contrast between the Digambaras and Śvetāmbaras concerns their attitudes toward early Jain literature. As Dundas suggests, the usual use of the word "scripture" to refer to that literature needs to be interpreted carefully, and especially in the light of the fact that the Digambaras disavow the present existence of any such literature, claiming it has been lost. And indeed both sects agree, at least, that a large body of early Jain literature has been lost, namely the *Pūrvas*, the works ascribed to the first fourteen *tīrthaṅkaras*. These texts are associated by the Śvetāmbaras with the twelfth, now lost, section of what they take to be the limbs (*aṅga*) of the Jain canonical literature. We shall now turn to what constitutes that canonical literature.

In contrast to other accounts Dundas cites as "what has come to be regarded as the standard version of the scriptural canon" forty-five texts which are classified into five groups.[45]

Group I: Limbs (*aṅga*)

1 *Ācārāṅgasūtra*: statements about the nature of reality, concerning particularly the self and karma; a biography of Mahāvīra, and advice about the monks' discipline.

2 *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra*: the views of opposing schools; karma, Mahāvīra, asceticism, women, hells.

3 *Sthānāṅgasūtra*: categories drawn from doctrine, practice, mythology and cosmology, etc., in clusters of one to ten.

4 *Samavāyāṅgasūtra*: like (3).

5 *Vyākhyāprajñaptyaṅgasūtra*: the biggest text of the canon, on subjects drawn from the entire range of Jain doctrine and practices.

6 *Jñātādharmakathāṅgasūtra*: stories providing appropriate advice concerning the religious path.

7 *Upāsakadaśāṅgasūtra*: stories about pious laymens' resistance to attack by demons.

8 *Antaḥkṛddaśāṅgasūtra*: stories about previously liberated beings.

9 *Anuttaraupapāttikadaśāṅgasūtra*: stories about those reborn as gods.

10 *Praśnavyākaraṇānyaṅgasūtra*: questions and answers on doctrinal matters.

11 *Vipākaśutāṅgasūtra*: stories about the experiences arising from one's karma.

12 *Dṛṣṭivādāṅgasūtra*: now lost; see above.

Group 2: Subsidiary Limbs (*upāṅga*)

1 *Aupapātikasūtra*: spontaneously-born gods and denizens of hell; Mahāvīra's teachings; how to gain liberation.

2 *Rājapraśnīyasūtra*: a discussion between King Prasenajit and the monk Keśin, follower of Pārśva, about the relation of the self to its body.

3 *Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra*: ontology.

4 *Prajñāpanāsūtra*: continuation of *aṅga* #5, above.

5 *Sūryaprajñaptisūtra*: the sun.

6 *Jambūdvīpaprajñaptisūtra*: on the island Jambūdvīpa; biography of Ṛṣabha.

7 *Candraprajñaptisūtra*: the moon.

8-12 Five stories about karmic results.

Group 3: Behavior of Monks (*chedasūtra*)

1 *Daśaśrutaskandhasūtra* (Prakrit: *Āyāradasāo*), which includes a *Kalpasūtra* as a chapter.

2 *Kalpasūtra*, not the same as the above; deals with monastic law.

3 *Vyavahārasūtra*: rules for monks and nuns.

4 *Niśīthasūtra*: atonements for breaches of ascetic behavior.

5 *Mahāniśīthasūtra:* rules and examples of asceticism.

6 *Pañcakalpasūtra*: lost; may never have existed.

7 *Jītakalpasūtra*: written by Jinabhadra in the 7th century A.D., it prescribes atonements for violations of rules of conduct.

Group 4: Basic Scriptures (*mūlasūtra*)

1 *Uttarādhyāyanasūtra*: 36 chapters of verses reporting legends, practical behavior and doctrines.

2 *Daśavaikālikasūtra*: ascribed to Śayyaṃbhava, it concerns correct asceticism.

3 *Āvaśyakasūtra*: concerning the six obligatory ritual actions, which has spawned a vast expository literature.

4 *Piṇḍamoryuktisūtra* and *Oghaniryuktisūtra*, which together explain how to beg for alms and care for a monk's equipment.

Group 5: Eight Mixed (*prakīrṇaka*) Texts concerning suicide, astrology, etc., along with two texts concerning epistemology titled *Nandīsūtra* and *Anuyogadvāriṇīsūtra*.

Even this list is not accepted by all branches of the Śvetāmbaras, though this appears to have been the list which was arrived at in the fifth century in Vaiśālī when a large meeting was held and the traditions concerning such matters was recited. It was at that same meeting, apparently, that the schism between the two primary sects was thoroughly and

irrevocably finalized. As was said above, the Digambaras refused to accept the above list of alleged scriptures as authentic. However, there are stylistic and other reasons to think that the texts the Digambaras appealed to as replacements, the *Ṣaṭkhaṇḍāgamasūtra* and the *Kaṣāyapāhudasūtra,* were composed much later and that other texts cited by the Digambaras were closely related to one or another of the Śvetāmbara list given above.

The rather few paragraphs above take us from the middle of the first century B.C. to the fourth or fifth century A.D., at which point the philosophical literature of the Jainas proper may be said to begin. Although some of this literature consists of commentaries on one or another of the forty-five scriptural books listed above, we shall for the most part ignore these commentaries in what follows. Rather, we shall concentrate on independent texts, and commentaries on them, that represented Jaina efforts to develop and explain a world-view in terms of which the traditions inaugurated by the *tīrthaṅkaras* culminating in Mahāvīra and fleshed out in the scriptures listed above can be rationalized and made both meaningful and the basis for a way of life that would capture the imagination of serious-minded aspirants for liberation.

PART TWO

SUMMARIES OF WORKS (ARRANGED CHRONOLOGICALLY)

1. UMĀSVĀTI (400?), *Tattvārtha(adhigama)sūtra*

A rather heated controversy rages within Jainism as to whether this author, apparently the earliest who wrote noncanonical material, belonged to the Śvetāmbara or the Digambara sect, as well as over other matters concerning his identity and time. In 1985 Johannes Bronkhorst published a thorough review of the evidence surrounding this matter[46]; since his approach is presumably not infected by any biases that might affect the opinions of Jains of either sect we report here his conclusions. One point of controversy concerns whether the same author wrote the *-sūtras* and the *-bhāṣya,* our #3, which is regularly attributed to him. Bronkhorst provides an extended argument to show that the two authors were different people; so, to be safe, we shall separate the summaries of the two works in the present Volume. Bronkhorst also argues that the author of the *Bhāṣya* incorporated the *Sūtra* into what was disseminated as his work.

A distinct question concerns whether this text stemmed from Śvetāmbara or Digambara origins. In fact there are two distinct versions of this text, each belonging to one or the other of these two schools. However, Bronkhorst gives some reasons to think that in fact the origins of the work stemmed from a third Jaina sect, that of the Yāpanīyas, and was incorporated by the other two schools into their literature with appropriate changes to fit their beliefs. That the original form was Yāpanīya is argued for by Bronkhorst on the grounds that a passage counting hunger and thirst among the eleven sufferings of a Jina is found at *Tattvārthasūtra* 9. 11, whereas the Digambaras hold that a Jina neither eats nor drinks. As for why it cannot be a Śvetāmbara work, he cites an extensive argument by R. Williams showing discrepancies between unique Śvetāmbara beliefs and passages in the text. Thus arises Bronkhorst's idea that the text stems from Yāpanīya sources.

That conclusion also bears on the question of the text's

proper dating. Since the Yāpanīyas faded out around the beginning of the fifth century and originated during the second century, this suggests a period between 150-400 for the composition of the work. Suzuka Ohira, *A Study of Tattvārthasūtra with Bhāṣya with Special Reference to Authorship and Date* (L. D. Series 86: Ahmedabad 1982), deserves attention since her work, which stemmed from a doctoral thesis at Gujarat University, is presumably operating from a position independent of the rival contentions of the two great schools of Jainism, viz., Śvetāmbara and Digambara. She places Umāsvāti "some time in the late middle of the 5th century A.D. where the migration of the Jainas to the South and the West was nearing to the end." However, on her own showing and that of many other historians of Jainism that "migration" seems to have been completed closer to the end of the fourth century, and indeed a reference on the next page suggests that she may rather have meant the fourth rather than the fifth century in the passage quoted above, especially since she cites evidence to show that Kundakunda, Pūjyapāda and Samantabhadra can be dated back to the 5th century and that Umāsvāti preceded them. Thus our surmise of 400 as a possible date to assign to Umāsvāti.[47]

The differences between the two versions of the text have been set forth by J. L. Jaini[48], as well as by A. Shantiraja Sastri.[49] In the summary below we adopt the readings of K. K. Dixit found in ET (which are not themselves consistent in following either of the two texts), noting a few major differences that appear crucial to understanding the texts.

Mahendra Kumar states that "it is beyond any doubt that *Tattvārthasūtra*...of Umāsvāmi or Umāsvāti...is in the form of *Sūtras* in Sanskrit containing, for the first time, the teachings of the *Āgamas*."[50]

A number of other works are often ascribed to Umāsvāti. Of them the only one that appears genuine, though not philosophical, is the *Jambūdvīpasamāsa* "of which the first two *āhnikas* describe the geography of Jambūdvīpa, the third

explains the world oceans and continents, and the fourth discusses about mensuration formulae and recapitulates the characteristic features of Jambūdvīpa." (Ohira, ibid., p. 139)

"E" and "T" references are the edition and translation by K. K. Dixit to be found in L.D.Series 44, Ahmedabad 1974. The summary is based on a separate contribution for this Volume provided by Prof. Dixit.

Summary by K. K. Dixit

CHAPTER ONE

1 (E3; T2-5) Right vision (*darśana*), right awareness (*jñāna*) and right conduct (*cāritra*)--these three constitute the pathway to liberation (*mokṣa*).

2 (E3; T5) Right vision is faithfully seeking out which are fundamental things (*tattvārtha*).

3 (E3; T5-6) That arises either naturally (*nisarga*) or from study (*adhigama*)

4 (E3; T7) The fundamental things are: self (*jīva*), what is not self, inflow (*āsrava*) of karma[1], bondage (*bandha*), cessation of inflow (*saṁvara*), cleansing off (*nirjarā*) (of traces), and liberation.

5 (E3; T9) These (things) are located (*nikṣepa*) or distinguished (*vibhāga*) according to their name (*nāma*), representation (*sthāpana*), substance-type or (karmic) state (*bhāva*).

6 (E3; T11) They are apprehended (*adhigama*) through (an) instrument of true cognition (*pramāṇa*) or from a perspective (*naya*),

7-8 (E3; T12) (known) as being mentioned (*nirdeśa*),

[1]As shall become clear in due course (and particularly in Chapter VIII of this text), the Jains conceive karman in the form of a physical formation that gets attached to a self as a result of its good or bad acts. It is purged off from a self either after yielding the appropriate fruit or with the help of some special endeavor like penance, etc.

as to (its) possessor (*svāmi*), its instrumentality (*sādhana*), its location (*adhikaraṇa*), its duration (*sthiti*) or classification (*vidhāna*), its existence (*sat*), number (*saṃkhyā*), (spatial) location, extent (*sparśana*), time (*kāla*), interval (*antara*), (karmic) state (*bhāva*), or relative numerical strength (*alpabāhutva*).

9 (E3; T17) The five kinds of awareness are called immediate (nonverbal) awareness (*mati*), linguistic awareness (*śruta*), extrasensory awareness (*avadhi*), telepathy (*manaḥ-paryāya*) and knowledge (*kevala*).

10 (E3; T19) They involve two instruments of true cognition,

11 (E3; T19) the first two (of the five) being indirect (*parokṣa*) instruments of true cognition

12 (E3; T19) and the last three being direct (*pratyakṣa*).

13 (E3; T21) Synonyms for "*mati*" are *smṛti, saṃjñā, cintā, abhinibodha.*

14 (E3; T22) Immediate nonverbal awareness can originate either from the sense-organs or not (i.e., or from the internal organ).

15 (E3; T22) There are four (successive) steps involved in it, called "indistinct" (*avagraha*), "directed" (*īhā*), "determinative" (*avāya*) and "concluding" (*dhāraṇā*).

16 (E3; T24) Immediate nonverbal awareness occurs in twelve ways: having many distinct contents, having one content, having many forms or only one, being grasped quickly or slowly, on the basis of a locus or not, accompanied by doubt or not, regularly (*dhruva*) or irregularly.

17 (E3; T28) All four steps involve grasping an object.

18 (E3; T30) Sense-object contact is called "*vyañjana*"; when it happens indistinct awareness ensues.

19 (E3; T30) But in visual and mental awareness this pattern is not applicable.

20 (E4; T36) Linguistic awareness is always preceded by immediate nonverbal awareness and can be classified into

classified into two, twelve, or many types.

21-23 (E4; T42) Extrasensory awareness is of two sorts: that owing to birth (*bhavapratyaya*), which is found in inhabitants of hell and of heaven, and that owing to quality (*guṇapratyaya*)[1], which arises from destruction and subsidence and is found in the six kinds of birth among animals and humans.

24-25 (E4; T46) Telepathy has two varieties, differing in respect of purity and the presence or absence of backsliding.

26 (E4; T47) Knowledge and telepathy differ as to purity, range, who (or which of the six kinds of beings) can experience them, and their kinds of contents.

27 (E4; T48) Telepathy and linguistic awareness range over all substances and some of their modes.

28 (E4; T48) Extrasensory awarenesses range over only those substances having color and touch.

29 (E4; T48) Telepathy grasps only a single one of the substances together with only a portion of its modes,

30 (E4; T48) while knowledge ranges over all substances and all modes.

31 (E4; T51) In a self there may occur at the same time one, two, three or four types of awareness, with the occurrence of no one kind being necessary.

32 (E4; T32) Immediate nonverbal, linguistic and extrasensory awarenesses can be false as well (as true).

33 (E4; T32) Such awarenesses, even though true, are in a sense false for one who does not know the difference between real and unreal, since such an awareness, even if true, is only accidentally so.

34 (E4; T55) There are five types of perspective (*naya*): conventional (*naigama*), generic (*saṃgraha*), commonsensical (*vyavahāra*), (temporally) immediate (*ṛjusūtra*) and linguistically implied (*śabda*).

[1]The text merely characterizes the second type without providing the term, which we take from commentaries.

35 (E4; T55) The conventional perspective has two varieties, the last linguistically implied three.

CHAPTER TWO

1 (E5; T73) A self's nature (at a moment) consists of five modifications (*bhāva*) (of applications of awareness (*upayoga*)): (1) that arising from the subsiding (*aupaśamika*) (of a karmic trace's operation), (2) that arising from the destruction (*kṣāyika*) (of a trace), (3) that arising from the combination of those two, (4) that arising from the fruition (*audayika*) (of a trace), and (5) that arising from the transformation (*pariṇāmika*) (of a trace).

2 (E5; T73) (1) has two sorts; (2) has nine sorts; (3) has eighteen, (4) has twenty-one and (5) has three.

3 (E5; T73) The two properties that result from subsiding of a karmic trace are right inclination (*saṃyaktva*) and right conduct.

4 (E5; T73) The nine types that arise through destruction of a karma are awareness, vision, giving (*dāna*), gain (*lābha*), experiencing (*bhoga*), repeated experience (*upabhoga*), energy (*vīrya*), right inclination, and right conduct.

5 (E5; T74) Among the eighteen types arising from a combination of cessation and destruction of karmic traces there are four kinds of awareness, three kinds of ignorance, three of vision, five of giving, etc. (giving, gain, experiencing, repeated experience and endeavor), right inclination, right conduct and partial restraint (*saṃyamāsaṃyama*).

6 (E5; T74) The twenty-one kinds that arise through fruition of karma residues include four kinds of rebirth (*gati*), four of passion (*kaṣāya*), three of sexual feeling (*liṅga* or *veda*), erroneous awareness (*mithyājñāna*), ignorance, lack of restraint, nonliberation (*asiddhatva*) and six types of (self-

colorings (*leśya*).[1]

7 (E5; T74) Being a self, being worthy of liberation (*bhavyatva*) and being unworthy of liberation.

8 (E5; T80) The mark of a self is (its) application (of awareness).[51]

9 (E5; T82) It can be viewed as having two, eight or four types.

10 (E5; T85) The two types of self are transmigrating (*saṃsārin*) and liberated.

11 (E5; T86) (Transmigrating selves may be classified in various ways: as possessing an internal organ (*manas*) or not,

12 (E5; T86) as mobile (*trasa*) or static (*sthāvara*)--

13 (E5; T86) earth, water and plants being static,

14 (E5; T86) fire, water, and those having two, three, four or five senses being mobile.

15 (E5; T89) There are five (sense-)organs (*indriya*),

16 (E5; T89) Each having two kinds.

17 (E5; T89) The substantial (sense-)organ (*dravyendriya)* can be (viewed as) outwardly visible (*nirvṛtti*) or as a capacity (*upakaraṇa*).

18 (E5; T89) The (sense-)organ as a state (*bhāvendriya*) can be either initial (*labdhi*) or applied (*upayoga*).

19 (E6; T89) The applied sort occurs with respect to tangible, etc. (objects)

20 (E6; T89) The five (sense-)organs are tactile, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory.

21 (E6; T92) The objects (*artha*) of these are respectively touch, taste, smell, color and sound.

22 (E6; T92) The contents of the internal organ are verbal.

1 The Jainas conceive a coloring (*leśya*) in the form of a physical formation that is variously colored and attaches to a self depending on the amount of purity that self exhibits. The six increasingly purer colorings are black, blue, grey, yellow, red and white.

23 (E6; T95) Selves up to those consisting of air (*vāyu*) have one sense-organ.

24 (E6; T95) Insects, ants, bees, and men possess respectively two, three, four or five sense-organs.

25 (E6; T96) Possessors of an internal organ are those who have recognition (*saṃjñā*).

26 (E6; T99) At the time of rebirth (?) there is only one sort of activity (*yoga*), viz., karmic.

27 (E6); T99) All motion follows a straight line (*śreṇī*))

28 (E6; T99) A self's movement toward liberation is undeviating,

29 (E6; T99) whereas a bound self's movements may involve deviations or not, and if it does, three at most.

30 (E6; T99) An absence of deviation comprises one moment (*samaya*).

31 (E6; T99) A self remains unassimilative for only one or two moments.

32 (E6; T106) The three kinds of birth arise from agglutination (*sammūrchana*), from a womb (*garbha*), and through sudden manifestation (*upāpāta*).

33 (E6; T106) There are nine kinds of places of birth--where no living beings are born, where some are born, both of the above, where it is partly cold and partly hot, where it is only hot, where it is all three, where birth is concealed, both concealed and revealed, and where it is revealed.

34 (E7; T106) Born wrapped in placenta (*jarāyu*), born from an egg (*aṇḍaja*), and born in a bare state (*potaja*)--these are the three ways of being born from the womb.

35 (E7; T106) Hell- and heavenly-beings are born from sudden manifestation.

36 (E7; T107) All the rest are born from agglutination.

37 (E7; T111) The five kinds of body are: (1) material (*audārika*), (2) transformative (*vaikriya*), (3) procuring (*āhāraka*), (4) fiery (*taijasa*) and (5) made of karma (*kārmaṇa*).

38 (E7; T111) (Those listed) later (in the foregoing list) are subtler than (those listed) earlier.

39 (E7; T111) (1-3 of 37 above) The later ones comprise more atoms than the earlier ones listed,

40 (E7; T111) and the last two even more atoms.

41 (E7; T111) (4) and (5) are nonresistant (*apratigha*).

42 (E7; T111) They are beginninglessly related to a self,

43 (E7; T111) and all selves possess one.

44 (E7; T111) A self can possess at most four (of 1-5 of 37) necessarily including (4) and (5).

45 (E7; T111) Only (5) is without the experience of satisfaction and frustration.

46 (E7; T111) (#1) (of 37) Material bodies are born only from the womb or through agglutination.

47 (E7; T112) A (#2) (of 37) arises only by sudden manifestation

48 (E8; T112) and is produced through the attainment of superordinary power.

(48A)[1] As is (#4) also.)

49 (E8; T112) (#3) (of 37) is good (*śubha*), pure (*viśuddha*), and without resistance (*avyāghāta*), and is the body only of a monk versed in the 14 texts of the Pūrva class.

50 (E8; T123) Beings in hell or born by agglutination are neuter (*napuruṣa*).

51 (E8; T123) Heavenly beings are never neuter.

52 (E8; T125) Beings born through sudden manifestation, those in their final embodiment, a person in his final embodiment and one who is destined to live for uncountable (*asāṅkhyāta*) years all must live out their karmically required period (*anupavartanīya*).

1 This *sūtra* is found only in the Digambara version of the text.

CHAPTER THREE

1-2 (E8; T130) Seven hells, one below another, are named, located on water, in the air and in space (*ākāśa*).

3 (E9; T130) Beings in hells have bad colorings, transformations, bodies, feelings (*vedanā*), and actions (*vikriyā*).

4 (E9; T130) They cause pain in each other.

5 (E9; T130) Those in the upper hells (earlier in the list in 1-2) also suffer from pain caused by troubled demons (*saṃkliṣṭa asura*).

6 (E9; T130) The maximum period of residence of the beings inhabiting each of the seven hells is enumerated.

7-13 (E9-10; T140-141) The world is so constituted that a continent and an ocean go on alternating until we have uncountable world-continents and uncountable world-oceans. In the middle of them all is situated the world-continent called Jambūdvīpa which has the mountain Meru located right at its center and is divided into seven regions separated from one another through six mountains. The second world-continent is Dhātakīkhaṇḍa and the third Puṣkara, while in each the number of regions and mountains is double that of those in Jambūdvīpa

14-16 (E19; T141) Human beings are found only in Jambūdvīpa, Dhātakīkhaṇḍa and fourteen in the inner-half of Puṣkara, and they are either noble (*ārya*) or not (*mleccha*). Again, certain regions lying in this world-portion are called "karmic places" (*karmabhūmi*).

17 (E10; T140) The minimum and maximum length of life of a human being is specified.

18 (E10; T140) For animals it is the same.

CHAPTER FOUR

1-2 (in Śvetāmbara reading; 1 in Digambara) (E10; T51) The gods inhabit four regions; the third has a yellow color.

3 (E10; T151) The number of subtypes of each of the

four regions is given.

4-5 (E10; T152) Subtypes of gods are named.

6 (E10; T153) The first two regions have two lords (*indra*) each.

7 (E10; T154) They have all four kinds of colors.

8-10 (E10; T154) The gods residing in the lowermost heavens experience sexual enjoyment through the body, those residing above them through touch, those residing above them through form, those residing above them through thought, while those residing above them are immune from sexual enjoyment.

11 (E10; T156) There are ten subtypes of the god-type Bhavanavāsin.

12 (E10; T156) There are eight subtypes of the god-type Vyantara.

13-16 (E10-11; T156-157) The five subtypes of the god-type Jyotiṣka are on the move in the region of human beings and are responsible for the time divisions there; outside this region they are static.

17-20 (E11; T157) The god-type Vaimānika is broadly divided into two groups--one where division into classes obtains, the other where all individual gods stand on an equal footing. The former group possesses twelve subtypes, the latter group six. Of these, the first two subtypes possess yellow color, the next three red, the rest white.

21 (E11; T164) The length of life, abilities (*prabhāva*), experiences, purity of their colorings, sense-objects, and contents of extrasensory awareness are better the higher the god is seated.

22 (E11; T164) The higher a god is seated the less movement (*gati*), body (*śarīra*), appropriation (*parigraha*) and arrogance (*abhimāna*) he has.

25-26 (E11; T168-171) The Lokāntika gods--subdivided into nine groups--are a special fraternity of gods residing in the heaven called Brahmaloka.

27 (E11; T171) The highest-situated god-subtypes

residing in the heavens Vijaya etc. attain liberation after being twice born as a human being.

28 (E11; T171) "Animal" (*tiryak*) designates any being which is not a human and is not born by sudden manifestation.

29-53 (E12-13; T172-176) The higher situated a god the greater are its maximum and minimum life-durations; similarly, the lower situated a hellish-type being the greater are its maximum and minimum life-durations.

CHAPTER FIVE[52]

1 (E13; T177) Bodies that are not selves (called *ajīva)* are of four kinds--(1) initiator of movement (*dharma)*, (2) initiator of stasis, (3) space, and (4) karmic product (*pudgala*).

2-3 (E13; T178-179) These four plus selves are substances, eternal, unchangeable (*avasthita*) and formless (*arūpin*).

4 (E14; T179) Karmic products have color/form *(rūpa)*.

5-6 (E14; T179) (1)-(3) are single and inactive.

7-11 (E14; T182) The sizes of various things are indicated: the sizes of the initiator of movement and the initiator of stasis, of a self and of space are uncountable; as for a karmic product, its size may be countable or uncountable; an atom has no size.

12-16 (E14; T185) The portion of space in our universe that is occupied by each of the four kinds of things is indicated: the initiator of movement and initiator of stasis are universal; karmic products are of various sizes; a self occupies one part or more, and can contract and expand.

17-18 (E14; T191) The initiator of movement and initiator of stasis cause things to begin or stop moving respectively. Space's function (*upakāra*) is to provide room.

19-20 (E14; T193-194) A karmic product makes possible a body, an internal organ, language, breathing, and

experiences of satisfaction and frustration, life and death.

21 (E14; T195) A self can interact with others.

22 (E14; T195) Time makes possible persistence (*vartanā*), transformation, action and is greater or less.

23-24 (E14; T198) A karmic product's qualities include touch, taste, smell, color, sound, union, subtlety, grossness, shape (*saṃsthāna*), differentiation (*bheda*), darkness (*tamas*), shadow (*chāyā*), hot light and cool light.

25 (E14; T202) There are two kinds of karmic products, atomic (*aṇu*) and molecular (*skandha*).

26-27 (E15; T203) Molecules arise through combination and splitting, whereas an atom is caused through split alone.

28 (E15; T204) Visible molecules arise from split and combination together.

29-31 (E15; T207-208) The desire of a speaker may be expressed in various ways. Thus sometimes he may desire to describe a thing as substance in general, sometimes as a particular subtype of substance, sometimes as something that originates, sometimes as something possessed of a mode (that originates and perishes). Again, in the last three cases he might desire to assert what exists or to deny what does not exist or to declare that it is impossible to simultaneously make this assertion and this denial, or he might combine the first of these attitudes with the second or the first with the third or the second with the third or the first with the second as well as the third (there thus being seven attitudes in all).

32-36 (E15; T214-219) Combination of karmic products does not take place between components possessed of smoothness or roughness of a minimum degree. When the degrees concerned are equal combination does not take place between similar components. Combination can take place between components whose degrees differ by two units or more. At the time of combination an equal or a larger degree transforms an equal or a smaller degree.

37 (E15; T220) A substance has qualities and modes).

38 (E15; T224) (Some say that) time also (is a

substance)[53]

39 (E15; T224) and is made up of endless moments.

40 (E15; T225) What resides only in substances and is itself without a quality is (defined as) a quality.

41-44 (E15-16; T225-227) A thing's being (i.e., its retaining its specific nature in the midst of origination and destruction) is transformation (=mode). In the case of a karmic product all transformation is possessed of a beginning; in the case of a self, activity (*yoga*) and cognitive application (*upayoga*) are alone possessed of a beginning; in the case of the remaining substances all transformation is without a beginning.

CHAPTER SIX

1 (E16; T229) Activity (*yoga*) is bodily, linguistic and mental action.

2 (E16; T229) It is also termed "inflow" (*āsrava*).

3-4 (E16; T230) For a good (*śubha)* self it is good (*puṇya)*, and for a bad (*aśubha)* self it is bad (*pāpa*).

5 (E16; T232) Activity involving passions causes persisting (*samparāyika*), and activity not involving passions causes fleeting (*īryāpathika*) karma.

6 (E16; T234) Persisting karma is classified into five vow-negaters (*avrata*), four passions, five organs of attachment and aversion, and twenty-five activities.

7 (E16; T237) Difference (in karmic result) depends on whether feeling (the action) is acute, mild, knowing, unknowing, effortful, and to what it is addressed.

8-10 (E16; T239) Locations "to which action can be addressed" are of two sorts, self and not-self. Those for selves are classified as to whether they are the objects of an intention to act (*saṃrambha*), of planned preparation to act (*samārambha)* or the actual performance of an act (*ārambha*), what specific activity is involved, whether an act is done, caused to be done or agreed to, and what passions are involved. Actions toward locations that are not selves may be

constructing (*nirvartanā)*, locating at a place, combining (*saṃyoga*) or naturally operating (*nisarga*) one's body, speech or mind.

11-26 (E16-17; T242-244) There are eight chief types of actions, each having several subtypes, and in the case of each type and subtype there is a set of appropriate behavioral acts that constitute this kind of action. The present *sūtra* merely lists them; details are provided in Chapter VIII.

They are: (1) *Jñānāvaraṇa*--jealousy, concealment, ungenerosity, obstruction, denial, false accusation in respect of awareness.

(2) *Darśanāvaraṇa*--the same in respect of vision.

(3a) *Asātavedanīya*--pain, sorrow, heart-burning, crying, killing, bewailing, each produced in oneself, in another or in both.

(3b) *Sātavedanīya*--compassion (*karuṇā*) for beings as such, compassion for those leading a disciplined life, donation, proper attentiveness towards a disciplined life accompanied by attachment, etc., forbearance, purity.

(4a) *Darśanamohanīya*--speaking ill of the omniscient, the religious order, religion, the deity.

(4b) *Cāritramohanīya*--the acute mental state resulting from manifestations of passion.

(5a) *Nārakāyuṣ*--too much infliction of injury and too much accumulation of possessions.

(5b) *Tiryakāyuṣ*--deceit.

(5c) *Manuṣyāyuṣ*--meagre infliction of injury, meagre accumulation of possession, softness and simplicity of nature.

(5d) All types of lives--to be devoid of *śīla* (i.e., the subsidiary vows of discipline), to be devoid of *vrata* (i.e., the chief vows of discipline), as also the just mentioned features of meagre influence, etc.

(5e) *Devāyuṣ*--disciplined life accompanied by attachment, life of discipline-cum-indiscipline, refraining from evil acts out of compulsion, childish penance.

(6a) *Aśubhanāma*--the crookedness of acts and false

behaviour (alternatively, creating dissension).

(6b) *Śubhanāma*--the opposite of the just-mentioned features--that is, the sincerity of acts and causing genuine behavior (alternatively, healing a dissension).

(6c) *Tīrthaṅkaranāma*--purity of inclination, respectful attitude towards things, highly spiritual nonviolation of morality and vows, ever-wakefulness as to the acquisition of cognition regarding verities, ever present fear of worldly joys, renunciation as *per* one's capacity, providing means of easement to the fourfold religious order, particularly the order of monks, offering services to competent personages, feeling of devotedness towards a *tīrthaṅkara*, a preceptor, a highly learned personage, a scriptural text, not missing a performance of the daily religious service designated "required" (*āvaśyaka*), to cultivate the path of liberation and to make others traverse it, feeling of disinterested love towards the co-religionists.

(7a) *Nīcagotra*--to condemn others, to praise oneself, to turn a blind eye towards even the existing merits of others, to make a display of even the nonexisting merits in oneself.

(7b) *Uccagotra*--the opposite of the just mentioned features--that is, to condemn oneself, to praise others, to make a display of one's own shortcomings, to turn a blind eye towards one's own merits.

(8) *Antarāya*--to cause obstruction to others engaged in the task of donation, etc. (i.e., donation, reception, immediate consumption, recurrent consumption, endeavor).

CHAPTER SEVEN

1 (E18; T258) A vow is refraining from violence, untruth, theft, sexual incontinence or attachment to possessions.

2 (E18; T260) It may be partial or complete.

3-7 (E18; T261-264) Each vow involves five helping ways *(bhāvanā)* to acquire steadiness in fulfilling vows. Additionally, there are the following four ways that are of a general nature: (1) To view the five defilements (violence,

etc.) as problems to be faced both in this world and the next; (2) to develop in relation to these (violence, etc.) a feeling that they are entirely and solely frustrating, (3) to develop a feeling of friendliness (*maitrī*) to all beings, a feeling of gladness toward those better than oneself, a feeling of compassion for those who are suffering, a feeling of neutrality in relation to those who are unworthy of instruction, (4) to develop a feeling of fear and of dispassion in relation to things worldly.

8 (E18; T267) Deprivation of the life-principle due to negligence is violence.

9 (E18; T273) Speaking what is not the case is lying (*anṛta*).

10 (E18; T275) Taking what has not been given is theft.

11 (E18; T275) Incontinence is copulation.

12 (E18; T276) Appropriation is attachment (*mūrcchā*)

13 (E18; T278) The (true) taker of vows is to be "devoid of thorns" (*niśśalya*).

14 (E19; T279) Vows may be taken by a householder or by a nonhouseholder.

15-17 (E19; T280) The vow-taker of the householder type observes the five subsidiary vows (*aṇuvrata*) and seven plus one additional duties--which are named but not described.

18 (E18; T285) Deviations from right vision are: doubt (*śaṅkā*), longing (*ākāṃkṣā*), perplexity (*vicikitsā*), holding a wrong view (*anyadṛṣṭi*) and consorting with those who do (*praśaṃsā*).

19-32 (E19-20; T286-288) Detailing of transgressions.

33-34 (E20; T296) A properly performed donation consists in duly offering to a competent person what might be of use to him.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1 (E20; T298) There are five causes of bondage: false

belief (*mithyātva*), indiscipline (*avirati*), negligence (*pramāda*), passion, and activity.

2-3 (E21; T301) When associated with passion a self acquires karmic products, and this is bondage.

4 (E21; T302) (Bondage) has four aspects (1) according to (an action's) nature, (2) in terms of (karma's) duration, (3) regarding the intensity of the act, (4) in respect to which karmic constituents are affected.

5 (E21; T303) (1) has eight varieties (as above, cf. VII. 11-26 above).

6-14 (E21-22; T305-306) Each of the eight is further classified, as follows:

(1) *Jñānāvaraṇa*--karma acting to conceal each of the five types of awareness called immediate, etc.

(2) *Darśanāvaraṇa*--concealing the four types of vision called ocular, nonocular, vaguely sensory and complete, as well as the five to be experienced in the form of sleeping (*nidrā*), a state between sleep and waking (*nidrānidrā*), sleeping while erect (*pracala*), while walking (*pracalāpracala*) and a sleep which generates superior energy for subsequent activities when awakened (*styānagṛddhi*), which are merely named here).

(3) *Vedanīya*--that to be experienced in the form of pleasure/satisfaction and that to be experienced in the form of pain/frustration.

(4) *Mohanīya*--that having for its subtypes (and still lower divisions) delusions affecting vision, conduct, passions and their helpers, which are respectively of three, two, sixteen and nine kinds. Right inclination, false belief and a combination of the two--these are the three kinds of delusion affecting vision. Passions and their helpers (*nokaṣāya*)--these are the two kinds of delusion affecting conduct. Of these, the passions are further divided into sixteen kinds: anger (*krodha*), pride (*māna*), deceit (*māyā*) and greed (*lobha*), each of which is divided into four kinds.[54] Similarly, helpers of passion affecting conduct are further divided into nine kinds--

viz., inducing laughter (*hāsya*), liking (*rati*), dislike (*arati*), fear (*bhaya*), sorrow (*śoka*), disgust (*jugupsā*), sexual excitement in a male (*puruṣaveda),* sexual excitement in a female (*strīveda*), and in a neuter (*napuṃsakaveda*).

(5) *Āyuṣka*--that having for its subtypes hell-beings, animals, men and gods.

(6) *Nāma*--that karmic outcome having for its forty-two subtypes species (animal, etc.), type (of animal, etc.), kind of body, bodily parts, acquisition of new karmic particles and the form taken in this embodiment, shape, bone-structure, its sensory qualities.[55]

(7) *Gotra*--that having for its subtypes higher and lower.

(8) *Antarāya* (?)--that pertaining to donation, etc.

15-21 (E22; T312) The duration of the karmic residues that are the result of (1).

22-24 (E22; T313) The maturation (*vipāka*) (of karma) is experiencing (*anubhava*). It conforms to (the karma that) produces it. And this experiencing produces the cleansing off of karmic traces.

25 (E22; T315) Each action is bound down by a self in the form of karmic products which come to occupy each and every constituent unit of that self.

26 (E22; T317) The good kinds of karma are listed; the rest are bad.

CHAPTER NINE

1-2 (E23; T320) The cessation of inflow comes about through restriction (*nigraha*) of activity in one or another of the forms called restraint (*gupti*), observance (*samiti*), *dharma*, reflection (*anuprekṣā*), discomforting (*parīṣahājaya*) conduct (*caritra*) and penance (*tapas*).

3 (E21; T321) Penance produces inflow as well as cessation of inflow.

4 (E21; T321) Restraint is the restriction of the

activities of body, speech and mind through right activity.

5 (E21; T322) The five right observances are: fleeting (i.e., passionless) (*īrya*) acts, right speech (*bhāṣā*), right acquisition (*eṣaṇā*), right acceptance (*ādāna*) and location of things, and right disposal (*utsarga*).

6 (E21; T323) There are ten aspects of the highest *dharma*: forbearance (*kṣamā*), modesty (*mārdava*), sincerity (*ārjava*), absence of greed (*śauca*), truthfulness (*satya*), restraint, penance, renunciation (*tyāga*), nonownership (*ākiñcanya*), studentship (*brahmacarya*).

7 (E21; T327) Reflection on twelve aspects of things--transience, helplessness, transmigration, aloneness, separatedness, impurity, inflow, cessation of inflow, cleansing off of traces, the universe (*loka*), the difficulty of achieving enlightenment and the realization that what is *dharma* has been well explained.

8-17 (E23-24; T331) Procedures designed to stick to the right path and get rid of karmic residues are called "discomforts" (*parīṣaha*). Twenty-two of them are identified, and the kinds of occasions for the use of each is outlined.

18 (E24; T337) There are five kinds of conduct: practicing equanimity (*sāmāyika*), proper initiation (*chedopasthāpana*), penance (*parihāraviśuddhi*), reducing greed to a small amount (*sūkṣmasamparāya*), expunging passions altogether (*vītarāga*).

19-21 (E24; T339) Penance may be external or internal. The former involves giving up food, reducing greed, living in a lonely place, self-mortification. The latter (internal) involves atonement (*prāyaścitta*), veneration (*vinaya*), giving service (*vaiyavṛttyā*), study (*svādhyāya*), renouncing selfish feelings (*vyutsarga*), and concentration (*dhyāna*).

22 (E24; T341) Nine types of atonement are described.

23 (E24; T342) Four types of veneration.

24 (E24; T343) Ten ways of giving service.

25 (E24; T344) Five types of study.

26 (E24; T344) Two types of renunciation of

selfishness.

27-28 (E24; T345) Fixing his/her attention on a single object by someone with sufficient physical ability is called concentration. It can last up to one *muhūrta* (= 4/5th of one hour).

29-30 (E24; T349) Concentration is of four types called frustration-producing (*ārta*), cruel (*raudra*), dharmic and white (*śukla*). The last two produce liberation.

31-35 (E24-25; T349) Further classification of frustration-producing concentration and who is qualified to practice it (i.e., in which stage of progress).

36 (E25; T350) Cruel concentration described as reflection on violence, lying, theft and covetousness, and who is qualified for it.

37-38 (E25; T351) Dharmic meditation and who is qualified for it.

39-46 (E25-26; T352-353) Four white meditative practices and who is qualified to do them.

47 (E26; T357) Ten kinds of persons, arranged in increasing levels of cleansing-off of karma).

48 (E26; T359) Five types of monks (*nirgrantha*) from less to more advanced.

49 (E26; T360) The different marks of these types of monks.

CHAPTER TEN

1 (E26; T365) From the destruction of delusion the obstruction of awareness, the obstruction of vision, and hindrances (*antarāya*) comes knowledge.

2-3 (E26; T365-366) Since there is no more cause for bondage, and because of traces having been cleansed, there is the destruction of all karma which is called liberation.

4 (E26; T366) Liberation occurs when there is the absence of the states of subsiding, etc., as well as of (the state of) being worthy of liberation, but not of the absence of the destruction of karma, of the awareness of that destruction, of

the vision of karmic destruction and of liberatedness.

5 (E26; T367) On this annihilation of karma the self rises up to the top of the world

6 (E26; T368) It rises because of previous impulses, since it is now disembodied, there being no more bondage and being its natural state of motion.

7 (E26; T369) Twelve ways in which liberated selves differ from one another named.

2. UMĀSVĀTI, *Praśamaratiprakaraṇa*

Though there is little firm evidence to support the attribution of this work to Umāsvāti, it is regularly assumed to be his, at least by Śvetāmbaras, as early as the seventh century in Jinadāsamahattara's *Niśīthacūrṇī*.[56]

The summary is taken from Yajneshwar S. Shastri's edition and translation which constitutes L.D.Series 107 (Ahmedabad 1989), pp. 5-8, with the translations of technical terms replaced by those chosen for use in this Volume. "ET" references are to the edition and translation provided in the same volume. Numbers in parentheses in the body of the summary refer to the numbered passages of the text.

Summary by Yajneshwar S. Shastri

1-23 (ET1-5) Chapter One. The first chapter is an introductory chapter in which the author, after paying homage to the five preceptors (Jinas, Siddhas, Ācāryas, Upādhyāyas and Sādhus), states the purpose of his undertaking to write this book. The main object of this work is to make one's mind firm on the path of nonattachment so as to reach an absolutely unperturbed state of the Self. This work is composed out of devotion towards Jain passages that are meant for the benefit of laymen. Then the writer, with characteristic modesty, requests scholars not to mind his intellectual weakness and any type of slips in this work (8-11).

The author says that he is not preaching any new principle but repeating the ideas which are already told and retold by ancient teachers and scholars (12). He defends this repetition by saying that just as certain *mantras* and medicines, which are used repeatedly, cure diseases, similarly repetitions have a decided value in annihilation of diseases of attachment (13-15). Here the author explains the term *praśama* occurring in the title of the present work as a synonym of *vairāgya*, nonattachment (17). Then the author introduces the central theme of this work stating that attachment and aversion (*rāgadveṣa*) are the causes of the karmic bondage in *saṃsāra* and describes the nature of the mundane and passionate self.

24-30 (ET6-7) Chapter Two deals with four kinds of passion, viz., anger, pride, deceit and greed (as the root cause of mundane life.

31-33 (ET8) Chapter Three deals with their relations to attachment and aversion on the one hand and to mineness (*mamakāra*) and ego or "I" (*ahaṃkāra*) on the other. Attachment consists of deceit and greed, and aversion consists of anger and pride. "Attachment" and "aversion" are the synonyms of "mineness" and "egoity" respectively. The pair of mineness and egoity are the roots of these four passions. These four fundamental passions accompanied by wrong belief, indiscipline, negligence and psycho-physical activities of mind, speech and body are the causes of eight kinds of karmic bondage of a self.

34-38 (ET9) In the fourth Chapter the author discusses the eight kinds of karma, their subdivisions, and six kinds of colorings of selves.

39-80 (ET10-17) Chapters Five and Six explain the cause of repeated births and deaths and also show the pathway to stop this cycle. Passions, wrong belief, indiscipline, negligence and activity are the cause of accumulation of karma and are the root cause of the chain of repeated births and deaths. The one who has no control over his senses, engrossed in sense-objects, meets with death like those of the deer, the

moth, the black bee, the fish and the elephant, who meet with death bound by the rope of their native tendencies.

The great net created by attachment and aversion can be completely destroyed by following the right path, right conduct, austerity, meditation, observing five vows which lead one to the complete withdrawal of self from the psychophysical activities, which withdrawal in turn leads to the breaking of the chain of births and rebirths. This breaking leads to the ultimate freedom, i.e., liberation.

81-111 (ET18-24) The seventh Chapter deals with eight kinds of pride, viz., pride of caste, family, beauty, strength, gain, intellect, popularity and cognition, which are not only the root cause of mental agitation but the cause of long chains of births and deaths.

112-148 (ET25-33) In Chapter Eight five kinds of code of conduct, viz., right vision, right awareness, right conduct, penance and rigor are prescribed for monks as a means of destroying attachment, aversion, passions, etc.

129-166 (ET34-37) Chapter Nine: The author discusses the important conception of twelve helping practices for fulfilling vows (*saṃprekṣa*) on which a monk has to reflect constantly. Reflection on these twelve aids leads to renunciation of attachment to worldly pleasures.

167-181 (ET38-40) Chapter Ten deals with ten kinds of monastic duties--a virtuous path such as supreme forgiveness (*kṣānti*), modesty, sincerity, absence of greed, self-restraint, renunciation, truthfulness, penance, and studentship.

182-188 (41-42) Chapter Eleven teaches us to avoid four kinds of unworthy topics such as stories about women, food, theft and different countries, which generate interest in worldly enjoyment, and to engage oneself in four kinds of religious stories which inspire us to perform religious duties.

189-193 (ET43) In the twelth Chapter the author mentions the nine fundamental principles, viz., self, not-self, demerit, merit, inflow, cessation of inflow, cleansing off of traces, bondage, liberation and the kinds of selves.

194-195 (ET44) Chapter Thirteen tells us that consciousness is the common defining characteristic of all souls. This consciousness is also divided into two kinds, viz., determinate (*sākāra*) and indeterminate (*nirākāra*). The former is of eight kinds and the latter is of four types.

196-207 (ET45-47) In the fourteenth Chapter the author explains the six kinds of states, (i.e., characteristic conditions of the soul due to fruition of karma): transformation (*pāriṇāmika*), natural state, subsidence of karma, destruction of karma, destruction and subsidence together and a mixed state of the last five kinds of states (*saṃnipātika*). They are subdivided into many kinds. The self conditioned by these different states of karma obtains rebirths in different regions having different senses. The self exists from the point of view of its own substance, space and time, and it does not exist from the point of view of others' substance, space and time. A real thing or substance is that which possesses the three characteristics of arising (*utpāda*), destruction (*vigama*) and permanence (*dhrauvya*)

207-227 (ET48-52) Chapter Fifteen gives detailed explanation of six substances, the nature of the universe, and nine fundamental topics. Firm faith in these topics is called right vision. There are two kinds of cognition: direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*). The former is of two kinds and the latter is of three kinds.

228-242 (ET53-55) The sixteenth Chapter teaches us about five kinds of right conduct, viz., equanimity, observation of penalties, refraining from sins, subtle persistence and annihilation of passions, which are the chief means of liberation. Right vision, right awareness and right conduct together constitute the path of liberation. If one of them is absent the path is imperfect.

243-254 (ET56-58) In the seventeenth and eighteenth Chapters concentration on *dharma* and its types is discussed. Meditation on this concentration leads one to the eighth step (called *apūrvakaraṇaguṇasthāna*).

255-272 (ET59-62) In the nineteenth Chapter the author shows how the aspirant gradually ascends to a state where all delusions are annihilated by destroying deluding karma and, after remaining for a period of less than forty-eight minutes (*antarmuhūrta*) in the twelfth stage, he ascends to thirteenth stage which is the stage of knowledge.

273-276 (ET63) Chapter Twenty deals with the process of the knower's spreading his self throughout the world.

277-282 (ET64-65) In the twenty-first Chapter the author explains the process of cessation of activity by the knower. After retiring from the spread-out-in-the-world state the knower ceases activity, eliminating his activities of mind, speech and body.

283-313 (ET66-71) The twenty-second Chapter deals with the process of ascending to the motionless stage by the the knower and the state of liberation (*siddha*). The knower, being free from all types of activities and colorings, immediately after the time taken to pronounce five syllables obtains a motionless state. In this state he destroys the germs of karmic matter and simultaneously annihilates length of life, feeling, name and lineage karmas and giving up his body immediately ascends to the top of the universe and obtains liberation, which is ever free from the impurities of matter and karma, beyond pain, suffering and transmigration. The self obtaining this infinite, incomparable, undisturbed state of happiness becomes the very essence of right awareness.

In this Chapter the code of conduct for householders is also discussed. This is a preparatory state for becoming a monk. Following these principles, householders will obtain heaven after death and within eight births, being perfectly pure, obtain liberation.

3. (Probably) UMĀSVĀTI, *Bhāṣya* on his *Tattvārthasūtra*

K. K. Dixit (in the Introduction to E) and Dalsukh Malvania suggest that that this work is not a Yāpanīya one,

it does not recommend nakedness and speaks of carrying utensils. Dixit, who takes the *Tattvārthasūtras* to have been composed by a Śvetāmbara, feels that the present work is Umāsvāti's autocommentary, and gives a number of reasons (cf. p. 33-34 of E). He also offers a number of reasons to conclude that Umāsvāti was not a Digambara (E, pp. 36ff.). Ms. Suzuko Ohira, cited previously, devotes an entire chapter to the question whether this *Bhāṣya* is an autocommentary, coming to the conclusion that at least part of it is. However, the identification of the author of this *Bhāṣya* with the author of the *Tattvārthasūtras* remains controversial.

"E" references are to the edition by Manilal Jhaveri published in 1932.

Summary by K. K. Dixit

CHAPTER ONE

Right Vision

1-3 (E15-21) The relation between right vision, right awareness and right conduct is such that the one mentioned earlier among those three can be present even in the absence of one mentioned later but not vice versa. The distinguishing features of right vision are spiritual cleanness (*praśama*), spiritual agitation (*saṃvega*), spiritual detachment (*nirveda*), compassion (*anukampā*), and religiosity (*āstikya*). Right vision originates automatically in those beings to whom the appropriate karmic conditions are available.

Methods of Investigation

5-8 (E22-31) To take an example, to consider self or substance in terms of name is to consider a thing that is given the name of "self" or "substance". To consider it with respect to representation of it is to consider the thing as a physical copy of a self or a substance. To consider it in respect of something containing potency for it is to consider a thing that is capable of becoming in future a self or a substance. To

consider it in respect to reality is to consider something that is actually a self or a substance. And all things whatsoever can be considered in this fourfold manner. As for instruments of true cognition and perspectives, they are going to be described later. Lastly, taking the case of right vision, it can be shown how knowledge of it can be had on the basis of the fourteen aspects of it. Thus we have to understand what right vision is, who are entitled to possess it, what are the means that produce it, where those who possess it are located, how long it lasts, how many types it has, and so forth. These questions can be raised and answered with regard to all things whatsoever.

General Classification of Contentfilled (*savikalpaka*) Awareness

9-12 (E33-35) Immediate awareness is a variety of instrument of true cognition because it ocurs through the instrumentality of a sense-organ or an internal organ, while verbal awareness is an instrument of true cognition because it is invariably preceded by immediate awareness and is conveyed to one person by another. On the other hand, the remaining three types of awareness are direct varieties of instruments of true cognition because they are had by a self without requiring a sense-organ or the like.

Immediate Awareness

13-19 (E36-41) The awareness of a thing as such is indistinct. The thought-process that is undertaken with a view to ascertaining specifically the general object that has been grasped by indistinct awareness is direct awareness. When through further attentiveness final ascertainment takes place as to the features grasped at the stage of directed awareness, that is determination. A continuous such ascertainment, its retention in memory and its recollection at a later time--all these three are called *dhāraṇā*.

Verbal Awareness

20 (E42) The verbal type of awareness is of two types, that included in those texts called "*aṅga*" and those not included. The latter are texts like *Sāmāyika, Caturviṃśati, Stava* etc., the former in a set of twelve texts such as *Ācāra, Sūtrakṛta*, etc. Again, the former include texts uttered by a *tīrthaṅkara* and given the form of a book by his chief disciples called "*gaṇadhara*"; the latter are composed by masters who arose in later times and kept in view the requirements and capacities of the relatively less competent audience. And the verbal type of awareness differs from the immediate type inasmuch as the latter has for its object something present, the former something past, present or future; moreover, the latter is natural to all selves while the former, presupposing the latter, is had as a result of it being imparted by one person to another.

Extrasensory Awareness

21-23 (E45-46) The extrasensory type of awareness on the part of animals and men is of six possible forms--(1) that which accompanies the cognizer from one place to another (*ānugāmika*), (2) that which does not accompany the cognizer (*anānugāmika*), (3) that which increases with the passage of time (*vardhamāna*), (4) that which decreases with the passage of time (*hīyamāna*), (5) that which does not remain constant (but increases and decreases from time to time) (*anavasthita*), (6) that which always remains unchangeable.

Mutual Relations of the Four Types of Awareness

26-29 (E51-54) Whatever objects are noticed by the extrasensory type of awareness are noticed in a relatively purer fashion by the telepathic type. Extrasensory awareness notices all the tangible substances situated within the confines of the entire universe, whereas telepathy only grasps certain tangible objects situated within the region of the universe that is inhabited by human beings. Similarly, extrasensory

awareness is available to a person whether he is disciplined or not, whereas telepathy can only be experienced by a disciplined person. Lastly, extrasensory awareness can notice any aspect of tangible objects, whereas telepathy cognizes only one part (i.e., the part available to human beings).

Knowledge

30 (E54) There is no type of awareness higher than knowledge, inasmuch as there is nothing whatsoever that does not become an object of this type of awareness.

Simultaneous Occurrence of Differing Types of Awareness

31 (E55-56) At one time a self can possess either immediate awareness alone, or both immediate and verbal awareness, or three awareness types, or four. But as for knowledge, certain authorities maintain that it can coexist with the other four types of awareness though it overshadows them as the sun overshadows the stars; on the other hand, certain other authorities maintain that knowledge, being an all-comprehensive type of awareness, cannot coexist with the remaining four types which are all more or less limited in scope.

True and False Awarenesses

32-33 (E57-59) Right awareness of things can be had only by one possessed of right vision. Hence it is that initial awareness, verbal awareness and extrasensory awareness on the part of one of wrong faith are false awarenesses even if they might sometimes be (accidentally) correct, just as a madman's utterances are sometimes correct.

Perspectives

34-35 (E60-73) Here are the respective definitions of the different perspectives. (1) The view which results from following popular convention is conventional. And when on

the basis of a word that is indicative of something generic just a few of the corresponding specimens are called to mind the resultant view is a conventional perspective encompassing a part (*deśaparikṣepin*); on the other hand, when on the basis of the same word the entire corresponding class is called to mind the resulting view is a conventional perspective encompassing the whole (*sarvapari-kṣepin*). (2) The view on the basis of which some single generic feature of things of various types are subsumed is called generic (*saṃgrahanaya*). (3) The view from which with a practical purpose one distinguishes between things that share common features is called commonsensical (*vyavahāranaya*). (4) The view which, disregarding the past and future, grasps only the present is a view confined to present situations (*ṛjusūtranaya*). (5) The view which chiefly depending on words posits a corresponding meaning is *samprāptaśabdanaya*; the view which posits a difference of meaning on the basis of etymology is *samabhirūḍhanaya*; the view which applies a word to a thing only when the thing satisfies the meaning of that word is *evaṃbhūtaśabdanaya*.

CHAPTER TWO

Awareness, the Defining Characteristic of a Self

8-9 (E82) Cognitive application is of two basic types--(1) formfilled (*sākāra*) and (2) formfree (*nirākāra*). (1) is of eight kinds: right immediate awareness, right verbal awareness, right extrasensory awareness, right telepathic awareness, knowledge, wrong immediate awareness, wrong verbal awareness, wrong extrasensory awareness. (2) has four kinds: that born of the visual sense-organ, that born of a sense-organ other than the visual, that of the form of extrasensory awareness, that of the form of knowledge.

Sense-organs and the Internal Organ

15-25 (E88-98) (1) The outwardly visible sense-organs

made out of physical aggregates are called *nirvṛttīndriya*. That external and internal capacity of such a sense-organ without which capacity it is not in a position to produce cognition is called (2) *upakāraṇendriya*. The subsidence-cum-destruction of karma--called *matijñānāvaraṇa*, etc.--is (3) *labdhīndriya*. Sense-born awareness is called (4) *upayogendriya*. (1) presupposes (3), (2) and (4) presuppose (1), (4) presupposes (2).

Transmigration

26-31 (E99-104) The transmigratory motion, undeviating, requires one moment, that with one deviation two moments, with two, three, with three, four.

Different Kinds of Body

37-49 (E110-121) Certain authorities are of the view that the body-type (5) (*karmaṇa-*) is the only one of the five that is possessed by every self. (1) gradually grows and ultimately perishes, (2) is capable of assuming one form and now another, (3) is temporarily assumed by certain highly competent monks in case they have to visit--with a view to getting a doubt removed--a person of knowledge staying in a far-off region, (4) is made use of for inflicting curses or bestowing favors on others, and (5) is of the form of accumulated karmas possessed by the self.

Who Must Live Out Their Life-Periods

50 (52 in E) (E132-134) The hellish beings born by way of sudden manifestation, the heavenly beings, humans in their last embodiment, highly noble persons like *tīrthaṅkaras*, universal monarchs, etc., and humans or animals destined to live uncountable years--all must live out their karmically required period of life. However, even in these cases accumulated karma gets worked off, for what happens is that the time taken for experiencing this karma is less than usual.

CHAPTER THREE

Hells and Hellish Beings

1-6 (E137-159) The seven hells are in fact the seven types of hells situated in the seven levels that lie beneath our earth one below another. Between our earth and the first level and so also between any two successive levels, there first lies a layer of dense water, then a layer of dense air, then a layer of rarefied air, then a layer of empty space. The lower the level the more extensive it is. Similarly, the lower a level the more inauspicious is its construction--also the more inauspicious are the colorings, the physical transformations, the bodies, the tactile feelings, the self-wrought bodily transformations exhibited by a hellish being residing on such a level. The hellish beings also cause pain to each other, while in the first three levels additional pain is caused to them by certain classes of highly irreligious gods. The lower situated a hell is the greater is the life-duration of those residing in it. In the case of each hell there are certain species of beings that are born in it but not in a lower situated one; similarly, in the case of each hell there are certain virtuous qualities that can be developed by one residing in it but not by one residing in a lower situated one.

World-Continents and World Oceans

7-13 (E160-174) The world-continent Jambūdvīpa is plate-shaped, the remaining world-continents and world-oceans are bracelet-shaped. Jambūdvīpa is 10,000 *yojanas*[57] in diameter while each other world-continent or world-ocean has a diameter double that of the immediately preceding world-ocean or world-continent. The world-continent Puṣkara is divided into an inner half and an outer half by means of a mountain called Mānuṣottara while the world-continent Dhātakīkhaṇḍa and the inner half of the world-continent Puṣkara are each divided into a right-half and a left-half by means of an intermediate mountain. Both the right-half and

the left-half of Dhātakīkhaṇḍa and those of the inner-half of Puṣkara have a center-located mountain Meru and six region-forming mountains bearing the same names as they do in Jambūdvīpa. The mountain Mānuṣottara is so called because no human beings are found beyond it.

Human Beings in the World

14-16 (E176-181) There are seven regions in Jambūdvīpa, fourteen in Dhātakīkhaṇḍa and fourteen in the inner-half of Puṣkara. Human beings are found only in these thirty-five regions, as also in the fifty-six intermediate continents situated in the first world-ocean called Lavaṇa. However, as a result of the exercise of a superordinary skill a human being might be found also in the two innermost world-oceans and even on the top of the mountain Meru. The regions Bharata, Airāvata and Videha (minus the sub-regions Uttarakuru and Dakṣiṇakuru)--each five in number--are called *karmabhūmi* inasmuch as here alone is the practice of the highest type of right conduct possible. Again, in these very fifteen regions there are certain localities that are alone inhabited by noble ones--the entire remaining world of human beings being inhabited by others. In all, the noble ones are of six types--viz., those who are noble owing to location, owing to race, owing to family, owing to activity, owing to skill, owing to language.

17-18 (182-184) There is also a rule as to how many times continuously one can be born in the same species of beings. For example, not more than seven or eight times in a row can one be born a human.

CHAPTER FOUR

Types, Classes and Colors of Gods

1-7 (E186-192) The four types of gods are Bhavana-vāsins, Vyantaras, Jyotiṣkas and Vaimānikas. And the ten

classes into which a god sub-type is divided are (1) Indra or someone who acts as a chief, (2) Sāmānika or someone who is as good as Indra, (3) Trāyastriṃśa or someone who acts as a minister or a chaplain, (4) Pāriṣadya or someone who acts as a companion, (5) Āmarakṣaka or someone who acts as a bodyguard, (6) Lokapāla or someone who acts as a border-guard, (7) Anīka or someone who acts as an army-chief, (8) Prakīrṇaka or someone who acts as an ordinary townsman or villager, (9) Ābhiyogya or someone who acts as a slave, (10) Kilviṣika or someone who acts as an outcaste. The god-types Vyantara and Jyotiṣka lack the classes Trāyastriṃśa and Lokapāla, the god-types Bhavanavāsin and Vyantara have two Indras each.

Types of Gods

11-24 (E198-230) The five subtypes of Jyotiṣkas are the sun (*sūrya*), moon (*candra*), planet (*graha*), constellation (*nakṣatra*), and stray star (*prakīrṇatārā*). And it is in terms of their motion around the mountain Meru that in the region inhabited by human beings time is divided into units like seconds, days and nights, months, years, etc. The properties which increase in the case of a higher-situated god are life-duration, efficiency, pleasure, glow, purity of soul-coloring, extension of the field of sensory cognition, and extension of the field of vague sensory awareness; and the properties which decrease in the case of a higher-situated god are movement, bodily size, appropriation and arrogance.

The Highest Gods

27 (E233) The text does not apply to the highest heaven, Sarvārthasiddhi, inasmuch as the gods residing there attain liberation in their very next birth, which of course is a human birth.

Extent of the Lives of Gods and of Hell-Beings

29-53 (E235-244) The rule expressed in the text applies in the case of Bhavanavāsins and Vaimānikas, but Vyantaras who are situated above Bhavanavāsins have the same maximum life-duration as the Bhavanavāsins and a shorter life-duration than they do. Similarly, among Jyotiṣkas the sun and the moon are situated lower than the planets and constellations and irregularly in relation to stray stars, but the maximum and minimum life-durations are greater in the case of the sun, the moon and stars than in the other three.

CHAPTER FIVE

Relations Among the Collections

1-6 (E245-251) The collections (called) initiators of motion, initiators of stasis, space and karmic products are called "bodies" (*kāya*) because they are made up of constituent units. Time, not being a body, is excluded from the list. To be material (*mūrta*) is to be possessed of color and/or touch, etc. By "active" is to be understood translocatory motion.

The Number of Components of the Collections

7-11 (E253-256) The measure of size is to be understood as based on a unit the size of a single physical (karmic-product) atom. Space is divided into two parts, that part confined to a universe and that confined to what is not a universe. There are endless units comprising space taken in its totality, while its worldly aspect possesses as many units as an initiator of motion, an initiator of stasis, or a self.

Portions of Space Occupied By the Various Collections

12-16 (E256-260) Whatever exists exists in the portion of space confined to a universe. As for a karmically-produced aggregate made up of atoms, a specific number can occupy different totalities of spatial units, just as the light of the same lamp can occupy rooms with different sizes.

The Functions of the Collections

17-22 (E161-169) Satisfaction and frustration (or pleasure and pain) are due to karmic aggregates inasmuch as certain karmically-produced bodies are possessed of pleasant sensory qualities, certain others of painful ones. Life is due to karmic products inasmuch as life is sustained by food which is karmically produced, and also because it is prolonged as a result of the non-reduction of the length of life which is something karmically determined. Death is due to karmic products because death is caused by a weapon, etc., which are karmic products, and also because life is shortened as a result of the reduction of the length of life which is again karmically conditioned. Selves act as occasioning causes for one another through preaching by one to another of things beneficial or harmful. By "occurring" is meant continuing to exist, by "transformation" is meant change, by action is meant translocatory motion, and by "greater or less" is meant seniority or juniority in age.

Karmic Products

23-28 (E270-277) The four sensory qualities of touch, etc. belong to a karmically-conditioned atom as also to a karmically-conditioned aggregate, while the ten beginning with sound belong only to a karmically-conditioned aggregate. Touch is of eight types--hard, soft, heavy, light, cold, hot, smooth, rough. Tastes are of five types: pungent, bitter, astringent, sour, sweet. Smell is of two sorts: good and bad. Color is of five kinds: black, blue, red, yellow and white. There are six kinds of sound: drum-produced, string-produced, bell- or cymbal-produced, produced by a blown instrument, produced by rubbing things together, and produced by living beings. Combination is of three kinds: voluntary, natural (or involuntary) and mixed. Subtleness and grossness are each of two kinds, absolute and relative. Shape is of two kinds, definite and indefinite. Splitting is of five kinds: that resulting from sawing off, that resulting from being pounded down, that

resulting from being broken into pieces, that resulting from a gradual chopping off of layers, that resulting from removing the bark. Darkness, shadow, hot and cold light have no varieties.

Aggregate-Formation of Karmically-Conditioned Bodies

32-36 (E288-292) A karmically-produced aggregate comes to be formed not simply because the constituent atoms happen to touch each other but because they combine with each other--in the sense of getting glued to each other--on account of possessing either some degree of smoothness or some degree of roughness. However, in this connection there are certain rules in according with which combination takes place. Thus two atoms will not combine in case both of them happen to be possessed of either the minimum degree of smoothness or the minimum degree of roughness--not even if one of them is smooth and the other rough. But even in case two atoms happen to possess a nonminimal degree of smoothness or roughness they will not combine if both of them are either smooth or rough while the two degrees are the same; in this case combination will take place only if the two degrees differ by two units or more.

Substances, Qualities, Modes

37-44 (E292-297) A quality is that which resides in a substance and is itself devoid of qualities. A mode is that on account of which a thing assumes another form and another name. Present time is just one moment while past and future comprise countless moments.

CHAPTER SIX

Causes of Karmic Inflow

1-7 (E298-303) Activities of body, speech and mind are in fact physical activities, inasmuch as body and speech as well as mind (internal organ) are something physical. But these

activities are accompanied by a corresponding transformation of the self--that is, of mental attitude--which may be good (i.e., auspicious) or bad (i.e., inauspicious). It is on account of such good or bad mental attitudes that karmic inflow takes place. Bad bodily activities are e.g. killing, etc., bad linguistic activities are speaking ill of others, etc., bad mental activities are thinking ill of others, etc. The opposite sorts of activities are good. And karma flows into a self on account of such bad or good activities as water does into a pond through a water-channel. The five vow-negators are violence, untruthfulness, theft, incontinence and acquisitiveness. The four passions are anger, pride, deceit and greed. Twenty-five acts (*kriyā)* are listed; they comprise (with one or two exceptions) five types of ill-intentioned or improper behavior.

The Kinds of Karma-Producing Acts

8-10 (E304-308) There are 108 types of karma-producing acts of living beings--three kinds of bad acts: impulsion to evil, preparation for such an act, performing it; three kinds: performed by either body, speech or mind; three kinds: performed either by oneself, caused to be performed by someone else, or approved of when performed by someone else; and four kinds: accompanied by one of the four passions (3x3x3x4=108).

CHAPTER SEVEN

Vows

3-7 (E320-328) Here is a catalogue of helping ways (*bhāvanā*) of fulfilling one's vows. (1) Nonviolence--attentiveness as regards movement, keeping one's mind under guard, attentiveness as regards procuring things, proper inspection of things eaten and drunk; (2) Truthfulness--speaking after proper consideration, renunciation of anger, renunciation of greed, renunciation of fear, renunciation of laughter; (3) Nontheft--begging for shelter after proper

consideration, frequently begging for shelter, fixing a limit to shelter, begging shelter from a co-religionist, eating and drinking as *per* permission; (4) Continence--to refrain from the use of bedding, etc. used by a woman, an animal, an impotent person; to refrain from passionate talk about women, to refrain from looking at the beautiful organs of a woman, to refrain from recalling the sensuous enjoyments earlier experienced, to refrain from eating delicious food; (5) Nonacquisitiveness--to accord similar treatment to an agreeable and disagreeable touch, an agreeable and a disagreeable taste, an agreeable and disagreeable smell, an agreeable and disagreeable form, an agreeable and a disagreeable sound.

Five Violations of Vows

8-12 (E330-333) Lying means to deny the existence of an existing thing or to describe it as something which it is not or to speak words that cause distress to others.

Vow-takers

13-14 (333-334) "*Śalya*" is the generic name for three defects of character, viz., deceit, desire for worldly enjoyment in return for one's pious performances, and wrong faith.

The Householder Vow-taker

15-32 (E334-350) The seven-plus-one duties of a pious householder are as follows: (1) To refrain from movement beyond a limit in the directions east, west, etc. with a view to avoiding bad acts in the regions lying beyond that limit (*digvirati*). (2) To further delimit from time to time the region of movement fixed in connection with (1). (3) To refrain from bad acts not necessary for conducting the affairs of the day (*anarthadaṇḍavirati*). (4) To refrain from all bad acts for a certain fixed period of time (*sāmāyika*). (5) On certain fixed dates of the month to keep fast, to refrain from bodily decoration, to keep awake during night time engaged in

religious acts (*pauṣadhopavāsa*). (6) To fix a limit for the use of food and drink, ornaments, clothing, utensils, etc., with a view to avoiding much unvirtuousness (*upabhogaparibhoga-parimāṇa*). (7) To offer with a feeling of devotedness appropriate donations to persons observing self-restraint (*atithisaṃvibhāga*). (8) To undertake a fast unto death when conditions of life are no more suited for a fulfilment of religious obligations (*saṃlekhanā*).

The following is a catalogue of types of transgressions likely to occur in the case of not practising right view, the five subsidiary vows and the just enumerated seven-plus-one duties: (1) Right faith--doubt, longing, inconstancy of understanding, praising those holding an alien view, developing intimacy with those holding an alien view; (2) Nonviolence--binding, injuring, piercing the body, loading another excessively, denying food and drink; (3) Truthfulness--false instruction, false accusation in private, forgery, misappropriating a pledged property, divulging someone's secret; (4) Nontheft--to encourage someone to commit theft, to receive what has been brought by a thief, to violate the taxation regulations of an opposing kingdom, to measure out more or less than the proper quantity, to deal in counterfeit commodities. (5) Continence--to arrange someone else's marriage, to enjoy a woman kept by someone else, to enjoy a woman looked after by none, an unnatural sexual act, intensive desire for sexual acts. (6) Nonacquisitiveness--to exceed an amount that has been fixed for the possession of fields and residential quarters, similarly to exceed the amount fixed for the possession of manufactured gold and silver, for that of cattle, wealth and corn, for that of servants and maid-servants, for that of clothes and utensils. (7) To violate the limits placed, to add limits not placed. (8) To get a thing brought by someone from outside the prescribed region, to send a servant to bring something from outside the prescribed region, to make a sound with a view to calling someone from outside the region, to make a bodily gesture for the same

purpose, to throw outwards some physical stuff for the same purpose. (9) Uncultured talk, jokes, etc., unbecoming bodily gestures, talkativeness, lending things to others without a proper thought, possessing in excess the things of daily requirement. (10) Improper bodily movement, improper speech, improper mental act, feeling of disregard, lack of requisite memory. (11) To evacuate, urinate, etc. at a place not properly inspected and not properly cleansed of dust, to receive and place things at such a place, to arrange bedding at such a place, feeling disregard, lack of requisite memory. (1) To eat something alive, to eat something possessing something alive, to eat a thing mixed with a living thing, to eat what causes intoxication, to eat what is not properly cooked. (13) To place the thing to be donated inside what possesses life, to cover it by what possesses life, to say about one's own possession that it belongs to someone else, malice, violating the fixed time. (14) To wish for life, to wish for death, affection for friends, refreshing the memory of past pleasures, to wish for some sort of enjoyment as a result of penance and renunciation.

Donation

33-34 (E351) An act of donation is especially meritorious in four ways--viz., insofar as the procedure adopted is proper, insofar as the thing donated is of a proper description, insofar as the attitude adopted towards the donee is proper, insofar as the donee himself is properly possessed of virtues.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Causes of Karmic Bondage

1 (E353) Of the five causes of karmic bondage mentioned above, an earlier one presupposes a later one but not vice-versa.

Karmic Bondage in Respect of Intensity

22-24 (E376-377) Each type or subtype of karma is possessed of the capacity to yield a definite sort of result. However, sometimes it can happen that a subtype yields an effect that is appropriate to another subtype of the same type. But this cannot happen in the following two cases: view-deluding and conduct-deluding karma cannot yield each other's results. As we shall see, karma takes leave of the self concerned also as a result of penance.

Karmic Bondage in Respect of Constituents

25 (E378) The karmic physical particles which get attached to a self are subtle and not gross, are situated at the same place as this self and not at another place, are in a static state and not in a mobile state, are attached to each and every constituent unit of this self, are themselves *anantānanta* (endless times endless!) in number.

Good and Bad Types of Karma

26 (E379) The following actions are good (the others bad): pleasure-yielding feelings, inclinations, laughter, male sexual acts, the good (i.e. godly and human) subtypes of length-of-life-determining karma, the good subtypes of name, the good subtype of lineage.

CHAPTER NINE

Cessation of Inflow Defined and Its Means Enumerated

1-3 (E381-382) Auspicious restriction of activities, etc., are the good qualities by developing which one brings about the cessation of karmic inflow; by performing penance one also brings about a purging-off of the earlier accumulated karma.

Restriction of Action

4 (E382) On the basis of a proper understanding of things, to undertake on a restricted scale, and if necessary and

possible, to altogether abstain from, the activities of body, speech and mind is called *gupti*.

Reflection

7 (E392-405) The twelve aspects are explained: (1) the transience of everything whatsoever, (2) the helplessness of a being in the face of the troubles of the world, (3) the transmigrations undergone by a self after facing all sorts of life situations, (4) the unrelatedness of a being to everybody else, (5) the separateness of one's self from one's body, (6) the impurities of various sorts characterising one's body, (7) the fundamental verity designated "karmic inflow", (8) the fundamental verity designated "protection against karmic inflow", (9) the fundamental verity designated "purging-off of karma", (10) the constitution of the world, (11) the fact that right awareness with right conduct is difficult to attain, (12) the fact that the religious message has been well delivered by the great sage (*tīrthaṅkara*). A reflection on these features enables one to face successfully the difficult contingencies befalling one in one's life.

Discomforts

8-18 (E405-410) The twenty-two discomforts in question are (1) hunger, (2) thirst, (3) cold, (4) heat, (5) the presence of gadflies and mosquitoes, (6) nakedness, (7) distaste for the monastic life, (8) the presence of women, (9) moving about in an uncomfortable fashion, (10) sitting in an uncomfortable posture, (11) lying on a bed uncomfortably, (12) harsh words spoken by others, (13) beatings administered by and threats directed at one by others, (14) begging, (15) non-receipt of alms, (16) disease, (17) uncomfortable touch of grass, straw, etc., (18) dirt accumulated on the body, (19) feeling puffed up while receiving honor and reward, (20) feeling puffed up on account of possessing, (21) feeling puffed up on account of one's learning, (22) feeling dejected because supersensuous entities

are not visible to one. Of these, eleven discomforts--(1-5), (9), (11), (13), (16-18)--result from a manifestation of feeling-obstructing karma; seven--(6-8), (10), (12), (14)--from that of conduct-deluding karma; two--(20-21)--from that of awareness-obstructing karma; one--(22)--from that of conduct-and-vision-deluding karma, one--(15)--from that of hindrance-producing karma. Hence it is that in the thirteenth and fourteenth stages, where feeling-obstructing karma is alone manifested, there are present only those eleven discomforts that are due to the manifestation of this karma, while in the tenth, eleventh and twelfth stages, where view-deluding and conduct-deluding karma are not manifested, there are absent only those eight discomforts which are due to the manifestation of these kinds of karma; (strictly speaking, a negligible degree of conduct-deluding karma is present in the tenth stage). As for the stages up to the ninth, all the twenty-two discomforts can be present there. However, since the discomforts (3) and (4) cannot occur simultaneously, nor any two of those number (9-11), there can simultaneously occur at the most nineteen discomforts only.

External Penance

19 (E411-414) The six types of external penance are a complete giving up of food, a partial giving up of food, a prior fixation of the quantity, quality, etc. of the alms to be begged for, a giving up of delicacies, a lonely residence, mortification of the body. All these penance-types result in a renunciation of attachment, a lightness of body, a control over one's sense-organs, a preservation of the disciplined life, and a purging-off of karma.

Internal Penance Further Classified

21-26 (E415-421) The nine subtypes of atonement are as follows: (1) to confess a transgression committed by oneself, (2) to repent for a transgression, (3) both to confess and to repent for a transgression, (4) to leave out forbidden

things from alms begged for, (5) to altogether discard the alms begged for in case the forbidden things cannot be extracted from them, (6) to perform external penance like giving up food, etc., (7) to reduce the reckoned period of monkhood in correspondence with the gravity of the transgression committed, (8) to exclude from the monastic order for a definite period one who has committed a transgression, (9) to make the offending monk undergo once more the initiation ceremony.

The four subtypes of veneration are (1-3) that pertaining to right awareness, right vision, and right conduct (in the sense of properly acquiring each), (4) that pertaining to formality, in the sense of formally greeting those who are superior to oneself as regards virtuous qualities like right vision, right awareness, etc.

The ten subtypes of a service rendered are those directed towards the following persons or groups of persons: (1) a teacher (*ācārya*), i.e. a monastic group chief, (2) an *upādhyāya*, i.e., one whose chief task in a monastic group is to teach scriptural texts, (3) one who performs a great and severe penance, (4) one who has newly entered the monastic order, (5) one who has grown weak owing to disease, (6) a group of monks who are disciples of different teachers but form one fraternity, (7) a group of monks that are disciples of the same teacher, (8) the totality of those who follow one religion and include monks, nuns, laymen, laywomen, (9) a monk, (10) a monk who belongs to the same monastic subgroup as oneself.

The five subtypes of self-study are: (1) to take first lessons in a text, (2) to make an inquiry about it, (3) to mentally ponder over it, (4) to correctly repeat the wording of it, (5) to interpret it to others.

The two subtypes of renunciation are those relating to external belongings like utensils, clothing, etc., and those relating to internal belongings like one's own body or one's blameworthy mental states.

Concentration

27-46 (E422-429) The frustration-producing type of concentration has for its object four things--the getting of what is not desired, the losing of what is desired, a disagreeable sensation, a hankering after enjoyments to be yielded by one's pious performance--and concentration of this type is practiced by one in one of the first six stages. Similarly, the cruel (*raudra*) type has for its object four things--violence, untruthfulness, theft, protection of an acquisition--and it is practised by one in one of the first five stages. Again, the *dharma* type has for its object four things--a religious commandment, a worldly disaster, a fruit yielded by an action, the constitution of the world--and it is practised by one occupying any of the stages of progress from the seventh up to the twelfth. Lastly, the white (*śukla*) type has four subtypes; of these, the first two are practised by one occupying the eleventh or twelfth stage and versed in the *Pūrva* text,[1] the last two by one's occupying the thirteenth or the fourteenth stage. Here, the first subtype is technically called *pṛthaktvasavitarka*, the second *ekatvāvitarka*, the third *sukriyāpratipātin*, the fourth *vyuparatakriyānivṛtti*. In the case of the first subtype the object is a diversity of things taught in a scriptural text, in the case of the second a single thing taught by a scriptural text--the word "*vitarka*" meaning (here) a scriptural text. The third subtype takes place when the process of putting an end to all activity is just on the eve of completion, the fourth when this process is complete (this process invariably taking place in the fourteenth stage of progress).

Levels of Cleansing Off of Karmic Traces

47 (E430) The following are the levels in question (a

1 The lost *Dṛṣṭivāda* is supposed to be a part of the *Pūrva* texts--fourteen in number--which were lost to memory quite early and are available no more.

member of the list brings about uncountable times greater cleansing than the one mentioned immediately preceding it): (1) one possessed of right view, (2) one possessed of partial discipline, (3) one possessed of complete discipline, (4) one engaged in getting rid of the endlessly binding passions (*anantānubandhikaṣāya*), (4) one engaged in destroying view-deluding karma, (6) one engaged in suppressing deluding karma, (7) one who has suppressed deluding karma; (8) one engaged in destroying deluding karma, (9) one who has destroyed deluding karma, (10) an omniscient one.

Types of Monks

48-49 (E431-436) The five types of monks are: (1) A *pulāka*, who has not yet developed full proficiency in the basic and derivative virtues of a monk but who never wavers in his faith in the scriptures. (2) A *bakuśa*, who indulges in decorating his body and his implements, who desires miraculous powers and fame, who loves ease, who not leading a lonely life keeps the company of an entourage, who suffers from the moral defects designated *cheda* (i.e., degradation of conduct) and *sabala* (failure of conduct). (3) A *kuśīla*, of which there are two subtypes--a *pratisevanākuśīla* who being a slave of his senses acts in violation of some of the derivative virtues of a monk, and a *kaṣāyakuśīla* who while never succumbing to an intense degree of a passion is sometimes attacked by a mild degree of it. (4) A *nirgrantha* in whom omniscience has not yet made its appearance but who is utterly devoid of attachment and aversion (and who will acquire omniscience within a period of *muhūrtas*). (5) A *snātaka* in whom omniscience has made its appearance. These different types of monk differ among themselves as to the discipline-type, scriptural cognition, violation of rules, spiritual overlordship, signifying mark, soul-coloring, next birth, and disciplinary stage.

CHAPTER TEN

Causes of Omniscience

1-2 (E437-438) Wrong faith, etc. have already been identified as the cause of karmic bondage, and they are absent when the karma causing them is destroyed. On the other hand, the past stock of the four karma-types in question disappears as a result of an appropriate purging-off.

Liberation

3-4 (E439-440) The idea is that liberation comes about when the remaining four karma-types too disappear.

Where the Liberated Self Goes

5-6 (E440-444) In this connection there simultaneously take place three things (all requiring but one moment): the separation of the self from the body, its motion signifying the process of being liberated, its ascending to the top of the universe.

Liberated Selves

7 (E445-463) The different liberated selves differ from one another (either in the liberated state or in the immediately preceding embodied state or in the still earlier embodied states) as to region, time, species, signifying mark, spiritual overlordship, right conduct, "whether enlightened through one's own effort or through that of another enlightened person", cognition, bodily size, interval, number, and relative numerical strength.

KUNDAKUNDA (400?)

The date of this author is most perplexing. It has been extensively discussed in many places. Without reviewing all the reasoning[58] we will merely note W. J. Johnson's[59] suggestion that the works attributed to Kundakunda are largely compilations, and that while external evidence (of the type cited by Upadhye, cf. footnote 11) is inconclusive, there

is some internal evidence (mentioned in E. H. Johnston, *Early Sāṁkhya* (London 1937, reprinted 1974, p. 41, fn. 1) to suggest a date no earlier than the third or fourth century A.D., despite the Jains' own estimate of his date as several centuries earlier. Ms. Ohira, cited previously, remarks that "Kundakundādvaya is recorded in 466 A.D. (Śaka 388) in Markara copper-plate of which script however is said to belong to the 9th century A.D.", with a footnote citing "E.C.I, no. 1" (Ohira, op. cit., pp. 142-143). If that is so we have firm evidence of a *terminus ad quem* within which to place Kundakunda. The date we suggest here is based on this evidence. It also intentionally begs the question of the priority between Umāsvāti and Kundakunda, another point on which the sects disagree without much evidence on either side.

A. N. Upadhye, in the Introduction to his edition and summary of the *Pravacanasāra*,[60] provides at pp. 1-23 an exhaustive review of much data relevant to the identity of Kundakunda. While the conclusions he arrives at are open to challenge (he dates Kundakunda at the beginning of the Christian era) he argues interestingly for South India as the place where Kundakunda flourished. He also notes that it is likely that Kundakunda wrote some eighty-four works titled (in Prakrit) *Pāhuḍa* (Skt. *Prābhṛta*) of which the eight comprising #8 below are among those that remain. Upadhye undertakes to give brief accounts of twenty-two works in all, including where appropriate summaries, of a number of *Prābhṛtas*, of which we provide summaries of the six that seem to contain the most philosophical material.

It seems unlikely that either the *Aṣṭaprābhṛta* or the *Dvādaśānupreksā* are from the hand(s) of the one (or those) who were responsible for (at least some of) the first four works summarized below. Nevertheless, since tradition ascribes these texts to Kundakunda, and we do not know anything otherwise to date or otherwise locate their authors, summaries of these two texts are located here rather than elsewhere.

4.KUNDAKUNDA (400?), *Pañcāstikāyasāra*

The work has been edited and translated by A. Chakravarti, first in the Sacred Books of the Jains and then in a reprint edited by A. N. Upadhye.[61] This is our "ET". It must be noted that Prof. Upadhye provides both the Prakrit text and a restoration into Sanskrit, which is helpful in standardizing the translations of technical terms. The summary by Prof. Upadhye reprinted here appears in volume containing his edition and translation of Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra* (op. cit.), pp. 40-42.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye

It is devotion towards the doctrine that has goaded the author to produce this book for the further propagation and glorification of the creed.

2 (ET1) He proposes to deliver a discourse on *samaya*; the contents are originally given out by Śramaṇa (Mahāvīra), and they lead the follower to liberation.

3-5 (ET2-3) *Samaya* is defined as the collocation (*samaya*) of five collections (*astikāya*), i.e., of those entities that manifest, through numerous qualities and modes, their existence with extensive spatial points, viz., self, karmic products, initiators of movement and of rest, and space, of which the three worlds are an outcome.

6-9 (ET4-6) The same collections plus time are designated as substances which mutually interpenetrate and accommodate each other ever retaining their individuality, and which are so called because of their passing through various modes ever maintaining their existential character.

10 (ET60) A substance has substantiality or existence, is endowed with the triad of origination, destruction and permanence, and forms the substratum of qualities and modes.

11-22 (ET7-16) Then follows a discussion on the mutual relation, etc., between substance, quality and mode, and the same is illustrated in the case of a self, in view of the

doctrine of seven-fold predication (*saptabhaṅgī*).

23-26 (ET16-19) This introductory section (*Pīṭhikā*) is concluded with a discussion on time, which is a substance but not a collection, from the real and ordinary points of view.

Then the author enumerates the special characteristics of a self and discusses them in detail both in the transmigratory and liberated conditions.

30-32 (ET22-23) The soul lives,

33-34 (ET24-25) is of the same size as the body it comes to occupy,

38-39 (ET27) has consciousness

40-52 (ET28-48) which manifests into awareness and vision;

53-56 (ET48-51) it is the performer of actions

57-67 (ET52-58) and is liable for the results thereof; and lastly the self is potent. When discussing the cognitive applications, namely awareness and vision, the author deals with the relation between substance and quality stated from the Jaina point of view.

71-72 (ET61) This discussion about the self is concluded with two cryptic passages on the nature of self in its one- to ten-fold aspects.

73-82 (ET62-70) In the discussion about not-self the author gives various types of matter down to the primary atom, the nature of which is defined in detail.

83-89 (ET72-76) Then the two collections, of movement- and stasis-initiators, the principles of motion and rest, are taken and their characteristic functions given with illustrations.

90-96 (ET79-82) Now we get some passages on the corporeal and noncorporeal aspects of these substances.

101-102 (ET87) Then time is discussed.

103-104 (ET88-89) and the section is concluded with two benedictory passages.

105-107 (ET90-95) Having discussed substances and collections the author proposes to discuss the same as

categories (*padārtha*), thus shedding light on the path to liberation which consists of right vision, right awareness and right conduct, which are defined briefly.

108 (ET96) The author enumerates the nine categories

109-123(ET97-106) and discusses them serially: self, its nature and types are biologically reviewed.

124-139 (ET106-109) Not-self is defined, contrasted and its relation with self discussed.

131-134 (ET109-111) Merit and demerit are defined as good and bad transformations which must be suppressed;

135-140 (ET112-115) Auspicious attachment, etc. lead to meritorious influx, and careless conduct, etc. lead to demeritorious influx of karman.

141-143 (ET116-117) For the stoppage of karmic influx one has to rise above attachment and aversion.

144-146 (ET118-120) He who has stopped the karmic influx, if he practises penances, etc., effects the destruction of karma;

146-150 (ET120-124) It is the passionate and tainted modifications (of cognitive application) that lead to bondage.

151-153 (ET124-125) When the karmic influx is stopped and the deposit is consumed the immediate result is liberation, wherein the soul has its innate and potential qualities completely developed.

161-173 (ET131-137) In conclusion the author gives a beautiful appendix in which a short discourse on liberation and the path of liberation is given from commonsensical and higher perspectives.

5. KUNDAKUNDA, *Pravacanasāra*

The work has been edited numerous times and translated at least twice: by Barend Faddegon (Cambridge: University Press 1935) and by A. N. Upadhye (cf. note 11 above). Upadhye also provides a summary on pp. 52-58 of the introduction to his edition-and-translation. "E" in what follows refers to Upadhye's edition (he provides both the

Prakrit and a Sanskrit translation) and "U" to his English translation; "F" refers to Faddegon's translation. Our summary is based on Upadhye's summary mentioned previously, somewhat expanded by the Editor.

CHAPTER ONE

1-6 (E2-6; U384-385; F1-4) The author offers salutation to Vardhamāna, to the remaining Tīrthaṅkaras, to the liberated selves and the great saints collectively as well as individually, and lastly to the contemporary Tīrthaṅkaras in the Mānuṣa region; then he declares his intention to adopt equanimity after entering the order of ascetics whereby is attained liberation the path to which consists in right conduct based on right vision and awareness.

7 (E7; U385; F5) Right conduct is equanimity, which is a transformation of the self free from delusion and disturbance (*kṣobha*).

8 (E8; U385; F5) A substance is constituted of that by which it is transformed or modified; therefore, the self, when it develops *dharma*, is called "*dharma*".

9 (E9; U385; F5)[62] The self becomes good or bad when it transforms into good or bad forms, and it is pure when free from both.

10 (E10; U385; F6) An object (*artha*) is always made up of substance, quality and mode.

11 (E11; U385; F7) Pure cognitive application leads to liberation, good application to heaven.

12 (E13; U385; F7) Bad application leads to the state of being a bad man (*kunara*), an animal or to hell, and involves continuous frustrations.

13 (E13-14; U385; F8) The happy experiences of pure beings is extolled.

14 (E15; U385; F8) An ascetic (*śramaṇa*) is called pure when he knows the categories and the *sūtras* explaining them, when he is restrained and has practiced penances, is nonattached and considers satisfaction and frustration the

same.

15-16 (E16-18; U385; F9-10) By this pure cognitive application the self, free from the four *ghātīya* types of karma, becomes omniscient and is named "*svayambhū*".

17 (E20; U386; F11) For him there is no state of being without deprivation (*vihīna*) and no destruction without origination,

18 (E21; U386; F11) whereas all objects have both origination and destruction; every object exists in some mode or other.

19 (E23; U386; F12) He whose karma has ceased, abundant in energy, beyond the senses, develops knowledge and happiness.

20 (E25; U386; F13) The one who is completely aware is without happiness or frustration, being beyond all sensory experience.

21-22 (E27-28; U386; F13-14) He enjoys direct vision of all objects without sensory stages in his perception.

23-25 (E29-30; U386; F14-15) The presence of knowledge is thus established: the self, i.e., the knower and knowledge are coextensive; any infringement of extension leads to the conclusion that either knowledge is a nonsentient function or the self can know without knowledge.

26-29 (E31-35; U386-387; F15-17) Knowledge is coextensive with objects known, and the objects known comprise the whole universe. Knowledge is the function of the self alone, and the omniscient self can know all objects as it were reflected in itself, though there is no mutual contact.

30-32 (E36-38; U387; F18-19) As a sapphire lights up the milk in which it is put, knowledge enlightens all objects, all of which, because of the omnipresence of knowledge (in the knower), are reflected in it. In this process of direct knowing the omniscient one neither loses nor gains anything.

33 (E39; U387; F20) One who understands the self as knower through scriptural authority is called a *śrutajñānin*.

34 (E40; U387; F20) "*Sūtra*" is what is taught by

(a/the) Jina through words which are by nature substantial; understanding it is called *jñapti*.

35-37 (E41-44; U387-388; F21-23) The knower and knowledge are one, and knowledge is not at all an extraneous instrument; when the self, as a knower, has its knowledge perfectly developed, all things--of past, present, or future, subject, object and their modifications--are reflected presently therein.

38-41 (E46-48; U388; F24-25) Both future and past modes are perceptible by knowledge. However, perception which grasps things as "here", i.e., present to the senses, is only mediate awareness, whereas the knowledge of things with and without location, both material and immaterial, whether in future or past modes, is called supersensible (*atīndriya*) knowledge.

42 (E49; U388; F26) If the knower evolves into (i.e., becomes attached to) the object he ceases to have the kind of knowledge that arises when karma is destroyed.

43 (E50; U388; F26-27) Elements of karma necessarily arise; one who is deluded, has attachment and/or aversion, will be bound by them.

44 (E51; U388; F27) Perfected beings (*arhat*) naturally stand, sit, wander and teach, just as women are naturally deceitful.

45 (E52; U389; F27) These perfected beings enjoy the results of their good actions; those actions, born of the fruits of karma, are free from delusion, etc., and are thus considered to arise from the destruction of karma.

46 (E53; U189; F28) There would be no rebirth for any embodied self if the self by itself, through its own nature, did not become auspicious or inauspicious.[63]

47 (E54; U389; F28-29) Awareness born of the destruction of karma knows all things at once in all their variety.

48-52 (E55-60; U389; F30-33) Omniscient knowledge visualises completely and simultaneously the whole range of

variegated and unequal objectivity of the present, past and future. A single substance has infinite modes, and infinite are the classes of substances. To know them serially is an impossibility. So in order to know even a single substance with its modifications it is necessary that one should know simultaneously the object of three senses and three worlds, being still immune from consequent attachment or aversion.

53-58 (E62-68; U389-390; F34-37) This omniscience, which does not require the use of the senses in its functions, can visualize nonconcrete entities, and as such it is the highest. The self, when it functions through organs of sense with which it is endowed in its embodied state, perceives only the perceptible, and sometimes does not; the sense organs cannot perceive simultaneously. The organs constitute a foreign stuff not essentially and naturally belonging to the self, and as such what is perceived by them cannot be natural for the self; so it is only in omniscience, when the self directly visualizes objects without the meditation of the senses, that there is direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*).

59-68 (E69-78; U190-391; F38-44) That self-born, perfect and pure knowledge, which enlightens infinite things and which is free from the stages of perception, is called real happiness (*sukha*). Omniscience is a state of happiness where there is no trace of misery because of the absence of hindering karmas; everything desirable is achieved therein, and it is appreciated by all the aspiring selves. Transmigrating beings are harassed by the senses, and they try to satisfy them by yielding to them; but this pleasure of the senses is misery itself. The self is the substratum of happiness, and bodily happiness is no happiness at all. Since the self is happiness, it is no use pursuing the pleasures of the senses, since it is the liberated self that has both knowledge and happiness (which are not contingent on external accessories), just as the sun has both light and warmth.

69-78 (E80-88; U391-392; F45-49) As a result of good cognitive application, which consists in devotion to gods,

teachers, etc. and the cultivation of philanthropy and fasts, the self is destined to subhuman, human or divine births wherein are available various pleasures of the senses. The happiness even of the gods is not self-established; simply to satisfy their physical itch they enjoy various pleasures, but the enjoyment of these pleasures leads to further prolongation of the embodied condition; their desire for sensory pleasures goes on increasing and they are ever unsatisfied. The happiness derived through the senses is dependent, open to disturbances, terminable and a cause of bondage and dangerous; so it should be completely eschewed. This should be thoroughly realized. Attachment and aversion to various objects should be given up. Good application must be cultivated so that the miseries of the body shall disappear.

79-82 (E89-93; U392; F49-51) Delusion is a great hindrance to self-realization. He who knows the perfected being in substance, quality and mode knows himself, and his delusion evaporates. All perfected beings have destroyed karma and attained liberation by being free from delusion, attachment and aversion, and by realizing the pure self, and they have preached also to that effect.

83-92 (E94-106; U393; F51-58) Delusion consists in being infatuated with various objects. One is baffled, therein developing attachment and aversion which give rise to various kinds of bondage which should be destroyed. The characteristics of delusion are perverted apprehension, cruelty to beings, indulging the senses with objects. This delusion can be exhausted by understanding from scripture the constitution of things from substances, qualities and modes, upon which liberation is attained. The self is constituted of knowledge, and other things are related to it only as substances. Thus the self and the nonself should be understood, if the self is to realize a delusionless state of itself. He is a true saint who understands thus, and he is called *dharma*, as he is free from delusion, expert in scriptures and established in conduct free from attachment.

CHAPTER TWO

1-2 (E108-111; U394; F60-63) An object is made of substance, substances by their nature have qualities, and these again have modes. Those deluded ones who are satisfied with modes are called *parasāmāyikas*; those who rely on the nature of the self are called *svakasāmāyikas*.

3-4 (E112-115; U394; F64-67) A substance is that which remains the same while undergoing birth, maintenance and destruction and has qualities and modes.

5-7 (E118-121; U394; F70-73) There is one mark belonging to all things and their properties; that is existence. That which exists is substance realized through its own nature.

8 (E123; U394; F75) There is no coming to be without destruction, no destruction of anything unborn, and neither birth nor destruction can occur without maintenance.

9 (E125-126; U395; F77) Birth, maintenance and destruction are modes; since modes are modes of substances, everything is substance.

10 (E127; U395; F78) A substance at a single moment has birth, maintenance and destruction inhering in it; thus substance is those three.

11 (E129; U395; F80) One mode arises, another ceases, but the substance remains.

12 (E130; U395; F80) Since the substance transforms itself from one quality to another without itself changing, these modes of qualities are also to be considered substance.

13 (E131; U395; F81) If substance were not existence it would be nonexistence or something else, and wouldn't be substance!

14 (E133; U395; F82) Separateness is occupying different places, says (Mahā)Vīra. Otherness is nonidentity. Substance, quality, mode are all existents, (not separates).

16-18 (E136-139; U395; F84-86) A substance is not a quality nor vice-versa. So nonidentity is not just nonexistence (of the one in the other). The quality is just the substance's transformation; it is not a different thing. "Substance" just

means a thing's existence.

19-22 (E139-1444); U396; F86-90) A substance which forever retains its position can be affirmed and denied, with respect to its existence, according as it is viewed from the perspective of substance or of mode. So far as the substance is concerned there is always nondifference, but there is difference in the mode which pervades the substance for the time being.

23 (E146; U395-396; F91) According to some mode or other a substance exists, does not exist, is indescribable, is both or otherwise.

24-28 (E147-152; U396-397; F93--96) Various activities lead to karmic results which give their fruits: the karma determining one's type (*nāmakarman*), which overpowers the self, shapes the figuration of the body, etc. in a particular existence like that of man, god, etc., and the self-substance is the same individual behind these modes that are developed by karma. There is nothing like absolute production or destruction in this world wherein, at every moment, some modification originates and some other passes away; so this mundane existence is a flux of active change through which the self-substance is moving.

29-34 (E154-160; U397; F96-100) The development of modes in the self, which is soiled by karma from time immemorial, is of the nature of the self, i.e., thinking (*cetanā*); it is of three kinds: awareness, i.e., conceptual construction of objects; the action done; and the fruit which is either happiness or misery. The self then is not the direct agent of these results, yet ordinarily they are attributed to the self. The self, which is itself the agent, means, action and fruit, realizes itself as pure when passions, etc. are not developed.

35-42 (E162-171; U397-398; F102-107) Substance comprises self and not-self. Self is constituted of the application of thought. Not-self or the insentient class comprises five substances: matter, (*pudgala*), i.e. karmic products, from the fine molecule to gross earth, possesses

sense-qualities; *dharma*, the intitiator of movement, serves as the fulcrum of motion; *adharma*, the initiator of stasis, serves as the fulcrum of rest. Space gives accommodation; time marks continuity. Of these matter alone is concrete and the rest are nonconcrete, i.e., devoid of sense-qualities and hence not amenable to sense-perception. All these substances exist in the universe, in which take place transformations consisting of origination, subsistence and destruction collectively or individually, while in the space not in the universe there is space alone.

43-52 (E172-185; U398-400; F109-118) Time is devoid of space-points, while other substances have innumerable space-points (*pradeśa*), and hence they are called collections (*astikāya*). A primary atom has no space-points, but it is itself the unit of measuring space-points. The time required for a primary atom to traverse one space-point of space is called a "moment" (*samaya*). A space-point of space is capable of giving room to the atoms of all substances. All these ultimate units are not exempt from the trio of origination, maintenance and destruction.

53-62 (E185-195; U400-401; F120-124) The universe is stable, eternal and filled with entities endowed with space-points; this is the object of awareness and the knower is the self endowed with the life-essentials, viz., senses, channels of activities, duration of life and respiration, which are fashioned by material substances. The self in its embodied condition, being bound by infatuating and other karma and experiencing the fruits of karma, incurs fresh karma. Being tainted with karma it develops attachment and aversion, and incurs fresh bondage. It takes birth in different grades of existence with different configurations of the body due to *nāmakarman*. Knowledge of things will rescue one from attachment and aversion.

63-70 (E197-203; U401; F125-129)[64] The self's self is cognitive application (*upayoga*). This application is awareness and vision and is good or bad. Good application is

characterized by devotion to religious duties and compassion to living beings and it leads to merit; bad application is characterised by sensual pleasures and passions and cruelty to beings and leads to demerit. In the absence of both there is the pure one which has neither (merit nor demerit). Being free from both good and bad application one should meditate on the self as an embodiment of knowledge and as absolutely different from everything else.

71-74 (E204-207; U402; F129-131) An atom, having no spatial parts and being soundless, "experiences" as either smooth or rough extension over two spatial units or more. The smoothness or roughness increases over more units until it "experiences" an infinite number (of units). Smooth or rough transformations are either even or odd. When one is two degrees higher than another then they are linked, except at the beginning. Thus, e.g., the second-degree smooth is combined with the fourth-degree smooth.

75 (E208; U402; F132) Molecules (*skandha*) of earth, water, wind or fire, comprising two or more parts, have shape and evolve in their appropriate ways.

76-78 (E209-211; U402; F132-133)[65] The physical world is fully packed with molecules, subtle and gross and capable of becoming karma which, coming into contact with the passional condition of a self, flow into that self, but not by the self's agency alone. This is the material constituting the various embodiments of the self.

79-80 (E211-212; U402; F133-134) All the various kinds of bodies consist of substances which are karmic products. The self itself, however, is without sense-qualities, unmanifest, with consciousness (*caitanya*) as its quality, without a mark or shape.

81-82 (E214-215; U402-403; F136-137) Objection: How can this incorporeal self be bound by material karma?

Answer: Just as, though colorless itself, it can see colors, and such experience constitutes its bondage, so likewise it can know substances though itself incorporeal.

83-85 (E217-219; U403; F137-138) The self, composed of cognitive application, undergoes attachment, aversion or infatuation over sense-objects. It is thus that the self is tinged, and thereby karma binds through the modifications of cognitive applications. The bondage of a karmic product is through touch, of a self through attachment, etc., and the two comprise mutual bondage.

86-87 (E219-220; U403; F138-139) The self has space-points wherein penetrate the karmic particles of karmic products; they remain there and pass away according to the period of bondage. When the self develops attachment there is bondage, otherwise not.

88-89 (E221-222; U403; F140) Delusion and aversion are bad, attachment is good or bad depending on whether it is purifying or defiling. A good transformation brings merit, a bad one demerit--so it is said. A transformation which is neither destroys frustrations.

90-94 (E223-227; U403-404; F141-142) The self is the direct agent of the developments of consciousness, but not of material karma. One who does not understand this deludedly thinks "I am this (not-self thing, e.g. this body)". The agent of his own substantial bodily transformations is for a time bound and then released from karma.

95-97 (E228-230; U404; F143) When the self develops attachment and aversion of good and bad forms obstructing awareness, etc., karma becomes involved with it, and this is bondage.

The foregoing (the higher view) is the summary of bondage as set forth by perfected beings; the view of ascetics (*yati*) is different.

98-108 (E231-243; U404-405; F144-150) Successful meditation on the self is possible only when all notions of attachment and mineness are completely severed. Objects whether living or nonliving are not permanent associates of the self which is essentially constituted of cognitive applications. The great saint who is completely immune from

the hindrances of the passions, being rich in knowledge and happiness of all the senses together and having no functioning senses, meditates on the highest happiness.[66]

CHAPTER THREE

1-4 (E246-251; U405; F152-155) The process of becoming a monk (*śramaṇa*) described.

4-7 (E252-255; U406; F155-157) The Jain monk's emblem is of two kinds: internal and external. The internal one, which aims at liberation, consists in being free from infatuation and preliminary sins, in being endowed with pure manifestation of consciousness and activities, and in having no desires at all. The external one consists in possessing a form in which one is born, in pulling out hair and moustache, in pure cognitive application, in being free from harm to beings, and in not attending to the body. A monk is of this sort.[67]

8-9 (E257; U406; F158-159) A monk's vows are listed.

10-12 (E258260; U406-407; F159-160) The one who gives the ordination is the teacher (*guru*); other monks who give advice about correcting faults (*cheda*) are *niryāpakas*.

13-15 (E261-263; U407; F161-162) The monk has no desires, avoids attachment.

16-21 (E264-271; U407-408; F162-165) Faults, e.g. violence,[68] involve heedless (*aprayatna*) action, internal or external. It is the heedlessness that is the problem: the careful monk is unharmed. E.g., when a living being is killed someone may or may not become bound as a result, but from attachment bondage certainly results. Only by absolute nonattachment can the monk avoid inflows.

22-25 (E272-276; U408-409; F166-167) He is allowed to keep only a little quantity of paraphernalia which does not involve sin and which is essential for the practice of his primary virtues. The only acceptable paraphernalia for a monk is said to consist of the bodily form with which he is born, the words of the teacher, (disciplinary) modesty and the study of sacred texts. Other articles of use, on account of his

nonattachment, are sure to disturb him and his course of conduct.

26-31 (E280-290; U409-410; F168-173) The diet and activities of a monk described.

32-36 (E291-297; U410-411; F174-178) A monk should constantly apply himself to the study of scripture whereby he acquires certainty of knowledge and meditational concentration. The scripture is his eye, and enlightens him on the nature of objectivity constituted of both self and notself. This scriptural study prepares him for self-discipline and self-control, and the value of the same will be heightened when he is completely nonattached.

37 (E298; U411; F179) Neither understanding of scripture without practice of self-restraint nor the reverse will suffice.

38-40 (E300-303; U411; F180-181) A (karma-producing) action which would ordinarily take a thousand crores of rebirths to expunge can be lived out in a single breath by someone who knows and practices the threefold auspicious restraint. But one who, though knowing the scripture completely, suffers from delusions about the body, etc., does not attain perfection. He is called self-restrained who fulfils the five observances (*samiti*) and three restraints, controls his five sense-organs, has conquered the passions and has complete vision and knowledge.

41-44 (E304-308; U411-412; F182-185) The differences between the successful monk and the unsuccessful one involves the presence in the former of restraint, right vision, and right conduct, lack of attraction, of aversion and of infatuation.

45-49 (E3309-313; U412; F185-187) Those free from inflows are the monks who have pure cognitive application. Those who are devoted to perfected beings and all who have studied the scriptures are called of good application: they show their respect to monks through praise, homage and attendance. It is they too who are teachers of others who

practice cognitive application.

50-60 (E314-321; U412-413; F188-192) Differences in two applications are classified in terms of the action's object, time, type of addressee, occasion and result.

61-70 (E322-329; U413-414; F193-196) Description of the difference between pure and impure application and the appropriateness of displaying good application towards only-apparent monks. The latter are explained to be those who may follow correct practices but nevertheless do not accept Jain categories. The value of proper respect towards those equal or superior to one in merit is extolled, and the monk is warned to keep the company only of those who practice penances.

71-75 (E331-335; U414-415; F196-199) Without correct understanding of things one transmigrates endlessly. But one who behaves properly, has correct understanding of the (Jain) categories, has given up appropriating things and is not attached to sense-objects is soon liberated, even in this present existence.

6. KUNDAKUNDA, *Samayasāra*

"ET" references are to the Sanskrit restoration of these verses found in Jnanapitha Murtidevi Granthamala English Series 1, (Delhi 1971), together with an English translation (which we assume is a reprint of that of J. L. Jaini, but the translator is not identified in this volume!). A summary (from which we have borrowed extensively below) is provided by A. N. Upadhye in the Introduction to his edition and translation of Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*, op. cit., pp. 42-44. The *gāthās* of the edited work and the summary below are consecutively numbered; T divides it into ten chapters, a division we omit here. The work is in Prakrit.

3 (ET3) The author opens his discourse with the definition of *svasamaya* and *parasamaya*, which respectively stand for the realisation of the self as identical with right vision, etc., and with material karma.

4 (ET6) When the oneness (*ekatva*) of the self is realized there is no bondage at all.

5 (ET9) The aim of the author is to point out this oneness, the same as *bhedavijñāna*, to the best of his ability (*svavibhāvena*).

7-8 (ET14-17) The ultimate aim of every aspirant is to realize the pure self as a knower from the higher perspective. Just as we cannot make a nonnoble person understand unless we talk to him in his language, so the commonsense perspective is quite necessary for the understanding of the pure perspective.

11-12 (ET21-22) The commonsense perspective helps the weak speech of ours, which is incapable of fully expressing reality as is expressed through the pure speech of the higher ones.

13 (ET23) Right (categories) are: self, nonself, merit, demerit, inflow, stoppage of karma, cleansing of karmic traces, bondage, and liberation.

14-22 (ET25-29) The pure perspective consists in realizing the self as unbound and untouched by karma, as one, steadfast and inseparable from its qualities and not united with anything else. The three jewels (of vision, awareness and conduct) stand for that self. Just as we know, believe in and follow a king, so also it should be with the self. Believing the self to be the karmic and nonkarmic (*nokarman*) body is to fail to understand the truth.

24-30 (ET31-35) The self as seen by the omniscient has cognitive application as its permanent mark. A self cannot be material.

Objection: But then hymns praising (the bodily) Tīrthaṁkara or Ācārya must be false!

Answer: That is the commonsense perspective; from the higher perspective the self and the body are not the same. One should not worship the Lord as an embodied person, any more than one should suppose that a city is the same thing as its ruler.

31-38 (ET35-41) Rather one should view the self as knowledge itself, understand it as the conqueror and destroyer of delusion. One should recognize oneself as cognitive application. One must not be subject to the delusion that even an atom of anything else is related to me.

39-48 (ET42-48) Various mistaken views about the self are rehearsed--that it is just a series of desires, etc., others that it is material, others that the self is just the karmic outcome of one's deeds, etc. But the Jina showed that these modifications are themselves the results of karma, and that the eight kinds of karma are material in nature, as well as the effect of karma, that is, frustration. And it is only from the commonsense point of view that Jinas say that the modifications belong to the self, just as one might see the echelon marching and say "the King has started!".

49-56 (ET49-55) A self has no material qualities, no shape; it is just thought (*cetanā*). In the self there is neither desire nor aversion nor delusion, no karmic matter, neither atoms nor molecules, no experiencing of satisfaction or frustration, no yogic stage, no karmic bondage, no stages of progress neither purification nor control. Differences among types of selves are solely due to their karmic attributes. Although these are properties of selves from the commonsense standpoint, none of them actually belong to the self.

57-68 (ET56-62) The self is only characterized by application. Jinas may say that a self has color, etc., but it is only a manner of speaking, since a self is not material. The classifications of selves are the product of *nāmakarman*. Even the stages along the way of spiritual growth attributed to a self are said to be due to deluding karma.

69-75 (ET63-67) One must realize the difference between the self and karmic inflow, and thus avoid anger, etc., which will only increase that influx. When the danger of impurity is known, the self refrains from the causes of inflow. Concentrating on the nature of the self one should consider everything as extraneous. The psychic states of the spirit and

the karmic transformations are naturally related; really speaking the self is the agent of its spiritual states wherein the material stuff is transformed into karman; it is only from the ordinary pont of view that the agency of karma is attributed to the self. The self does not produce any transformation of matter. When the self realizes itself as an embodiment of knowledge, there is no more bondage occasioned by falsehoods, etc.

76-79 (ET67-69) The self knows various kinds of karmic matter having various results but does not transform them, identify with them, or cause them to appear as modes of something else. Nor does matter transform, identify with or cause to appear any modes of the self.

80-86 (E70-74) Still, caused by transformations of the self the karmic products transform, and likewise, caused by karmic conditions the self transforms. The self does not produce changes in karma nor does karma produce changes in the self. Rather, they are occasional causes (*nimittakāraṇa*) of each other. So, from the higher standpoint the self doesn't produce anything except itself. But from the commonsense perspective the self produces the karmic products and experiences their results. If that were true from the higher perspective as well, two different effects would arise from the same cause, which is denied by the Jains.

87-101 (ET74-85) So there are two sorts each of (modes such as) error, ignorance, want of control, activity, delusion, anger, etc., one sort related to the self and the other to the not-self. One sort, application, relates to the self, the other, karmic products, relates to notself. The self's conceptual application is involved in three delusions as appropriating (*upādāna*)--error, ignorance and wrong conduct--though remaining itself pure. As a result of ignorance he seems to become an agent of karma. But this is only the empirical point of view. If the self really were the appropriater or producer of notself then he would have to be notself. A self cannot make a pot, a cloth, etc.; these arise from bodily activity and mental

application of which he is (empirically) the cause. The self does not make the substantial karmic products which become knowledge-obstructing

102-108 (ET86-90) The self indeed causes his own good or bad modifications, which become his karma and produce his experiences. But he does not produce substances or qualities of a karmic sort. When it is seen that with the self as cause a transformation of bondage occurs, it is (only) figuratively spoken of by saying that karma is produced by the self. Likewise, in a figurative way it might be said that the self produces, binds, transforms and acquires karma, as a king is figuratively said to perform the actions, etc. of his kingdom and its people.

109-112 (ET91-92) There are four generic conditions (*pratyaya*) or agents of bondage: falsity, indiscipline, passions and yoga. There are thirteen types of these four, viz., the thirteen stages of progress from false view to complete awareness involving qualities (*saguṇakevala*). These progressive stages are nonconscious (*acetana*) since they result from the arising of karmic products. But it is the stages of progress that produce karma, not the self.

113-120 (ET92-95) If anger, like the self's cognitive applications, were nondifferent from the self then the self would be identical with what is nonself. On the other hand, if anger is entirely different from the self's applications then conditions, karma and nonkarma must also be different from the self. If the substantial body of karmic products does not transform itself and thus become bound to that self, then it must be nontransforming; but if so there can be no transmigration, as is the case for the Sāṃkhya.

Objection: The self itself causes the substantial body of karmic products to transform into karmic modes.

Answer: How can a thinking self cause something that is by nature nontransforming to transform?! So it has to be the substantial body made of karmic products itself that transforms into the various modes; the self does not cause

that. And this goes for all kinds of karma, e.g., for awareness-obstructing karma as well.

121-124 (ET97-98) If the self is not bound by karma and does not have modifications like anger, etc., then it must be nontransforming, and then transmigration cannot occur, and the Sāṁkhya view results.

Sāṃkhya: It is substantial karma (=*prakṛti*) that causes the transformations in the self such as anger.

Answer: How can it do so, since the self is (according to you) incapable of transformation?

Sāṃkhya: The self by itself, without help from *prakṛti*, undergoes the transformations like anger.

Answer: Then what you said above is wrong.

125-136 (ET98-102) The self when cognitively applying anger is angry, when cognitively applying pride is proud, etc. The self is the agent of the modifications (of its applications). If the modification is constituted of correct awarenesses, the karmic mode is good and breeds no karma, if of false--that is, ignorant, impure (involving passions) and activity-involving--awarenesses, the karmic mode is bad and produces karma.

137-142 (ET102-105) If both the self and karmas together cause attachment, etc., then both would be attached. But if the self by himself could cause attachment, etc. it wouldn't require karma to do so. If karmic modifications are really produced by the substances comprising karmic products together with the self, then both matter and self become material. But if karmically produced substance by itself is capable of producing karmic modifications then matter as such must be able to do so (without requiring a self at all). It is from the commonsense perspective that it is said that karmas bind in contact (*spṛṣṭa*) with the self; really karma neither binds nor contacts the self. So the self is bound from one point of view, free from another.

144 (ET106) But that the self is just right vision and right awareness transcends points of view and so is termed "*samayasāra*".

145-150 (ET107-109) Bad karma, involving attachment, opposes morality (*śīla*), and good karma, involving detachment, accords with morality. Both bind, so one should not be attached to either.

151-154 (ET109-112) "Supreme" (*paramātman*), "*samaya*", "pure" (*śuddha*), "knower" (*kevalin*), "sage" (*muni*) and "knower" (*jñānin*)--fixed in this (i.e., what is denoted by all these terms) the wise attain liberation (*nirvāṇa*). Penance and vows undertaken without such fixedness on the highest (self) is childish; it does not itself produce knowledge and only leads to rebirth.

155-163 (ET112-115) Right vision (that there is a) self, etc., right awareness of a thing's nature, and right conduct in rooting out attachment, etc., comprise the path to liberation. The wise (*yati*), appreciating that the destruction of karmas is only for those hewing to the highest (path), will not adhere to the commonsense perspective ignoring the higher perspective. Jina said that falsity undermines right vision, ignorance undermines right awareness, and passions undermine right conduct.

164-180 (ET116-123) Falsity, etc., which are the psychic states of selves in transmigration, are the causes of karmic influx. When the psychic state is free from passions there is no cause for ondage. A ripe fruit fallen to the ground cannot stick back to the stalk, so karma, when once completely destroyed, cannot involve the self in transmigration. A man of right vision, because of his discriminative ability, is above bondage.

181-192 (ET124-129) Neither anger nor the other types of karma have any relation with conceptual application. There is no karma nor any *nokarma* (karmic helper) in application. Errorfree awareness arises when there is pure conceptual application causing no modifications. Just as gold, though heated, does not lose its yellow color, so, though operated on by karma, the knower does not lose his knowerness; his aim is to discriminate the pure self from passional states. Being

free from all atttachments, when one concentrates oneself on his self, there is no more contact with karma and its products.

193-236 (ET130-152) The pleasures, etc. of a man of right vision, because of the complete absence of attachment, etc. in his case, only exhaust his karmic deposit. He has fully realized that his self is only a knower and not to be identified with anything else. Attachment, etc., even to the extent of a primary atom, cause a great danger to self-realization, even though one has mastered all the sacred texts. One should absorb oneself in his self, which is an embodiment of knowledge, and thus be satisfied; that is excellent happiness. A knower, being free from attachment, etc., like a piece of gold thrown in mud, is not rusted by karma; while the ignorant person is to be compared with a piece of iron, which rusts. A man of vision is endowed with desirelessness and other virtues, and is free from fear.

237-287 (ET153-176) If a man, with his body smeared with oil, stands in a dusty place and takes exercise, he is coated with dust; similarly a man of false faith, passing through various states of attachment, etc. and acting in various ways, is bound by karmic dust. On the other hand, when the oil is removed the dust will not stick to his body in spite of his various exercises; so a man of vision, who is not at all attached to anything, though he acts in various ways, is not bound by karma. One should be always indifferent to the effects of karma. Really speaking, bondage results from impure thought-activity, whether a sinful act is committed or not. Though the thought-activity proceeds from some object or the other it is not the object but the thought-activity that is responsible for bondage.

288-307 (E178-187) A man, bound in shackles, cannot get himself released if he simply thinks of shackles without thinking of breaking them; so a man in transmigration must break the bonds of karma so that he might be completely free. The chisel of self-discrimination will help him to cut off these

karmic shackles, and then the pure self is realized.

308-318 (E189-195) The self is neither cause nor effect. The seat of consciousness (*cetayitṛ*) is born and dies for the purpose (*artha*) of *prakṛti*, and *prakṛti* is born and dies for the purpose of consciousness. Through the relation of the two through mutual conditioning (*anyonyapratyaya*) transmigration is produced. As long as the relation between self and *prakṛti* is not broken it remains unenlightened. When the relation is broken the wise knower (*muni*) becomes free from actions and remains a spectator of them, not experiencing them. Only the nonknowing self is an enjoyer of them; the knower knows them but is no enjoyer (*avedaka*). However, he knows the nature of karmas and their results, whether good or bad.

319-323 (E195-197) Likewise, knowledge is neither doer nor enjoyer; it only knows bondage and release, karma and its destruction. Ordinary folk and monks who believe in the perpetual creation of worlds, who believe that Viṣṇu or the self actually creates everyone and everything, are precluded from belief in liberation.

332-335 (ET200-201) It is through karma that the self is ignorant or knower, asleep or awake, satisfied or frustrated. It is karma that leads him to wrong beliefs and practices, that he finds himself in various heavens or hells. Karma is what gives and destroys; a self is a nondoer.

338-344 (ET202-203) So no self is guilty of killing; killing refers to one karma destroying another karma.

Objection: Yes! You thus accept the Sāṃkhya position!

Answer: According to the Sāṃkhya position *prakṛti* thus becomes the agent and all selves are inactive.

Objector (a Vedāntin?): A self transforms itself.

Answer: That cannot be, for scripture tells us the self is eternal and occupies uncountable places and so cannot change, being co-extensive with the universe.

345-355 (ET206-209) The self dies in the sense that its modes terminate, from another viewpoint it does not die. Both

are one-sided views. The person who believes that the agent-self is identical with the experiencing-self has a wrong view and is not a perfected being. The carpenter uses his tools but is not the same as them, the self uses its organs but is not the same as them. That is the commonsensical way of understanding it; here is the higher way. As the artist conceives his work and then makes a physical form that is one with it, so the self makes karma and then becomes it.

356-365 (ET211-213) Analogy between chalk, which while making the board white remains distinct from the board, and the self, who while knowing an object remains distinct from it. But this is only the commonsense perspective; the higher analogy is as follows. Chalk whitens a thing because it is essentially white; a knower knows a thing because it is intrinsically a knower.

366-389 (ET215-225) The properties of the conscious self and nonconscious matter are entirely different from each other. Thus destroying the former leaves both the purified self and matter unsullied. And the properties of one thing (the self) are not produced by a different thing (matter). So by getting rid of attachment, aversion and delusion the self stops thinking of itself as an agent and enjoyer and remains only pure consciousness. This is certainly (*niścaya*) productive confession (*pratikramaṇa*), productive reflecting, productive conduct. But if one identifies his self with his experiences of the results of karma he breeds more karma.

390-407 (ET226-232) Awareness, which is intentional, is a different kind of thing from any nonintentional object or organ. It is different, too, from reflective discerning (*adhyavasāya*), for reflection isn't aware of anything. And since the self is always aware it cannot be other than awareness itself. So the self, which is pure consciousness only, does not grasp or relinquish any object.

408-415 (ET233-236) Those who flourish insignia on their bodies to indicate their exalted status are false monks who misunderstand the path to liberation. That path consists

of vision, awareness and conduct. One who follows it will achieve liberation.

7. KUNDAKUNDA, *Niyamasāra*

"ET" refers to the edition and translation by Uggar Sain, Sacred Books of the Jainas 9, Lucknow 1931.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

CHAPTER ONE

1 (ET1) Dedication to Vīra Jina, the possessor of supreme knowledge.

3 (ET2) Restraint (*niyama*) is what is worth doing, viz., right vision, awareness and conduct. The addition of *-sāra* is to avoid anything contradictory to it.

4 (ET3) Restraint is the aid to liberation; its fruit is the highest liberation.

5-6 (ET3-4) Right inclination (*samyaktva*) is belief in qualified persons (*āpta*), in scripture and in the fundamental topics. A qualified person is a self possessing all the good attributes and free from defects, which are listed.

7 (ET4) The one free from those defects, possessing knowledge, is called the highest self (*paramātman*).

8 (ET4) His words are scripture, and in them are enunciated the fundamental topics.

9 (ET4) These topics are: self, karmic product, initiator of movement, initiator of rest, time and space, along with their qualities and modes.

10 (ET5) A self essentially has cognitive application (*upayoga*), which is directed towards vision or awareness. An application of awareness may be either natural (*svabhāva*) or nonnatural (*vibhāva*).

11-12 (ET6-7) Natural awareness is complete (*kevala*), involving no use of the sense-organs, and independent (*asahāya*). Nonnatural awareness is of four kinds: immediate, verbal, extrasensory and telepathic. Lack of awareness

(*ajñāna*) is also of three kinds, starting with the immediate.

13-14a (ET7-8) Visual cognitive application is of two kinds, natural and nonnatural. The natural kind is complete (*kevala*), nonsensory and independent. Nonnatural cognitive application is of three kinds: sensory vision (*cakṣurdarśana*), nonsensory vision, and extrasensory vision.

14b-15 (ET8-9) Modes are of two kinds, natural and nonnatural. The nonnatural modes are human, hellish, animal and heavenly. Natural modes are those that do not stem from (past) actions.

16-17 (ET9) Human selves are of two kinds: those born to work and those who merely enjoy. There are seven sorts of hell-beings. Animals are of fourteen sorts, and heavenly beings are of four kinds. Consult *Lokavibhāga* (?) for details.

18-19 (ET11-12) From the commonsensical viewpoint a self performs karmic acts and experiences karmic products, but from the higher viewpoint the self is an agent and enjoyer through the modifications of karma. From the substantial viewpoint a self is free from the afore-mentioned modes, but from the modal viewpoint selves have both (natural and nonnatural) modes.

CHAPTER TWO

20 (ET12) Not-self or karmic matter is of two sorts: atomic and molecular. There are six kinds of molecules and two kinds of atoms.

21-24 (ET12-13) (The six kinds of molecules are:) gross-gross (earth, stones); gross (ghee, water); gross-subtle (shadow, sunshine), subtle-gross (objects of touch, taste, smell and hearing), subtle (karmic molecules attached to a self), and subtle-subtle (all the rest).

25 (ET13) A causal atom (*kāraṇaparamāṇu*) is a cause of the four *dhātus* (viz., earth, water, fire, air). An effect atom (*kāryaparamāṇu*) is the smallest molecule.

26 (ET13-14) An atom is indivisible and noncognizable.

27 (ET14-15) Something that has one taste, one color,

one smell and two touches is of natural qualities. Those available to all the senses are held to be nonnatural in Jainism.

28 (ET15) A natural mode is not dependent on other things; a nonnatural mode is molecular.

29 (ET15) From the higher viewpoint an atom is called a space-point, but from the commonsense viewpoint that appellation is applied to a molecule.

31 (ET16) Time can be divided into two kinds, a moment and a trail (lit., "wink") (*āvali*), or into three kinds, past, present and future. Past time is measured by (the number of) destroyed shapes multiplied by uncountable trails.

32 (ET16-17) (The number of) moments is infinite times the number of karmic products times the number of selves. "Real time" (*paramārtha kāla*) occurs in worldly space.

34 (ET17) The five nonself categories are called "collections" (*astikāya*). They occupy many spatial units according to Jainism.

35-36 (ET17-18) The space-points of material things are either countable, uncountable or infinite. In initiators of movement, initiators of stasis and in each self as well as in the universe they are uncountable; in what is other than the universe they are infinite. Time, having no extension, has only one space-point.

CHAPTER THREE

38-49 (ET20-23) A long list of things a self is not and has not are provided. All of them are predicated of a self commonsensically, but from the highest point of view every self is a liberated self.

50 (ET28) All these things just listed should be renounced.

51-53 (ET29-30) What right awareness involves.

CHAPTER FOUR

56-60 (ET31-33) The five vows of noninjury, truth,

nonstealing, chastity and renunciation are described.

61-65 (ET33-34) How to carry on the daily activities of walking, speaking, eating, handling things, and excretion.

66-70 (ET34-35) How to restrict in a proper way daily activities of thought, speech, and body, initially by avoiding improper behavior, eventually by complete abstention.

71 (ET36) A perfected being is free from bad karma, has such perfect attributes as knowledge, etc., and has thirty-four superior qualities.

72 (ET37) Those are called "liberated" (*siddha*) who have destroyed eight kinds of karmic bondage, have eight properties, exist eternally at the top of the universe,

73 (ET37) Those are called "teacher" who observe five kinds of conduct, control all the five senses, are firmly determined and of deep qualities.

74 (ET37-38) Preceptors (*upādhyāya*) are those brave ones who have the three jewels, teach the Jina's categories, and are desireless.

75 (ET38) Monks (*sādhu)* are those who, free from worldly occupations, remain in four kinds of contemplation, without possessions and undeluded.

76 (ET40) All the above activities are examples of right conduct from the commonsense viewpoint. What right conduct is from the higher standpoint will be indicated later.

CHAPTER FIVE

77-81 (ET40-41) What the seeker should say to himself: "I am not a self", "I am not a doer", etc.

82-94 (ET42-45) What confession (*pratikramaṇa*) consists of is explained as complete renunciation by the saint of wrong vision, wrong belief and wrong conduct.

CHAPTER SIX

95-106 (ET46-49) Repentance (*pratyākhyāna*) involves abandoning sophistry (*jalpa*), prevention of good and bad thoughts and actions, and meditation on oneself as a perfect

knower, as free from karmic bondage, as nonattached, as only cognition, as eternal, equanimous and free from passions.

CHAPTER SEVEN

107-112 (ET50-52) Reflection (*ālocana*) involves concentration by an ascetic on his self as free from matter whether karmic or not, as without qualities or modes. There are four kinds of reflection: reflection proper, eradication (*āluñcana*) of the roots of karma, obtaining unchangingness (*avikṛti*) in equanimity, and purity of states (*bhāvaśuddhi*), i.e., freedom from thoughts involving desire, pride, etc.

CHAPTER EIGHT

113-121 (ET53-55) Atonement (*prāyaścitta*) involves observing vows, care, sense-control, self-concentration. It results in the destruction of karmic molecules accreted by the self.

CHAPTER NINE

122-133 (ET56-59) The highest concentration (*parama samādhi*) described. It leads to pure equanimity.

CHAPTER TEN

134-140 9ET60-61) Supreme devotion (*bhakti*) described. It leads to liberation.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

141-158 (ET62-67) One of real independence (*niścaya āvaśyaka*) can perform independent actions capable of destroying karma; thus it is the path of liberation. The one of real independence--who is different from the man of good or bad thoughts, or who meditates on qualities and modes--thinks of his self as stainless, and thus gains equanimity. He is known as one of "internal self" (*antarātman*); engaged only in pure nonlinguistic meditation and passionless conduct, studying scripture, observing vows, he is engaged only in self-

concentration. Since there are various kinds of selves, karmic bondages and attainments one should avoid discussions with both those of one's own faith and of others. That (path) leads to perfect knowledge.

CHAPTER TWELVE

159 (ET68) Vision and awareness coexist in the man of perfect knowledge.

160 (ET69) Objection: Actually, awareness illuminates other things, vision illuminates the self only, and it is the self which illuminates itself and other things.

161-167 (ET69-71) Answer: If awareness only illuminates others then vision is different from awareness. If the self illuminates other things then vision is different from the self. From the commonsense viewpoint, just as awareness and the self illuminate other things so does vision. But from the higher viewpoint both awareness and vision illuminate the self alone. Really, the completely knowing Lord (*bhagavān*) sees only the self, but neither universe or nonuniverse. Awareness of both material and nonmaterial things, of conscious and unconscious things, of self and others, that awareness is called "direct" (*pratyakṣa*) and supersensible. One who does not perceive all the items just listed together with their qualities and modes has only indirect vision.

168-171 (ET71-72) Commonsensically understood, a perfectly knowing Lord knows the universe and the nonuniverse but not the self. But really, knowledge is the essential nature of a self, so a self always knows (its) self. If it were not so it would mean that awareness is a separate thing from the self. But awareness cannot occur without a self, nor vice-versa. So just as awareness illuminates the self (the knower), so does vision. But a perfect knower does not have to exert himself to know; that is why he is a "perfect" knower and is called free from bondage.

172-182 (ET72-75) Bondage arises in an ordinary person from intentionally (*irhā*) expressed thoughts; in a

(perfect) knower language, not issuing from thoughts, causes no bondage. Furthermore, a perfect knower does not intentionally perform actions; thus he incurs no karmic bondage. As soon the length-of-life karma ends, all remaining karma is destroyed and the self rises to the top of the universe. There the perfect knower is free from birth or death; it is pure, supreme and free from the eight kinds of karma. In liberation there is neither frustration nor satisfaction, no karma of any kind, no thought, nothing good or bad, no concentration; there is only *nirvāṇa* (he is *siddha*).

183-186 (ET75-76) The movements (*gamana*) of selves and of karmic products occur only within the collection of initiators of movement and no further, since there is nothing beyond.

8. KUNDAKUNDA (?), *Aṣṭaprābhṛta*

Summary by Ratna Lahiri

Prakrit *Pāhuda* (Sanskrit *Prābhṛta*) means a special gift, for example an offering to a king, say a text having verses (*pada*) of essential value. In Jaina literature it came to mean chapters in sacred texts like this one. It is believed that Kundakunda wrote 84 *Pāhuda* works. A. N. Upadhye[69] has enumerated 43 *pāhudas*, though not all are available. In keeping with our practice in this volume we use the Sanskrit *prābhṛta* throughout.

Ascription of this work to Kundakunda is rather doubtful.

"E" references are to the publication found in the Kundakunda Kahāna Digambar Jain Teerth Suraksha Trust's version, published from Jaipur (7th edition, 1994).

A summary of this work can also found in the Upadhye's Introduction cited in note 69, pp. 27-34.

CHAPTER I: *Darśana Prābhṛta*

This Chapter has 36 verses in which, after the benediction, the importance of right vision is emphasized.

2-10 (E3-19) Right vision is essential. Those who do not have right vision are not fit for reverence. Even though they may perform austerities for thousands of years they will not achieve salvation or know the self. Those who have realized right inclination do not gather further karma particles and the existing ones are washed away. The selves that are bereft of right vision, right awareness and right conduct are the worst. They perish themselves and cause their followers to perish as well. Such people make allegations against the righteous in order to hide their own faults.

If the root perishes, then the branches, leaves, flowers and fruits also do not prosper. Similarly, if the basic right awareness is missing, control, etc. and all other spiritual qualities also fail to prosper.

12-13 (E20-21) One who is bereft of right awareness and, considering himself well controlled, desires others to revere and bow to him, will become lame and dumb as vegetables and will never achieve knowledge. Those who bow to such teachers of wrong faith will also never achieve knowledge.

23-27 (E28-31) Just as the one with wrong vision is not fit for reverence, so also the man without control is unfit. Even though such ones may have given up dress, etc. and other outer habits, if they are not internally well controlled they are not fit for reverence. Neither body nor family nor caste is fit for reverence; the only quality fit for reverence is (the combination of) right vision, awareness and conduct. In the path of Jina anyone bereft of the (above) three gems should not be worshipped.

28-36 (E32-37) Just as the lack of qualities is not fit for reverence, similarly the one with positive qualities must not be ignored. Those who do not worship the sages with these right qualities due to jealousy, etc. are not righteous folk with

proper vision. Have proper vision at least: that is right awareness. This right awareness is the first step to the castle of liberation. This causes awareness and conduct to become right. Vision, belief, austerities and conduct when proper lead to a controlled balance known as liberation. This correct vision is to be lauded in every way, and leads to infinite pleasurable knowledge that liberates.

Sūtra Prābhṛta

1 (E39) The path shown by *arhats*, those with untied knots (*gaṇadhara*) and gods (*deva*) and is celebrated by Jina saints, is by tradition passed on through *sūtras* and aphorisms, also called "threads".

3 (E46) Just as having the thread, the needle does not get lost, similarly by following these aphorisms the seeker will stay on the right path.

5 (E47) Substances, self and not-self and their essences, are described in the aphorisms, which show what is desirable and what is not. Having faith in those teachings is right awareness.

8 (E53) Those aspirants who follow these aphorisms are able to destroy their karma. Those who do not follow these practices may be important chiefs of monasteries or even be like Śiva or Viṣṇu, but they will continue to roam the worlds. Therefore aspirants should follow the aphorisms.

18 (E60) As the child is born, so is the garb of the ascetic. This insures no acquisition of karma whatsoever. If an ascetic acquires even a little, he is bound to become a vegetable.

21-22 (E63) Three kinds of dress codes have been described in the Jina aphorisms. The best is that of the naked Digambara saints, second best is that of pupils (laymen) and the third is that of Jaina women ascetics. There is no other garb that is to be revered.

23 (E64) Even if an ascetic reaching the highest stage of semi-realized ones (Tīrthaṅkaras) puts on clothes, he will

not be liberated, so what can be said of others? Nudity is the only path, all other paths are wrong paths.

24 (E64) For women, nudity is not possible, therefore they cannot be liberated. Very small mobile bacteria keep growing in their vaginas, between their breasts, and under their armpits and in their navel. They are forever worried about their monthly periods and are by nature lazy, so exemplary asceticism is not possible for them. However, they are not evil or demeritorious, as they may have right vision, right awareness and one-aspected right conduct.

25-26 (E65-66) If a woman has right inclination and practices austerities, then she is laudable and may reach the heavens, but cannot be liberated in the woman mode. A woman cannot practice proper meditation either due to her lethargic nature, lack of purity of mind and worry of monthly period, etc.

Cāritra Prābhṛta

5 (E71) There are two kinds of right action: right inclination based on right action, and controlled perfection in outer conduct. Both have been taught in the Jina way. And that pure right inclination conduct is also right controlled conduct.

18 (E81) The self knows the true nature of essentials by having right vision of them, having correct awareness about substances and their modes, having right inclination toward their nature and thus performing right conduct. This right conduct is nothing other than pure right vision based on true belief. Mere appropriation of outer right conduct, without correct views and awareness, will not help one to attain liberation.

23 (E85) Various rules of conduct for ascetics are described. Five kinds of smaller vows, three quality vows and four educational vows are the twelve ways of those of right controlled conduct.

24 (E86) Abstaining from killing mobile beings, from

untruth, from taking what is not given or belongs to another, from taking a woman belonging to another, and from limiting acquisitions are the five lesser vows. The other vows and conduct rules are described.

Bodha Prābhṛta

1 (E100) Eleven concepts are explained to underline the asceticism required of teachers of the path.

3-4 (E102-103) These, as told by Vītarāgadeva, have to be known in sequence from i-viii (following). Then the last three (ix-xi) as told by *arhats* have to be known.

5-7 (E103) i. The exemplary ascetic's abode (*āyatana*).

8-9 (E105-106) ii. The house of worship (*caityagṛha*).

10 (E106) iii. The Jina image (*pratimā*).

14 (E109) iv. One who shows right views and has himself internally right vision..

16 (E111) v. The picture of the perfect ascetic is pure, extremely detached and causes karma to cease (*jinabimba*).

19 (E112) vi. Qualities of the same enumerated (*jinamudrā*)

20-23 (E115) vii. The kind of knowledge, external and internal, that graces the ascetic.

24 (E116) viii. The true definition of gods that are givers of the four aims of man (*puruṣārtha*).

26 (E117) ix. True pilgrimage is to visit the ascetic and bathing the self in purity, etc.

28 (E119-131) x. Qualities of the realized highest state of destruction of the *ghāti* karma, etc. in great detail.

45-49 (E133-142) xi. The highest type of renunciation after giving away (*pravrajya*) everything possessed. In great detail the true ascetic is described as one who is internally and externally renounced.

60-62 (E142-147) These eleven concepts emphasize internal purity as opposed to mere outward show and physical renunciation. It is helpful to humans, as has been told in great detail above, if practiced with emphasis on the internal

matching the external austerities.

These Prakrit aphorisms have come to be heard in tradition, as told by the Jina god (Mahāvīra) and known to the fifth *śrutakevali* Bhadrabāhu who told it to his disciple *Viśākhācārya*. Bhadrabāhu had special knowledge of the twelve limbs and fourteen pre-limbs (*pūrvāṅga*) in full detail; hence he was a *śrutajñānī*. He was the high teacher of the *gamaka* type of preceptors who knew the true meaning of an aphorism and parse it accordingly. Praise be to him.

Bhāva Prābhṛta

Explains the importance of pure mental attitude without which nothing can be fruitful.

3-4 (E152-153) Outer acquisitions are renounced for the sake of mental or attitudinal purity. However, without giving up internal acquisitions like attachments, etc. outer renunciations, even if practiced for a million years, will be useless. Therefore travelers on the path of liberation should recognize mental attitude as the first requisite.

7-10 (E155-156) O Self, you have accepted outer austerities so often, but without the inner garb you have continued to suffer the sorrows associated with the four types of births. In the infernal worlds you had extreme cold, heat and shelter problems; in the animal births you had digging, burning, pain, piercing, stoppage, etc.; in the human births you had fear of future, mental, physical, etc.; and in the godly incarnations you had separation, inferiority, etc. types of sorrows.

17-20 (E161-162) What more can be said when without a sense of self you are shriveling in the most impure place in your mother's womb. If all the milk you have drunk from so many mothers were to be collected it would fill the oceans. The tears mothers have shed for your birth and death will again fill the oceans. You have taken so many births already that if the bones, marrow and meat of all those bodies were to be collected it would make a pile larger than the Sumeru

mountain.

23-24 (E164-165) O Self, without the mental state of recognizing the self you have resided in the three worlds in water, earth, air, fire, mountains, rivers, trees, forests, etc. and everywhere you have suffered. You have continued to eat karmic products (*pudgala*) and yet are not satisfied. You have been thirsty and drunk from waters of the three worlds but have not yet quenched your thirst. Considering all this, look towards ending this by meditating on the three gems (*ratnatraya*).

30-32 (E168-169) Without acquiring the three gems you have suffered in this world since infinite time, so now concentrate on the three gems. This means having right vision of the self, with right awareness and conduct, so that your death this time becomes a good death (*sumaraṇa*) and not a bad death (*kumaraṇa*) and you acquire eternal bliss.

34-35 (E173-174) Describing the futility of having only the outer garb (*dravyaliṅga*) he addresses the self again. There is no place left on earth where you did not take birth and die with only an outer garb, nor are there any matter-particles left that you have not acquired in the process. Still you have not been liberated, because without the internal garb (*bhāvaliṅga*) you continue to suffer the sorrows of birth, old age, etc.

37 (E175) In each finger-length of this body there are ninety-six kinds of illnesses. Imagine how many in the whole body which you have suffered in the past and will suffer during your future births.

39-41 (E176-177) O ascetic, you have lived in the impure place of your mother's womb. There you have eaten the liquids created from the already mouthed food of the mother. Then as an infant you have unknowingly lain in filth and eaten filthy things. This body is full of impure meat, bones, marrow, and blood, feces and pus, in which you continue to have attachment and therefore are suffering forever.

43 (E178) One who has merely left the family is not

renounced; the truly renounced is one who has rid himself of the inner states of attachments. So, knowing this, give up internal passions. There have been many that have given up acquisition of bodily needs and become renounced outwardly, but having egoism, they have not succeeded. Only when they gave up egoism did they get liberated. An outwardly renounced person acquires many special powers but anger can cause it all to fall.

52 (E187) Thus it is evident that outer nudity without inner purity is futile. The outer garb when added to right inner attitude leads to the dropping off of the karmic nature. Knowing thus, you should meditate on the self.

56-57 (E190) The ascetic who, having rid himself of bodily attachments and passions arising out of egoism, meditates on the self, is known as the *bhāvaliṅgī*. He is completely detached. "My nature is without attachment, so I renounce all other crutches and take hold of the self"--this is how the ascetic should think. Also,

58 (E191) "I am the knowledge-faith-natured self, and everything else adhering or associating to it is separate from me."

62, 64 (E193-195) The self is of the nature of consciousness. Dwelling constantly in the conscious, the knowledge-natured self leads to liberation. (Refutes Cārvāka.) The self is without taste, form, smell, manifestation, sound, garb, or shape.

66 (E196) The stages of aspirant and ascetic are caused by the right mental attitude.

67 (E197) The outer garb with the inner attitude leads to destruction of karma. Otherwise, if nakedness were all that was required, infernal beings and animals would be the first to be liberated. They actually suffer even more, so it is clear that nudity alone can only lead to sorrows and further rounds of the worlds.

69 (E198) The aspirant with outward nudity, when active in backbiting, ridiculing others, bad language, etc.,

begets a bad name and becomes the butt of derision. Therefore one should totally renounce all mental faults and possessions before taking the outer garb (of nakedness).

74 (E201) The inner attitude is the key to a higher state (heaven) and liberation. The striver who is bereft of inner purity is going to animal births because his mind is clouded with impure activities.

89 (E211) Without purity of inner being the external renouncing of acquisitions, living in caves, understanding, studies, etc.--all activities are useless.

94-98 (E214-216) Accepting the twenty-two discomforts (*pariṣaha*); meditating on the twelve reflections (*anuprekṣa*); contemplating the nine substances, seven essentials, ten types of non-celibacy, and revealing the nine types of celibacy are advised in order to purify inner atttitude. Only with this inner attitude can the outer-garbed ascetic acquire right vision, awareness and conduct; without these he gets the four births with eternal sorrows.

121-122 (E236-237) Meditation results in liberation. Eliminating the frustration-producing and cruel (*raudra*) types, practice the *dharma* and the white (*śukla*) types of meditations. The ascetic who is merely outer-garbed is not able to practice the latter two types of meditation.

125-126 (E239-240) Concentration of awareness is meditation. Drink the pure cooling waters of meditation with right inclined attitude, to cool the fever of worldliness. By meditation the seeds of karma are burnt, from which the sapling of worldliness then cannot arise.

131 (E243) One who has reached the inner-attitude state does not wish to acquire special prodigious gifts, or the pleasures of men and gods. He only wants to benefit his self as soon as possible.

138 (E248) Just as the snake that drinks jaggery-mixed milk is still not rid of its poison, those not eligible for liberation do not forego their misconceptions even after hearing the Jain way.

141 (E250) They continue to hold false beliefs in only one false perspective and continue to suffer worldly travails. Think about it. You should forego the 363 false faiths and adhere to the Jain faith only.

143 (E253) The body without right vision is like a moving corpse. A corpse is not worthy of worship. The Jain *muni* and aspirant have right vision and are worthy.

A detailed description of the qualities of the good monk follows.

164 (E267) Thus knowing the value of right inclination and the faults of false faiths, accept the right inner attitude as the first step to liberation and to the four aims of man: *dharma, artha, kāma, mokṣa.*

Mokṣa Prābhṛta

The eternal blissful state of the self that has achieved liberation is described in 106 verses.

4-7 (E273-275) The self has three aspects, outer, inner and higher. The first relates to the outer senses, the second to the mind and intuition, and the third to what is known only to the self, the inner soul. Give up the outer for the inner. The self is pure, without sense-organs, without body, desirable and praiseworthy in all ways, eternal and realized.

10 (E277) Causes of bondage and liberation are discussed. Substances other than the self cause it bondage: therefore dwell in the self and renounce the nonself.

14-19 (E279-283) Anything other than the intrinsic nature of the self, e.g., wife, children, wealth, possessions, etc., are nonself. The embodiment of knowledge, eternal self-god is the self-substance (*svadravya*). Those who meditate on self-substance get liberation.

29 (E289) The seeker of the self realizes that all talk is useless because all else is false, unconscious and embodied. I am not so. Therefore he remains silent and meditates on the self.

31 (E290) The seeker who is asleep to outer behavioral

practices is awake to inner needs. Knowing thus, a yogi relinquishes all outer interaction and meditates on the self.

37 (E294) One who knows essentials has knowledge. One who is inclined to knowing essentials has vision, and one who does meritorious deeds as opposed to evil ones is of right conduct.

59 (E309-310) Understanding without austerities (Sāṃkhya) and austerities without understanding are both futile. Liberation comes from knowledge based on austerities. Meditation is the best austerity. However some fallen ones say it is not possible in this age. This is not true. Knowledge with austerities is the path.

64 (E313) One who becomes absorbed in the self in meditation, that pure conduct ascetic definitely achieves liberation, knowing the self to be of pure conduct, view and awareness.

65-86 Further detailed description of the path for ascetics. Then the path for lay aspirants is described.

87-88 (E327-328) Right vision is the first essential. Whosoever in the past has been liberated, or shall be in the future, all are due to the greatness of right vision.

103-105 (E337-339) The best substance is the self, which resides in one's own body. The five highest realized states also remain immersed in their selves. Right vision, awareness and conduct are the stages of this self, so I surrender to the self alone.

Liṅga Prābhṛta

2 (E348) The truly religious self (Digambara monk) has the garb (nakedness), but merely accepting the garb is not enough. So recognize the inner condition (*bhāva*) which is essential.

3-4 (E349-350) The sinful people who laugh at the naked bodies of Jain monks are denounced in strong terms. Those who taking the garb (nakedness) then dance and play instruments, etc. to cause ridicule, are animals, not monks.

5 (E350) Those who having renounced everything take the garb and afterwards acquire things, they are not true monks but ignorant and like animals.

6-13 (E351) Those who still have appetites for tasty food, run to eat, fight among themselves, sleep whenever they like, run as they walk, gamble, and jump, even after taking the garb, are neither ascetics or human; they are animals.

18 (E358) Monks who take special interest in householders, whether they be initiated or not, do not keep to the acceptable activities of ascetics and do not revere their preceptors, are not ascetics, they are animals.

20 (E359) Those garb-takers (nude monks) who believe in women, or deal with them taking them into their confidence, are worse than the animals, they are fallen. Even if very erudite, such garb-taking ascetics are not true monks.

Śīla Prābhṛta

2 (E364) There is no knowledge without right conduct, nor right conduct without right awareness.

5 (E367) Knowledge without proper conduct is meaningless. Without proper vision, the taking of the naked garb is meaningless. Without self-control, austerities are useless.

6 (E368) Right awareness must be purified by conduct. Undertaking the garb (naked) should be purified with right vision and austerities with self-control. Definitely great results will be achieved.

20 (E376) Good conduct is the purest of austerities, good conduct is the purity of right vision, good conduct is the purity of knowledge and good conduct is also the enemy of sense pleasures and is a step to liberation.

29 (E382) One does not see the liberation of dogs, donkeys, cows and women. Only those who seek the four aims of human life are liberated.

38 (E388) Those who have understood the essence of

Jain teachings and have thus renounced all sense pleasures, who practice their wealth of austerities (austerities are their only wealth), and are patient, and have become pure due to right conduct, those ascetics beget the bliss of realized beings.

9. KUNDAKUNDA, *Dvādaśānuprekṣā*

Edited by Balabhadra Jaina, *Bārasanupekkhā (Dvādaśānuprekṣā)* (New Delhi 1990), is our "E". The summary of contents provided here is taken from the Introduction to A. N. Upadhye's *Śrī Kundakundācārya's Pravacanasāra* (op. cit.), pp. 37-38.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye

It contains ninety-one *gāthās*. This work deals with twelve reflections which should necessarily be cultivated for the stoppage of karmic influx. The following are the topics on which the monk is to reflect constantly.

1-7 (E1-4) Various paraphernalia, relatives, physical strength and beauty, etc. are all transitory; the soul alone is eternal and above all these.

8-13 (E5-7) No external things like gems, medicines, armies and weapons can rescue the soul from death; the only shelter is the self itself which is the seat of five dignitaries and an abode of right vision, awareness, conduct and austerities.

14-20 (E8-10) The soul is alone, alone responsible for the fruits of the acts done.

21-23 (E11-12) Relatives, friends and this body: all these constitute the object external, and are absolutely separate from the soul which is an embodiment of faith and knowledge.

24-38 (E13-22) The soul is wandering in *saṃsāra*, suffering many miseries with false motives and pretended attachments; the soul, when it is free from karmas, gets out of *saṃsāra*.

39-42 (E23-25) This universe is threefold with hells below and heavens above that are the consequences of inauspicious and auspicious manifestations of consciousness; when there is pure manifestation, liberation is attained.

43-46 (E26-27) Everything in this world is impure, and the soul alone, when free from karma, is pure and an abode of eternal happiness.

47-60 (E28-35) Falsity, vowlessness, passions and various activities are the causes of karmic influx which is the cause of *saṃsāra*.

61-65 (E36-38) Such religious activities, which counteract the karmic influx, should be reflected upon.

66-67 (E39) Further the twofold way of shedding karmic matter should be considered.

68-82 (E40-47) Then eleven *pratimās* of a householder and ten *dharmas* of a monk should be considered; the internal and external attachment should be given up, and one should meditate on the pure nature of the self.

83-86 (E48-49) Enlightenment is rare, so one should reflect on the means of attaining it.

87-91 (E50-52) Reflection on these twelve topics is spiritually fruitful, and leads on to liberation.

SAMANTABHADRA (430?)

The most complete discussion about what little we know or can surmise about this author is by Saratchandra Ghoshal, writing in 1944 (more recently published as *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā of Āchārya Samantabhadra* (New Delhi 2002), pp. 1-20). If we assume, as Ghoshal does, that Pūjyapāda (or Devanandin) lived in the fifth century--he claims that "It has been ascertained that Pūjyapāda lived before 482 A.D."--he reasons as follows: "This Pūjyapāda has mentioned Samantabhadra in his work *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa* (Vol. 4, p. 140)--'*catuṣṭayaṃ samantabhadrasya*'." (p. 12). If this is

correct it fixes Samantabhadra's date prior to 482, and if we make our usual 50-year interval assumption we arrive at the date we have opted for here. Ghoshal cites various sources in favor of a much earlier date than this. It seems clear, however, that Samantabhadra must follow Umāsvāti and Kundakunda. Inscription No. 64 of "Inscriptions in Sravanabelagola" by Lewis Rice confirms this order.

Besides the two works summarized below a number more are ascribed to Samantabhadra, including several *stotras*: *Svayambhūstotra* (on which Prabhācandra has commented), *Stutividyā* (it goes by other names), *Ratnakaraṇḍaśrāvakācāra,* and a number of other works. Ghoshal remarks (p. 19): "Though references to these (other) works are found in works of Jaina writers of a very late date, nothing definite can be said unless manuscripts of these are discovered."

10. SAMANTABHADRA (600?), *Āptamīmāṁsā*

Nagin J. Shah has provided us with an edition and translation, with extensive discussion, of this work (Ahmedabad 1999). The numbered headings with page references (S) refer to the 116 verses as edited and translated there. He also give us a brief synopsis together with a more extended analysis of each of the sections he analyzes the work into. Besides S there is an edition and translation (G) by Saratchandra Ghoshal in his work cited above. Neither translation makes easy reading by itself.

The summary that we now provide is by the Editor of this Volume on the basis of (S) and (G).

CHAPTER ONE

1 (G25; S1) Magicians have such special abilities (*vibhūti*) as making gods appear to come down to earth, sky-walking, and displaying symbols of glory. You are not our Lord because of those things.

2 (G28; S2) Bodily and mental merits, wonderful as they are, are found even in the denizens of heaven who are full of attachments

3 (G32; S2) Even those who advise concerning liberation (*tīrthakṛt*) contradict each other. Everyone's word cannot be trusted. Only one (person) should be accepted as teacher.

4 (G35; S3) The destruction of defects and obstructions occurs in at least one self due to its excellence.

5 (G42; S4) Subtle, concealed and distant things are perceptible by an omniscient person, since they are knowable by inference, like fire.

6 (G46; S5) You, this omniscient person, speak words uncontradicted by reasoning or scripture, for what you desire is not opposed to what should be accepted.

7 (G47-48; S6) The views of those who disagree with your position, sweet as nectar, and who always espouse a single aspect (*ekānta*), are refuted by what is evident (*dṛṣṭa*).

8 (G52; S7) Those who accept only a single aspect, O Lord, who are opposed to both their own views and those of others, cannot distinguish good from bad actions, and for them the other world (i.e., liberation) is not possible.

9 (G53; S9) Those who attribute only being to things and deny nonbeing must conclude that every thing is beginningless and endless, has each other's nature, and thus is without a nature of its own.

10 (G60; S9) If prior absence is denied, effects and substances will be beginningless. If destruction (i.e., posterior absence) is denied, they will be endless.

11 (G61; S11) If mutual absence, i.e., difference is denied there will be only one thing (in the world). If none of them (the foregoing three absences apply, anything can inhere in anything![1]

1 The second line of this verse has different renditions among the commentators.

12 (G63; S14) The denial (that any) being (exists) has no instrument of true cognition to support it or to convince others. How could there be support for their view or repudiation of that of others?

13 (G66; S15-16) The view of those opposing the logic of *syādvāda*, who claim that contradictory things can be inherent in (one) substance, as well as the view that things are utterly indescribable (*avācya*), are not correct.

14 (G68; S17-18) From different perspectives being, nonbeing, both and indescribability are acceptable to you, but not in all respects.

15 (G72; S19) Who will not accept that everything exists in its essential nature? Likewise, who will deny that each thing is absent from something else? If it were not so nothing could exist at all.

16 (G74; S19-20) Taking them successively everything both has being and is an absence. (Moreover, nothing is) both (being and absence) simultaneously, that being an impossibility. Finally, three more (perspectives) apply respectively to each (of the first) three as being themselves indescribable.

17 (G78; S22) Just as, when we desire to speak of difference (between A and B) we ascribe similarity (to them) through that qualification, we speak of the existence in A of another property (B) when there is invariable concomitance (of B) with A's counterpositive.

18 (G79; S23) And just as, when we desire to speak of nondifference (between A and B) we ascribe difference through that qualification, we speak of the nonexistence in A of another property (B) when there is invariable concomitance (of B) with A's counterpositive.

19 (G81; S24) Whatever is a qualificand capable of being spoken about has the characters of being positively described as well as of being negatively described, just as a property of the *sādhya* may or may not be a reason (*hetu*) in a given case.

20 (G82; S25) The rest of the (seven) perspectives are to be understood according to their specificities. O Lord of sages, in your teachings there is no contradiction whatsoever.

21 (G83; S26) Thus the causation of an object cannot be understood either through ascribing existence to it (*vidhi*) or by denying (*niṣedha*) its existence. If you deny that, it will not be possible to explain an effect by reference to external and internal conditions.

22 (G84-85; S27) Specification of each feature among the indefinite number of features of an entity serves a purpose, since when one (feature) is given prominence the others become subsidiary.

23 (G86; S28) One who understands (the doctrine of) perspectives should apply it in different specific cases, for example, in the conceptual constructions of one and many, etc.

CHAPTER TWO

24 (G87; S29) On the single-aspect view of nondualism (*advaita*) differences, which are perceived, between causes (*kāraka*) and actions (*kriyā*), etc., are denied. But one cannot be produced from oneself.

25 (G88; S29) Actions could not be of different kinds, thus their results and the worlds inhabited by their agents could not exist. Understanding and ignorance would not occur, and there could be no bondage or liberation.

26 (G88-89; S30) If nondualism is (sought to be) established (by inference) on the basis of an *h* there would have to be duality between the *h* and the *s*. If no *h* is needed why shouldn't dualism (*dvaitavāda*) be established by mere words?

27 (G90; S30) Without what is *ahetu* there cannot be a *hetu*; without dualism there cannot be nondualism. There can be no denying if there is nothing to be denied.

28 (G91; S31-32) On the single-aspected view which insists on separateness there can be no separateness, since a thing would not be separate from its separateness. A quality

(such as separateness) is located in many things.

29 (G91-92; S32) If singleness is denied there can be no stream(s) (*santāna*) (of awarenesses) or collection(s) (*samudāya*), no similarity, no birth.

30 (G92-93; S32-33) And if awareness is different from its content they will have distinct actual natures, and so cannot be twofold. To those who disagree--how can there be a content of awareness, internal or external, without there being an awareness?

31 (G93-94; S33) For those who say that words designate only universal properties and deny particulars all (sentences) become false in the absence of general (meanings).

32 (G95; S36) The position of those who deny *syādvāda*, saying that a thing cannot have more than one aspect, is wrong because contradictory. Those who say that only the view that things are inexpressible is wrong, their view itself being inexpressible according to them!

33 (G95-96; S36) Singularity and separateness are unreal since both are without cause. Actually the very same thing is both one and separate, just as the very same prover (*sādhana*) is both itself and separate.

34 (G96-97; S37) The unity of everything is due to everything having the universal of being, and the separateness is in respect to (each) being a substance or something else. It is like the too-specific reason (*asādhāraṇahetu*) which proves both the difference and the nondifference of things.

35 (G97; S37) Those who affirm or deny (universals or particulars) are trying to speak about a particular qualifier in infinite qualificands, not of something that doesn't exist.

36 (G98; S38) Both difference and nondifference are existents, being the referents of cognitive instruments. They are not merely conventional (*saṃvṛti*). There is no contradiction in their both occurring in a single thing, any more than there is when you yourself speak about both secondary and primary qualities of things.

CHAPTER THREE

37 (G100; S40) For those who hold that everything is eternal there can be no change. Since from the start there is no agency, how could there be a cognitive instrument or its result?

38 (G100-101; S40-41) If any things could be revealed as cognitive instrument-agents, like the objects of the senses they also would have to be eternal; so how could they be subject to change? That assumption of universal eternality, O *sādhu*, being external (to the implications of your claim), is censurable.

39 (G101; S41) If the effect always exists it cannot come into being; it will be like (your) *puruṣa.* Any idea of transformation (*pariṇāma*) will refute your position of (the) eternality (of everything).

40 (G102; S41) There could be no meritorious or demeritorious actions--so how could there be rebirths when those are nonexistent? O Lord, those whom you do not guide cannot (establish) bondage or liberation.

41 (G102-103; S42) For those who believe in momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) existence after death is impossible. Moreover, there can be no recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), etc., and thus there will be no arising of an effect from which (karmic) results could arise.

42 (G103; S44) If there can be no effects anywhere nothing can ever happen, like a sky-flower (which never occurs). There will be no regularity of material (effects) and there will be no expectation of any effect arising.

43 (G104; S44-45) No cause-effect relationship can exist, since there can be no concomitance between one thing and another. One stream (*santāna*) of experiences is not like another, for a stream of experience and a (persistent) thing which possesses experiences are quite different (things).

44 (G105; S105) Objection: This word "stream" is merely conventional, being used to attribute nonotherness to

something actually other.

Answer: Then why isn't it just false? A primary (i.e., actual) entity cannot be merely conventional, and without (a) primary (object) there can be no conventional usage.

45 (G106; S105) Objection: Since one cannot apply the conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) of fourfold negation (*catuṣkoṭi*) to everything, nothing can be said about the nature of differences of streams or of something which possesses experience.

46 (G107; S105-106) Answer: You shouldn't say that fourfold negation is a conceptual construction. The result will be the nonactuality of everything, qualifiers and qualified alike.

47 (G107; S46) One can only deny the properties of other substances, etc. to an object that exists. Differences between nonexistent entities cannot be a matter of ascribing either existence of nonexistence to them.

48 (G108; S47) Without any limitations whatever everything is nonexistent, indescribable. The reverse of that reasoning is that unreality can only be affirmed of existent objects.

49 (G108-109; S47) If all things are indescribable how can we even speak of them?

Objection: We (rather) say: everything is conventional (*saṃvṛti*).

Answer: Then everything must be false (*mṛṣā*), being other than reality (*paramārtha*).

50 (G109; S47-48) Is the indescribability because of (our) inability (to describe things), because of the nonexistence (of everything), or because of (our) nonawareness (of anything)? The other two (i.e., the first and third) cannot occur. Stop evading--state your position!

51 (G110; S48) (On your position, which must be the second,) one who does not intend to kill will kill, and one who decides to kill will not kill. There can be no bondage in either case, and without bondage no one can be liberated.

52 (G111; S48) If destruction is without any cause a person intending injury cannot cause any injury. Then there can be no stream of consciousness nor any liberation through the eight causes.

53 (G112; S49) Objection: A cause is needed to bring about something different (from before).

Answer: Then the same cause that causes what was before causes what comes about now. Thus entities that are not already different do not have causes that produce difference.

54 (G113; S50) (Your) streams of aggregates must be unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), being conventional. They cannot exist, be born or die, any more than the horns of a donkey can!

55 (G113-114; S52) The view, opposed to *syādvāda*, that both (permanence and momentariness) are true (of the same thing is to be rejected) because it involves contradiction. It is not correct either to say that the perspective of indescribability is itself indescribable.

56 (G114; S53) What exists is persistent (*nitya*), since it is recognized. It is uninterrupted. Things are momentary (*kṣaṇika*) due to temporal differences. Your position (to the contrary) would have the fault of the disconnectedness of awarenesses.

57 (G115; S54) A thing does not come into or go out of existence through its general nature; that is evident in general. Its coming into and going out of existence is rather due to its particular (nature). On your position (too) one existence has in common birth, (persistence, death), etc.

58 (G117; S54-55) The arising of an effect involves the destruction of its cause. But because of the regulatoriness these two things are not separate. Since universals, etc., exist in both (cause and effect) they cannot be held to be (nonexistent) like the sky-flower, since they are not independent (of each other).

59 (G118; S55) A person wanting a pitcher, an

ornament or gold gets grief, joy or indifference along with destruction, arising or persistence and their causes.

60 (G118-119; S55) One who has vowed to drink only milk does not eat curd. One who has vowed to eat curds does not drink milk. One who has vowed not to imbibe anything from a cow doesn't imbibe either. So things have three natures.

CHAPTER FOUR

61 (G120; S57) Some hold the one-sided view that effect and cause are different, that quality-possessors and their qualities are different, and that universal properties are different from any of those.

62 (G120-121; S58) The faults in these non-Jaina views are: The occurrence of many in one could not occur, since (these) things either have no parts, or have many. And it is a fallacy (*ābhāsa*) to say that a thing cannot be single because it has parts.

63 (G121; S58) Since separable (*yutasiddha*) things can occur in distinct places and times, a cause and its effect cannot occupy the same place.

64 (G123; S58-59) Naiyāyika: A thing and its locus are not independent; they are co-inherors (*samavāyin*).

Answer: Since there is no relation between them it is not right to speak of "(co)-inherors".

65 (G124; S59) A universal and inherence, in their completeness inhering in one substance, cannot (each) exist without a locus. What, then, is the rule concerning causation, destruction, etc.?

66 (G125; S59) Being completely unconnected the universal and inherence, are likewise unconnected with any object. So all three are nonexistent like the sky-flower!

67 (G125; S61) In the one-sided view that (an effect) is always nondifferent from the atoms (that cause it), there will be disjunction (of the atoms) even when connected (*saṃghāta*). The four (elements), being unconnected, would

be illusory.

68 (G126; S61) If their effects are illusory the atoms will be so also, since a cause is known by its effect. If both (atoms and the substances that are their effects) are nonexistent, then qualities, universals, (and motions) cease to exist as well.

69 (G127; S62) If both (cause and effect) are nondifferent each will be nonexistent, for one cannot exist without the other. That the number two applies to them will be contradicted.

Objection: They are merely conceptual constructions.

Answer: That is an illusion.

70 (G128; S63) So what verse 13 said is correct.

71 (G129; S63-64) Substance and mode are one since there is no negative concomitance (*vyatireka*) between them, because of their specific transformations, and because of the powers of things which possess powers.

72 (G131; S63-64) The difference (between substance and mode) is not complete, but comes about through the particularities of name, number, etc., according to their specific marks (*svalakṣaṇa*), and because of differences in purpose, etc.

CHAPTER FIVE

73 (G132; S66) If universals and particulars depend on each other, the two cannot exist. But if they don't depend on each other there can be no universals and particulars.

74 (G133; S67) Repeats verse 13.

75 (G133; S68) The invariable concomitance of a property and its possessor is established through their interdependence. They do not have essential natures of their own. They are established by each other, as are being an instigator (*kāraka*) and being an indicator (*jñāpaka*).

CHAPTER SIX

76 (G135; S69) If everything is established through

inference there is no role for perception. If everything is established by scripture, even contradictory views will be established.

77 (G136; S69-70) Repeats verse 147.

78 (G137; S70) When a speaker is not authoritative what he proves through a reason is called "proved by reason". When the speaker is reliable, what is proved through his speech is called "proved by verbal authority".

CHAPTER SEVEN

79 (G138; S72) On the one-sided view that the only reality is internal (to thought, all) awarenesses and sentences must be illusory, only apparently instruments of true cognition--but how can that be (known) if there are no instruments of true cognition?

80 (G139; S72-73) If what is to be proved and its prover are consciousness-only (*vijñaptimātratā*), there can be no *s* nor *h* since the thesis and the reason involve fallacies.

81 (G140; S74) On the one-sided view that the only reality is external there can be no fallacies; thus every contradictory expression would establish what ought to be done.

82 (G141; S74-75) Repeats verse 13.

83 (G141; S75) If all positive objects are dependent on awareness there can be no fallacies. Your instruments of true cognition prove external objects only.

84 (G142; S75-76) The word "self" ("*jīva*") designates an external object since it involves conceptual identification (*saṃjñā*), like the word "*hetu*'. Words expressing illusory conceptual identifications, such as "*māyā*", deal with illusory objects; similarly words expressing veridical awareness (*pramā*) (designate actual objects).

85 (G143; S76) The words "*buddhi*, "*śabda*" and "*artha*" designate awareness, language, and an object respectively; so they are three. Likewise the awarenesses of the three (viz., awareness, language and object) designate the three things

that those words reflect (*pratibimbika*).

86 (G144; S77) Knowledge arising from words is different in the case of the speaker, the hearer, and the person who is engaged in proving. In the case of error an external object is connected with either knowledge or error in the same (three) cases.

87 (G145; D77) Validity of an awareness or a verbal expression occurs when there is an external object, otherwise not. Truth or falsity depend on whether the object is verified or not.

CHAPTER EIGHT

88 (G146; S79) If the realization of purpose is attained through destiny, how is it that destiny can arise from the activities of a person? If destiny stems from another destiny, a person cannot attain liberation, and personal activity becomes useless.

89 (G146-147; S79) If things are only attained by personal activity how can personal activity result from destiny? If results arise only from personal activity everyone would always succeed in their efforts.

90 (G147; S80) Repeats verse 13.

91 (G147-148; S80) When desired or undesired things are attained without any awareness, that is destiny. When desired or undesired things are attained knowingly, it is from personal activity.

CHAPTER NINE

92 (G149; S81) If demerit (*pāpa*) arises from (causing others') pain (*duḥkha*), and merit (*puṇya*) arises from (others') happiness (*sukha*), unconscious (things) and (things) free from passions will get bondage from instrumental causes.

93 (G150; S81) If merit arises from pain caused to oneself, and demerit arises from one's own happiness, a learned sage without attachments or hatreds would become attached due to these (same) causes.

94 (G151; S82) Repeats verse 13.

95 (G152; S82) The inflow of merits and demerits arises from the happiness or pain caused by others or by oneself depending on whether it is done with evil or pure intent respectively. Otherwise the view of the Ārhats will be untenable.

96 (G156; S84) If bondage comes from ignorance there can be no omniscient ones (*kevalin*), since there are infinitely many knowable things. If there can be liberation with little knowledge one with great ignorance can be liberated.\

97 (G157; S84-85) Repeats verse 13.

98 (G158; S85) Bondage arises from ignorance if there is delusion, but not if delusion has disappeared. When there is no delusion liberation occurs through even a little knowledge, but not when delusion persists.

99 (G160; S85) According to one's karmic bondage the results of desires (*kāma*), etc., are varied. The karma arises from its appropriate cause according to the purity or impurity of the (agent's) self.

100 (G162; S86) The capacity for purity and impurity are like the capacity to be cooked or not to be cooked. Occurrences of each can have a beginning or be beginningless, according to one's intrinsic nature based on reasoning.

101 (G163; S87-88) Knowledge of things and instruments of true cognition illuminate everything at once. Gradually that knowledge is purified by perspectives and *syādvāda*.

102 (G164-165; S89) The result of the first (viz., perspectives) is neutrality (*upekṣā*) toward, of the second (*syādvāda*) the desire to get or avoid, the results (of actions). Alternatively the result of the first is neutrality or the destruction of ignorance concerning the realm of everything.

103 (G165-166; S90) The word "*syāt*" has the sense of a particle (*nipāta*) indicating that what is spoken of has various aspects and indicates that your sentence's meaning having those as its domain is approved by those with

knowledge.

104 (G166; S90-91) The word "*syāt*" excludes the absolutely one-sided viewpoint, and involves words derived from "*kiṃ*" ("who") and "*cit*" ("-ever"), etc. It is dependent on sevenfold predication (*saptabhaṅgīnaya*) and features distinguishing things to be acquired and avoided.

105 (G167; S91) *Syādvāda* and complete knowledge illuminate all the categories (*tattva*) (of things). Their difference is that between direct and indirect (awareness). What is unknown to these two kinds of knowledge is not an actual entity.

106 (G167-168; S91) A perspective (*naya*) indicates an individual aspect of an object that has been understood through *syādvāda* by indicating the features it shares with the thing to be proved (*sādhya*) and those the lack of which it shares with what contradicts it.

107 (G168; 92) A substance is the meeting-ground of one-sided viewpoints, both perspectives (*naya*) and subsidiaries to them (*upanaya*), though not necessarily separately related to them. It is both one and many (from different perspectives).

108 (G169; S92-93) Objection: A collection of false features must be false!

Answer: On our view there is no one-sided falsity. The perspectives are false when unconnected with each other, but in connection they indicate actual entities.

109 (G170; S93) In a statement an object is affirmed or denied, regulated one way or another, regulated by what it is or what it is not. Otherwise it could not be a qualified entity.

110 (G170; S93-94) In a statement that a thing is "only thus" it is meant that the actual entity is both what it is and what it is not. If this were not the case, how could one teach about actual entities through false statements?

111 (G171; S94) The nature of a spoken sentence is that it can without obstruction deny what another sentence means.

Objection: (No,) what it expresses is the universal property of the object meant.

Answer: This would make it like the flower in the sky.

112 (G172; S94-95) A word intending a universal property, if not indicating a specific thing, must be false. It is the word "*syāt*" that indicates the truth involved in (the word's) indicating a specific entity.

113 (G173; S95) The aspect of an object that is desired is opposed to what one wishes to avoid. Likewise with accepting and rejecting. *Syādvāda* works that way.

114 (G173-174; S96) This *Āptamīmāṁsā* is composed for those who seek liberation, who desire to obtain (and avoid, respectively,) the particular things available through correct and wrong teachings.

115 (S97 only) Concluding invocation.

11. SAMANTABHADRA, *Yuktyanuśāsana*

Summarized by Ratna Lahiri

Internal evidence shows this has been written after the *Āptamīmāṁsā*. The entire work of logic is disguised cleverly in the adulatory style of addressing Mahāvīra and referring to his teaching as the best logically proven method of attaining knowledge and liberation. Another name for this 'prayer' is therefore *Vīrajinastotra*. In the summary I have removed the adulatory mode of addressing each philosophical idea as a qualification eulogizing Lord Mahāvīra.

"E" references are to pages of Bharatvashiya Anekanta Parishad's publication No. 48 (Jaipur 1989-90) with a Hindi translation by Jugal Kishore Mukhtar.

5 (E5) gives causes why the true teachings may not be rightly understood:

(i) *Kaliyuga*, the modern times, which is an external cause;

(ii) The false orators (who are not able to speak on the higher (*niścaya*) plane) adddress only the practical perspective (*vyavahāraṇaya*), which is an extraordinary external cause, and

(iii) The inability of the listener or layman who due to misapprehension of the faith is not successful in getting the real meaning--which is an internal cause. All this is in contrast to the many-aspected Jain teachings, which lead to riches and power in all fields.

7 (E6-8) The Jain way teaches that both essential difference and essential nondifference of qualities of self, etc. are true. Due to different perspectives they are sometimes substance, sometimes modes, sometimes both. If both are considered independent of each other each becomes nonexistent and no meaning can remain. In addition, substances and their qualities, causes and effects, are perceived as collocations (this is refuting the Vaiśeṣika view of qualities). If not, nothing can be accepted.

8-9 (E11-14) If the states are considered to be permanent, then there is a problem--what of the modifications that occur? There can neither be bondage nor release. If it is said that the permanent substances (the self, etc.) are by nature multimodal, then the question may arise whether they are forever perceived as such without any cause from childhood or not. (Then it would create the problem of misconceptions, whereas the Jain way would accept both forms through perspectives and many-sidedness and have all the answers.)

11 (E16) If it is surmised in the Buddhist theory of momentariness that the self at a moment is nonexistent in the next moment, then it is just a proofless statement of madness, because there is no visible or imaginary cause possible for it. If it is argued that a trace (*saṃskāra*) at the first moment remains in the next moment (for continuity) that too is not

possible, as the same substance does not exist in the second moment, being like a son of the first moment. A trace along with its effects (*vāsanā*) cannot remain in the second moment, which is quite different in existence from the first.

12 (E18) Nor can a cause-effect relationship be established between moments, as at each moment the past existence dies and the new one is born. So how can they be similar if not arising from the first? If it is said that the first cause (is father to) the second and is thus related, then it is questionable if the second is first born and exists relative to the cause or not (since the first moment dies before the second is born). Both contentions are impossible like the flower in the sky, and thus are not proved.

Similar logical refutations of all points of Buddhist logic, *saṃvedanādvaita*, etc. are proved to be false views (15, E22), *viparītābhiniveśa* (24, E34).

26 (E37) The fixed-ended doctrines of others are either bereft of general states or of specific ones, but do not take into account the one relative to the other. This is one-sided and lacks all possibilities and thus is of the nature of nonsubstance, so, nonexistent like a flower in the sky.

27 (E39) If someone were to negate the nonexistence and affirm the natural state of being and then say that direct and indirect perception both become instruments of bondage or release, then too both states have to be recognized as interdependent; else there is a dichotomy of statement. They are not opposites but relative to each other. Thus in absolutist (one-sided) theories there can be no recognition of being or truth.

29 (E41) To say a thing is indescribable goes against that very contention because the word 'description' is still a part of it, i.e., we are describing it as indescribable. If referring either to its own nature or to the nature of others we say it is indescribable, it becomes a fallacy.

30-33 (E46-47) Similar types of fallacies are discussed and proved to be untenable unless the *syādvāda* of Mahāvīra's

way is accepted.

34 (E49) (Cārvākas say:) Just as the intoxicating quality of wine is created by the coming together of its ingredients like paste, sugar, vessel, etc., similarly the coming together of elements (*mahābhūtas*--earth, water, fire, air) causes consciousness to manifest. This is not the doing of any god. But those shameless and fearless men (the Cārvākas), busy in filling their bellies and sexual appetites, have thus been making fools of poor simple people. When consciousness remains as a byproduct of the elements then how can the Cārvākas think highly of life, consciousness, or its visible forms like intelligence, etc.? Thus they fall into an abyss of ignorance. They think of the world as freedom to do whatever they wish and consider that, irrespective of ethical standards, at the time of initiation itself there can be liberation immediately. All these are outside the Jina path of conditioned predication (*syādvāda*), bondage, release and knowing the causes of both and stages of liberation.

39 (E59) Those who torture themselves (and others) by offering the head of a goat, falling from a height, wearing certain berries, worshipping false gods and consider themselves realized (*siddha*) are false, those who do not look towards destroying their faults (*doṣa*) and are greedy for pleasures, are not our followers.

40 (E61) All general and specific qualities are interdependent in relation to a substance, whether they are consecutive or coexistent. They are also collocated and perceived according to perspective.

43 (E67) Those who assert the *śūnya* or *sattādvaita* views say that existence of a substance implies nonexistence at the same time. That is contradictory, lacking the conditioned predication of *syādvāda*. Specifics then do not exist.

47 (E75-76) Just the substance by itself without the modes does not exist as it does not become an object of knowledge, neither does the mode by itself become a known object. Thus, the sentence with the 'maybe' predication (i.e.,

the *syādvāda* formulation) implies neither just the substance nor just the qualities nor just both, as they cannot become known objects.

51 (E82) One-sided understanding leads to misapprehension and in turn to passions, egoism, etc., in people. When one-sidedness is destroyed (as in the Jain *anekānta* view) the true nature is revealed and right awareness occurs naturally.

55 (E89-91) If various existing generalities of substance, qualities and modes are considered existent outside the self and without options, then they become immeasurable and do not remain existent or objects of knowledge.

60 (E98-99) The Jain teachings alone accept all facets, general and specific, substance and modes, one and many, etc. natural states, including the perception of primary and subsidiary natures. There is no (absolute) one-sidedness in such perception and it is of a relative nature. This is why it is beneficial for all humanity.

62 (E100-101) Even those who have considerable malice towards the Jain teachings, if without prejudice and with a balanced mind they analyze and examine our (Mahavīra's) way, then their false pride will definitely be destroyed. Although they have false beliefs, they will see the truth (*saṃyagdṛṣṭi*).

PŪJYAPĀDA or DEVANANDIN (430?)

"He was born in Karnataka region of India in the 5th century A.D. According to Śravaṇa Belgola Inscription No. 40 he occupied a very important position amongst Jain saints and *ācāryas*. Several kings and chiefs of his time were among his great devotees and he was considered...one of the greatest saints of his time. He was the preceptor of Durvinīta, the then ruling king of the great Gaṅgā dynasty of the Deccan. His

original name was Devanandin but being held in high esteem by all, he was renowned as Pūjyapāda, i.e. one whose feet are worth worshipping. He was also called *Jinendra-buddhi* as he excelled in intelligence."[70] He is held to be the author of the well-known grammatical work *Jainendravaiyākaraṇa*.

As to his date, Ohira remarks: "Samantabhadra quotes *maṅgalācaraṇa* of Pūjyapāda in his *Āptamīmāṃsā,* and Pūjyapāda refers to Samantabhadra in the *Jainendravyākaraṇa*. Therefore both authors are speculated to have been contemporaries" (Ohira, op. cit., p. 143). As noted previously, however, the specification of 430 is based on evidence about Samantabhadra; there is no such independent evidence to confirm Pūjyapāda's date given, although we have cited the evidence as best we can.

12.PŪJYAPĀDA, *Sarvārthasiddhi* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

Our "E" is the edition by Phoolchandra Siddhanta Shastry in Jnanapitha Murtidevi Granthamala, Sanskrit Grantha No. 13 (New Delhi 1971). "T" is the translation of the work by S. A. Jain titled *Reality* (Calcutta 1960). For the Digambaras this is the earliest commentary on Umāsvāti's *sūtras*, and there is some discrepancy between the *sūtras* accepted by each of the commentators as constituting Umāsvāti's work.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

CHAPTER ONE

2 (E5;T5) "Right vision" would better be rendered as "right faith" (*śraddhā*), and in fact the word "faithfully" occurs in this *sūtra*.

3 (E9-10; T6) Objection: Does one become aware of the fundamental things through right faith or not? If one does, right faith and right awareness arise together and shouldn't be

distinguished. If one does not, how can one have faith in those things without being aware of them?

Answer: The distinction is between the faith that is gained without a teacher versus that gained through a teacher.

7 (E16-20; T11-15) Which kinds of beings can have right faith? Right faith can be attained by those in hell, by male (but not female) animals, by humans and gods whose relevant karma has subsided or been destroyed (different degrees distinguished, with attention to the difference between the sexes on all levels). It is also explained just how beings on these various levels attain right faith, how long right faith lasts, and other classifications of right faith.

Question: It is said that apprehension arises from the instruments of true cognition and from perspectives. But various things have been identified as instruments of true cognition--awareness, others say relationships, still others say the senses are those instruments.

10 (E67-70; T1719) Answer: There are only two instruments. If awareness were the instrument it couldn't also be the result. If connection with the senses is required one couldn't know very small, hidden or remote things.

Objection: If a cognitive instrument is needed to know a thing, there must be another instrument to know the instrument.

Answer: No. A cognitive instrument is like a lamp, it lights up itself as well as other things.

12 (E72-73; T20-21) Objection: Surely perception must be direct and the last three, not involving the senses, indirect (contrary to what you claim).

Answer: If it were so the person qualified (for advanced states) could not have direct awareness, since he does not use the senses there.

Objector: He only uses his internal organ.

Answer: Then he cannot be omniscient (since the internal organ's range is limited to one content at a time), or else we have to give up the assumption that traces are

momentary.

18 (E81; T26-27) "*Vyañjana*" means, e.g. , unmanifest sounds, etc. I.e., it takes several exposures to a sense-content before one grasps distinctly what it is; when that happens one has indistinct awareness of an object (*arthāvagraha*).

19 (82; T27-28) Vision occurs without the visual organ making contact with the object that is its content; we know this from scripture as well as from inference (one does not, e.g., perceive medicine applied to the eye). The mind also does not contact its object. Thus the other three senses (ear, nose, tongue) alone can occasion indistinct awareness.

20 (E84-85; T28-30) Objection: Scripture is without beginning or end, so it can't be preceded by immediate awareness. And it must be unauthoritative (*apramāṇa*) since it is manmade.

Answer: Scripture was not created at a particular time and place by someone, but a particular text has a beginning and an end, just as in general a sprout beginninglessly and endlessly requires a seed but a particular sprout doesn't require any particular seed. And authority is not confined to authorlessness.

Actually, sometimes scriptural knowledge is preceded by other scriptural knowledge, (contradicting (20)).

21-22 (21 in E and T) (E888-89; T32-34) Objection: "Birth" (in "extrasensory awareness owing to birth") is the mode which causes the arising of a particular length and kind of life. The gods and hell-beings have lives that are so caused, and so their extrasensory awareness cannot bring about destruction or subsidence of their karma.

Answer: For them destruction and subsidence of karma occur naturally when they leave the present birth(-mode), just as birds fly naturally and don't need to be taught to do so. However, we are here speaking only of those whose extrasensory awareness is accompanied by right faith; extrasensory awareness in others is called "*vibhaṅga*", not "*avadhi*".

23 (22 in E and T, with partial variation) (E88-89; T32-34) "Destruction" here refers to a state that results from the arising of partially but not completely obscuring karma. "Subsidence" refers to the existence of such karma in one that has not yet arisen. Extrasensory awareness is caused in both animals and humans of six kinds of birth.

24-25 (23-24 in E and T) (E90-92; T34-36) The two kinds of telepathy, knowledge of others' minds, are called (1) "straight" (*ṛjumati*" and (2) "crooked" (*vipulamati*). (2) lasts longer, extends farther than, and grasps subtler contents than (1), and one who has (2) cannot backslide, though one who has (1) can.

26 (25 in E and T) (E92; T36) Telepathy is purer than extrasensory awareness since only those in the seventh-twelfth stages who are advancing and have the seven supernatural powers *(ṛddhi)* can obtain it, whereas extrasensory awareness is available to hell-beings, animals, humans and gods.

34 (33 in E and T) (E98-102; T41-46) The conventional viewpoint is characterized as thinking of an action, e.g., in terms of its intention or purpose rather than its result. Pūjyapāda also reads this *sūtra* as counting the words *samabhirūḍha* and *evaṃbhūta* as indicating two additional kinds of viewpoint (rather than subvarieties of the *sūtra*'s fifth kind, *śabda*, as is implied in what the *Vyākhyā* counts as a 35th *sūtra* that divides the fifth kind into three sorts); Pūjyapāda's reading doesn't recognize 35 as a *sūtra*.

CHAPTER TWO

1 (E105-106; T47-48) Pūjyapāda interprets this and subsequent passages as naming fundamental topics of right vision. The first three of the five modifications of awareness mentioned in the *sūtra*--subsiding, destruction and the combination of the two--are described specifically as varieties of right vision. Of these three, the numbers of the second are far greater than that of the first, and likewise the number of those in the third class is far greater than the second.

Question: Why is the third of these an additional class?

Answer: Because while all those in the first two states--subsiding and destruction--have the capacity to be liberated, some of those in the third do not.

2 (E106-107; T48-49) The enumeration of "sorts" here is of varieties of states in general, not just of subsidence.

3 (E107-108; T49-50) Question: How can karma subside for one who is beginninglessly subject to false awarenesses?

Answer: Through the occurrence of appropriately favorable times, through the fact that some karma binds for only a limited period, and because of a favorable birth.

4 (E108-111; T50-51) Thus, e.g., through destroying all knowledge-obscuring karma one gets knowledge; through destroying the hindrances to giving one is able to provide fearlessness to endless numbers of living beings; through destroying gain the omniscient escapes the limitations of hunger, etc. And when "repeated" (i.e., renewed) experiences of these kinds of destruction ensue one gains various splendid experiences.

Question: Does the above describe the state of the liberated self (*siddha*)?

Answer: No, for the liberated self has no properties of these sorts, but only infinite bliss and pure energy. It is the perfected being and the *tīrthaṅkara* who have the above-mentioned perfections, since the former is still embodied and the latter still has *nāmakarman* (i.e., is still identifiable through specific qualities).

7 (E113-114; T54-55) The three features listed belong to a self alone and do not depend on the subsiding and/or destruction of karma. The word "and" (*ca*) at the end of the *sūtra* indicates that others, e.g., existence and eternality, are added members of this list.

Objection: But you said "three"?

Answer: No, since existence and eternality are common to both selves and not-selves, whereas the three mentioned are

found only in selves.

Question: Since the self is nonmaterial how can it be "worthy of liberation"?

Answer: The self is not just nonmaterial; in the sense that it has the modes of karmic bondage it is material as well.

8 (E115; T55) Though the self is both material and nonmaterial, still its distinguishing mark is (the capacity for) cognitive application (*upayoga*).

9 (E115-116; T55-56) The two kinds of cognitive application are those of awareness and vision. The former has eight kinds, the latter four (cf. the summary of the *Vyākhyā* on 8-9 for the list).

Question: How do awareness and vision differ?

Answer: The former is formfilled, the latter formless. They occur successively in those formfilled but simultaneously in the formless.

10 (E116-120; T56-60) There are five aspects of transmigration: in terms of (1) matter, (2) space, (3) time, (4) condition and (5) state (of the self). (1) has two varieties, (1a) nonkarmic and (1b) karmic. (1a) is found in three kinds of body and five kinds of development, which are each instantiated in a karmic product (*pudgala*) at an initial moment. The kinds of development are: as first acquired, as momentarily acquired, as momentarily lost, as mixed (both acquired and lost), and as returning to their original state. Thus each self has been involved with each and every karmic molecule at some time in history.

As for (2), a *nigoda* occupying a minute point in space is born with the central eight points of the universe as the middle of its body. It exists briefly and dies, is reborn again in the same place and dies, etc., each time extending its spatial location. Thus each self has occupied all the places in the universe.

(3) Thus a self is born and dies at each moment without interval.

(4) Expected lifetimes in various states from hell to

heaven are specified.

(5) A complicated account is given of the stages undergone by a self as the amount of passion, intensity, and vibration (*yoga*) involved and the extent, both spatial and temporal, involved.

11 (E121; T61) The term "internal organ" can be understood as a substantial thing or as a functional activity. In the former sense it refers to that action-organ (*karmendriya*) which undergoes maturations of karmic products. In the latter sense it refers to the purity of the self arising from the destruction and subsidence of energy-obstructing and nonkarmic actions.

12 (E121-122; T61-62) The words "*trasa*" and "*sthāvara*" cannot mean "mobile" and "static" respectively, since all beings with more than two sense-organs are said to be mobile in scripture. So the terms must refer to which kind of karma one is bound by.

13 (E122-123; T62-63) The text as read by Pūjyapāda is different from the Digambara version of the *Tattvārthasūtra*, and states that there are five static categories, earth, water, fire, air and plants. A being of one of these five sorts has four life-principles: (*prāṇa*): touch, bodily strength, breath and duration.

14 (E123; T63) This text is also differs from the Digambara version of the *Tattvārthasūtra*, since fiery and watery beings have just been said to be static.

19 (E126-127; T65-66) Again the text differs from Umāsvāti's text. What's *sūtra* 20 for Umāsvāti is 19 for Pūjyapāda, so that each *sūtra* up to 48 is numbered one less than in the *Tattvārthasūtra* summary given above.

22 (E228-229; T67) Pūjyapāda's text differs from that of Umāsvāti. What it says is that bodies up to plants (*vanaspatyanta*) have just one sense--that sense being touch, Pūjyapāda explains.

25 (E130-131; T68-69) Karmic activity is the action of the karmic body after death and prior to the next life.

29 (E133; T71) Something following a straight line without bend takes only one moment to go however far it goes.

30 (E133; T71) The text according to Pūjyapāda reads "for only one, two or three moments". "Procuring" (*āhārika*) means acquisition of karmic molecules contributing toward three kinds of bodies (physical, heavenly or hellish, and saintly) and six kinds of development (assimilation of molecules, formation of the body, the senses, breathing, speaking and thinking).[71]

31 (E134; T72) "Sudden manifestation" refers to how or where heavenly and hellish beings are born.

32 (E134-135; T72-73) There are three pairs of opposites--living vs. dead, cold vs. hot, concealed vs. revealed. These in their combinations provide the loci for the nine ways of being born.

34 (E136; T75) A footnote in T tells us "The celestial beings are born in box-beds, and the infernal beings in bladders hung from the ceilings of the holes in hell."

35 (E136-137; T75) T translates "*sammūrchana*" (which we have rendered as "sudden manifestation") as "spontaneous generation".

52 (E144-145; T82-83) The Digambara text has here an additional *sūtra* which says that the remaining selves (other than those born in hell, by agglutination, or in heaven) are of one of three sexes--male, female and neuter. Pūjyapāda rather pedantically explains carefully the difference between men, women and eunuchs.

CHAPTER THREE

The number of *sūtras* is increased substantially in Pūjyapāda's reading, so that this Chapter has 39 of them. Verses 12-32 are interpolated, so that 12 of the -*sūtra* = 33 of the present text. The new material adds new mythical material to the account of the Jain universe.

CHAPTER FOUR

Again there is a rather wide discrepancy between the Digambara and Śvetāmbara accounts of the contents of this Chapter. Since the material is not particularly enlightening philosophically we omit consideration of the differences here.

CHAPTER FIVE

1 (E196-197; T128-129) What does "body" (*kāya*) mean here? A bunch of space-points. And the word is used to distinguish things properly called "bodies" from other things such as time, which doesn't have space-points, or an atom, which occupies minimal space and so only one space-point (i.e., no space-points).

2-3 (2 of E and T) (E197-199; T129-132) A substance is what has its own modes.

Objection: A substance is that which has the universal property substanceness.

Answer: No, for a universal property serves to qualify two or more distinct things which exist separately, but a quality and its substantial locus don't exist separately. Otherwise there should be a universal property common to a nonexistent lotus and the sky!

Substance and quality are not entirely different; yet they can be brought under the same name, mark, etc.

Objection: Aren't earth, water, etc., substances?

Answer: No. Earth, water, etc., are either atomic or they are karmically produced molecules. But atoms do not have modes; indeed, they are not cognizable at all. There are no atoms of earth, water, etc.--all activity involves the blending of classes. And molecules are combinations of atoms of different sorts, so no molecule is earth (alone), etc.

(Digambara's 5. 3 is Śvetāmbhara's 5. 2.)

4 (5 of E and T (E200-201; T132-133)[72] With no apology for the apparent contradiction, our commentator interprets this passage as saying that karmic products (*pudgala*), or at least those that are products, do have form,

i.e., color/shape. It is added that if karmic products were formless, like *pradhāna* (a jab at Sāṃkhya) one couldn't see them.

5 (6 of E and T) (E201; T133) "Single" means that they count each as one, not that they may not occupy more than one space-point or moment.

6 (7 of E and T) (E202-203; T133-135) Objection: If these three are inactive there can be no birth and thus no death!

Answer: No. Birth, sustenance and death are proved rather by scripture, which affirms that everything (including these nonself things) goes through six stages of increase and decrease; furthermore, we know what the causes of birth, etc., are.

Objection: But if the initiator of movement and the initiator of stasis are themselves inactive (as the passage states) then they cannot be initiators.

Answer: Just as the eye helps one in providing vision, so these initiators help people in moving and stopping.

7 (8 of E and T) (E202-203; T135) There are three kinds of uncountability: the minimum, the maximum and a point in between. A space-point is the space occupied by an atom.[1] The initiator of movement, the initiator of stasis, and each self contain uncountable (in the third sense) space-points, yet a self (unlike the other two) can expand and contract to fill a smaller or bigger body as determined by its operative karma.

What is counted as 5. 9 in the Śvetāmbara version doesn't appear in Pūjyapāda's Digambara text.

10 (E204; T136) Objection: You said the universe contains uncountable space-points, and now you say that a molecule may itself have uncountable space-points. This is a contradiction.

1 This kind of "atom", a *paramāṇu*, is in this context a synonym of what we have been calling an atom (*aṇu*) up till now.

Answer: No, since an atom (*paramāṇu*) can take a subtle form, so that infinite numbers of atoms can occupy the same space-point.

11 (E205; T137) Something comprising one space-point (i.e., a *paramāṇu*) is said to be of "no size" since it cannot be further divided.

12-13 (E205-206; T137-139) Space is divided into two parts, the space in the universe and that outside it. Initiators of movement and stasis reside in the former space, not in the latter.

19 (E211-214; T144-146) Objection (by a Vaiśeṣika): The internal organ is an additional (separate) substance, without color/form and of atomic size. So it can't be a karmic product.

Answer: Either your internal organ is connected to a self or it isn't. If it isn't then it can't help the self or the sense-organs. If it is connected then, being atomic in size, it can only help that minute part of the self that it occupies

Vaiśeṣika: It circulates (among points) like a circle of fire (*alātacakra*) through the power of *adṛṣṭa*.

Answer: In your view *adṛṣṭa* is a property of the self, which is (for you) inactive; so *adṛṣṭa* too must be inactive, and so can't cause activity elsewhere.

(The Digambara version has 5. 29, which merely tells us that it is substances which are said to exist or have being (*sat*). As a result, 5. 30-38 of our present text corresponds to 5. 31-39 of the Śvetāmbara version).

38 (39 in E and T) (E232-235; T163-165) Why isn't time listed in 5. 1 as an additional kind of not-self? Because the four mentioned in that *sūtra* each comprise a plenum of space-points from one of two points of view, whereas time comprises no space-points from either point of view. Furthermore, we were told that the not-self substances (1)-(3) were each single, but time is manifold, existing throughout the space in the universe, every particle of time existing in each space-point.

CHAPTER SIX

1 (E238; T167) Activity (*yoga*) is the vibration (*parispanda*) of the space-points of the self.

3 (E239; T168-169) Good activity is an action done with good intention, bad with bad intention, not on the basis of whether the act produces good or bad karma; otherwise there would be no good activities at all, since good activities like bad ones produce bondage.

(Pūjyapāda's Digambara version counts 3 and 4 as constituting a single passage (=6. 3), so *sūtras* 4-17 are numbered one less in his text than in the Śvetāmbara reading.)

4 (E169; T240) "Persisting" (*samparāyika*), i.e., leading to rebirth of those with passions; "fleeting" (*īryāpātha*), i.e., caused by vibrations for those free from passions.

18 (E251; T181-182) An additional *sūtra* reads "And also natural modesty". Pūjyapāda explains "natural" as without instruction, and says that it leads to inflow leading to rebirth as a human being or a god.

21 (E252; T183) This passage is inserted between the 20th and 21st *sūtras* in the Śvetāmbara text. It adds rightness (i.e., right vision) to the list in 6. 20. Thus its 6. 21 = 6. 22 of Pūjyapāda's, and so on to the end of this Chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

(Pūjyapāda has a few additional *sūtras* which provide specific examples of fulfilling the five kinds of vows listed in 7. 1. Thus for him Śvetāmbara 7. 4 is Digambara 7. 9, etc.,)

14 (=9 of Śvetāmbara) (E265; T197) "Lying" (*anṛta*) is glossed as speaking what is not praiseworthy (*apraśasta*), i.e., causing pain (*pīḍā*) in living beings whether it is real or imagined.

13 (=18 of Śvetāmbara) (E238-239; T200) To be "devoid of thorns" is metaphorically used to mean being without deceit, desire for things and experiences (*nidāna*) or wrong vision. The true vow-taker is such.

14 (19 of Umāsvāti) (E269; T200-201) "*Anagāra*", lit. "homeless", refers to the person whose thoughts are turned away from home. A monk or a householder may observe vows and thus be "homeless".

CHAPTER EIGHT

2 (E258-259; T217-218) The intent of this passage is that it is karma, meaning karmic products (*pudgala*), that makes the self associated with passions. Through wrong vision, etc., the self, always active, attracts subtle matter of infinite space-points pervading the space-points occupied by that self, that are capable of turning into karmic matter, which then is combined by interpenetration with the space-points of the self. This is called bondage.

(E and T read Umāsvāti's 8. 2-3 as a single 8. 2, so that the succeeding *sūtras* are each numbered one less in Umāsvāti than in Pūjyapāda's text.)

4 (3 of Śvetāmbara) (E286-287; T219-220) The term translated here as "nature" is *prakṛti*, explained here as that which brings about effects. "Duration" is maintaining that nature.

22 (21 in E and T) (E302-303; T232-233) Experiencing happens in two ways, based on its own nature and by another's nature. Experiencing of the main (eight) types of karma (*mūlaprakṛti*) is based on the action's own nature.[1] In the case of subtypes of the same species--except in the case of (length-of-)-life-karma, faith-deluding and conduct-deluding karma--fruition is possible by other's nature also. For instance, the fruition of life-karma of an animal or a human being is not possible through life in hell. And the fruition of faith-deluding karmas is not possible through conduct-delusion or vice versa.

1 "That is, knowledge-covering karma will cover knowledge only and will not produce feeling or will not determine life or status." (S. A. Jain in T, p. 233)

24 (=23 in E and T) (E304; T234) The "cleansing off", i.e., the dissociation of karma from a self, is of two kinds: through maturation or natural ripening, and through processes not involving natural ripening, e.g., through penance, and other ways.

CHAPTER NINE

1 (E309-311; T238-241) Just which kinds of karma cease at which of the fourteen stages of progress is explained as follows:

Stage 1, of False View or Delusion[73]: That karma which is accreted through false view ceases.

Stage 2, of Downfall: Sixteen kinds of karma cease, including the kind causing false view, being sexually neuter, living in hell, going to hell, being born as a one-sensed, two-sensed, three-sensed or four-sensed being, misshapen embodiment, weak bone structure, etc.

Stage 3, of Mixed Right and Wrong Belief: Here, upon the termination of three kinds of nonrestraint, viz., that kind of passion that leads to endless rebirths, the kind that hinders partial restraint, and the kind that hinders self-discipline, cease. A long list of kinds of causes of karmic influx is hindered, including, e.g., anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed, rebirth as a female or an animal, an unpleasant voice, birth in an inferior family. But length-of-life karma still operates.

Stage 4, of Vowless Right Belief,

Stage 5, of Partial Vows: anger, pride, deceitfulness and greed cease at the end of this stage.

Stage 6, of Imperfect Vows: up to this stage one is still visited by karmas caused to arise from negligence and which produce frustration, a weak or ugly body, and disrepute.

Stage 7, of Perfect Vows, during which one comes to be reborn in a heaven.

Stage 8, of New Thought-Activity, where negligence ceases and one's rebirths, whether as god or human, have many lovely qualities.

Stage 9, of Advanced Thought-Activity, where some gross passions still remain, such as forms of anger, pride, male sexuality, deceitfulness, greed.

Stage 10, Slight Delusion or Subtle Passion. Here five kinds of knowledge-obscuring karma, four kinds of perception-obscuring karma, honor, glory, high-caste status, and five kinds of obstructing karma caused by very small degrees of passion cease.

Stage 11, Subsided Delusion,

Stage 12, Destroyed Delusion, and

Stage 13, Omniscience with Vibration. Through these three one continues to feel the emotions of satisfaction (or pleasure) stemming from mere vibrations or activity.

Stage 14, Omniscience, where activity ceases and with it feelings altogether.

2 (E311-312; T241-242) Restraint (*gupti*) (defined in 9.4) is that by which the self is protected from transmigration.

Pūjyapāda's Digambara version combines 9. 27-28 of the Śvetāmbara version, so that 9. 28-36 of Pūjyapāda is 9. 29-37 of Śvetāmbara. Also the order of 9. 31 and 32 of Pūjyapāda (9. 32 and 33 of the Śvetāmbara version) is reversed in the two versions. 9. 38 of Śvetāmbara is not found in Pūjyapāda. Thus 9. 37-47 of Pūjyapāda is 9. 39-49 of Śvetāmbara.

CHAPTER TEN

1 (E356-357; T280-281) How one ascends through each stage of progress is again explained.

2 (E357-358; T282-284) Exactly which passions are destroyed at which stage is detailed.

Śvetāmbara's 10. 3 is part of Pūjyapāda's 10. 2.

13. PŪJYAPĀDA, *Iṣṭopadeśa*

There is an edition and translation by Champat Rai Jain to be found in Dhanya Kumar Jain's edition of this work, Srimadrajacandrajainasastramala 14, Agasa 1973. The translation was first published as *The Discourse Divine* from Hardoi in 1925, and most recently in *Spiritual Insights: Ishtopadesh and Samadhi Shatak by Acharya Pujyapada Svami* (Ed. with Introduction by Jagdish Prasad Jain "Sadhak") (New Delhi 2000). The translation is very free.

This is a brief text conveying good advice to its hearer. The text is especially noteworthy for the many pertinent similes it provides.

14. PŪJYAPĀDA, *Samādhitantra*

"ET" is the text and translation found in *Samādhi Shatak (A Century of Verses on Concentration of Self-Absorption) by Acharya Shri Pujyapada Swami Alias Devanandi, with English Rendering and Commentary by Vangmaya-Pradip Late Raoji Nemchand Shah* (Jaina Academy Publications 2). Second edition, Aliganj (Etah), U.P. 1962. The most recent publication is in *Spiritual Insights*, cited under 4. 2 above.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

1-3 (ET1-3) Invocation.

4 (ET3) The self is threefold: external, internal and highest. One should renounce the first and approach the last through the second.

5 (ET4) The delusion that the body and organs are the self gives us the idea of the "external" self. The internal self lacks body and organs. And the highest is completely stainless.

9 (ET6-9) The self has infinite knowledge and power and can be realized only by itself, becoming fixed and immovable.

11-12 (ET7) But the confused person takes his body to

be himself and views other bodies as likewise their selves. He supposes he is involved with them and is grieved when separated from them. This is the result of ignorance, and rebirth follows involving the same confusions.

16-26 (ET9-15) The internal self rejects these beliefs of the external self and identifies itself with the highest self.

27 (ET16) Meditating thus one gets into the habit of thinking one is the highest self.

32-55 (ET20-36) One who does not see that his eternal self is quite distinct from the body cannot attain liberation even after performing severe austerities. But one who sees is full of joy in realizing his true nature. He is free from conceit, ignorance, likes and dislikes, and feels no pride. He shuns feelings of attachment and hatred, has no affection for any body or thing, for such feelings are based on the wrong belief that body and self are the same. The self has no sex--male, female or neuter.

57 (ET36) One who believes in the highest should always regard his body as not his own, and the bodies of others the same way.

60-62 (ET40-43) He is satisfied with inner things, while the unenlightened is satisfied with external objects. Bodies do not experience pleasure or pain, but the deluded ascribes pain to the same body that experiences happiness. As long as this continues one will wander in the worlds.

67 (ET46) Only one who remains tranquil and views the changing world as inert attains peace.

71-72 (ET51-52) One with wavering mind cannot attain liberation; thus the yogi should avoid contact with people and reside in the self itself.

75 (ET55) Only the self leads the self to either birth or liberation; no other teacher is necessary for getting the highest state.

83-84 (ET61-62) Renouncing vowlessness, observing holy vows, the seeker for salvation should renounce even those vows, having attained the highest state.

87-89 (ET65-67) Caste, sex, race and other such differentiations apply only to the body; they do not affect the self.

90 (ET68) Those who are conceited about their sex or race do not gain release. Too, those who give up such things in the hope of gaining happiness still love the body and not the inner self.

94-95 (ET71) The one who experiences and meditates discriminatingly on the true self attains liberation even though asleep or intoxicated. Wherever there is faith, equanimity is sure to follow.

101 (ET77) Just as the self is not destroyed when one dies in a dream, so when one is awake he sees the destruction of the embodied state but the self is not destroyed.

SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA (550)

The dating of this author, like the dating of many another Indian philosopher, has been the subject of much speculation and controversy. A thorough review of the discussion can be found in A. N. Upadhye's introduction to his translations of Siddhasena's *Nyāyāvatāra* with editions of the *Dvātriṁśikā* and Yaśovijaya's *Nayakarṇikā* (Bombay 1971). With apologies to the many scholars whose views Prof. Upadhye treats and dismisses, and being unable to draw a better conclusion than his ourselves, we provide here a few paragraphs from pp. 278-279 of Upadhye's introduction.

"This famous logician, who was a pupil of Vṛddhavādī Sūri, received the name of Kumudacandra at the time of his ordination. He is said to have split, by the efficacy of his prayers, the *liṅga* (Brahmanical symbol) of Rudra in the temple of Mahākāla at Ujjain, and to have called forth an image of Pārśvanātha by reciting his *Kalyāṇamanirastava*. He is believed to have converted Vikramāditya to Jainism 470 years after the *nirvāṇa* of Mahāvīra. The Jains believe that he was the spiritual tutor of that famous king, as is evident from the *Kumārapālacaritra* and other works.

"It may be noted here that Vikramāditya of Ujjain has been considered by scholars to be identical with Yaśodharma Deva, king of Malwa, who, according to Alberuni, defeated the Huns at Korur in 533 A. D. The Chinese pilgrim Hsuan-tsang, who came to India in 629 A. D., says that a very powerful king (presumably Vikramāditya) reigned 60 years before his arrival there. From this it appears that Siddha Sena Divākara, who was a contemporary of Vikramāditya, must have lived at Ujjain about 550 A. D.

"Legends and historical accouts show that Siddha Sena was the well-known Kṣapaṇaka (the Jaina sage), who adorned the court of Vikramāditya and was one of the Nine Gems (*navaratna*). Varāhamihira, the famous astronomer, who was another of the Nine Gems of the court of Vikramāditya, lived between A. D. 503 and A. D. 587. We are told that Kṣapaṇaka, alias Siddha Sena, was a contemporary of Varāhamihira, so he must have flourished about the middle of the 6th century."

For an earlier but very thorough review of the evidence about Siddhasena's milieu and age cf. Charlotte Krause, "Siddhasena Divākara and Vikaramāditya", *Vikrama Volume* (Ujjain 1948), pp. 213-280.

15.SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA, *Dvātriṁśikā*

The title of this work means "thirty-two", and refers to a number of short metrical works in Sanskrit, each comprising thirty-two stanzas. As we have the work today, it comprises twenty-one compositions dealing with a variety of topics, such as eulogies to Mahāvīra and refutations of Buddhist and Hindu views, together with an exposition of Jaina adepts.

"E" refers to the edition by Vijayalavanya Suri, Botad 1977.

Summary by P. N. Dave

5. 1. 1

By way of paying homage to Lord Mahāvīra, the philosophy of many aspects (*anekāntavāda)* is explained here in the list of the perspectives and topics (*bhaṅga*).

20 (E29) The logical controversies which generate mutual animosity are attributed to the absolutist attitude of logicians towards the doctrine of causality. For instance, some logicians (Sāṃkhya-Yoga) assert the eternal existence of the effect, while others (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) demonstrate its absolute absence in the cause.

23 (E31) The validity of many aspects as moral discipline is shown through rejecting the efficacy of cultivation exclusively of physical austerity or scriptural learning as the path to liberation. A combined path of knowledge and action is the correct one.

28 (E34-35) Moral attributes such as anger, attachment, etc. are neither different from a self nor identical with it.

30 (E36) Whatever valid propositions are found in other philosophical systems are emanations from the scriptural lore of the Jainas, the upholders of (the) many aspects (view).

5. 1. 2

This is also a eulogy offered to Mahāvīra. In it the confluence of opposing attributes is shown to be true of Mahāvīra's personality. He is neither moved by mercy for people subject to frustrations, nor does he rejoice at the fulfilment of their worldly desires. Yet he does not fail to lead them to the highest good.

2 (E42) Plainly speaking, Mahāvīra remains unmoved by worldly passions, and yet ceaselessly works for the spiritual welfare of all living beings.

25 (E65-66) There is no inconsistency in the self's remaining unfettered by karma on the one hand and karmic retribution on the other. (This seems addressed to Buddhists, who reject the existence of a self.)

5. 1. 3

The eulogizing is continued.

8 (E84) A co-ordinated view is taken of the principles of determinism (*niyati*) and absence of free will, essentialism (*svābhāvavāda*), time as the determinant of creation, the doctrine that one enjoys exclusively the karmic results of one's own actions, and the opposing doctrine that a person enjoys the results of actions done by others.

16 (E93) A critical estimate of the supreme principle of nonviolence is proposed. A person may kill and yet be free from the sin of killing; on the other hand, one may not actually kill any living being but yet be bound by the sin of killing.

5. 1. 4

In the three previous sections the author lauds Mahāvīra by asserting that all other views are incorporated into the boundless ocean of his philosophy of many aspects, though it is unrecognizable in them individually.

23 (E128) The activity of the mind is not outside the body, nor is the activity of the body outside the mind; the body and the mind are thus mutually neither different nor identical.

26 (E130) The self is both in motion and motionless, it indulges in action and yet is free from the result of action; it enjoys the fruit and yet is incapable of earning the fruit. This is how the spirit of many aspects is brought home to the person who is in doubt.

5. 1. 5. *Stuti*

A short biography of Mahāvīra.

6 (E140) Lord Mahāvīra, the lover of Yaśodhā whom he married, is described as the conqueror of death (*māra*).

16-18 (E149-150) He is also eulogized as the conqueror of great hardships created by gods and men

23 (E156) and as omniscient.

26 (E158) His teaching is described as free from obscurity or deception, full of mercy for all living beings, inducing mental peace and vanquishing all kinds of evil.

5. 1. 6

1 (E165) Uncritical learning is despicable.

5 (E168) What is new is old after it dies. The merit of a statement is not proved by its antiquity if it does not stand the test of logic. It is suicidal to underestimate one's own power of thought by blindly accepting the infallibility of one's teacher.

8 (E170) It is nothing but delusion to place unconditional faith in the imaginary statements of the old and to reject the same views arising in modern times.

10 (E171-172) A person with a critical outlook should be assigned a place of distinction, and uncritical faith in the validity of a spiritual discipline is nothing but delusion.

23 (E180) One has to exercise one's logical faculty by searching out a reliable spiritual teacher who is omniscient and capable of leading his disciple to the highest goal of life.

28 (E184) A person with blind reverence for the old is incapable of distinguishing right from wrong; reverence should be born of merit.

5. 1. 7. *Vādopaniṣaddvātriṁśikā*

This section deals with the essential basis of debate.

2 (E190) Victory cannot be achieved in a debate in the assembly unless there is a definite *sādhya* to be proved.

3 (E191) One should read beforehand the mind of the king and look at the eyes of the assembly with respect to himself and the opposition.

5 (E192) For achieving victory, one should speak in a language that is lucid and clearly understood, neither too loudly nor too slowly, overpowering the intellect of the opposition.

8 (E195) The opposition, if inadequately equipped or gagged under the pretext of ignorance, should be asked to define his position and to explain the texts he quotes from treatises that he accepts.

27 (E209-210) The most important condition of success in a debate is unperturbed tranquility of mind. It is, therefore, said that one should exert oneself a hundred times more for the preservation of mental tranquility than for acquisition of learning.

5.1.8. *Vāda*

1 (E215) Two dogs contesting for the same piece of meat may arrive at a compromise, but two disputants, though uterine brothers, can never agree to be friends.

7 (E218) The path to liberation and the path to victory in a debate are poles apart.

9 (E218) A single person, versed in the *śāstras* and self-possessed, is capable of proving his thesis which an assembly of people indulging in casuistry and sophism is unable to vindicate.

10 (E219) A person with an unbalanced mind is not capable of achieving victory in a debate.

11 (E219) Neither logic without learning nor learning without logic is capable of achieving victory. A person adept in both is bound to achieve victory.

12 (E220) A person depending on mere sophisms is a hopeless disputant.

18 (E222) It is an accepted principle that egoism is a source of suffering and misery. How then can a person immersed in egoism aspire to victory in a debate?

19 (E222) A deep insight into the philosophy of the opponent is essential for appreciating the strength of one's own position in philosophy.

20 (E223) One should make effort for one's own enlightenment and not just to vanquish his opponent. Even the omniscients have failed to convince their opponents in the

past. How then can one aspire to bring the world to unanimity in philosophy?

23 (E224) Even a weak philosophy is capable of attracting people if it is couched in humble and sweet expresssions and is free from egoism, whereas even a valid philosophy expressed in words full of vanity falls on deaf ears.

26 (E226) A sane person cannot be subject to egoism if he is conscious of the fact that even a single object is incapable of being comprehended in all its aspects by him.

5. 1. 9. *Vedavāda*

(E227-250) An exposition of Sāṃkhya and Vedānta that presents Jaina principles in Upaniṣadic terminology, quoting verses from the *Ṛgveda*.

5. 1. 10.

This section gives a brief account of moral and mental disciplines from the standpoint of Jainism.

6 (E254) Desire (*pipāsā*) is the basic cause of coming to exist (*bhava*) and appropriating (*upādāna*) things.

8 (E256) *Bhava* is explained as the doer of worldly activity inspired by passions which constitutes appropriating (*upādāna*).

16 (E261) The author distinguishes two types of activity--one leading to worldly life and the other leading to liberation. The first type is represented by the process beginning with birth and ending in death, whereas the second is the path based on freedom from passions through the right view of things and a life of self-restraint.

21-22 (E262-263) The practices of detachment and endurance of hardships are prescribed.

23-24 (E263-264) Meditative postures (*āsana)* and breath-control (*prāṇāyāma*) are recommended.

27 (E265) The above practices calm down all passions and effect cessation of all kinds of karmas. They lead to what is called concentration on *dharma*. This is followed by the

"white meditation" which destroys ignorance *in toto*.

32 (E274) The author gives a very comprehensive view of liberation which is nothing but the consciousness of power, an existence that is not susceptible to any kind of characterisation.

5. 1. 11. *Guṇavacana*

(E276-300) The work is edited and translated by Charlotte Krause in *Vikrama Volume* (Ujjain 1948), pp. 236-252. Ms. Krause offers the following characterization: "In this *Dvātriṃśikā* a royal patron is addressed, who is revealed as such a unique personality, standing out in bold relief against a background of warfare, empire-building and ingenious rule, that, with the help of contemporaneous literature, even a modern reader can guess who he was and thus infer when Siddhasena lived....The understanding of this poem is made somewhat difficult by the fact that behind the inspired eulogy with its graceful poetic figures hides itself a smart attack on the system of Vaiśeṣika philosophy achieved with the help of occasional paranomasia. Thus the word "*guṇa*", the *leitmotiv*, as it were, of the whole poem, is sometimes used in its conventional meaning of "virtue", "merit"..., sometimes as a logical *termimus technicus* meaning "quality" in contradistinction to *dravya* "substance", while in some cases it is to be understood as conveying both the meanings simultaneously. Other words too are used with a similar *double entendre*."[74]

5. 1. 12. *Nyāya*

1 (E301) The author deplores the fact that there is no dearth of audience for fools, and that any shameless person can pass as a learned scholar.

5 (E303) Philosophy, in a sense, is an unnecessary discipline; if ill-conceived it dies a natural death, and if well thought out it needs no further deliberation.

7 (E304) Philosophers quarrel with words.

8 (E304) Doubt explained.

9 (E305) Topic (*prayojana*) and example are defined.

10 (E306) Conclusion (*siddhānta*) is mentioned, along with the members of the argument and *tarka*, which are expressed by the words "*aṅga*" and "*dharmavikalpa*" respectively.

11 (E306) Ignorance, standing for absence of knowledge as well as perverse awareness, is given as a dominant factor in all fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*).

12 (E307) Quibble (*chala*).

14 (E308) Futile rejoinder (*jāti*) and ways of losing an argument (*nigrahasthāna*).

16 (E309) Sophistry (*jalpa*).

17 (E309) Cavil (*vitaṇḍā*).

19 (E311) Ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) is the cessation of all doubts. There must be an end to doubt, as there is no further doubt when one has seen an object with his own eyes.

28-32 (E316-318) (These verses may be characterized as being a glorification of the speaker (*vāktṛpraśasti*). A philosophy derives its strength from the power of exposition of its proponent.

5. 1. 13. *Sāṃkhyaprabodha*

This section gives a critical estimate of Sāṃkhya philosophy as explained to Āśura by Kapila and by Āśura to his followers.

3 (E321) *Prakṛti* is defined as the state of equilibrium of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. The principles of *mahat, ahaṃkāra*, etc. arise on the disturbance of this equilibrium.

4 (E322) The characteristics of *sattva* are lightness, illumination and happines; suffering and restlessness constitute *rajas*; the opposite of all these is *tamas*.

5 (E322) Only two instruments of cognition, namely perception and inference, are recognized. Unlike the traditional Sāṃkhya the statement of a qualified person is not recognized as a third instrument.

8 (E325) The *puruṣa* is a nondoer (*akartṛ*) because it is the controller and a free agent as well as the knower.

9-10 (E326-327) It is said that the principles of *mahat*, etc., originate on account of the imbalance in *prakṛti*, which is also responsible for the arising of the other evolutes such as sound, etc., and their counterparts, viz., space and the like on the one hand, and the five sense-organs like the ear, etc., on the other.

11 (E327) The five action-organs (*karmendriya*) are enumerated, and the internal organ is characterized.

15 (E330) The four kinds of intellectual creation (*pratyayasarga*) are briefly defined as follows: (1) *siddhi* stands for the fulfilment of the desired end, (2) *tuṣṭi* signifies satisfaction with a partial success; (3) *aśakti* means imperfection of the instruments of success, (4) *viparyaya* stands for achievement of the reverse of (1) - (3).

19 (E332) The *bhautika* path is classified as divine, human and brute.

22 (E333) Nonattachment is given as the cause of the dissolution of the qualities, which had arisen for the service of the *puruṣa*.

23 (E334) Siddhasena refutes the Sāṃkhya-Yoga view that detachment is the culmination of the cultivation of knowledge.

32 (E338) *Puruṣa* enjoys *prakṛti*, remaining aloof from it, much like the eyes, which see their objects, keep away from them. *Puruṣa* is free from bondage and liberation: it is devoid of qualities, though living beside them even after they have fulfilled their mission.

5. 1. 14

The fundamental categories of the Jaina system are explained.

3-4 (E342-343) Substance, quality, karma.

5 (E348) Perception and inference.

6 (E349) Atoms (*paramāṇu*) are the ultimate material

causes.

7 (E350) The definition of earth, etc. up to *ākāśa* in terms of the Vaiśeṣika qualities is provided.

17 (E362) The conventional nature of the act of naming things is mentioned.

21 (E365) The origin of doubt, dream and memory is explained.

25 (E367) The importance of *adṛṣṭa* is recognized.

27 (E369) The role of knowledge (*vidyā*) and nonattachment (*vairāgya*) as leading to enlightenment is explained. The importance of the breaths (*prāṇa*), etc. is mentioned.

30 (E371) Inherence is explained.

(The category of absence (*abhāva*) does not appear to have been discussed in this section.)

5. 1. 15.

A very brief summary of early Buddhist philosophy is given in this section.

1 (E375) It opens with the enigmatic statement that *nirvāṇa* cannot be achieved by an egoistic person, nor is it reached by a person who is free from egoism; knowledge (*vidyā*) does not lead to discrimination (*viveka*) nor does ignorance lead to karmic states. 2 (E376) Emptiness of the person (*pudgalaśūnyatā*) and emptiness of aggregates (*skandhaśūnyatā*) of Mahāyāna philosophy are mentioned.

3-4 (E376-377) A person is nothing but aggregates.

5 (E377) Reference to the *Bhārahārasūtra* in order to explain the nature of *sattva*.

6 (E378) A person is compared to the stream of a river or the flame of a lamp.

7 (E379) The principles of matter/form (*rūpa*) and consciousness (*vijñāna*) explained.

8 (E379) Delusion, desire, mind and karma.

10 (E380) Matter/form is said to undergo change every

moment, just like awareness (*citta*).

13 (E382) The principle of a self refuted.

16 (E384) All the factors cease to exist at every moment, but their cessation is recognized only when a heterodox set of causes and conditions takes place.

17 (E384) Liberation is possible only if there is transmigration. But as transmigration means motion, and motion is logically inconceivable, how can there be liberation?

27 (E391) The Vijñānavāda view of bondage-breeders (*kleśa*) as extraneous elements, and purification as removal of those bondage-breeders, is refuted.

In brief, this section is mainly a critical estimate of the two branches of Mahāyāna philosophy, namely Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda.

5. 1. 16. *Niyata*

3 (E399) When a person is not capable of producing even his own body and sense-organs, how can he be the master of his future life?

4 (E400) Merit and demerit are also dependent upon place, time, etc., and as such are not controlled by the person.

10 (E404) Everything is controlled by its own nature, and there is no efficient cause outside it.

11 (E405) Even the *guṇas* of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are activated by themselves, and as such it is sheer madness to believe in the efficacy of knowledge and nonattachment.

14 (E407) The efforts of Buddhist philosophers to achieve liberation by controlling the passions of attachment, etc., are futile, because everything is momentary and devoid of substance according to them.

18 (E410) The function of *abhijāti*, a very peculiar doctrine of determinism of Makhaliputta Gosāla, is mentioned, a concept which is explained at some length in the verses that follow.

25 (E414) There is no necessity of spiritual sermons. Enlightenment is achieved spontaneously by fit persons, even

as a lotus opens up by a touch of the sun.

5. 1. 17

1-2 (E418-419) Merit and demerit are not opposed to worldly suffering or enjoyment, because an effect depends for its origination upon a set of conditions and not on merit or demerit alone.

3 (E420) The purpose of vows and self-restraint is to induce steadfastness in the discipline.

4 (E421) A vow is either the negation of demerit or the acquisition of merit.

5 (E421) "Vow" stands for abstinence from sin (*virati*). For the practice of vows the eradication of false awareness is of vital importance.

10 (E424) The passions are but the manifestations of false view. False view, nonabstinence and passions are responsible for bondage which is a kind of imbalance of the personality.

11 (E424) Violence, falsity, etc., are the signs of the passions, and therefore the spiritual aspirant is required to desist from violence, etc.

15 (E426) Destruction of these faults cannot be effected without spiritual calm (*praśama*), and as such restraint is a definite step towards self-purification. The eradication of the vices, however, needs the services of vices themselves, even as wind requires another flow of wind in the opposite direction to stop it.

16 (E427) The noble ones recoil from the views which ordinary people have in their homes, but the saints who are set on doing favors to others chalk out their spritual path according to the needs of the people.

18 (E428) It is the mind which is the root cause of bondage as well as of release.

19 (E429) Egoism gives rise to attachment or mineness, but attachment may not give rise to egoism; it is egoity which

has a necessary relation with wishful thought (*saṃkalpa*) and as such is the cause of bondage.

20 (E429) The proposition "I do not exist" is analyzed as negation or affirmation; in the former case it stands for the cessation of all phenomenal existence, while in the latter it means the cessation of all imperfections.

26-27 (E433) Austerity without knowledge and knowledge without austerity are denounced as futile; mere knowledge of medicine does not help cure the patient.

5.1.18

1 (E436) The teacher should take note of the place, time, heredity, customs and the age of the student along with his attitude toward worldly life.

2 (E437) The teacher should be pure in mind and body, of pleasing nature, brilliant, compassionate, conversant with the needs of the disciple, a good speaker and self-possessed.

4-5 (E438) The aptitudes of various kinds of disciples are described in respect of their power of knowledge and practice of spiritual discipline. A disciple is like the patient who needs medicine according to his disease. The teacher should be a specialist in the treatment of a person. The imperfections and blemishes of diseases of the body and the mind, which are controlled by physical discipline alone, may arise again and again, but if they are removed by means of enlightenment their cessation is radical. A person who eats just enough to maintain life and is engaged in self-purification all the time, living in a secluded place, does not expose himself to distractions which destroy his mental vigilance.

In the verses that follow it is prescribed that teaching should be according to the ability and inclination of the disciple.

28 (E458) It is not only futile but also harmful to explain the merits of a work to a person who has not controlled his mind, just like a suppressive medicine given to

a person who has just been attacked by high fever. Austerities are also to be prescribed according to the nature of the discipline.

5. 1. 19. *Niścaya*

1 (E462) Awareness, vision and conduct constitute the path leading to liberation.

2 (E468) Immediate awareness is classified into doubting, determinative (*apāya* or *avāya*) and *dhāraṇā*.

12 (E477) The traditional difference between immediate awareness and verbal awareness is rejected.

15 (E481) The possibility of an omniscient person is proved on the ground of the fact that the complete eradication of awareness-concealment is possible.

17 (E485) The cogency of awareness of mental modalities of even the thoughts of the two-sensed living beings is accepted.

31 (E494) A student of philosophy is asked to explain philosophical positions through the method of complete and partial affirmation and negation.

5. 1. 20. *Dṛṣṭiprabodha*

1 (E495) The whole of Mahāvīra's philosophy is summarized in the fix of origination, cessation and continuity on the one hand, and the duality of substance and mode on the other.

4 (E500) All philosophers have at their disposal the same instrument of knowledge for discovering the truth, yet they quarrel among themselves on account of the different definitions they propose from their individual standpoints.

6 (E502) It is laid down that the nature of knowledge and conduct for the purpose of attaining liberation is bound to vary from person to person, and one is free to follow the path of one's own choice.

7 (E503) The entanglement in worldly life has different causes and conditions for different persons, and consequently

the ways of disentanglement are also different.

Different schools of philosophy which flourished at the time are mentioned in the verses that follow.

24 (E515) The reasons for the origin of these philosophies are given as the inclination of the disciple, the strength of the opposition, and the ability of the teacher.

28 (E518) Awareness and activity (*yoga*) are given as the path to spiritual emancipation.

5.1.21.[1]

12 (E540) The trio of origination, destruction and permanence has its counterpart in the Brahmanical trio of Brahmā (*vidhi*), Śiva (*hara*) and Viṣṇu (*hari*).

16. SIDDHASENA DIVĀKARA, *Sanmatitarka*

This work was originally written in Prakrit. "ET" is the Prakrit text and translation by Sukhlalji Sanghvi and Becaradasji Dosi, originally published in Gujarati, rendered into English and published from Benares in 1939.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

CHAPTER ONE

3 (ET3) There are two fundamental perspectives: as substantial (*dravyāstika*) and as modal (*paryāyāstika*). All other perspectives can be subsumed under these.

4 (ET5) The basic forms of the substantial perspective are the generic viewpoint and the commonsense viewpoint.

5 (ET6) The basic form of the modal perspective is a view which is confined to the present (*ṛjusūtra*). The perspective of what is linguistically implied (*śabdanyāya*) and other perspectives are varieties of view confined to the

1 A. N. Upadhye (*Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and Other Works* (Bombay 1971), p. xxi. says: "It is held by all that the 21st *Dvā* is composed by a different Siddhasena" .

present.

6 (ET9) The locating perspective (*nikṣepanaya*) has four sorts--linguistic (*nāma*), representational (*sthāpana*), substantial, and modal.

7 (ET11) The pure form of the substantial perspective is just the straightforward thesis that something exists. All other statements, dealing in some way with an attribute, involve both substantial and modal perspectives.

8-10 (ET13-16) Any generalization involves substantial as well as modal perspectives. The purely particular is only that which involves no further possibility of particularization. Thus nothing is purely substantial, and nothing purely modal: to classify a perspective as one or the other is a matter of what one wishes to draw attention to. Still, each point of view claims it is the right one.

11 (ET16) E.g., from the modal standpoint everything is born and dies; from the substantial standpoint everything exists forever.

12 (ET17) Nothing lacks the modifications of birth and death. On the other hand, there is nothing that doesn't have some permanence in it.

13 (ET18) Each perspective, if taken independently of the other, fails to adequately characterize a thing. So each point of view abstracted from the other is a wrong standpoint.

14 (ET19) There is no third point of view. The truth cannot be correctly expressed from either point of view by itself; this is the thesis of many aspects.

15-16 (ET21-22) All the other perspectives are likewise wrong when taken alone.

17-21 (ET22-24) The shortcomings of taking a single point of view are shown.

22-25 (ET26-27) A simile to show the point: a bunch of jewels lying on the table does not constitute a necklace; so a bunch of perspectives improperly related does not constitute the truth.

26 (ET28) The value of such an illustration is lauded.

27 (ET29) Thus, of the views that the effect is contained in the cause, that it is not, or both--all are incomplete.

28 (ET31) All perspectives are right in their own sphere but only there--they are wrong if extended to the sphere of another perspective.

29 (ET32) The substantial perspective deals with objects unrelated to other things; as soon as one is distinguished from another we have a substantial perspective.

30-31 (ET33-36) There are two kinds of difference, that depending on words (*vyañjana*) and that dependent on things (*artha*). The former admits of further subdivisions; the latter doesn't.

32-35 (ET36-39) A man stays a man all his life; boy, youth, etc. are modifications of the man. To say that either point of view is mistaken is wrong.

36-40 (ET39-41) The seven modes of predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) are reviewed.

41 (ET45) All seven modes apply differences dependent on a thing; but for a difference dependent on words only two modes are possible--construction-filled (*savikalpaka*) and construction-free (*nirvikalpaka*).

42-46 (ET47-51) From the modal perspective it is a thing's modes that are real--but this fails to consider their substance and thus cannot be the whole truth for the Jains. The same man is ashamed of his childish excesses and longs for future features that are good for him. The man is not merely a child, nor merely an older man. It is like that with respect to the self.

47-48 (ET52-53) The modes cannot be parcelled out to separate substances, but are inextricably mixed.

49 (ET56) So it is not contradictory to speak of a self as single and many.

50 (ET57) Really, there is no difference between external and internal; internality depends on the mind.

51-52 (ET58-59) So, from the substantial perspective

one's self exists, is subject to karma, and experiences the fruits of his own actions. From the modal perspective no self exists, karma applies to one thing and the fruit is the experience of another.

53 (ET60) The correct Jain view combines these two perspectives.

52 (ET61-62) Still, a wise teacher may well speak from one or the other standpoint in order to lead his pupil toward the truth.

CHAPTER TWO

1 (ET63) Vision is awareness of the general, of the substantial perspective; awareness is knowledge of the particular, of the modal perspective.

2 (ET64) Still, it is the same thing that is viewed from either standpont.

3 (ET66) The substantial and the modal perspectives do not occur at the same time for the (three states) up to awareness of mental modalities. But in complete awareness the two synchronize; there vision and awareness are the same.

4 (ET68) Some teachers think, to avoid violating the view of the Tīrthaṅkara, that the omniscient one comprehends only the particular, not the general form of a thing.

5-9 (ET70-74) But (we say that) when the obstructions to knowledge are removed both vision and knowledge arise naturally. Passages from the *sūtras* are appealed to that are said to show that someone with knowledge does not have sensory cognition but has knowledge--that is, his perception (immediate awareness) is not different from knowledge. Both vision and knowledge are said to be endless for the completely aware, but on the view of the one who claims (4) above, one or both will have to end; thus that view is wrong. Both vision and knowledge arise simultaneously for the knower--indeed, they are not different from each other (for him).

10 (ET75-76) If the "omniscient" knower is claimed to have deeper awareness of all things at the same time he must

have it at all times.

11 (ET76) The person who knows finds no difference between vision and knowledge.

12 (ET76) If vision and knowledge are different there can be no omniscient knower.

13 (ET76) If the knower perceives what is unknown and knows what is unperceivable, how can he be omniscient?

14 (ET76) Scripture says both vision and knowledge are endless, but if they are different at least one must be limited.

15 (ET80) Objection: We say a person has different kinds of amounts of knowledge, though he has not knowledge.

Answer: Likewise, the knower does not have all five kinds of awareness, though he does have the fifth, knowledge.

16-17 (ET81) Indeed, at the levels of linguistic awareness, extrasensory awareness and telepathy, objects are known as distinct and have aspects such as perception, etc., different from each other. But knowledge is different--there is no division possible.

18 (ET83) Though it may seem that some *sūtras* take the objector's point of view, the wise must interpret those passages in the proper way.

19 (ET84-85) Since there is no vision of substance at the level of telepathy, it is called awareness, not vision.

20 (ET85-86) Vision has four kinds: sensory (lit. "visual" (*cakṣus*), verbal, extrasensory, and complete. Thus knowledge and complete vision are different.

21-22 (ET86-87) Objection:[1] Just as nondistinct awareness is vision but also knowledge at a higher stage, so it is with complete (awareness or) knowledge. In knowledge, however, vision and knowledge are identical.

23-24 (ET88-89) Answer: If nondistinct awareness is vision, but apprehending individuals is awareness, then sensory awareness must be vision.

25 (ET90) Vision is awareness through the eye and the

1 Following the interpretation of Abhayadeva.

internal organ; it excludes inferential awareness of future things, etc.

26 (ET92-93) Objection: Telepathy is vision.

Answer: No, for the proper organ of that kind of awareness is the internal organ, which cannot grasp jars, etc.

27 (ET94) Sensory and linguistic awareness are required to cognize things.

28 (ET95) Objection: But linguistic awareness is vision.

Answer: No, for things known by linguistic awareness are not known directly.

29 (ET96) There can also be extrasensory vision as well as extrasensory awareness, since by the latter things untouched are cognized.

30 (ET96-97) A knower perceives and knows an object simultaneously.

31 (ET97) In canonical literature it is said that (complete) knowledge and (complete) vision have a beginning but no end. So they must be simultaneous.

32 -33 (ET98-99) Vision actually applies to the awarenesses of those who have firm faith. So right awareness is always accompanied by right vision, but not necessarily the reverse.

34-36 (ET100-101) The above-cited canonical passage about "a beginning but no end" has to be properly interpreted. What it means is that complete understanding (*kevalabodhi*), occurring only once, has a beginning, but since the self that undergoes changes is endless, that same complete understanding is also without an end.

37-42 (ET103-105) Objection: The self is beginningless and knowledge has a beginning and no end (, you say). So they must be entirely different from one another.

Answer: We have answered this already (cf. verse 12). But here is an example: just as we say of the same man, now sixty, who was king at thirty "this man became king", so we say of the same self who has perfect knowledge "this self became omniscient". The substantial self without any

individuating marks is beginningless, but the mode of completeness, like being king, is a particular feature and nothing more.

43 (ET107-108) Knowledge is sometimes measurable (*saṃkhyāta*), sometimes immeasurable and endless, just as the self is sometimes passionate, sometimes hateful, sometimes deluded.

CHAPTER THREE

1-2 (ET109) There is no such thing as a universal unmixed with particularity, or a particular unmixed with generality.

3-4 (ET111-112) (Thus) the description of a substance in terms of the connections of the thing with its previous and its subsequent states is the correct one.

5-6 (ET113-114) (So) every thing is absent from the standpoint of things entirely unlike that thing. Even among things that are alike one exists from the perspective depending on words and does not exist from the perspective depending on things. And a substance is both the same and different from itself, since there are infinite qualities that it has or doesn't have at various times.

7 (ET116-117) A person now is clearly different from that person in his next life, for they are the effects of different causes. But he is the same person!

8 (ET118) Objection: The qualities of a substance are different from that substance, for their qualities are grasped by different organs.

9-15 (ET119-122) Answer: You apparently think that what you mean by "quality" (*guṇa*) is the same as what we mean by "mode" (*paryāya*). Though they are synonyms they are not interchangeable: Mahāvīra used the word "*paryāyāstika*", not "*guṇāstika*".

Objection: But in scripture he refers to *guṇa*s such as ten kinds of colors, etc.

Answer: But he didn't mean by "*guṇa*" color. Lots of

types of things are tenfold.

16-22 (ET125-126) Objection: Just as one man can be a father of *x*, a son of *y*, a brother of *z*, etc., so the same substance appears from different aspects to have different colors, etc.

Counterobjection: That a thing has different qualities doesn't merely depend on its relation to other things.

Objector: But if you admit that in a particular case the appearance of difference is compatible with actual identity, why shouldn't you admit it as a general rule?

Answer: But color, smell, etc., arise from things' relation to the senses. That is, the causes of things undergoing change are external to the thing changing. A thing takes on different modes at particular times; at some times it does not change its modes.

23-24 (ET133) Objection: A substance is permanent; a quality perishes. So they are completely different.

Answer: If a substance must be different from its qualities they must be either material or immaterial. If they are material then an atom must also be material, since it has material qualities. If, however, an atom is immaterial and its qualities are too, then they can never be cognized.

25-26 (ET136) The above discussions are really irrelevant for us, since we do not accept either dualism or monism. Those who espouse such theories are ignorant.

27-28 (ET137-138) "*Anekānta*" means brooking no one fixed view. Thus to be *anekānta* is compatible with onesidedness (*ekānta*), providing it doesn't conflict with the right awareness of things. E.g., the view that there are six kinds of sentient beings (though a Jain tenet) should not be taken as gospel, since sentient beings can be viewed as a single kind.

29-31 (ET140-141) E.g., a thing moving upward is not moving (i.e., not moving downward). Fire which burns is also a nonburner, since there are things that can't be burnt. As substance the jar exists, as living thing it doesn't exist.

32-34 (ET142-143) There are two kinds of creation: natural (*samudayakṛta, aikatāttvika*) and artificial (*samudayākṛta, apariśuddha*). Natural creation is found in space, initiators of movement and of stasis; it is due to external causes and is variable. Destruction too has two kinds: natural and artificial. It is found in nature in the form of the separation of aggregates or in the exchanging of a form for a new one.

35-37 (ET148-149) Origination, maintenance and destruction are both different from and the same as a substance. Though the time of expansion is not the same as that of extraction, there is no interval between the one and the other. To describe a substance as what was produced, is produced, or will be produced, is to speak of the same thing from three temporal viewpoints.

38-42 (ET152-154) (Vaiśeṣika): A substance arises through contact of one substance with another, and not by disjunction. You admit that the term "atomic" applies to a double atom (*dvyaṇuka*), and that "*tryaṇuka*" applies to a composite with three double atoms. Furthermore, an atom is only figuratively said to be "produced" when it separates from the double atom.

Answer: Creation can occur through disjunction; e.g., one substance produces many arisings, maintenances and destructions. Furthermore, even the same arising has many modes: as body, internal organ, language, action, form, motion, contact, disjunction or awareness.

43-45 (ET159-160) Scripture may be either *hetuvāda* or *ahetuvāda*. Categories such as worthiness and unworthiness for liberation are the subject of *hetuvāda*. E.g., (according to *hetuvāda* only) worthiness leads to liberation through right vision, right awareness and right conduct. But actually the *ārādhaka* (one who worships correctly) alludes to reasons (*hetu*) only when *hetuvāda* is under discussion; he relies on scripture when it is appropriate. One who doesn't do this is a heretic.

46-49 (ET163-165) The proper topic of perspective theory is the (Jain) canon. There are as many perspectives as there are ways of speaking or heresies. E.g., the system of Kapila is merely the substantial viewpoint and that of the Buddha is the modal viewpoint alone. Kaṇāda (also known as Ulūka) makes reference to both perspectives, but his system is fallacious because it uses the perspectives independently.

50-52 (ET168-169) The views just alluded to, that things exist and that they don't exist, are unable in themselves to provide liberation, but when adjusted according to the many aspects view the result is right vision.

53 (ET171-172) Time, nature, fate, *adṛṣṭa* and aims of life (*puruṣārtha*)--if taken singly these are false, but when connected properly they are all true.

54-55 (ET173-174) It is wrong to hold that there is no eternal self that acts and experiences, and thus no path to liberation is possible. It is right to hold the reverse views.

56-59 (ET175-177) When the believer in a single truth (*ekāntavādin*) proves a conclusion by similarity or dissimilarity the result is nihilism (*asadvāda*). E.g., to view things in terms of either generalities or particularities alone each constitutes a claim for a single truth. The difficulties of producing reasons for onesided views is set forth.

60 (ET178) To explain categories properly one needs to speak of substance, field, time, karmically produced state, mode, place, connection and difference.

61-62 (ET178-179) Those who cite *sūtras* which involve only one perspective are confined to the verbal only; they impede appreciating alternative viewpoints, thus impeding spiritual progress.

63 (ET179-180) No mere scholar can possess real knowledge of the truth, and should not presume to interpret the canon.

64-65 (ET180-181) Though the *sūtra* is meaningful, it cannot by itself give (true) meaning, which is hard to come by given (the truth of) perspectivism.

66-67 (ET182) The shortcomings of studying with an unqualified teacher, or with one who is too insistent on rules and regulations.

68 (ET183-184) Knowledge and practice need to be combined.

17. MALLAVĀDIN KṢAMĀŚRAMAṆA (550), *Nayacakra*

The summary that follows is taken from the following sources: the summary of Chapters 1-4 of Jambuvijaya's text is by Erich Frauwallner and is found in his introduction to the edition of the *Dvādaśāram Nayacakram* with Siṁhasūri Gaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa's commentary, Part I, edited by Muni Jambuvijayaji (Sri Atmanand Jain Granthamala Serial No. 92) (Bhavnagar 1966). This is our F. In the second volume of the same series (No. 94, 1976) there is a very brief summary of Chapters 5-8 by Jambuvijayaji. This is our J. And in the third volume of the series (No. 95, 1988) Jan Willem de Jong has provided a summary of the remaining four Chapters, our D. These references are to the pages of the relevant volume in which the English summary is found, We indicate respectively the pages of each of the three volumes where one finds the Sanskrit text by "E1, E2, E3". There is also in print a summary of the entire work by K. K. Dixit (K. K. Dixit, *Jaina Ontology*. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 31, Ahmedabad 1971.) We indicate the pagination of excerpts from this summary by D.

"Mallavādi has...referred to Siddhasena; this fact also supports the limit of his age",[75] writes Mahendra Kumar Jain, dating this author as after the 5th century. He continues, "The fact that *Nayacakra* refers to Dignāga and is totally silent about Dharmakīrti and his disciples leads us to the irresistible conclusion that Mallavādi flourished after Dignāga (5th c. A.D.) and before the 7th c. A.D.", the latter because Akalaṅka quotes Mallavādin in his commentary on the *Tattvāvatāra* I. 33.[76]

The work is not available in its entirety, but has had to be reconstructed from the commentary by Siṃhasūrigaṇi Kṣamāśramaṇa. This presents a problem, since as Dixit remarks, "the difference between Mallavādi's own text and this text as restored from Siṃhasūri's commentary is obvious" (D114, though Dixit does not tell us how he knows this--presumably from comparison of the parts otherwise available). As a result the summaries of T and that of D differ in emphasis. We have tried to give samples of both readings. As usual in this Volume we substitute preferred translations of technical terms where required.

(D114) "*Nayacakra* is written in the form of a marathon debate taking place between some seventeen disputants where the incoming one criticizes the outgoing one before presenting his own case. Among themselves these disputants exhaust almost all of the most representative systems that dominated the contemporary philosophical scene."

(E1.1-3) "The old doctrine of the *naya* teaches a number of standpoints which form a basis for the consideration of things. It holds that each of these modes of consideration by itself is onesided and therefore wrong, so that true knowledge of things only becomes possible by the combination and concentration of all modes (Jainism). According to their object the latter have been divided into two groups by Siddhasena Divākara: modes aiming at the thing *per se*, i.e., substance, or at qualities and states. His ideas are based on the Jain view of the essence of things, as we find it clearly defined with patriarchs such as Kundakunda. According to them things consist of their substance, or their state, and their various qualities and modes (*paryāya*), but they have no essential existence of their own as they have in the Vaiśeṣika, but are welded into an inseparable unity. The 'being" of things (*bhava*) is a "becoming" (*bhavana*), i.e., it exists in an incessant continuity of changing phenomena, a process in the course of which they continually shape into a new state."

"Here Mallavādi's trends of thought take their start; the substance of things in contrast to the continually changing states may be accepted as the general feature (*sāmānya*) within them, while in the conditions the restricted, the particular feature (*viśeṣa*) manifests itself. Accordingly also the mode of consideration aiming at the substance of things or their states can be differentiated. If, viz., things are being considered according to their substance, i.e. to their general feature, the result is a general statement, an affirmation or an assent (*vidhi, utsarga*)...(C)onsidered according to their states, i.e. to their particular feature, the result is a limited statement, a restriction or a negation (*niyama, apavāda*)..."

"Thus, Mallavādi teaches three fundamental modes of considering things: general affirmation (*vidhi*), affirmation and restriction (*vidhiniyama*), pure restriction (*niyama*). In addition hereto each of these modes of consideration can be (the) subject of the same three viewpoints, so that finally a total of twelve modes of consideration is brought about..."

"Arranged in a circle these twelve modes form the 'wheel of modes of consideration' (*nayacakra*)...the title of Mallavādi's work. By taking into account these twelve modes of consideration Mallavādi believes (himself) to have exhausted all possibilities in the consideration of things..."

"Thus, the main contents of Mallavādi's work is the framing and refutation of various philosophical doctrines..."

CHAPTER ONE

(E1.1-89; F3) "The first and simplest viewpoint, the simple, general affirmation (*vidhi*), is the viewpoint taken by ordinary men (*laukika*) towards things. It accepts things as they appear, refuting at the same time the attempt to define them further by a philosophical system, which may either see a common factor in all things (*sāmānya*), as does Sāṃkhya, something specific (*viśeṣa*), as the Buddhists do, or both, as it is the case with Vaiśeṣika. This viewpoint is vindicated in the fact that it considers the essence of things, i.e. their process of

becoming (*bhavana*). According to an old rule of grammar, the intrinsic which concerns the inmost essentials of things (*antaraṅga*) claims priority to all external definitions (*bahiraṅga*) of commonness, specificity, or both. This viewpoint is essenially agnostic (*ajñānikavāda*) as it renounces *a priori* any attempt to define the essence of things in concrete terms, stating its futility. Here it coincides with the Pūrvamīmāṃsā, which declares only the ritualistic precepts of the Veda as essential for man's happiness repudiating any philosophical consideration of things..."

(D116) "Finally, there is a long refutation of Diṅnāga's theory of perception with a view to proving that ordinary perception has nothing to do with the same as conceived by Diṅnāga. In this conection there occurs a criticism of the position that many physical things can well be the object of one single perception--in the course of which it is said: 'this will mean seeking refuge with the Lord of doctrinal views, and we have no quarrel with him. For he is certainly the Lord of the whole world. He comes to the rescue of a world-element when it is on the verge of disappearance.' As for how it means seeking refuge with him, it is because the *rūpāyatana* (physical aggregate) has been admitted to be of a multiple nature. This criticism over, there is a brief submission to the effect that similar difficulties arise in connection with the Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika theories of perception, the reason being that ordinary perception reveals reality to be unlike what these theories maintain, just as it reveals it to be unlike what Diṅnāga's theory maintains."

CHAPTER TWO

(E1.117-245; F3-4) "As a second viewpoint Mallavādī mentions the express affirmation of the most general kind (*vidher vidhi*). The first viewpoint had left undetermined the exact nature of being or becoming...'(B)ecoming' means that something becomes something else' (and) therefore is in need of a subject (*kartā*) or vehicle. What, then, is the vehicle of all

becoming? In reply to this question Mallavādī quotes several doctrines of which the following (i.e. succeeding) always contradicts the preceding. The first of these doctrines make a world-soul (*puruṣa*) the vehicle of becoming, the second necessity (*niyati*), the third time, the fourth 'the own being' or the nature of things (*svabhāva*), and the fifth finally being *per se* (*bhāva*), which Mallavādī follows with Bhartṛhari's doctrine of the word as the First Cause of all things (*śabdabrahmavāda*)."

(D116-117) "...(A) really important discussion ensues when *asatkāryavāda* is refuted and *satkāryavāda* maintained...*Satkāryavāda* argues that if the effect is absent there before its production why should it not behave like a sky-flower, that is, why should it ever be produced at all? On the other hand, the *asatkāryavādin* argues that if the effect is present there before its production why should it not behave like the cause, that is, why should it not be present there for all to see? Then begins a representation of (the first doctrine) of *puruṣādvaitavāda* proper where the central proposition is that all phenomena must be one of the four possible states of the sole world-cause *puruṣa*, i.e., deep sleep, dream, wakefulness, the fourth state (absolute wakefulness). *Niyatyadvaitavāda* criticizes *puruṣādvaitavāda* on the ground that a person only too often undergoes suffering--which means that he is not a free agent but an agent predetermined in a particular fashion. *Kālādvaitavāda* criticizes *niyatyadvaitavāda* on the ground that even a predetermined event cannot occur except at a particular time. *Svabhāvādvaitavāda* criticizes *kālādvaitavāda* on the ground that even for an event to occur at a particular time the things involved in it must have a particular nature of their own. Lastly, *bhāvādvaitavāda* criticizes *svabhāvavāda* on the ground that there are no different things to have a particular nature of their own but just one thing behaving in the way it does."

CHAPTER THREE

(E1.246-334; F4) "Against this viewpoint stands a third (*vidher vidhiniyama*) which refutes the vehicle of becoming as the sole principle. It is manifest in two doctrines: the Sāṃkhya system and the doctrine of a Godhead as the creator of all things (*īśvaravāda*). And again Mallavādī allows the first of the two doctrines to be contradicted by the second. The viewpoint of the Sāṃkhya system reasons in the following way: it differentiates two forms of being or becoming, being present (*sannidhibhavana*) and coming about (*āpattibhavana*). Only an existent duplicity, however, makes them possible. As concerns being present someone who knows (*jñātā*) presupposes something that is known (*jñeya*), someone who enjoys (*bhoktā*) presupposes something that is enjoyed (*bhogya*) and vice versa. (The) coming about requires a manifold unity (*aneka eka*) which by changing again and again (*pariṇāma*) adopts a new fom. At the same time it requires a second principle on acount of which the change is being brought about. Thus, the two principles of Sāṃkhya, the soul (*puruṣa*) and original matter (*pradhāna*), are given. The doctrine of a Godhead does away with the differentiation of being present and coming about. It also teaches a duplicity, however: a vehicle and cause of all becoming (*bhāvayitā* or *pravartayitā*) besides material principles whose becoming it causes and steers (*bhāvya* or *pravartya*). Both doctrines hold up express affirmation (*vidher vidhi*) by presupposing a general vehicle of becoming, (but) restrict it, however, by presupposing a second principle that is only passively steered and does not act as the active subject of becoming (*vidher niyama*)."

CHAPTER FOUR

(E1.335-375; F4-5) "By a fourth viewpoint the supposition of a subject and separate vehicle of becoming is done away with completely. At first using as examples action (karma) and soul (*puruṣa*) Mallavādī shows by a number of rather daring conclusions that neither action nor soul can

alone be general cause as they converge in one and the same essential existence. (The same holds good in general for the steering and the steered, the inciter and the incited (*pravartaka* and *pravartya*). Thus, one essential existence remains as the sole vehicle of becoming the 'substance that becomes'. A subject or causer of becoming (*kartā*) is eliminated. Thus the second viewpoint, the additional affirmation (*vidher vidhi*), which demanded such a subject, is refuted. It is true, though, that simple affirmation (*vidhi*) remains valid and is to be found in the supposition of the general vehicle of becoming. Yet it is restricted to substance, i.e. the pure process of becoming (*niyama*)."

(D117) "This chapter contains a representation of the doctrine that *puruṣa* and its karmas are two all-sufficient factors to account for the multiplicity of world phenomena. Hence it begins with a criticism of the theistic position on the ground that God has no necessary role to play in the happenings of the world. Later on the chapter also contains a criticism of the doctrine that the *puruṣa*'s endeavors and not karmas account for the multiplicity of world-phenomena as also of the doctrine that karmas and no *puruṣa*'s endeavors account for the same."

CHAPTER FIVE

(E2.377-415; J9) (D118) "This chapter contains a representation of the position that *dravya* and *kriyā* are two absolutely distinct factors in world-phenomena. Hence it begins with a general criticism of the earlier theories which had spoken as if the posited world-cause and its states are somehow one with each other. According to this position *dravya* is that world-factor which ever remains absolutely the same while *kriyā* is that which becomes different every next moment."

CHAPTER SIX

(E2.416-454; J9) (D118) "This Chapter contains a

representation of the Vaiśeṣika view and it begins with a criticism of the earlier view on the ground that a *dravya* absolutely untouched by *kriyā* is a nonentity, for such a *dravya* cannot exhibit the three essential characteristics of a real entity, viz. origination, destruction and permanence. At the end of this criticism *satkāryavāda* is refuted and *asatkāryavāda* maintained, it being understood that the earlier view somehow involves *satkāryavāda*. In this conection an interesting distinction is made between absolute nonexistence (*atyanta asattva*) and conditional nonexistence (*saviśeṣaṇa asattva*) and it is argued that it is only an absolutely nonexistent thing that never comes into existence while a conditionally nonexistent thing comes into existence when appropriate conditions are available."

CHAPTER SEVEN

(E2.455-551; J9) "In this (Chapter) old Vaiśeṣika works which are not extant nowadays, such as *Vākya, Bhāṣyaṭīkā* by Praśastamati and *Kataṇḍiṭīkā* have been criticized at length. Also in this (Chapter), the meaning of the Word is described according to the famous Buddhist Logician, Diṅnāga, who is aptly called the Father of the Buddhist Logic."

(D118) "...The chapter begins with the elaborate criticism of *asatkāryavāda* and ends with an elaborate criticism of *ṣaṭpadārthavāda*. In between the two there occurs a positive defence of *syādvāda*."

(D178) "...(I)t is only towards its end that the speaker adopts a tone more appropriate to a Sautrāntika Buddhist--perhaps thus preparing the way for the chapter being declared to be a vindication of *ṛjusūtranaya*...(T)he Vaiśeṣika here argues that an effect exists in its cause even prior to its production but that it is then called absent there because it has not yet been associated with *sattā*--an example of things which exist without being associated with *sattā* being *sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya*."

CHAPTER EIGHT

(E2.553-737; J9-10) "In the Eighth (Chapter), which is the longest of all..., the doctrines of Bhartṛhari, his teacher Vasurāta, and Dignāga and his commentators, have been fully repudiated."

(D118-119) "This chapter contains a representation of what the Jaina theoreticians call *śabdanaya*. It begins with a brief criticism of the view that *abhāva* is as much a constituent of the real as is *bhāva*, a view maintained by *syādvāda*. (On the present disputant's view *bhāva* alone constitutes the real.) But its criticism is directed against several other doctrines viz. (i) the doctrine of primacy of name (the *nāmanikṣepavāda*); (ii) the doctrine of primacy of word (Bhartṛhari); (iii) the doctrine of impartite word-meaning (of Vasurāta, the preceptor of Bhartṛhari); (iv) the doctrine of primacy of configuration (of the *sthāpanānikṣepavāda*); (v) the doctrine of demarcation (of Dignāga)."

"On his own part the *śabdanayavādī* maintains that the meaning of a word consists of both the general and the particular, with emphasis on the particular."

CHAPTER NINE (of E andDJ)/ CHAPTER TEN (of D)

(E2.765-793; D119) "This chapter contains a representation of what might be called *rūpādisamudāyavāda*, that is, of the view that the real is but a conglomeration of qualities-devoid-of-an-abiding-substance. It begins with a criticism of *avaktavyavāda* on the ground that a real *avaktavyavāda* must be absolutely speechless, a self-defeating position. Towards the end of the chapter it is maintained that a real undergoes no origination or destruction of any sort."

CHAPTER TEN (of E and DJ)/CHAPTER ELEVEN (of D)

(E2.794-805; D119) This chapter contains a representation of what might be called *kṣaṇikavāda*. It begins with a criticism of *rūpādisamudāyavāda* on the ground that an entity that undergoes no origination or destruction is a

nonentity. In the course of argument the thesis is maintained that all destruction of a thing is causeless and that this is why this thing must necessarily be momentary."

(DJ1) "The tenth chapter refutes the theory of inexpressibility and the existence of *viśeṣa* and *sāmānya*...The concept of *samudāya*, which plays such an important role in the Sarvāstivāda school of Buddhism, is refuted in terms similar to those used by the Sautrāntikas, who considered that an object is not an assemblage (*samudāya*) of really existing atoms but only something nominally existent (*saṃvṛtisat*). Mallavādin next refutes the theory of the existence of the effect (*sat kārya*), considering two alternatives, i.e. the existence of both cause and effect and the existence of the effect alone. In the same way he refutes the existence of an *ātman* which is separate and different from the five *skandhas*. *Ātman* is only a designation given to the group of the five *skandhas* just as the word 'heap' (*rāśi*) is used for an accumulation..."

CHAPTER ELEVEN (of E and DJ)/CHAPTER TWELVE (of D)

(E2.806-873; D119) This chapter contains a representation of *śūnyavāda*, that is, of the position that things of the world are essenceless (*niḥsvabhāva*). It begins with a criticism of *kṣaṇikavāda* on the ground that an alleged momentary entity must first come into existence before it is associated with a moment but that in that case it ceases to be a momentary entity. Towards the end of the chapter it is suggested that it will also do if things of the world are called not essenceless but something of the nature of consciousness on the ground that they are necessarily objects of consciousness. So the doctrine of the chapter can also be called Vijñānavāda."

18.JINABHADRA GAṆI (600), *Dhyānaśataka*

"Jinabhadra...belongs to the last quarter of the 6th and first quarter of the seventh cntury A.D."[77]

The translation that follows, together with the text of the work and of the Hindi commentary which is translated into English here, was published from Delhi in 1972. This is our "ET". Technical terms are translated in accordance with the standards for this Volume, as usual.

Translation by Muni Dulaharaj

1 (ET1-3) Bowing to Lord Mahavīra who has burnt away the fuels of karma by the flames of *śukla dhyāna*, who is Yogeśvara (highest yogi) and the refuge, I shall expound the treatise on concentration (*dhyāna*).

2 Mental effort which is steady is concentration. The one which is unsteady is called "mind" (*citta*). Mind is of three kinds: (1) *bhāvanā*, effort to practise meditation; (2) *anuprekṣā*, reflection, the effort to re-fix the mind on the same concentration from which it has fallen off; (3) *cintā*, anticipative thinking.

3 Meditation (holding of the mind) on one particular object (mode) by one who has not become an omniscient can never (last for) more than one *antarmuhūrta*) (a period of time extending no more than 48 minutes). After this duration the mind fixes itself on some other object, and as such the flow of meditation changes its course. But (for) those who have become *jinas* by exterminating four *ghaṭīya* karmas, the meditation would be the suppression of all the activities of word, mind and body.

4 After *antarmuhūrta* some other thought or a different meditation (*bhāvanā* or *anuprekṣā*) starts. The mind then fixes itself on different objects and thus the flow of meditation may be for a longer duration.

5 (ET3-7) Concentration is fourfold:

1. frustration-producing (*ārta*)
2. cruel (*raudra*)
3. *dharmya*

4. white (*śukla*).

The last two are the instruments of emancipation and the first two lead to transmigration.

6 Polluted with dislike, one who excessively thinks of separation from undesirable objects of the senses like sound etc. and constantly strives for avoiding their acquisition is the first type of *arta* concentration

7 One who, because of his attachment to the body, eagerly desires to get rid of the unbearable pain caused by colic, headache etc., and constantly strives for avoiding their repetition is the second type of *arta* concentration.

8 One who is overpowered by attachment has a strong mental urge for retaining the desirable objects of senses and pleasant sensations caused thereby and also strives again and again for their acquisition. This is the third type of *arta* concentration..

9 The longing to obtain sensual objects, splendor and supernatural accomplishments of Indra and emperors and of such others is called *nidāna*. This indeed is a mean consideration for material gain which is generated by deep ignorance. This is the fourth type of *arta* concentration.

10 All these four types of *arta* concentration are found in a person infatuated by attachment, aversion and delusion. This concentration increases transmigration of the self and is the instrumental cause which leads the self to be bound in animal existence.

11-12 One who contemplates the reality of substances, remains neutral and knows that combination, separation, diseases, etc., are the consequences of one's own karma, one who remains equanimous in all the divergent circumstances, one who adheres to the virtuous recourses to get rid of trials and tribulations, one who considers penance and self-control to be the resistant forces overcoming all the ailments caused by karma, and who engages himself in their use without any idea of acquiring any material gain, is a competent aspirant for the *dharmya* concentration..

13 (ET7-11) These three factors--attachment, aversion and delusion--are the root causes of *saṃsāra*. They are found in *ārta* concentration and hence *ārta* concentration is the seed for the tree of *saṃsāra*.

14 *Kapota* (*kāvoya*?), blue (*nīla*) and black (*kṛṣṇa*)--these three colorings of a person engaged in *ārta* concentration are not excessively afflicted. These colorings are the consequences of karma.

15 Four characteristics of *ārta* concentration (are):

1. screaming,
2. weeping pitiously,
3. lamenting,
4. beating one's own chest, head, etc. in sorrow.

These occur due to the pains of separation from the desirable and union with the undesirable.

16 In *ārta* concentration one decries one's own activities and deeds and praises with dismay the affluence of others. He intensely hankers after them and when they are acquired he becomes absorbed in them and constantly strives to acquire them more and more.

17 One who is absorbed in sensual objects like sound, etc., who is away from spirituality, who is negligent and disinterested in the religion of expunging passions altogether *(vītarāga)* dwells in *ārta* concentration.

18 *Ārta* concentration is found in three types of persons:

1. one who is devoid of self-control;
2. one who practices self-control to the extent of a seeker,
3. an ascetic who is in the sixth category, who is not free from unmindfulness. *Ārta* concentration is the root of all negligence. It should be avoided by all the aspirants.

19 (ET11-15) Seized by the merciless and cruel intention to strike, cut, bind, burn or brand and kill living beings and possessed by excessive anger of mean fruition is the first type of *raudra* concentration..

20 The firm intention of a person to delude, to cheat, to engage in backbiting, to conceal his sins, to lie, to utter vulgar words, to use words likely to cause killing leads to the second type of *raudra* concentration.

21 Engaging oneself, overpowered by intense anger and greed, in killing living beings, indulging in ignoble activities, misappropriating the possessions of others and remaining indifferent to the calamities of the next world is the third type of *raudra* concentration..

22 To be absorbed in protecting wealth which is the means of procuring objects of sensual enjoyment, to be engrossed in filthy thoughts, to remain suspicious of others, to be very much agitated by the filthy thoughts of killing is the fourth type of *raudra* concentration.

23 Hence *raudra* concentration is of four kinds:

1. dominated by violence,
2. dominated by falsehood,
3. dominated by stealing,
4. dominated by protection of sensual objects.

One who engages oneself in these drags others towards them and gives consent to others already engaged therein and remains deeply engrossed in the respective subject is in *raudra* concentration. It is ignoble. This concentration is found in two types of persons:

1. those who are completely devoid of self-control,
2. those who are partially restrained.

24 These four types of *raudra* concentration are found in a person who is overwhelmed by attachment, aversion and delusion. They lead to the increase of transmigration and are root causes leading the soul to hell.

25 For one engaged in *raudra* concentration three thought-currents (*kapota*, etc. as above) become excessively afflicted. They are the consequences of one's own karma.

26 The characteristics of one who is engaged in these four type of *raudra* concentration through word and body are

as follows:

1. to remain constantly engaged in one of these four types with intensity of mind;
2. to remain engaged in all the four types;
3. to indulge in violent activities, such as lynching, pecking the eyes out of sockets, etc.;
4. not to repent for one's sinful activities till death.

27 One who is engaged in *raudra* concentration feels elated at the misfortune of others, remains indifferent (that is, becomes unmindful of the fear of sin), becomes cruel and unrepenting, feels happy at evil deeds. These are the indications of a person engaged in *raudra* concentration.

28-29 (ET16-24) A monk should engage himself in *dharmya* concentration after knowing well the meditative practice, place, time, posture, supporting object, order of succession, aim, meditator, contemplation, thought-currents, signs and the fruits. After practising this, he should proceed to *śukla* concentration.

30 One who practises meditation through the medium of repeated meditative practice becomes competent to engage in concentration. Practices are of four kinds:

1. practice of awareness (*jñāna bhāvanā*)
2. practice of vision (*darśana bhāvanā*)
3. practice of conduct (*cāritra bhāvanā*)
4. practice of nonattachment (*vairāgya bhāvanā*).

31 One who is constantly engaged in acquiring knowledge, one who is steadfast in knowledge, one who always retains purity of text and its meaning, one who knows the utmost through the practice of knowledge, can engage in meditation with a steadfast awareness.

32 One who is free from the defects like suspicion, etc., and who is calm and composed, becomes noninfatuated in meditation through the purity of vision.

33 By stopping the inflow of karma, annihilating the old ones and acquiring auspicious karma, one through this

practice of conduct becomes engrossed in meditation even without any effort.

34 The mind of one who is conscious of the nature of the world, one who is detached, fearless and desireless, becomes inundated by nonattachment. He can easily become steadfast in meditation.

35 Monks should always dwell in a secluded place which is free from young women, beasts, eunuchs and unchaste people; particularly when he is engaged in concentration, he must remain in solitude.

36 Those monks who have thoroughly practised *yoga* and have become steadfast in it, those whose minds are unflinching in meditation, make no discrimination between an overpopulated village and a desolate forest in their selection of a place for meditation.

37 Hence a place where the activities of mind, word and body remain composed and which is free from the disturbances of living beings is a fit place for one to meditate.

38 When mind, vocal organ and body remain composed it is the proper time for meditation. There is no restriction regarding day and night or other period for one who meditates.

39 In meditation, one should remain in that bodily posture which has been mastered and which does not become a deterrent to meditation. He can do meditation standing, sitting or lying down.

40 Several sinless monks have attained omniscience through meditation in all places, periods and bodily postures.

41 Scriptures have not placed any restriction with regard to place, time and posture of meditation. One should strive so as to bring about the pacification of one's activities of word, mind and body.

42 Supports for *dharmya* concentration are:

1. study of the scriptures,
2. questioning,
3. repetition of studies,

4. reflection on meanings.

These are the four props dominating verbal (awareness) concentration (*śrutadharma*).

Practising equanimity and other such necessary works are the props dominated by conduct *dharma*.

43 Just as a person climbs a steep place with the support of a firm substance (like a rope), even so, one progresses steadily in *dharmya* concentration by taking support of a scriptural text.

44 When an omniscient reaches the motionless state (*śaileṣī*), white concentration functions in the following order-- first of all the activities of mind, then the activities of vocal organ and lastly the actions of body are stopped. But one who is in the sphere of *dharmya* concentration does not follow this order. He accomplishes the cessation of activities in accordance with his spiritual well-being without sticking to any particular order.

45-46 (ET25-29) One engaged in *dharmya* concentration should first of all meditate on the commandments of the Lord who is like a beaconlight for the whole world. The meditator should be desireless. The commandment of the Lord is stilled and perfect, eternal, beneficial to beings, cherished by truth, invaluable, boundless, invincible (and which) has a great objective, has great valor, has various subjects to deal in, unknowable by the unskilled persons and which is deep with differential standpoints (*naya*), permutations and topics (*bhaṅga*), instruments of true cognition (*pramāṇa*) and different approaches (*gama*).

47-48 This commandment of the Lord is not easily comprehensible due to some fundamental causes:

1. Feeble intellect,
2. Absence of proper teacher,
3. Depth of subject-matter,
4. Intense obscurity of the knowledge,
5. Dirth of logical wisdom,
6. Lack of proper illustration.

These causes act as hindrances to the proper understanding of the commandments of the Lord but a man of wisdom should strive in this direction.

49 *Arhats* are the most excellent in the world. They have conquered attachment, hatred and delusion. They do good even to those who do ill to them. They always speak what is true.

50 A monk who avoids what is avoidable and meditates on the perils of this world and the next world of the people engaged in attachment, hatred, passions and causes of inflow of karma, engages himself in the second type of *dharmya* concentration.

51 One who reflects upon the fruitions of action regarding their nature, duration, intensity and location which are grouped into auspicious and inauspicious and which are generated by the activities of mind, word and body and also by negligence...is (practising) the third type of *dharmya* concentration.

52 One should also reflect on the characteristics, forms, bases, classifications, measures, origin, endurance, destruction and modes of substances delineated by the Lord.

53 (ET29-34) This universe consists of five elements: (1) self, (2) not-self, (3) initiator of motion, (4) initiator of stasis and (5) space. It is without a beginning or end, is infinite, is differentiated by name, etc. It is threefold: (1) upper region, (2) lower region and (3) nether region.

54 This universe is structured into the earths, spheres, islands, oceans, hells, heavens and *bhāvanā* (abodes of gods). It is settled on air and space. One should meditate on the structural appearance of the universe. This is the fourth type of *dharmya* concentration.

55 The characteristic of the self is active consciousness. Self is without beginning or end. It is different from the body, it is formless and is the doer and enjoyer of its own karma.

56-57 This ocean of *saṃsāra* is the product of one's own actions. This ocean is filled with (the) water(s) of birth and

death, is deep with passions like anger, pride, etc. and is inhabited by innumerable wild animals in the form of catastrophes. It is full with the cesspools of delusion; it is dreadful. It is attacked by the successive waves of connection and separation caused by the strong wind of ignorance. It has neither a beginning nor an end. It is inauspicious. One should reflect on this nature of *saṃsāra.*

58-59 That great boat of conduct is capable of crossing this ocean of *saṃsāra* which has right intention as the fastening cord and pious and right awareness as the navigator. This boat is without any holes due to discipline. Its movement is accelerated by the wind of penance. It moves on the way of nonattachment without being shaken by the raging billows of counter-currents of wrong thoughts.

60 Travelling in this boat which is filled with precious jewels of conduct, the mendicant merchants reach safely and quickly the city of emancipation.

61 There the self in exchange for the three jewels (right vision, right awareness and right conduct) obtains happiness which is absolute, spontaneous, unobstructive, uncomparable and imperishable.

62 What more? The scriptures of the Lord are replete with the description of self, etc. They represent the different standpoints. One must reflect on this.

63 Those monks of wisdom who are free from all types of negligence, whose delusion is dissolved or subsided, are the incompetent authorities of *dharmya* concentration.

64 (ET34-40) Those whose practice in *dharmya* concentration has reached the acme of perfection, who are *pūrvadhāra* (versed in ancient texts) and whose bodily constitution is of excellent kind, can alone be the meditators of white concentration's first two phases. The third phase comes to the omniscient and the fourth to the one who is on the verge of emancipation and who as such has stopped all physical actions and has become completely inactive.

65 One whose inner soul is well tainted with *dharmya*

concentration always remains engrossed in the contemplation of different meditative practices in which he constantly thinks on the transitoriness of the world, etc.

66 During *dharmya* concentration yellow, lotus and white--these three auspicious colorings gradually become pure. These colorings mitigate in accordance with the conscious-awakening of an individual.

67 The signs of *dharmya* concentration are to have firm belief in the teachings of the Lord, through scriptures, exhortations, commandments and natural inheritance.

68 The meditator of *dharmya* concentration is one who eulogizes and adores the qualities of (an) *arhat* and the monks, who is endowed with the virtues of modesty and generosity and who is engaged in the study of scriptures and the practice of the code of conduct and self-restraint.

69 In the Jain religion the predominant factors are: forgiveness, meekness, rectitude and nonattachment. Taking these bases, one climbs in white concentration..

70 The object of mind comprises all the three worlds. A *cadmāstha* (?) monk practising white concentration contracts his mind gradually and establishes it in an atom and meditates steadfastly. Omniscience is devoid of mind and as such there is no mental meditation for him.

71-72 Just as poison which has spread all over the body is collected and localised at the point of the serpent's bite through mental incantations (*mantra*) and then with more powerful *mantras* it is thrown out of the body, even so the *arhat* physician who is endowed with the strength of *mantras* and meditation contracts in an atom the mind-poison which wanders in all the three worlds and expels it (mind) out therefrom.

73-74 Just as a fire, fuel of which has been removed, gradually diminishes and ultimately remains with a few rampants of fuel and when that remaining fuel is removed, it extinguishes, even so the mind-fire devoid of the objects of sense-fuel becomes less and less and ultimately dies out when

the fuel is completely extinguished.

75 Just as water in a tube or inside a hot iron vessel gradually lessens, even so you should understand that a yogi's mind (mind is compared to water) gradually disappears and ultimately becomes *amana* (without any mind).

76 Likewise an omniscient suppresses the activities of the vocal organ and body in their due succession, becomes steady like Mount Meru and reaches the motionless state.

77-78 (ET40-53) The unattached monk versed in ancient texts considers the modes like origin, decay and persistence of a single substance from different standpoints. This is the first type of white concentration called *pṛthaktvavitarkasavicāra*. Here the word *savicāra* means to flee from an object of meditation to the verbal symbol (*artha* to *vyañjana*) and from one activity to another.

79-80 To fix the mind in any one of the modes, like origin, decay and persistence of a substance, and to meditate steadfastly like the flame of a lamp kept in an airtight place, is the second type of white concentration called *ekatvavitarkāvicāra*. It is also accomplished by taking the support of ancient scriptures (through which the meditator meditates on very subtle modes of a substance). In this mode of meditation there is no fleeing from an object of meditation to the verbal symbol and from one activity to another.

81 When the time of emancipation draws near, the activities of mind and vocal organ of an omniscient stop but the subtle activity of inspiration and expiration remains. This is the third type of white concentration called *sūkṣmakriyānuvṛtti*, where the subtle activities remain.

82 The omniscient reaches the stage of motionlessness like a mountain. This is the last type of white concentration called *vyavachinnakriyāpratipatti* where all the activities come to naught and the meditator never falls down from his meditation.

83 In the first type of white concentration there may exist all the three kinds of activities (mental, vocal and

physical) or any one of them.

84 In the second type, there exists only one kind of activity amongst the three. In the third type, there exists only the activity of the body, and in the fourth type there is complete cessation of all activities. This is the state of inaction.

Just as the steady mind of a *cadmāstha* is called meditation, even so the steady body of an omniscient is called meditation.

85-86 In an omniscient who is in the sphere of action or has reached the state of inaction, even though he is devoid of mind, the active consciousness of the self is present there. Hence the last two types of white concentration exist there. The main reasons for this consideration are:

1.Due to the previous actions of the self,
2.Due to annihilation of karma,
3.Due to manifold meanings of a word,
4.Due to scriptural authenticity.

87-88 An aspirant whose mind is well tainted with white concentration and who is equipped with the supreme code of conduct, even after retirement from meditation ponders on the four reflections:

1. To think of the calamities which follow the inflow of karma,
2. To think of the evil nature of the world,
3. To think of the infinity of worldly existence,
4. To think of the decay and deterioration of all the worldly substances.

89 In the first two types of white concentration the coloring is also white, and in the third type it is *paramaśukla* (ultimately white). The fourth type is beyond the sphere of colorings. There the stability is acquired to such a great extent that it conquers the stability of Meru mountain and hence it is a *paramaśukla* state naturally.

90 One engaged in white concentration is known by these four signs:

1. pacification of the whole being,

2. non-infatuation,
3. high discrimination,
4. utmost renunciation.

91 An aspirant of wisdom and valor never swerves nor is frightened by afflictions and obstacles. He never gets confused even in subtle matters or in supernormal phenomena.

92 He sees the self as distinct from the body and likewise perceives all fetters. Being unattached, he completely renounces body and all the substances.

93 The fruits of *dharma* concentration are the inflow of pious karma, stoppage of influx of new karma and annihilation of accumulated karma, and abundance of heavenly pleasures. All these fruits are connected with auspicious lineage.

94 The fruits of the first two types of white concentration are the extra-ordinary gain of the inflow of suspicious karma, the stoppage of inflow of karma and the cessation of old karma. Along with this, the meditator attains the highest (*anuttara*) heavens. The last two types of white concentrations result in the final emancipation of the soul.

95 Inflow of karma is the root cause of this worldly existence. Hence in *dharmya* and white concentrations there is no inflow of karma. It is for this reason that the *dharmya* and white concentrations never become the cause for worldly existence.

96 Stoppage of the inflow of karma and the annihilation of accumulated traces are the path of emancipation. Penance is the path of *saṃvāra* and *nirjarā*. The predominant factor in penance is meditation and hence, finally, it is the cause of emancipation.

97-98 Just as water cleanses the stains on a cloth, fire removes the rust of iron and the sun dries up the slough of water on earth, likewise the stain, rust and slough of karma in the cloth, iron and earth of the soul is cleansed, removed and dried up by the water, fire and sun of meditation.

99 Just as during the time of meditation the body heats up, is weakened and aches severely, even so, the karmas of a

out by yogic procedures like meditation, fasting, etc.

101 Just as fire fanned by wind burns up quickly the heaped fuel, even so the fire of meditation burns up in a moment (an) immense mass of karma-fuel.

102 Just as clusters of clouds struck by the wind disappear in a moment, even so the clouds of karma are destroyed by the gale of meditation.

103 One who has reached the inner state of meditation is never tormented by the mental ailments like envy, grief, dejection, etc. which are the products of passions.

104 One whose mind has become steady in meditation, who always acts for the annihilation of karma, is never disturbed by manifold bodily afflictions like cold, heat, etc.

105 Thus meditation is the storehouse of all spiritual virtues. It is the means of happiness, both seen and unseen. It is exceedingly noble, an object of faith and a thing to be always known.

106 Thus Jinabhadra Kṣamāśramaṇa has compiled this treatise on meditation containing 105 *ślokas* meant for the purification of karma.

19.JINABHADRA GAṆI (600), *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* on the *Āvaśyakanirukti*

Dalsukh Malvania, in the English Introduction contained in Volume Three of his three-volume edition of the *Āvaśyakasūtra* with this commentary, estimates the year of the death of Jinabhadra Gaṇi as 609 A.D. (p. 5). He also says "it is certain that he toured in the region of Valabhī and other neighbouring parts of West India where the Jain Religion--especially the Śvetāmbara sect--was gaining importance there." (p. 5) Evidence of his having toured Mathurā is also found in the the text (p. 6).

The text, with commentary and an autocommentary, was first edited by Dalsukh Malvania in Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series Volumes 10, 14 and 21, our "E". The text is also edited by Nathmal Tatia as Prakrit Jaina Institute Research Publication Series Volume 6 (Volume I: Vaishali, Bihar 1972). As Dr. Tatia tells us, the work actually comments on only the first chapter of the *Avaśyakanirukti*.

The summary provided here is by Dalsukh Malvania, found in the Third Volume of his edition cited above. Page references under "S" are to that Volume. Numbers in parentheses are to the numbers of the verses in the text.

Summary by Dalsukh Malvania

(S8-9; E1-158) "The *Anuyogadvāra(sūtra)*, at the outset, (*sūtra* 1), enumerates the five awarenesses (*jñāna*), establishes the connection of the *Āvaśyakasūtra* with verbal (*śruta*) awareness (*sūtras* 2-6), one of those five awarenesses, clarifies the meaning of the title *Āvaśyakaśrutaskandha* applying the method of locating (*nikṣepa*) (*sūtras* 7-58) and then discusses the subject-matter, etc. of the *Āvaśyaka*."

"The *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* too comments on the *Āvaśyakasūtra*. Hence it follows the *Āvaśyakanirukti* which in turn follows the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* in respect of the order in which the exposition is to proceed. Thus it naturally follows that the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* follows the order of exposition found in the *Anuyogadvārasūtra*. Hence the *Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya* too contains not only the method of exposition found in the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* but also the explanation of the method itself..."

"The *Anuyogadvārasūtra* starts with the mention of five awarenesses, viz. *mati, śruta, avadhi, manaḥparyāya* and *kevala*. That is why the *Āvaśyakanirukti* first explains these five *jñānas* only. Complete explanation of the five awarenesses is found in the *Nandīsūtra* too. The *Nandīsūtra* is a *maṅgala*

(an auspicious introductory prayer). Hence Ācārya Jinabhadra discusses first the *maṅgala* (12-78) and then at length the five awarenesses (78-832) under the pretext of *maṅgala* after having identified *maṅgala* with the *Nandīsūtra* and the *Nandīsūtra* with the five awarenesses..."

"After the exposition of the five awarenesses there occurs the explanation of the name of the *śāstra*. The title of the *śāstra* itself suggests its subject-matter or its contents (*samudayārtha*). Hence this portion of the text...is given the name of *Samudayārtha*."

"Following the method of exposition demonstrated in the *Anuyogadvārasūtras* it is declared that, out of the five awarenesses, to the verbal awareness only could be applied the method of exposition (*anuyoga*). For this Jinabhadra offers clarification as follows. Verbal awareness is other-dependent in the sense that it requires the medium of language, so that it is acquired from others. Again, it is other-illuminating in the sense that it could be imparted to others through preachings and teachings. This being the case with verbal awareness it becomes possible for us to apply to it the method of exposition (834)."

(S9-10; E158-169) "On the other hand, the remaining four awarenesses being neither other-dependent nor other-illuminating, it is quite impossible for us to apply to them the method of exposition. The *Āvaśyaka* being verbal its exposition means the exposition of the language itself. Again, it is established that the *Āvaśyaka* is a *śrutaskandha*, that is, it consists of several chapters (*adhyāya*) (833-838). At this occasion, it is stated that it is not compulsory for a commentator to comment upon the *Nandī*, though here at the outset the *Nandī* is commented upon for the benefit of the pupils. While writing a commentary on any work one should perform a *maṅgala* (auspicious introductory prayer) at the outset; and what is compulsory for performing a *maṅgala* is merely the mention of the five awarenesses and not the exposition of the *Nandīsūtra* (839-841)."

"Then follows the explanation of the constituent terms of the title *Āvaśyakaśrutaskandha* through the method of locating which settles the meaning of a term after having discussed the various senses in which it is employed in different situations, viz., *nāma, sthāpana*, etc. (*gāthā* 842 ff.). And this explanation of the title itself constitutes the substance of the text (*piṇḍārtha* or *samudayārtha*). It is so because the *Āvaśyakasūtra* is divided into six chapters and the subject-matter of all these chapters is suggested by the explanation of the title of the text. Hence this portion wherein the meaning of the title is discussed is given the name of *samudayārtha* at the beginning of this topic (2) and that of *piṇḍārtha* at the end of the topic (899)."

(S10; E169-181) "*Piṇḍārtha* (general content, substance of the text) is followed by the *avayavārtha* (exposition of the chapters one by one). Equanimity (*sāmāyika)* being the first chapter its exposition is now due in order. Hence at this juncture first the entrances to exposition are explained. They are *upakrama,* etc. Having stated that mental equanimity is the basis of all spiritual qualities (900) Jinabhadra explains in a general way the four entrances to exposition, their divisions, the etymology of their names, etc. (900-911). Then follows the detailed explanation of each and every entrance to exposition (912ff.)..."

(S10-11; E182-298) "In the *Anuyogadvāra* occurs the *upodghāta* (preface, introduction) to the entire work...In the first *dvāra* of *upodghāta,* viz. *uddeśa,* we are required to understand that the general name of the text commented upon is *adhyayana* (chapter). In the second *dvāra, nirdeśa,* we are required to understand that the particular name or title of the text commented upon is *Sāmāyika*...(970, 1501) Then follows the detailed explanation of the meanings of the terms *uddeśa* and *nirdeśa* applying the method of *nikṣepa*. (1484) After this occurs the discussion on the *nirgamadvāra,* the third constituent of the *upodghāta*..."

(S11; E193-254) "While describing the spiritual

evolution by which any soul can attain Tīrthaṅkarahood Jinabhadra has described the nature of a Tīrthaṅkara, given the life-sketch of Lord Mahāvīra, the last twenty-fourth Tīrthaṅkara and the propounder of the present Jaina Religion, and explained the Jaina theory of spiritual evolution. (1023-1343)..At this juncture he has explained the way of action (*kriyāmārga*) and the way of knowledge (*jñānamārga*). According to the former, it is action only that leads to liberation. According to the latter it is knowledge only that leads to liberation. Jinabhadra has pointed out that the two ways are two extremes fraught with many faults and defects. He has synthesized both these ways and has declared that both action and knowledge, when synthesized, lead to liberation. (1123-1179)."

(S13; E272-286) "..Jinabhadra discusses the *kāladvāra* because *kāla* (time) is an internal cause. Jinabhadra gives an etymology of the term *kāla* and declares that time is nothing but a mode of a substance. Its different names are due to its minor insignificant special features. Time is treated of in nine different ways. In the *Āvaśyakanirukti* at one place occurs the statement "*pagadaṃ tu bhāvena*" (2502=*Niryukti* 503) and at another place occurs the statement "*ettha puṇa adhikāro pamāṇa-kālena*". Jinabhadra points out that these statements are not contradictory. It is so because the first statement means that Lord Mahāvīra preached equanimity when he was in the state of destroying karmic traces. Thus *bhāvakāla* means the time of the destruction of karmic traces. (2556=*Āvaśyaka-nirukti* 519). The second statement means that Lord Mahāvīra preached equanimity in the Mahāsena woods in the morning of the eleventh day of the bright half of Vaiśākha (2555=*Āvaśyakanirukti* 518). Thus the *Niryukti* removes the contradiction. Jinabhadra too follows the *Niryukti*. Moreover he declares that there is no difference whatsoever between *bhāvakāla* and *pramāṇakāla* from the point of view of time as a substance; they are identical. The different names that time has are due to some trifling different features."

(S13-14; E2570-2583) "In the *kāraṇadvāra* Jinabhadra conducts a discussion on various senses in which the term "*kāraṇa*" ("cause") is employed under different situations, viz. *nāma, sthāpanā*, etc. Here one finds an exposition of the problem of cause in various ways. This exposition is very important as it contains different views about the nature of a cause, expressed in different systems of Indian philosophy."

(S14; E2612-2616) "In the *pratyayadvāra*...we are told that there are three conditions *(pratyaya)* of the knowledge of equanimity--the self, the teacher and the Scriptures. For a Tīrthaṅkara the knowledge of equanimity is self-conditioned (*ātmapratyaya*). It is so because he has the direct realization of the nature of the self, that is, of the fact that he is an omniscient person. That is why he has not to rely on any other person for the knowledge. But for others all the three severally serve as the cause of the knowledge of equanimity. They being not possessed of omniscience have to depend on either the teacher or the scriptures. Thus for the *gaṇadharas* (the chief disciples of a Tīrthaṅkara) the knowledge of equanimity is not self-conditioned (*ātmāpratyaya*). They entered into discussion with Lord Mahāvīra and got their doubts removed and thus they acquired the knowledge of equanimity, having relied on the teacher."

(S14-15; E2617-2650) "In the *Lakṣaṇadvāra* twelve different ways of defining a thing are pointed out. And the *Bhāṣya* explains them. Form or structure possessed by all the *mūrta dravyas* (i.e. substances having physical qualities) in common is considered to be their defining characteristic. That common characteristic out of so many like existence, being a substance, etc. possessed by *amūrta siddhas* (i.e. by liberated souls devoid of physical qualities), to which we direct our attention, will be looked upon by us as their defining characteristic. If we apply the term *siddha* to all of them then we shall be regarded as formulating the definition of a *siddha* without directing our attention to any common quality (existence, etc.) possessed by *siddhas* (2623-2624). Again, it

is established that origination and destruction are also the characterizing features of a thing (2635-2642). It is suggested that five internal states (*bhāva*) of a soul, viz., *aupaśamikabhāva* (existence due to subsidence of karmas), etc., constitute the defining characteristics of one who has equanimity. And it is also pointed out that other definitions of equanimity are also to be formulated keeping in view the *nāma*, etc."

(S15; E2651-2759) "In the *Nayadvāra* all the seven *nayas* (perspectives) beginning with the conventional (*nigama)* are dealt with at length. Nowhere (else) do we come across such an extensive exposition of the perspectives. Here it is stated that there are as many perspectives as modes of expression...We are told that all the perspectives, taken singly, represent the *parasamayas* (other creeds, partial truths), but that when synthesized they represent Truth (2736). It is declared that each of the seven fundamental perspectives has a hundred divisions and hence in all there are 700 perspectives. And we are told at this juncture that if the number of the fundamental perspectives is five only then there would be 500 perspectives in all...Moreover, it is pointed out that one is liable to mistake the right for wrong and vice versa if one were to think without applying the methods of perspective, locating, and instruments of true cognition. Hence all these three methods should be applied while determining the nature of a thing or finding out a solution of any problem (2744)."

(S15; E2746-2749) "In the *Anumatadvāra* (*kasya kiṃ anumataṁ*) it is discussed as to which equanimity leads to liberation from a particular perspective. It was already pointed out that in the *Nirdeśadvāra* much space is devoted to the treatment of equanimity applying the method of perspectives (1503-1528). One is likely to consider this to be the reason why equanimity is not treated of here (by) applying the method of perspectives. But this is not the case because the *ācāryas* declare that while expounding theories according to

the various views (*dṛṣṭivāda)* the application of the method of perspectives is necessary and inevitable but here it is not necessary. Again, it is stated that mostly the exposition is conducted applying the three fundamental perspectives and that in the exposition the expositor should take recourse to one or more perspectives according to the calibre of the hearers or readers; he may even remain satisfied with treating of the subject from one viewpoint only..."

(S16; E3108-3115) "The question as to which (kind of) equanimity is regarded as the way to liberation by a particular perspective is dealt with in the *Anumatadvāra*. According to the immediate view (*ṛjusūtranaya)*, etc. conduct alone is the cause of liberation because liberation takes place as soon as conduct becomes perfect while it does not take place even though awareness and vision are perfect (3108-3114). But the synthesis of all the perspectives is *syādvāda*. And hence awareness, vision and conduct all three together should be regarded as the cause of liberation (3115)."

(S16-17; E3117-3155) "Then follows the *Kimitidvāra* wherein the question as to what equanimity is is discussed. Here first the nature of equanimity is discussed from the point of view of category. That is to say, the question is raised as to whether it is self (*jīva)* or not-self or both or a non-entity. Again, the question is raised as to whether it is a substance or a quality. In answer it is said that the soul in the state of a resolve that 'I refrain from all sinful activities' itself has equanimity. And in the first great vow this refraining is with regard to selves only while in other great vows it is with regard to all the substances (3117-3124). From the point of view of substance it is to be regarded as a substance. But from the point of view of modes it is to be regarded as a quality. Here the question of identity or difference of substance and modes is dealt with at length...."

(S17; E3160-3174) "In the *Kassadvāra* the question as to who could be regarded as possessed of equanimity is discussed. The person who is always engaged in the practice

of restraint (*saṃyama*), observances of lesser vows (*niyama*), penance (*tapas*) is regarded as possessed of equanimity. Again, one who considers all the souls--whether mobile (*trasa*) or static (*sthāvara*)--to be equal is to be regarded as possessed of equanimity. The equanimity of a monk (who has abandoned all the sinful activity) is far better than that of a layman. This is so because a layman cannot shun all sinful and harmful activities. He is allowed to give consent to such activities..."

"In (S17; 3274-76) we come across the discussion about the point as to how long equanimity continues after its acquisition."

(S18; 3277-3287) "In the *Katidvāra* the question as to how many persons can acquire equanimity is discussed."

(S18; 3281-3289) "In the *Antaradvāra* the question as to how much time (is) required for re-attaining equanimity once having fallen from it is discussed."

(S18; 3290-3291) "In the *Avirahadvāra* there occurs a discussion regarding the time which the mundane souls have without equanimity."

(S18; 3292) "In the *Bhavadvāra* is discussed for how many lives one can continuously retain equanimity."

(S18; 3293-3294) "In the *Ākarṣadvāra* there has been raised a question as to how many times one should perform equanimity again and again in one life or in many lives in order to relish it. At this occasion an illustration given is that of a man taking a particular number of morsels for relishing the good."

(S18; 3295-3296) "In the *Sparśanadvāra* the question as to how many space-points of the universe are touched by a self possessed of equanimity (3295-3296) is discussed."

(S18; 3305-3306) "In the *Niruktidvāra* the term "*sāmāyika*" is etymologically explained...Jinabhadra says that "*sama*" means freedom from attachment and aversion and "*aya*", which is equivalent to "*ayana*"(=*gamana*), means attainment. Thus the term "*samaya*" means the attainment of the state characterised by freedom from attachment and

aversion. And "*samaya*" and "*sāmāyika*" are identical. The term "*samaya*" means *samyak* (right) *samaya* (attaiment or acquisition). The self having the attitude of universal love (=*samaya*=*samyak gamana*=*dayā*) towards all creatures is itself *sāmāyika*."

20.SIṂHASURAGAṆI (600), *Nyāyāgamanasāriṇī* on Mallavādin's *Nayacakra*

As noted in the Introduction to the section on (17) Mallavādin's *Nayacakra*, the text of that work is only extant by reconstructing it from Siṃhasuragaṇi's commentary. That commentary is available in the several editions of the parts of Mallavādin's work detailed under the Introduction to that section. Erich Frauwallner, in his Introduction to the first of the three volumes mentioned there, remarks "Siṃhasūri's commentary which naturally takes Mallavādis original for granted...is not understandable without it. Therefore it is imperial to reconstruct the original" (of Mallavādin's text) "from Siṃhasūri. This is difficult and sometimes almost impossible, because as a rule Siṃhasūri quotes only the first and the last words of the sentence to be explained, allows space only to more difficult passages, and passes quickly over others with the remark "easily understood" (*sugamanam*)." [78]

21.KOṬYĀCĀRYA (725) , Commentary on Jinabhadra Gaṇi's *Āvāśyakanirukti-Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*

This commentary has been edited several times. About its author, Nathmal Tatia, on p. 6 of his Introduction to his edition of the work constituting our #19, speculates that Koṭyācārya "must have flourished before the eighth century A.D, and might have been a contemporary of Ācārya Haribhadrasūri."

22.SIDDHASENA MAHĀMATI (700?), *Nyāyāvatāra*

The identity and date of this Siddhasena, who seems not to be the same as Siddhasena Divākara, has been frequently discussed. The most recent examination of the issues is found in Piotr Balcerowicz, *Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective*. Alt- und Neu-indische Studien herausgegeben von der Abteilung für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets des Asien-Afrika-Institutes an der Universität Hamburg 53. 1-2, Stuttgart 2001. Balcerowicz reviews the extensive literature about Siddhasena's date, coming to the conclusion that this author must have lived after Dharmakīrti, to whose Buddhist innovations he refers, and before Haribhadra Sūri, who quotes one of the verses from the *Nyāyāvatāra*. This places Siddhasena in a period from about 620-750, and we are left to estimate where within that range to place him

Apparently neither the *Nyāyāvatāra* nor its earliest commentary, the *Vivṛti* of Siddharṣigaṇi, give the name of its author. Balcerowicz suggests calling the author "Siddhasena Mahāmatī", since "Mahāmatī" is the name by which Haribhadra Sūri appears to have have known him.

Balcerowicz provides an edition (interlarded within his edition of the *Vivṛti*) in the second volume of his work cited above. This is our "E". His translation appears in the first volume, and our "T" below is based on that, but with some emendations to fit the translations of technical terms to fit our current practices.

0 (E323; T1) This (work) is begun in order to explain (what) an instrument of true cognition (is).

1 (E333; T9) An instrument of true cognition is an awareness (*jñāna*) which reveals both itself and something else, and is without sublation (*bādha*). It is of two kinds, direct (*pratyakṣa*) (i.e., perception) and indirect (*parokṣa*) (i.e., inference), depending on the kind of object each ascertains.

2 (E353; T26) Objection: Instruments of true cognition are well-known, and common practices (*vyavahāra*) are carried out through them. So there is no point in giving a definition of "instrument of true cognition".

3 (E356; T29) Answer: The purpose of giving a definition of "instrument of true cognition" is well-known; it is remove the delusions of those whose minds are deluded.

4 (E358; T31) An awareness which grasps an object directly is perception; the other is to be known as indirect in its manner of grasping.

5 (E367; T38) Traditionally, inference is (taken to be) the determination (*niścaya*) of the *sādhya* through the *hetu*'s (here, *liṅga*'s) inseparability from it. Inference is nonerroneous (*abhrānta*) because it is an instrument of true cognition like perception.

6 (E373; T43) Perception is not erroneous, since it is clearly an instrument of true cognition. To say "error is an instrument of true cognition" would be to utter a contradiction.

7 (E379; T47) Since it is wrong to suppose that all appearances are illusory, what is clear (*sphuṭa*) and ascertains both itself and something else is an instrument of true cognition with regard to both.

8 (E380; T48) When from a sentence that is not opposed to experience and which speaks of ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) an instrument of true cognition arises that grasps things as they are (*tattva*), that (instrument) is called "verbal testimony" (*śābda*).

9 (E58; T6) Scripture is the awareness of a qualified person that is nontransgressing (*anullaṅghya*), not inconsistent with competent perception, that concerns things as they are and prevents mistaken ways of behaving.

10 (E384; T52) A sentence which produces certainty for others as it brings about certainty for oneself is called by wise persons an instrument for others (*parārtha*) through metaphorical transfer.

11 (E386; T53) Since both perception and inference reveal well-known objects, and since they are means (for the knowledge) of others, both are known as instruments for others.

12 (E388; T55) An expression (*vacas*) indicating an object cognized through perception is (also) called perception, since it is the instrument (*nimitta*) of the appearance (in the mind of that object).

13 (E389; T55) Inference for others is an expression indicating that a *pakṣa* (has) a *hetu* that is regularly connected with a *sādhya*.

14 (E393; T59) The *pakṣa* is (something that is) associated (*abhyupagama*) with the *sādhya* and is not excluded therefrom by perception, etc. (Or: the thesis is the acceptance of the *sādhya* (in the *pakṣa*) that is not set aside by perception, etc.) The *pakṣa* must be provided, being (or showing) the place of residence (*gocara*) of the *hetu*.

15 (E394; T59) Otherwise, if the addressee misunderstands the (*pakṣa*, i.e., the place of residence) of the *hetu* intended by the speaker, the reason may be suspected of being contradictory, just as

16 (E395; T60) for a spectator watching archery, the bowman who fails to say what he is aiming at may be equally rightly be taken either to have hit or to have missed the target.

17 (E396; T61) The specification of the *hetu* can be (exemplified) either through its positive relation (to the *pakṣa*) or otherwise; there are these two ways, since the *sādhya* is established by either one of these ways.

18 (E398; T62) An example (*dṛṣṭānta*) by similarity is a statement of the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the *sādhya* by the *hetu* (here, *sādhana*) when that relation is recollected.

19 (E400; T63) But an example in which, where there is absence of the *hetu*, the absence of the *sādhya* as well is found, is traditionally held to be based on dissimilarity.

20 (E401; T64) Since the *sādhya* is proved only through internal pervasion (*antarvyāpti*) there is no use for an

example from outside. Thus those wise in reasoning (*nyāya*) conclude that even in the absence of external examples the relation in question stands.

21 (E403; T65) A fallacious thesis is one that is already accepted by the addressee, (or) is sublated by direct perception of an inferential sign or by what is said by people in the world or by one's own say so--there are these many kinds (of fallacious thesis).

22 (E404; T66) The definition of the reason (*hetu*) is that without which something would be inexplicable. A fallacious reason is due to its not being perceived, its being doubtful, or there being an error concerning it.

23 (E405; T66) The unproved (*asiddha*) reason is one which is not found present. Where a thing is explicable only otherwise it is contradictory (*viruddha*). And that (reason) which is plausible both in the present case and otherwise is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*).

24. (E409; T70) Faults in the example--here based on similarity--are said by logicians to arise from inapplicable definitions of the *hetu* or from lacking the *sādhya*, etc.

25. (E413; T73) Faults in the example based on dissimilarity are said by logicians to include nonexclusion of one or more of the terms or their combination and doubtfulness (concerning their presence).

26, (E418; T78) Refutation is pointing out faults in what someone has said. A fallacious refutation is to point out faults in an argument that is faultless.

27 (E420; T79) That which free from all veils, that is pure (*kevala*), is perception which constantly reveals the very nature of all objects.

28. (E424; T82). The result of instruments of true cognition is the removal of ignorance; (the result of) purity is happiness and indifference; the result of the rest (of the five kinds of perception) is the ability to acquire and avoid.

29. (E425; T83) That reality (*vastu*) whose nature is multiple (*anekāntātmaka*) is the domain of all acts of

awareness. An object qualified by (only) one place is the content of (one or another of the) standpoints (*naya*).

30 (E475; T125) Since standpoints are used in context of (verbal) testimony relating to one (aspect), testimony concerning the complete object is called "testimony based on (sevenfold) predication".

31 (E477; T126) The cogniser (*pramātṛ*) is aware of himself and of what is not himself; (he is) an agent, an experiencer, (he) changes, knows himself, is alive and not (made of) earth, etc.

32 (E489; T136) Instruments of knowledge are established as beginningless and endless, even though they are well-known to all people in everyday life. They have been discussed here.

23. YOGĪNDUDEVA (750), *Paramātmaprakāśa*

This writer is also known by other names which include the element "Yoga" or "Yogi". A Digambara, little to nothing is known of the details of his life.

This summary is taken from the Introduction to our "E", A. N. Upadhye's edition of this work together with Yogīndudeva's *Yogasāra*, constituting Rajachandra Jaina Sastramala 3, Agas 1973, pp. 10-24.[79] We have amended the summary in some places to bring it into conformity with the translations of technical terms and stylistic policies of the present Volume.

Prof. Upadhye in his Introduction to E compares several manuscripts of the work, and after a careful analysis concludes that the text we have now is undoubtedly somewhat different from the text apparently composed by Yogīndudeva in around 750 A.D.

The work was presumably written in, and at any rate comes down to us as in, Apabhraṁśa. Prof. Upadhye has also provided in E a Sanskrit restoration of the text.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye

CHAPTER ONE

1-7 (E5-12) Salutation to selves supreme (*paramātman*) that have become eternally stainless and constituted of knowledge after burning the spots of karman with the fire of meditation.

Salutations are offered to hosts of liberated selves (*siddha*) who are the embodiments of bliss and unparalleled knowledge, who have consumed the fuel of karma with the fire of great meditation, who dwell in *nirvāṇa* never falling back into the ocean of transmigration though supremely weighty with knowledge, and who being self-established clearly visualize everything here, both physical and superphysical existence. Then devotional obeisance to the great *jinas* who are the embodiments of omniscience, omnivision and omnibliss and by whom all the objects of knowledge are enlightened. Lastly, salutations to the three classes of saints, viz., teachers (*ācārya*), preceptors (*upādhyāya*) and monks (*sādhu*) who, being absorbed in great meditation, realize the vision of *paramātman*.

8-10 (E15-17) After saluting the five divinities Bhaṭṭa Prabhākara, with a pure mind, addresses Yogīndu: Sir, for infinite time we have been in this round of rebirths. Not a bit of happiness has been attained, but a lot of misery has fallen to our lot. We are tortured by the miseries of the four grades of existence, viz., divine, human, sub-human and hellish states of existence; so please instruct us about *paramātman* (i.e., the soul supreme) or *paramapada* (i.e., the lofty status of liberation), to put an end to our miseries.

11-15 (E18-22) Then Yogīndu asks Bhaṭṭa Prabhākara to attend closely to his discourse that follows, and says: The self (*ātman*), the principle of life, is of three kinds, viz., external self, internal self and the supreme self. One should give up attachment to the external and then by knowing oneself realize the self supreme which is an embodiment of

knowledge. He is an ignoramus who takes the body for the self. But he is a wise man who considers himself as an embodiment of knowledge distinct from the body and being engrossed in great meditation realizes the *paramātman*. Realization of the self as an embodiment of knowledge and as free from karma after quitting everything external: that is *paramātman*. Thus it is the internal that by leaving everything external becomes the supreme.

16-25 (E23-29) One should concentrate one's mind on the supreme self that is respected in all the three worlds, that has reached the abode of liberation, and on which meditate Hari and Hara. The supreme self is eternal, untainted by passions and consequent karma. He is peace, happiness and absolute bliss. He does not leave his nature and get changed into something else. He is untainted (*nirañjana*), having no color, no smell, no taste, no sound, no touch, no birth and no death. He is not subject to anger, delusion, deceit and pride; nor is there anything like a specific place and object of meditation for him who is all by himself. He is not amenable to merit and demerit, nor to joy and grief. He has not a single taint or flaw, so he is untainted. He is an eternal divinity in whose case there is no devotional control of breath, no object of meditation, no mystical diagram, no miraculous spell and no charmed circle. That eternal self, who is the subject of pure meditation or contemplation, is beyond the comprehension of Vedas, *śāstras* and senses. His is the highest state, dwelling as he does at the summit of three worlds, representing unique or absolute vision, knowledge, happiness and power.

26-33 (E30-35) The divinity that dwells in liberation, being free from karma and constituted of knowledge, is essentially the same as the spirit or the self in the body; really speaking there is no difference between the two. It must be known that *paramātman* is already there in oneself, and by realizing this the karmas accumulated over a long time are shattered away. The self should be realized as immune from pleasures and pains of the senses and of mental activities, and

everything else must be avoided. Though the self dwells in the body the former should not be identified with the latter, because their characteristics are essentially different. The self is mere sentiency, noncorporeal and an embodiment of knowledge; it has no senses, no mind, nor is it within sense-perception. The lengthy creeper of the round of rebirths is crippled by him who meditates on his self with his mind indifferent to worldly pleasures. One that dwells in the temple of the body is doubtlessly the same as *paramātman*, the eternal and infinite divinity with his constitution brilliant with omniscience. Though he dwells in the body, there is no mutual identity nor connection between himself and the body. It is *paramātman* that is revealed, giving supreme bliss, to saints who are established in equanimity.

34-42 (E36-42) It is the ignorant that understand the highest self as a composite body, but indeed he is one whole, separate from karma, though he is bound by karma and though he resides in the body. Like a star in the infinite sky the whole universe is reflected in the omniscience of the highest self on whom, as an object of meditation, the saints always concentrate their attention in order to obtain liberation. It is this very *paramātman*, when he is in the grips of karma, that assumes various forms of existence and comes to be endowed with the three sexes. The universe is there in the highest self reflected in his omniscience, and he is in the universe, but he is not (convertible into the form of) the universe. The *paramātman* dwells in the body, but even to this day he is not realized by Hari and Hara, because they are devoid of the highest meditation and austerities.

42-49 (E43-48) So far as modifications are considered the highest self is said to be coupled with origination and destruction, but in fact from the realistic point of view he is above them. With his presence the sense-organs function, otherwise the body becomes desolate. Through the sense-organs he knows the objects of sense, but he is not known by them. Really speaking there is no bondage or transmigration

for *paramātman*, so the commonsensical viewpoint should be given up. The supreme characteristic of *paramātman* is that his knowledge, like a creeper, stretches as far as the objects of knowledge are. With reference to him actions fulfil their own functions, but the highest self neither loses nor gains anything. Though bound by karma he is never transformed into karma.

50-56 (E49-54) Some say that the self is omnipresent; some hold it to be devoid of knowledge; some say that it has bodily size; and some others say that it is empty (*śūnya*). The self is all-pervading in the sense that, when free from karmas, it comprehends by its omniscience physical and superphysical worlds. Sensory knowledge functions no more in the case of selves who have realized spiritual light; and in this sense the self is devoid of knowledge. The pure self, there being no cause, neither expands nor contracts, but it is of the same size as that of the final body; and in this sense the self is of the bodily size. He is empty in the sense that, in his pure condition, he is not amenable to any of the eight kinds of action and eighteen faults.

57-58 (E56-57) The self is not created by anybody, nor is anybody created by the self. As a substance the self is eternal, but only its modes appear and disappear. Substance is that which is endowed with qualities and modes. Qualities are co-born with the substance, while modes present themselves in succession on the substance. The self is a substance; vision and knowledge are the qualities; the appearances in the four grades of existence are the modes caused by karma.

59-66 (E59-56) The association between self and karma has no beginning in time, and furthermore one is not created by the other; so both of them have no beginning in time. The embodied self, because of its previous karma, develops various conditions, and thus becomes virtuous or otherwise. The self, thus obscured by eight kinds of karma, will not realize its own nature. Karma represents (subtle) atoms (of matter) that stick into the space-points of selves that are infatuated and tainted

with sense-pleasures and passions. Really speaking the five sense-organs, the mind, the tortures in the four grades of existence and all other conditions are, in fact, separate from (the nature of) the self: they are fashioned by karma for the self. Various kinds of pleasures and pains and all the conditions such as bondage and liberation are brought about by karma; the self does nothing beyond mere seeing and knowing: that is the realistic view. There is not a single region in the 840,000 births which has not been visited by the self wandering without obtaining the instructions of Jina. The self can be compared to a lame person; by himself he neither comes nor goes; it is the force of karma (*vidhi*) that drags about the self in the three worlds.

67-70 (E67-70) The self is itself, and it can never be anything else; that is a rule. So far as its real nature is concerned, it is not born, it does not die, nor does it bring about anything like bondage or liberation. Various terms like birth, old age, death, disease, gender and color do not, in fact, refer to the self but only to the body.

71-75 (E71-74) The self is Brahman without old age and death, which refer only to the body, so one should not be afraid of them. To reach the other end of transmigration one should meditate on the pure spirit without minding whether the body is cut, pierced or destroyed. The self is essentially different from attachment, etc., which are occasioned by karma and from other insentient substances. The self is an embodiment of knowledge, and everything else is foreign. The self must be meditated on as independent of eight kinds of action, as free from all the faults and as an embodiment of vision, knowledge and conduct.

76-84 (E78-80) When the self realizes himself by himself he becomes right vision, i.e., possessed of right vision or spiritualistic attitude, and gets rid of karma; but if he pursues the modes his view is perverted, and he incurs the bondage of many karmas and wanders long in transmigration. Sticky and hard karmas lead the self astray in spite of the

acquisition of knowledge. When the self develops perverted attitudes he grasps reality in a perverted manner and identifies the conditions created by karma with himself. Then he begins to say "I am fair", "I am black", "I am a Digambara, a Buddhist, or a Śvetāmbara". It is an ignorant fellow who speaks thus. Mother, father, wife, home, sons, friends and wealth: all this is a magical network of unreality, and only a fool claims all this as his. A being of perverted attitudes does nothing else than enjoy the objects of pleasure which are the cause of misery.

85-91 (E81-85) Right vision is attained by the self when, finding an opportune time, delusion is destroyed: thus necessarily the self is realized. The wise man should realize that the self is neither fair, nor red, nor black; he is neither subtle nor gross...neither a Buddhist, a Digambara nor a Śvetāmbara, and the self possesses none of the ascetic characteristics. The self is neither a teacher nor a pupil, neither a master nor a servant, neither a hero nor a coward, etc., etc.

92-103 (E86-97) The Self, besides its essential nature of consciousness, is not to be identified with merit, demerit, time, space, initiators of movement and of stasis. The self is restraint, chastity and austerity; it is faith and knowledge; and the self is the seat of eternal liberation when it is realized. Ignoring the pure self one should not search after some heavenly place, serve some other teacher, and think of some other divinity. The self represents absolute vision, and all other descriptions are formal, being true from the commonsense point of view only; when the pure self is realized, the highest state of liberation is reached within a moment. Religious treatises, sacred works and austerities do not bring liberation for him whose mind is not occupied with (reflection on) the pure self. When the self is known, the whole world is known; because it becomes reflected in the knowledge of the self. That both physical and superphysical worlds are seen (reflected) in oneself is a privilege of those who are merged in self-

realization. Undoubtedly it is a natural phenomenon that the self enlightens himself and others like the light of the sun in the sky. The vision of the world reflected in the self is like that of stars reflected in clear water. The saint by the strength of his knowledge should realize his self whereby he knows himself and others.

103-108 (E96-101) When Prabhākara requests that he should be instructed in the great knowledge, he is thus addressed: The self is knowledge, and he who knows his self pervades all of space with his knowledge, even though ordinarily he is limited to the body. Whatever is different from the self is not knowledge, so leaving aside everything one should realize the self which is a fit subject for knowledge. As long as a knower does not know the self, which represents knowledge, by means of knowledge, he will not, being a nonknower, realize the highest Brahman who is an embodiment of knowledge. By knowing one's self *parabrahman* is visualized and realized whereby the highest realm of liberation is reached.

109-123 (E101-112) When Brahman is seen and realized, the world other than *saṃsāra (paraloka)* is reached. The lofty divinity, the embodiment of knowledge, residing therein is meditated on by saints, Hari and Hara. One reaches that condition on which one's mind is set; one should not, therefore, direct one's attention towards other foreign stuff than the status of *parabrahman*. That which is nonsentient and separate from the self is the foreign stuff consisting of matter, the principles of motion, rest, space and time. One who is devoted toward *paramātman* even for half a moment burns the whole lot of sin, as a spark of fire reduces a heap of logs to ashes. Setting aside all thoughts, one should peacefully concentrate on the highest status of liberation and thus realize the divinity. The highest bliss, which is attained by visualizing *paramātman (śiva)* in the course of meditation is nowhere attained in the world of transmigration. Even Indra, who sports in the company of thousands of nymphs, does not get

that happiness which the saints attain when meditating on their self. The self which is free from attachment, when realizing the self termed "Śiva" and "bliss" (*śānta*), attains that infinite happiness realized by great Jinas by visualizing the self. The highest self is visualized in the pure mind like the brilliant sun in the cloudless sky. As no figure is reflected in a mirror with a solid surface, so indeed the God, the highest self, is never visualized in the mind (*hṛdaya*) unclean with attitudes of attachment, etc. There can be no place for Brahman when the mind is occupied by a fawn-eyed one: how can two swords occupy the same scabbard? It appears to me that the eternal divinity dwells in the clear mind of a knower like a swan on the surface of a lake. God is not there in the temple, in the statue, in the plaster, nor in the painting, but he dwells in the equanimous mind as an eternal and stainless embodiment of knowledge. When the mind and *parameśvara* have become identical, nay one, where is the question of any worship? To concentrate the mind that is running towards pleasures and passions on the *paramātman* free from the stains of karma, that is the means of liberation, but not any mystic syllable or practice.

CHAPTER TWO

1-10 (E115-124) Then Prabhākara asks: What is liberation (*mokṣa*), what are the means and what are the fruits of attaining liberation? The author expounds only the views of Jina. Liberation is superior to *dharma, artha* and *kāma*, which do not give absolute happiness. That the Jinas attain liberation alone by avoiding the other three shows that liberation is the best of the four. The world or transmigration means bondage. Even beasts in bondage want to get liberation, then why not others? That the realm of liberation is at the top of the world is a sign of its superiority. Liberation represents the best happiness, that is why liberated selves stay in liberation all the time. Hari, Hara, Brahman and Jinavara and great saints--all these meditate on liberation concentrating

their minds on the pure highest self. It must be realized that in the three worlds there is nothing else than liberation which brings happiness to selves. The wise sages have said that liberation consists in the realization of the highest self by being free from all karma.

11 (E125) The highest and eternal fruit of liberation is that there is (infinite) vision, knowledge, happiness (and strength) without being lost even for a moment.

12-14 (E125-128) The selves attain liberation without right vision, awareness and conduct which really speaking consist respectively in seeing, knowing and conducting oneself by oneself. From the commonsense point of view right faith, awareness and conduct constitute the means of liberation, but really speaking the self itself is all three. The self sees, knows, and realizes himself by himself; therefore the self himself is the cause of liberation. Proper knowledge of the self constituted of right vision, awareness and conduct lead to spiritual purity.

15-28 (E129-145) Right vision consists in the steady belief in the true nature of the self resulting from the knowledge of various substances exactly as they are in the universe. Those are the six substances which fill these three worlds and which have no beginning and end. Of these six, the self is a sentient substance, and the remaining five, namely, karmic products, initiators of movement, initiators of stasis, space and time are insentient and separate from the self. Really speaking (so far as its essential nature is concerned) the self is noncorporeal, an embodiment of knowledge, characterized by supreme bliss and (one that can achieve) an eternal condition of purity. Karmic products, in their six types, are corporeal or concrete (*mūrta*, having sense-qualities and thus amenable to sense-perception), while the others are noncorporeal. Space is that in which the rest of the substances exist, i.e., it is that which gives room to all the rest. Time is a substance characterized by persistence (*vartaṇā*), being an accessory cause of change when things themselves

are undergoing a change; the moments of time are individually separate like jewels in a heap of jewels. Excepting the self, karmic products and time, the remaining substances are indivisible and homogeneous wholes. Beside the self and karmic products the remaining four substances have no movement. Initiators of movement and of stasis and a self occupy innumerable space-points. Though the six substances exist together in physical space, they exist in fact in their own qualities or modes. These various substances fulfil their own functions for the embodied beings which wander in transmigration suffering the miseries of four grades of existence. The very nature of these substances has been the cause of misery; so one should follow the path of liberation that he might reach that realm other than this of transmigration.

29 (E148) The condition or state of the self which understands the substances exactly as they are is known as knowledge.

30 (E149) Cultivation of that genuine and pure state of the self after fully realizing and discriminating the self and the others and after giving up (attachment to) the others is known as right conduct.

31-33 (E150-152) The devotee of the three jewels will not meditate on any other thing than the self which is an abode of great merit. To identify the three jewels with the self is to meditate on oneself with the condition of liberation in view; and gradually meditating on the self day by day they attain liberation.

34-52 (E154-172) Selves have first vision, which consists in the general comprehension of all things devoid of particular details. Thus clearly vision comes first, and then, in the case of selves, authentic knowledge follows when the particulars of particular details are known. The self without any attachment, putting up with pleasures and pains and sunk in the austerity of meditations, becomes the instrument of the shedding of the stock of karma. Treating merit and demerit

alike (from the point of view of liberation), when the self is equanimous fresh influx of karma is stopped. As long as the saint, with no distractions, remains submerged in meditation on the nature of the self, fresh karma is stopped and the stock is exhausted. The old karma he destroys, and fresh karma he does not incur: giving up all attachment he cultivates peace. And right vision, right awareness and right conduct belong to him who has equanimous peace and to none else; so the great Jina has said. Self-control is possible where there is peace of mind; self-control is lost when the self becomes a victim of passions. Infatuation, which gives rise to passions, must be given up. Knowledge devoid of attachment and aversion is possible when one is free from delusion and passions. Those who understand what is real and what is otherwise and who are equanimous, taking pleasure in their spiritual nature, are happy in this world. An equanimous person has two faults: he destroys his *bandhu* (meaning "brother", also "bondage"), and makes the world *gahilu* (meaning "foolish", also "possessed"). He has a third fault as well: he leaves his enemy (*sattu*) and becomes engrossed in *para* ("enemy", also "the highest self"). There is another fault: being *vikala* ("without stains", also "without body") he rises up to the top of the world. And the last fault is that when all beings are asleep he is awake, and when the world is awake, he sleeps. He neither speaks nor opens a discussion; he neither praises nor blames anybody, but he realizes an equanimous attitude which leads one to liberation. The saint, realizing that paraphernalia--pleasures, body, etc.--are foreign to his self, has neither attachment to nor aversion from (internal and external) paraphernalia like pleasures and the body, etc. The great saint feels no attachment and aversion for activity (*vṛtti*) and withdrawal (*nivṛtti*), because he knows them to be the cause of bondage.

53-65 (E174-186) Not knowing the causes of bondage and liberation and not realizing the self as right vision, awareness and conduct, one incurs through delusion both merit and demerit as though they lead one to liberation. The

self that does not treat merit and demerit alike suffers misery all along and wanders in transmigration being deluded. The wise say that even demerit or sins (*pāpa*) are beneficial, since they immediately give pain and leave the self free to attain liberation; and even the merits (*puṇya*) are not beneficial when they bestow kingdoms and consequently bring lots of misery. Better to court death that leads to self-realization than merits that lead astray. Those that march toward self-realization attain infinite happiness, but others that have mistreated the same suffer infinite miseries in spite of meritorious deeds. Merits lead to prosperity, prosperity to vanity, and vanity to intellectual perversity, which further leads to sin; therefore merits are not desirable. Devotion to gods, scriptures and saints leads one to merit, but never to the destruction of karma: so says the venerable saint. Contempt of the same, however, necessarily leads to sin whereby one wanders in transmigration. Sin leads the self to hell and the subhuman world, good conduct leads to heaven, and mixture of both to the human world; but when both are destroyed there results liberation. Worship, self-reprobation and repentance with correction--all these bring merit; so a man of knowledge will not devote himself to these by leaving meditation on the pure and holy self, the embodiment of knowledge.

66-71 (E187-192) A man of impure manifestation of consciousness has no self-control, and his mind is not pure. Pure manifestation of consciousness is the best, because it is attended by self-control, character, righteousness, vision, knowledge and the destruction of karma. Pure manifestation of consciousness is the *dharma* which supports beings falling in the miseries of four grades of existence. Pure manifestation of consciousness is the unique path leading to liberation: one who goes astray can never be liberated. One may go anywhere and do whatever one likes, but liberation can never be attained unless the mind is pure. Good manifestation of consciousness leads to piety, bad to impiety, and pure

manifestation, which is free from both, is immune from karma.

72-78 (E193-199) Giving brings pleasures, austerities bring the status of Indra, but knowledge brings that state of existence which is free from birth and death. To know one's self is to get released; otherwise without this knowledge one has to wander in transmigration. Without this knowledge nobody has attained liberation: by churning water the hands would not be greasy. That knowledge which is not self-knowledge is to no avail, and even austerities which are not conducive to self-knowledge are simply painful. In the presence of self-knowledge there is no scope for attachment: darkness cannot spread before the rays of the sun. For men of knowledge there is no other object of attachment than the self: so when they realize this reality, their mind finds no pleasure in objects of the senses. Their minds cannot be concentrated on any other object than the self: he who knows an emerald attaches no value to a piece of glass.

79-85 (E189-205) When experiencing the fruits of his actions, he who entertains, through delusion, good or bad attitudes incurs karma again; and if he has no attachment or delusion fresh karma is not incurred and the old stock is exhausted. Though the highest reality is being studied, even a particle of attachment proves to be a hindrance. If the self is not realized, study of scriptures and the practice of penances will not rescue anyone. A man studying the scriptures may still remain dull, if his doubts are not cleared, as long as he has not realized the pure highest self residing in his body. Scriptures are studied for self-enlightenment, and if one has not attained that highest knowledge thereby, is he not a fool? A tour to holy places will not rescue anyone from transmigration if he is devoid of self-knowledge.

86-107 (E205-224) There is a vast difference between foolish and wise saints: the wise forsake the body realizing the self to be independent thereof, while the foolish wish to possess the whole world with the pretext of practising various virtues. The foolish take pleasure in their pupils--male and

female--and in books; but the wise are ashamed of them, knowing them to be the cause of bondage. Mat, board (or garment, bowl) and male and female disciples attract a monk and carry him astray. It is a self-deception if a saint wearing the emblem of great Jinas pulls out his hair with ashes but does not give up attachment for paraphernalia. To receive desired paraphernalia even after being a monk is to swallow back one's vomit. Those monks, who give up the pursuit of liberation for the sake of worldly profit and fame, are burning a temple in fact for a nail. The monk who considers himself great because of his possessions never realizes reality. To those who have realized reality no one is great or small: all selves are the great Brahman. The devotee of three jewels makes no distinction between selves and selves, whatever bodies they might be occupying. The selves in the three worlds are distinguished from one another by the ignorant, but in omniscience they are of one type. All selves have knowledge as their essence; they are free from birth and death; they are alike with regard to their spatial extent, and they are similar with regard to their characteristics. Vision and knowledge are their essential attributes: if the mind is enlightened, no distinction should be made between various selves. Those that make no distinction between the (potential) Brahmins in this world realize the pure light of the highest self. By leaving attachment and aversion and (consequently) being established in equanimity (*samabhāva*) those that treat all selves alike easily attain liberation. The distinction between various bodies should not be attributed to the selves, which are essentially characterised by vision, knowledge and conduct. Bodies, small or big, are fashioned by karma (*vidhi*), but the selves are all alike everywhere and always. He who considers friends, foes, himself, others and the rest all alike knows himself. He who does not realize the one nature of all the selves cannot develop the attitude of equality which is like a boat in the transmigratory ocean. The distinction between selves and selves is occasioned by karma which is not to be identified

with the self and which will be separated from the self when there is an opportunity. All the selves should be treated alike without dividing and without distinguishing them according to class (*varṇa*); as is the highest self so are these three worlds.

108-111 (E226-229) The great saints know what is other than the self and give up their association therewith, because that association distracts their concentration on the highest self. Association with a person who is not equanimous should be avoided, because that makes one anxious and uneasy. Even the good lose their virtues in the company of the wicked: fire, for instance, is hammered because of its company with iron. Infatuation does no good, and uniformly it brings misery; so one should get rid of it.

It is a matter of disgrace that a nude monk with hideous physical appearance should desire sweet dishes. The monk, if he wishes for abundant fruits of his twelve-fold penance, should give up greed for food in thoughts, words and acts. To love savoury and detest tasteless food is gluttony that comes in the way of realizing reality.

112 (E232) Moths, deer, elephants, bees and fish are ruined respectively by light, sound, touch, scent and taste: so one should not be attached to those.

113-124 (E233-240) Greed and attachment bring no good, but uniformly they bring misery: so one should get rid of them. Fire in the company of *loha* (=greed, and also iron) is picked up by a pair of tongs, placed on the anvil and struck by a hammer. Sesame seeds, because of *sneha* (=oil, and also attachment) are sprinkled with water, pressed underfoot and crushed repeatedly. Successful and virtuous are those persons who easily swim across, when they have fallen in the pond of youth. The great Jinas abdicated their thrones and reached liberation: then how is it that persons who are maintaining themselves by begging should not achieve their spiritual good? The selves wandering in transmigration have suffered great miseries, and hence by destroying the eight karmas they should achieve liberation. Beings cannot put up with even a

bit of misery: then how is it that they can afford to incur karma which brings manifold miseries in the four grades of existence? The whole world, being entangled in turmoil, foolishly incurs karma, and not a moment is devoted to the rescue of the self. Till the great knowledge, viz., omniscience, is attained the self, suffering misery and infatuated with sons and wives, wanders in millions of births. The selves should never claim ownership over the house, relations and body: they are the creations of karma as understood from the scriptures by the saint. Thoughts about residence and relations bring no release: the mind should be applied to austerities (which bring about the destruction of karma) that liberation might be reached.

125-127 (E241-243) One has to suffer for the sins that one has incurred by killing manifold beings for the benefit of his sons and wives. One has to suffer infinitely more pain than the pain one has inflicted on beings by crushing and killing them. Harm unto living beings leads one to hell and shelter unto them to heaven; these are the two paths that are available: one should select whichsoever one likes.

128-143 (E244-258) Everything here is ephemeral: it is of no use to pound the husk; even the body does not accompany the self; the mind, therefore, should be directed to the pure path of liberation without any attachment to relatives and residence. Temples, (images of) gods, scriptures, teacher, holy places, religious texts (*veda*) and poems and the tree that has put forth flowers: all this shall be the fuel (in the fire of time). Except in one, Brahman (i.e., *paramātman*), the whole world is earthly and ephemeral, and this should specially be remembered. Those whom one meets in the morning are no more in the evening: so *dharma* should be practised without any greed for youth and wealth. No religious merits are amassed and no austerities practised by this tree covered with skin (i.e., the embodied being); hell then is the destiny after being eaten by the ants of old age. The self should be devoted to the feet of Jina; and relations, even one's

father, must be abandoned, because they simply drag the self into transmigration. It is a self-deception if austerities are not practised with a pure mind in spite of one's having obtained human birth. The camels in the form of five senses should not be let loose; after grazing the whole pasture of pleasures they will again hunt the self into transmigration. Unsafe is the course of meditation; the mind cannot be settled at rest as it repeatedly reverts back to the sensory pleasures. The *yogin* cultivates (right) vision, awareness and conduct, and being exempt from the influence of the five senses meditates on the highest reality. The pleasures of the senses last for a couple of days only, and then again follows the stream of misery; one should not be deluded, and one should not flourish the axe on one's neck. That man commands respect who gives up pleasures though they are at his disposal; the bald-headed fellow has his head shaved by destiny (for which he deserves no credit). By capturing the leader, viz., the mind, all others (i.e., the senses) are captured; the roots being pulled out the leaves necessarily wither. A lot of time is spent in enjoying the pleasures of the senses; therefore steady concentration on Śiva (i.e., the highest self) is necessary whereby liberation is reached. Those who are engrossed in the concentration on the highest self are never seen to suffer miseries. Time has no beginning, the self is eternal, and the round of rebirths has no end; the self has not secured two: the teacher, Jina, and the religious virtue, right vision.

144-153 (E260-267) Family life is full of sin; it is indeed a steady net decorated with death. When the body does not belong to oneself there is no propriety in claiming other things by neglecting the concentration on the highest self (called Śiva). Concentration on anything other than Śiva will not lead one to the bliss of liberation. Apparently the body looks nice: but (as to its real nature) it gets rotten when buried, and it is reduced to ashes when burnt. Anointing, decorating and sumptuously feeding the body serve no purposes, like obligations bestowed on the wicked. This body

is like a dilapidated filth-house (*narakagṛha*), and as such it deserves no attachment. As if with vengeance fate has fashioned this body out of all that is miserable, sinful and filthy. It is shameful to enjoy the loathsome body; the wise should take delight in *dharma*, purifying their selves. The saints should not be attached to this body which brings no good to them: they should realize the self, which is an embodiment of knowledge separate from the body. Attachment can never bring eternal happiness.

154-160 (E267-272) One should be satisfied with that happiness which entirely depends on one's self; pleasures from external accessories will never remove (further) desires. The self should be realized as essentially constituted of knowledge, and there should be no attachment to anything else. If the mental waters are not disturbed by pleasures and passions, the self immediately becomes pure. Of no avail is *yoga* which does not separate the self from others after suppressing or curbing the mind at once. Omniscience cannot be attained by meditating on anything other than the self, the embodiment of knowledge. The saints who meditate on *śūnyapada* (a point of meditation devoid of disturbances), who do not identify themselves with anything foreign, who have neither merit nor demerit, and who populate the (so far) deserted (attitude) and desert the (so far) inhabited (attitude) deserve all respect.

161-164 (E273-276) In response to Prabhākara's question the author says: There, in that meditation, delusion is smashed to pieces and the mind sets into steadiness, when the breath issuing from the nostrils melts back into *ambara*. When one dwells in the *ambara* delusion melts, mental activities are no more, inhalation and exhalation are stopped and omniscience develops. He who concentrates his mind, which is as extensive as the physical and superphysical space, on *ākāśa*, has his delusion destroyed, and he is an authority to others.

165-172 (E178-183) (Then possibly the pupil speaks in a mood of repentance:) The self, the infinite divinity, which is

in the body, has not been realized; and it has all been a waste to have held the mind in the equanimous Ambara. All the attachments are not given up; the attitude of detachment has not been cultivated; the path of liberation liked by saints has not been understood; severe austerities, which are the essence of self-realization, are not practised; both merit and sin are not consumed; then how can the round of rebirths be terminated? Gifts have not been given to saints, the great Jina is not worshipped and the five great teachers are not saluted: then how can liberation be maintained?

(Answer:) Successful meditation does not consist so much in closing the eyes, half or complete, as in remaining steady, with the mind undisturbed whereby alone liberation, the best state of existence, is attained. If undisturbed concentration is attained, the round of rebirths comes to an end; even the great Jina will not achieve *haṃsācāra* if he is liable to disturbances and anxieties. It is indeed foolish to run after the world and its activities. Brahman who is above all this should be realized, and the mind must be set at rest. The mind must be curbed from all attachments, from the six tastes and five colors, and then be concentrated on the self.

173-201 (E284-304) The infinite self assumes that form in which he is meditated upon like a crystal or a *mantra*. The self himself is the highest self; but he remains as self because of special karma; as soon as the self is realized by himself then he is the highest self. One should meditate thus: I am the same as the highest self, the embodiment of knowledge and the infinite divinity, and the highest self is myself. Like the colors reflected in a transparent crystal all the karmic associations are different from the nature of the self. By nature, like crystal, the self is pure; the dirty appearance of the body is mistaken for that of the self. The body should not be considered as red, old and worn out when the clothes are red, old and worn out. Similarly, red color, old age and destruction of the body have nothing to do with the self. As clothes are separate from the body, so the body is separate

from the self. The body is the enemy of the self, because it produces miseries; then he is a friend who destroys this body. It is indeed a great gain if actions, which are to be made ripe for operation to give fruit, become automatically ripe and exhausted. If the mind cannot bear harsh words, meditate on the highest Brahman whereby the mind might be set at rest. Beings that are averse to their spiritual welfare wander in transmigration pursued by karmas; what wonder, then, if they escape from transmigration when they establish themselves in themselves. If others take pleasure in finding fault with you, then consider yourself as an object of pleasure for others, and give up anger. Monks, if they are afraid of misery, should not entertain any anxiety, for even a bit of it, like a subtle nail, necessarily causes pain. There should be no anxiety even for liberation, for anxiety will not bring liberation: that which has bound the self will rescue it. Those that sink in the great lake of meditation have their selves rendered pure, and the dirt of transmigration is washed off. Elimination of all mental distractions is called the great meditation (*paramasamādhi*); the saints, therefore, give up all attitudes of good or bad. Though severe penances are practised and though all the scriptures are understood the *Śāntam Śivam* is not realized if the great meditation is not practised. Realization of the highest self cannot be accomplished if meditation is not practised after destroying pleasures and passions. If the highest Brahman is not realized through great meditation one has to wander infinitely suffering the miseries of transmigration. The omniscient have said that the great meditation is not achieved unless all good and bad attitudes are annihilated. The self becomes a perfected being when all the mental distractions are stopped, and when, being on the path of liberation, the four *ghāṭīya* kinds of karma are destroyed. The self becomes the perfected being, necessarily full of supreme bliss, who continuously knows the physical and superphysical worlds through omniscience. That Jina who is omniscient and whose nature is supreme bliss is the highest self, the very nature of

the self. The Jina who is separate from all karmas and blemishes should be understood as the very light of *paramātman*. The great saint Jina, who possesses infinite revelation, knowledge, bliss and strength is the great light. It is the great and pure Jina, the highest self, that is variously designated as *paramapada, hari, brahman, buddha* and the great light. The Jina, when he is absolutely free from karmas through meditation, is called the great *siddha*.

202-203 (E305-306) *Siddha* represents self-realization: he is the brother of three worlds; and his nature is eternal happiness. He is not accessible to births and deaths; he is free from the miseries of the four grades of existence; and he is free and blissful being an embodiment of absolute revelation and knowledge.

204-209 (E307-310) The saints that sincerely study the *Paramātmaprakāśa* overcome all delusion and realize the highest reality. The devotees of this work attain that spiritual light which enlightens the physical and superphysical world. Those that daily meditate on this book have their delusion immediately smashed and become the lords of three worlds. The competent students of *Paramātmaprakāśa* are those who are afraid of the miseries of transmigration, who abstain from the pleasure of senses, whose minds are pure, who are devoted to the highest self, who are intelligent in self-realization and who wish to obtain liberation.

210-212 (E311-312) This text, which is composed not (much) minding the rules of grammar and metrics, if sincerely studied destroys the misery of the four grades of existence. The learned should not mind here the merit or otherwise of repetition; ideas are repeated for the sake of Bhaṭṭa Prabhākara. The learned, who have realized the highest reality, should forgive the author for whatever is said here, reasonable or otherwise.

213-214 (E313-314) He attains liberation when flashes forth in his mind that highest principle which, as an embodiment of knowledge, is meditated upon by great saints,

which having no body dwells in the bodies of embodied beings, which is an embodiment of celestial knowledge, which deserves worship in three worlds, and which represents liberation.

Glory to that blissful omniscience which is a celestial embodiment of effulgence to those that have attained the highest status, which is a celestial and liberating light in the minds of great saints, and which cannot be obtained here by people who are given to pleasures of the senses.

24.YOGĪNDUDEVA, *Adhyātmasandoha*

NCat I, 53 advises consulting Jaina Siddhānta Bh 0185skara (=Jain Journal) volume 4, p. 222. A. N. Upadhye says that the work is in Sanskrit (rather than Apabhraṃśa), but that we do not know anything about it.[80]

25.YOGĪNDUDEVA, *Yogasāra*

Summary by R. S. Betai

Syādvāda is a major contribution of the Jainas in the realm of philosophy. As far as philosophical experience for the ultimate end and aim in view, liberation, is concerned, the most important points for a seeker are (1) an absolute observance, both in theory and practice, of nonviolence, (2) a total annihilation of all karma; (3) a strict and absolute following of and adherence to the three jewels--right vision, right awareness and right conduct, (4) probing deep into the inner consciousness after withdrawal from the external as a real seeker, and (5) a complete cessation of I-ness and lifting one's self to self-realization, so that one's self sublimates and is on the path of becoming the highest self.

"E" references are to the edition contained in A. N. Upadhye's edition and translation of the same author's 23.

Paramātmaprakāśa.

1-3 (E359) At the very outset it is stated that since the mortal world is full of sorrow the work is composed for those who are frightened by mortal existence and aspire after liberation.

7 (E360) For the present purpose, the self is stated to be the external self (*bahirātman*) that is deluded by false visions and, as a consequence, its lot has so far been in constant rotation in the cycle of mortal existence.

8 (E360-361) The other aspect of the self is the inner self (*antarātman,* also known as *paṇḍātman*), that has visualized the external self and has decided to disregard outright the external world and existence therein.

9 (E361) The body, etc., are not the highest self that is here known as stainless (*nirmala*), timeless (*niṣkāla*), pure, Jina, Śiva, Viṣṇu and peaceful (*śānta*).

12 (E361) The one who knows the self as the self attains liberation (*nirvāṇa*).

13 (E362) If one becomes absolutely free from desires and takes recourse to austerity, comes to self-realization, followed very soon by visualization of the highest course (*paramagati*), such a one is free from the cycle of births and deaths.

14 (E362) The self seeker should make a clear distinction between bondage and liberation.

15 (E362) But when the seeker is on this path, knowledge of self comes first because even all merit might lead one only to mundane existence.

16-17 (E362-363) Actually, thus only self-realization is supreme and only that is the cause of liberation.

18 (E363) It is specifically stated that this highest state, liberation, is possible even for men of the world if they have clearly and specifically made a distinction between what is worth abandoning and what is worth adopting.

19 (E363) Remembering the Jina, pondering, medita-

ting on him with a pure mind leads to the highest state.

20 (E363) This is because the pure self and Jina are the same.

25 (E364) No sublimation is possible without attaining right inclination.

26 (E365) The purport is that Jina is himself the highest self.

27 (E365) Here, as the philosopher talks of liberation, he uses other words for *mokṣa*, "Śivāgamana", etc. ("Śivalābha" in 38, "Śivavāsa" in 32, "Śivapurīgamana" in 34). All these show what a uniquely blessed state liberation is.

29 (E365) The vows, austerities, self-control, etc. lead to liberation only when the self comes to a state of visualizing and experiencing pure, sacred feelings thereby.

32 (E366) Man can attain self-realization only when he renounces the reward of both merit and demerit.

33 (E366) Otherwise they constitute only practical activities (*vyavahāra*), the commonsensical path.

34 (E366-367) All this becomes possible only when the self is known by the self and all externals are totally renounced.

35-37 (E367) That is the reason why all practical activity is to be renounced, that practical activity that is constituted of substances, categories, nonthinking substances, etc. Rather one should resort to the highest self.

38 (E367) What all this means is that when the distinction between self and not-self shall be known, only then is liberation possible.

39 (E368) Liberation is of the nature of absolute knowledge.

43-45 (E369) Jinadeva is present in all temples of the body, and man would be a fool to seek him in temples.

54 (E371) We are also to understand that if the self remains unknown all study and memorizing of scriptures is futile.

57-60 (E372-373) The author describes the *yoga* that

can be resorted to for the gradual uprise of the self and ultimate experience of liberation. It is *yoga* or perfect concentration on the self to visualize it as bodiless, so that one does not again take birth, this birth that is shame-inspiring. Actually, when man lifts himself far above the body he comes to genuine realization. Bodilessness constitutes a good body. That is why delusion is to be given up.

61 (E37373) Let the self experience that it does not accept even its own body.

VĀDIBHĀ SIṂHA (750)

In a manuscript at Tanjore (P. 257, Srirangam, 1916) of this author's literary work *Gadyacintāmaṇi* his nickname is given as Odeyadeva. He was from Southern India, belonging to the Odeya clan, and his teacher's name was Puṣpasena. He is also known as Vādisiṃha. As well as the two works identified below he is also the author of two texts dealing with the story of Jīvāṇdhara, titled *Kṣatracūḍāmaṇi* and *Gadyacintāmaṇi*.

26.VĀDIBHĀ SIṂHA, *Navapadārthaniścaya*

NCat 9, 397 informs us that a manuscript of such a work is listed in *A Supplementary Hand-List of 230 Manuscripts in Ailak Pannalal Digambar Jain Sarasvati Bhavan, Sukhadananda Dharmasala, Bombay* IV, pp. 5, 8.

27.VĀDIBHĀ SIṂHA, *Syādvādasiddhi*

Summary by Bhagchandra Jain

The work is divided into fourteen chapters as follows:

(1) *Jīvasiddhi*, (2) *Phalanbhoktṛtvabhāvasiddhi*, (3) *Yugapād-ānekāntasiddhi*, (4) *Karmaṇekāntasiddhi*, (5) *Bhoktṛtvabhāva-siddhi*, (6) *Sarvajñasiddhi*, (7) *Jagatkartṛtvabhāvasiddhi*, (8) *Ārhatsarvajñasiddhi*, (9) *Arthāpattiprāmāṇyasiddhi*, (10) *Vedapauruṣeyatvasiddhi*, (11) *Paratahprāmāṇyasiddhi*, (12) *Abhāvapramāṇadūṣaṇasiddhi*, (13) *Tarkaprāmāṇyasiddhi* and (14) *Guṇaguṇī Abhedasiddhi*.

The entire text is composed in *anuṣṭubh* meter. Its subject matter can be understood from the names of its chapters. It appears that the text is incomplete. It has been published more than once.

28.DHARMADĀSAGAṆI (750), *Upadeśamālā* with *Bālāvabodha* thereon

Some idea of the contents of this work, which is untranslated, can be gleaned with much effort from the thesis of Trimbaklal N. Dave, University of London 1931, published as *A Study of the Gujarāti Language in the 16th Century (V.S.) with special reference to the MS. Bālāvabodha to Upadeśamālā* (London 1935). Dave studies the grammatical aspects of the commentary, and by trying to piece together the contents of the work from the snippets of commentary he chooses for attention one may perhaps acquire an idea of its contents. The book contains a transliteration from Gujarati of the commentary (pp. 72-112) but not the text itself. However, the text (though perhaps not the commentary) has been edited in Sanskrit several times; cf. Volume I of this Encyclopedia, Bibliography, Third edition, #307 on p. 331.

BHAṬṬA AKALAṄKA (770)

Sarat Chandra Ghoshal, in the Introduction to his edition of Māṇīkyanandin's *Parīkṣāmukha* (Sacred Books of the Jains 11, Lucknow 1940), reviews the information pertaining to the date of this important writer on Jain logic and

epistemology. He notes (p. xxxv) that "In the work *Akalaṅkacāritra* it is mentioned that in 700 Vikrama Saṃvat (643 A.D.) there was a great discussion between Akalaṅka and the Buddhists".[81] And Nagin Shah writes: "(It) is almost certain that he flourished between 720 A.D. and 780 A.D., that he belonged to Mānyakheṭa; that he was a son of Puruṣottama, a minister of Śubhatuṅga of Mānyakheṭa; that he stayed in the Buddhist *Maṭha* to study Buddhist philosophy and that he had debates with a Buddhist teacher at the court of king Himaśītala of Kaliṅga."[82]

Shah remarks about Akalaṅka's style "In his writing Akalaṅka is very satirical and sarcastic about Buddhists, particularly about Dharmakīrti keeping in view the euphemistic criticism of Syādvāda resorted (to) by Dharmakīrti. He replies in forceful words...There is hardly any doubt about the fact that Akalaṅka imbibes the method, style and spirit of Dharmakīrti..."

"Akalaṅka sometimes bodily takes the sentences of Dharmakīrti (sometimes introducing minor changes therein) and makes use of them in connection with constructing his own...This..suggests that the main purpose that remained constantly before Akalaṅka in composing his original works should have been to save the Jaina philosophy from the Buddhist's and particularly Dharmakīrti's attacks."

"Even in his style Akalaṅka imitates Dharmakīrti."[83] Shah's book, then, attempts to study the content of Akalaṅka's criticism of Dharmakīrti, and we shall make use of many of his references in the summaries below.

The dating of Akalaṅka is the subject of an exhaustive inquiry by Mahendra Kumar Jain.[84] Without going through the intricacies of the argument, it will suffice to report that he also concludes by assigning a period of 720-780 for Akalaṅka's flourishing.

29.BHAṬṬA AKALAṄKA, *Aṣṭaśatī* on Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā*

The summary below is taken from the comments by Saratchandra Ghoshal, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā of Āchārya Samantabhadra*, edited and translated by Saratchandra Ghoshal (Delhi 2002), referred to below as (G). The entire text of this work is provided by Nagin Shah in his edition and translation of Samantabhadra's *Āptamīmāṃsā* denominated as (S) for the summary of work #10 above.

Summary by Saratchandra Ghoshal

1 (G27) Akalaṅka says that both *maṅgalācaraṇa* and the setting out of the purpose have been mentioned in the first verse. The praise of the omniscient in an attempt to examine his characteristics is the *maṅgalācaraṇa*. The necessity of the work is also indicated by laying down that it is characterised by faith (*śraddhā*) and knowledge of the qualities.

2 (G29-30) It might be urged that as magicians fail to show these the same are neither false nor mundane. So we should accept these as identifying essentials of the omniscient.

Akalaṅka, therefore, says: "The internal and external excellence of bodies, etc., though not found in shows or magicians, cannot be accepted as proving the omniscient, for these are seen in celestial beings whose passions have not disappeared. So, you are not praised as our Lord even for this."

3 (G32-33) There are many who are accepted as *Tīrthakṛts*. Buddha, Kapila and others are known as *Tīrthakṛts* from *śāstras*.

(Objection: So the Buddha, Kapila, etc. are omniscient as well!) The reply to this is that all these lay down different doctrines contradictory to one another.

11 (G62) Akalaṅka says that the view of the Buddhists, which also, like the Sāṃkhya view already described, denies the existence of *abhāva*, is refuted in this verse. We see that

some quality exists in something at a certain time. By denial of absolute nonexistence, the position will be that every quality will exist in everything at all times.

13 (G66) The logic of *syādvāda* or *anekāntavāda* accepts existence or non-existence or indescribability with limitation. Leaving out the limitation, it is impossible to maintain the embodiment of existence and non-existence in the same substance, because this will be quite inconsistent. It is explained that the Sāṃkhya view of simultaneous existence and non-existence is thereby refuted.

30 (G93) If knowledge be non-existent, the object of knowledge will also become nonexistent as the object of knowledge depends on knowledge.

So the view of the Buddhists, like that of the followers of the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy who hold the one-sided view of separate existence, is refuted

32 (G95) Akalaṅka explains this verse as follows: It is not possible that an object possessing qualities should have two natures opposed to each other existing at the same time. For example, existence and non-existence, oneness and many-sidedness, cannot be jointly predicated of the same thing, as one will oppose the other and existence of both will be self-contradictory; a barren woman and a child cannot be connected together.

35 (G97-98) This verse attempts to refute the view of the Buddhists who say that unity and divergence cannot be established by one's desire to speak or not about a certain quality of a substance, as both of these are unreal. For example, when we speak about unity we deny the existence of diversity, and vice versa. The reply is that when we want to speak about anything, we accept its existence. We never want to speak about anything which is non-existent. Otherwise we cannot have any action performed. By merely saying "a man, and fire" we cannot get cooking. There must be action to get cooking. The connection between qualities which we hold to be non-existing, when we want to speak about it, is merely an

analogy.

55 (G114) It cannot be urged by the Buddhists to escape the absurdity of their position that permanence and nonpermanence should jointly be accepted. For this would be as impossible as simultaneous existence of life and death.

56 (G115) Avoiding this fault, the *anekānta* view is that according to modifications, the seven *tattvas* may in one sense be recognised as transitory, for there is a difference in time in seeing and recognition.

63 (G122) A pitcher and a cloth, for example, are accepted as separate by the Naiyāyikas not only from themselves but also from their parts (*avayava*). The result would be that the parts and the objects having parts might be said to exist in a different place and time which is absurd. If they try to escape by saying that we accept existence in the same place we urge that even this is not possible for wholes (*avayavin*) which cannot exist with their parts in the same place. These will occupy different space, like an ass and an elephant.

73 (G132) Divergence and identity are only relative. They are connected with *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

76 (G136) There are many persons who urge that without the logical process of reasoning or inference, we would not accept the proof, even if it be seen by our eyes.

91 (G148) The Jaina view is that when one engages in discriminating good or bad actions and begins to act accordingly, the results flowing from it are caused by *pauruṣa* and when things (for or against us) happen without there being even any thought of the same (not to speak of efforts) the result is from *Daiva*.

93 (G151) A person practising penances and devoid of attachment) or aversion often causes pain to his body. To hold that from this pain there arises merit, will mean that he will have bondage from this merit and will not be able to gain liberation. Further, a learned *muni* gains pleasure from equanimity resulting from knowledge of realities. To hold that

demerit results from one's own happiness would mean that such a person would have bondage from this cause. The view that merit and demerit are derived from causing pain or pleasure to oneself is untenable. The result would be that no one would attain liberation, which happens only when there is no possibility of any bondage resulting from merit or demerit.

94 (G152) The Jain view, regarding the influx of karma consisting of merit and demerit, is that the cause of such influx depends on *viśuddhi* and *saṅkleśa* relating to happiness and misery of one's own or of others.

Saṅkleśa is the result of *ārta* and *raudra dhyāna* and its absence is *viśuddhi*, i.e., the existence of the soul in its innate nature.

109 (G170) A substance is established by affirmation or negation. From a merely one-sided view, there will be no difference between existence and non-existence of a substance. As the knowledge is varied according to *pramāṇa* and *naya*, its object is also of many kinds.

We mention that a substance is "this and not this" and do not hold only that "it is this", for the latter is false and cannot lead to correct knowledge.

111 (G172) We do not find anywhere a universal without a particular or a particular without a universal. The Cārvāka view of universals without particulars is an impossibility.

113 (G173) When we want to have a pitcher, we say "bring a pitcher". This necessarily goes to mean that we do not want to have a picture (of a pitcher). The acceptance of pitcher and (the) discarding (of) other things necessarily comes from our intention. In this manner, the seven modes of predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) are accepted by refuting opposites and accepting particulars.

30.BHAṬṬA AKALAṄKA, *Laghīyastraya* with *Vivṛti* thereon

The summary of certain sections of this text found

below is compiled from Nagin J. Shah, *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy*, op. cit., indicated by "S". "E" references are to Mahendra Kumar's edition of three works of Akalaṅka's of which this is one, the book containing his edition entitled *Akalaṅkagranthatrayam*, edited as Saraswati Oriental Series No. 8, Ahmedabad 1939, reprinted 1996. Unquoted passages of this summary are by Ratna Lahiri. "*V*" indicates the *Vivṛti* commentary.

"...It is a compendium of three small treatises. The colophon of the *vṛtti* on *Laghīyastraya* goes to prove that the *Pramāṇa Praveśa* and *Naya Praveśa* together formed one book and was named as *Pramāṇanayapraveśa*. Since the *Pravacana Praveśa* has a separate *maṅgalācaraṇa* and repeats mostly the topics of *Nayapraveśa*, it can be proved that it is a separate treatise."

"...(T)he total number of *ślokas* (is) 78...It is apparent that Akalaṅka followed...the chapter on *Svārthānumāna* of *P(ramāṇa)V(ārttika)* and its *vṛtti* of Dharmakīrti."[85]

Summarized by Nagin J. Shah and Ratna Lahiri

Pramāṇapraveśa

Chapter One: Perception (*pratyakṣa*)

1-3 (E1; S229) "Akalaṅka, following his predecessors, divides perception into two categories--empirical (*saṃvyāvahārika*) and transcendental (*mukhya*)."

(E1; S192) "Even Akalaṅka agrees with Dharmakīrti insofar as he holds that it is a cognition that should be regarded as *pramāṇa* (instrument). The reasons why he upholds this view are the same as those advanced by Dharmakīrti."

V downplays the importance of sense-organ-derived perceptions and highlights the importance of the internal knowledge rising from austerities in discriminating reality (*tattva*).

4 (E2; S228-229) "Akalaṅka defines perception as the construction-filled awareness which is lucid and vivid. In turn, he defines vividness in such a manner as would apply the definition to both sensory and extrasensory perceptions. Vividness, for him, consists in generating a type of objective awareness in which are reflected the particular characteristics of an object more in number than those reflected in inferential cognition and the like. This vividness is natural to it and neither borrowed nor adventitious as Dharmakīrti holds. Moreover, Akalaṅka repudiates the idea that perception grasps its object through the mental copy of that object...On his showing it grasps the object directly."

V gives two further subtypes of empirical perception, viz., perception through the sense-organs and perception not through those organs. The latter is the main type. The superiority and possibility of extrasensory omniscience is thus established.

5 (E2-3; S229-230) "According to Akalaṅka and other Jaina logicians, sense perception can be analysed into four stages: indistinct (*avagraha*), directed (*īhā*), determinative (*avāya*) and focussed concentration (*dhāraṇā*). These four stages are usually described as types of sense perception. But it would be more appropriate to treat them as four stages of sense perception because this is what they turn out to be when psychologically analysed. The correctness of this interpretation can be seen from the fact that Akalaṅka himself states that an earlier form (i.e. stage) develops into the next subsequent forms and that all of them are of the same essential nature."

"Akalaṅka defines *avagraha* as that construction-filled cognition of the distinctive nature of an object which follows in the wake of the construction-free cognition of the pure existence of this object, a construction-free cognition which in turn is consequent upon the contact of the sense-organ with the object. On th(at) contact...there arises the construction-free cognition of pure existence (*sanmātradarśana*). This construction-free cognition then develops into the

constructionfilled cognition of the object. This is called *avagraha* or indistinct awareness. *Īhā* (directed) awareness is defined by Akalaṅka as the striving for (the knowledge of) a specific characteristic of the object cognised by *avagrāha*. This *īhā* is different from doubt for the reason that it positively possesses the element of ascertainment. The definition of "determinative" *(avāya)* given by him is as follows. Determinative awareness means the ascertainment of the specific features of an object. In other words, *avāya* is the constructionfilled cognition of a specific characteristic of an object. It arises from the exclusion of the wrong and the ascertainment of the right. Akalaṅka defines *dhāraṇā* (focussed concentration) as the condition of recollection, a condition called *saṃskāra* (trace). But this...trace is not physiological in nature. It is a species of cognition. "

V: These types of awarenesses may have different names in different contexts.

6 V: The nature of focussed concentration is detailed. It is a type of immediate awareness (*matijñāna*). Focussed attention creates traces and that, added to directed awareness, should be considered to be the nature of knowledge (*jñānasvarūpa*). The four stages of sense perception have further subdivisions, which total 48 types of thought.

(E3; S223-224) "Dharmakīrti argues that...inference is (an) instrument of valid cognition because it removes superimpositions consequent upon the cognition of similarity. Akalaṅka in return observes that it is precisely because a constructionfree cognition stands in need of the removal of superimposition that we (Jains) refuse to treat it as an instrument of valid cognition."

Chapter Two: Objects of Valid Cognition (*prameya*).

(E3; S192) 7a. "It is interesting to note that Akalaṅka for the first time takes clear note of and endorses the

relativistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position according to which the intermediary links in the...causal chain of a cognitive process are, each of them, an instrument of valid cognition as well as the effect of an instrument of valid cognition."

(E3; S70) 7b. "Reality is neither substance alone nor modes alone but is characterised by both."

The pure particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) or the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa?* or of Advaitins?) cannot be objects of knowledge.

8 (E4) Efficiency (*arthakriyā*) is not possible for those who view the nature of things as either eternal or momentary.

V ridicules the Buddhist view which labels the origin of a substance itself as its efficiency (*arthakriyā*).

Chapter Three: Indirect (*parokṣa*) Awareness

10 (E4) An initial awareness may be an immediate awareness (*mati*), a recognition (*saṃjñā*) or an anticipation (*cintā*). Subsequently follows verbal (*śruta*) awareness.

V explains how the subsequent perception arises from the previous one and thus memory and recognition are also valid instruments of knowledge.

(E5; S197) "For the Jainas inference and testimony are two species of...indirect source(s of valid cognition). Again, according to them comparison (*upamāna*) is a form of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) which is a species of...indirect source of valid cognition. Similarly, they consider cogitation (i.e., *reductio ad absurdum*, *tarka*) to be one of the indirect source(s) of valid awareness. As for noncognition and implication they are both reduced to inference by them (the Jainas)."

11 (E5; S260) "Some hold that the awareness of necessary connection (or pervasion) (*vyāpti*) is acquired by a single act of sense-perception. For example, the necessary connection between smoke and fire is grasped at the time of the very first observation of the two together. On the very face of it this view is untenable. The object of sense-perception is

something existing at the present time and place while the necessary connection between smoke and fire expresses their relation in all times and places. So, we cannot grasp the necessary relation between two things at the time of the first observation of the two together."

12 (E5; S261) "Nor could it be held that it is inference that grasps necessary connections. For, it might be asked as to which inference grasps a necessary connection--the inference requiring the awareness of necessary connection or another one. The first alternative involves the fallacy of mutual dependence; the second involves an infinite regress."

14 (E5; S258) "Coming to the cases of pervasion based on the relation of necessary succession between *hetu* and *sādhya*, Akalaṅka points out that even if some of these are cases of causal relationship...others are not. Thus he finds...instances where though two things are invariably successive yet they are not causally related. Such for example is the inference of the previous appearance of the *bharaṇī* constellation and the forthcoming appearance of the *rohiṇī* constellation from the rise of the *kṛttikā* constellation. The *kṛttikā* appears invariably aftter the appearance of the *bharaṇī* and the *rohiṇī* appears after the appearance of the *kṛttikā*. Yet they are not causally related with one another...Certainly, the stars forming the constellation *bharaṇī* do not generate the stars forming the constellation *kṛttikā*. Thus Akalaṅka proves the possibility of there being necessary sequence even without causality."

15 (E6) (Buddhist:) The nonexistence of a substance may become the content of an awareness due to the nonperception of what is not available (*adṛśyānupalabdhi*).

16-17 (E6) As a reply to the Buddhist, it is averred that in constructionfilled perception there is no experience of momentariness; on the contrary a stationary, solid substance is experienced. So after negating the nonapprehension (*anupalabdhi*) cause (*hetu*) of the Buddhists the effect-cause (*kāryahetu*) is also criticized.

18 (E6-7; S227-228) V: "...(T)he self-cognition of a construction-filled awareness...could never be construction-free. Dharmakīrti holds that the self-cognitions of all awarenesses--including even construction-filled awareness--is construction-filled. This would mean that even a construction-filled knowledge is not self-determined but requires another knowledge to determine itself; this would involve an infinite regress detrimental to all purposive action."

19 (E7) criticizes the Naiyāyikas perception of comparison as an instrument of valid cognition by asking: if perception of similarity (i.e. comparison) is an instrument of knowledge then what kind of an instrument will perception of difference be?

V demolishes the number of instruments accepted by Naiyāyikas.

20 (E7) If the relation between a word and what is meant by (*vācyavācaka*) it is not acceptable as an instrument of valid cognition then the perception of similarity isn't one either!

V gives an example: A knowledgeable person has described a certain village and its qualities to a traveler, who on going there recognizes it as the one that person had described. This should also qualify as an instrument of valid cognition just like comparison.

21 (E7-8) Many subdivisions of memory and direct perception have been enumerated, and have been established as separate and parallel instruments of valid cognition.

Chapter Four: Verbal Testimony (*āgama*)

22 (E8; S189) "Akalaṅka...considers harmony or non-discrepancy (*avisaṁvāda*) to be the true mark of valid cognition...By non-discrepancy he...means the correspondence of cognition with the nature of its object. Sometimes he also means by non-discrepancy the coherence between the cognitive and conative activities."

The visual awareness of a patient of dim vision

(*taimirika*) is a fallacy of direct perception.

V: A person with such dim vision sees two moons: he sees something, so this kind of perception is faulty only in the matter of number, not regarding its object (the moon). Therefore this awareness may not be considered entirely false.

(Dharmakīrti:) Only constructionfilled (*savikalpaka*) awareness occurs; constructionfree awareness is a fallacy.

23 (E8; S222) V: "Akalaṅka has also criticised Dharmakīrti's view that the object of perception is only a unique particular. He observes that constructionfree cognition, which is the only type of perception according to Dharmakīrti, has not a unique particular for its object because a man whose senses are operating never cognises such an object. One does not experience such a unique particular either externally or internally. Externally we perceive (for example) a pot undergoing modifications and having parts; internally we experience our own consciousness having many forms. Even the person who has withdrawn his thoughts or concepts from all objects perceives only a gross form having many parts and not an absolutely unique impartite particular. This is proved by the fact that a person awakened from such a state does not remember having experienced such an absolutely unique particular."

24 (E9; S218) with V: "Dharmakīrti contends that perception does not involve constructions (*kalpanā*) as they are not noticed by us in (a) perceptual cognition. If they were present there in...perceptual cognition they would have been noticed by us because they never come into existence or pass away unnoticed. But Akalaṅka points out that though constructions are present in perception they are not noticed by us at the time of perception just as the difference among point-instants coming into existence in close succession at one spatial point is not noticed by us in perceptual cognition. Dharmakīrti might urge that there is no reason why we should not notice constructions if they are present in perceptual cognition, while there is a reason why we do not notice the

difference obtaining among point-instants--the reason being that they are similar. Akalaṅka observes that on the momentarist hypothesis there is no possibility of any two things being similar. The intelligent person should ponder over the question whether absolutely construction-free, thoughtless cognition is possible or not. Moreover, how could the absolutely construction-free, thoughtless cognition generate construction-filled cognition?

25 (E9) Perception and fallacious perception are further differentiated. Perception, memory, recognition, etc. are valid because they can be verified practically. If experience contradicts expected outcome then they are fallacious.

26 (E9) Verbal awareness is an instrument of true cognition. The Buddhist view that correct understanding of the word (for it) leads to perception of an external object is rejected.

27 (E9) If having found verbal awareness contradictory one always considers it false then direct perception and inference will also have to be considered false, because sometimes even these are contradicted.

(E9; S292-293) V: "Akalaṅka refutes the Buddhist view that words do not directly lead to the knowledge of things. He observes that words are connected with things. Of course, though words and things are not related by natural physical relation...yet they do have some invisible invariable relation between them just as (two constellations) *śakaṭa* and *kṛttikā* have--as a result of which it becomes possible to infer the posterior rise of *śakaṭa* from the prior rise of *kṛttikā*..."

(S295-296) "...Akalaṅka says that words enable us to know not only the intention of the speaker but...external things also. The mere fact that...cognition acquired through words at times does not correspond to facts is not sufficient to establish that all cognition acquired through words is of such nature that words could not enable us to cognize things at all. Akalaṅka observes that if this be the reason for the Buddhist logicians's acceptance of the position that words do not enable

us to cognize things and that they enable us to cognize only the intention of the speaker, they are laboring under a blunder because sometimes, as for example in the case of *gotraskhalana* (the mistake of pronouncing a different name from the intended one), etc., the words are not used by the speaker according to his intention to convey some particular information and hence the cognition derived through words would not then have for its object the speaker's intention to convey some particular information. But Dharmakīrti deems it possible to understand the speaker's intention through his words in spite of the fact that all words are not used in accordance with the intention of the speaker. Similarly, he should recognise the possibility of cognizing things through words even though all words do not describe the things as they are."

28 (E9-10) If the apparent meaning of the words of a knowledgeable person or those arrived at by reason are not considered sufficient for validity, then how will you distinguish between an instrument of true cognition and a fallacy?

29 (E10) On recognizing the deviation of the meaning of the words of a person from those in his heart, if the word itself is considered deviant (*vyabhicārin*) from its meaning, then it is a wrong inference, a false reason being ascribed as a causative factor which cannot then be labeled as a specific cause leading to a specific effect.

V further criticizes the Buddhist view of essential nature (*svabhāva*) and of inference based on an effect (*kāryahetu*) as being a possible anomaly. If on the basis of wrongly derived causation we accept the possibility of constructionfree awareness by deducing it on the basis of essential nature and inference based on effect, then merely knowing the word should also be considered a means for awareness of its meaning. This is fallacious reasoning. Thus verbal testimony is a proper instrument of true cognition.

Nayapraveśa

30 (E10) Perspectives and fallacious perspectives are defined.

V: Two perspectives are the substantial or generic (*dravyāstika*) and the modal (*paryāyāstika*). The former focusses on nondifference, that is, on generalities (*satsāmānya*),

31 (E11) which are inclusive of all being, nonbeing, etc. and all their subdivisions.

32 (E11) The generic (*saṃgraha*) perspective is of pure substance, i.e., of generality. Nothing is totally nonexistent. No knowledge can be derived without first knowing the basic general existence (*sat*).

33 (E11) Vs. Buddhism: In direct perception there is no awareness of partless moments (*niraṃśa kṣaṇa*).

34 (E11) Just as, in the Buddhist view, one awareness appears in its many (momentary) forms, similarly, substances constantly appear with all their qualities and modes.

35-36 (E12) The identifying qualities of a substance are the basis of its efficiency (*arthakriyā*), but this is not true on the Buddhist view of momentariness. If the effect occurs in the same moment as the cause then the cause-effect relationship cannot occur. Thus no effect is possible on the Buddhist view of momentariness.

37 (E12) A substance may perform more than one function and pervade many natures.

38 (E13) V: The subject of the generic perspective is that existence (*sat*) is itself reality (*tattva*). This does not totally exclude analytic viewpoints (*bhedadṛṣṭi*). If it did so, there would have been no difference between the subject of the generic perspective and the unity theories of Advaita (*brahmavāda*).

39 (E13) The nature of the conventional perspective and its fallacies are discussed.

V: Between a quality and the qualified the first is focussed upon, the other becomes secondary. This is the

meaning of the conventional perspective. However, where quality and qualified, whole and part, etc. are each viewed separately, it is a case of a fallacious conventional perspective.

40 (E13) Yoga is refuted by querying if a substance is real or unreal. If before association with the real (*sat*) the substance had existence, then where is the need for the association. If it is unreal like the hare's horn it could not be associated with reality.

V: The Sāṃkhya doctrine is subjected to the same criticism.

41 (E14) The use of instruments of true cognition is conventional, but if the convention is fallacious there is not an instrument of true cognition.

42 (E14) While discussing the commonsensical (*vyavahāra*) perspective and its fallacies, the existence of an external (*bāhya*) meaning is considered practical while the Yogācāra doctrine that only consciousness is real and the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness are considered fallacious.

43 (E14-15) The temporally immediate (*ṛjusūtra*) perspective makes only the present mode its subject. However, the Buddhist's "variegated awareness" (*citrajñāna*) is not its subject since that is merely an aggregate of atoms.

44 (E15) discusses the linguistically-implied, the etymological (*samabhirūḍha*), and the strict constructionist (*evambhūta*) perspectives. The linguistically-implied perspective differentiates meaning on the basis of tense, case and gender. The etymological bases meaning on modes, and the strict constructionist bases it on the primary verb.

45 (E16) Buddhist: Why is memory not recognition?

Answer: Both have a past object, but sensory awareness is clear while memory may be ambiguous.

46 (E16) Both scriptural and sensory awarenesses can be accurate (nonwandering, *avisaṃvādin*), the difference again being that the latter is clear while the former may be ambiguous. But that does not impugn scripture's validity, since inference, which also may be unclear, is accepted even by the

Buddhists as valid.

47 (E16) One should determine tense, case and gender whenever possible.

V: When they are not ascertainable a many-aspects view should be accepted.

Pravacanapraveśa

51-52 (E18) Mahāvīra is remembered again, along with a promise to state the instruments of true cognition, perspectives, and locatings in use.

54 (18-19) If objects (*artha*) cause awarenesses what causes illusions or hallucinations? If one answers that it is defective sense-organs or mental states, then what is the use of recognizing meaning as the cause of knowing? Only a faultless mind and sense-organs can be instrumental in true awareness; thus it is better to recognize mind and organs (and not objects) as the causes of awareness.

56 (E19) Awareness cognizes meaning but does not know that it knows. If it did there would be no controversies.

V: E.g., though perception cognizes through a sense-organ it does not cognize the sense-organ; likewise, though verbal awareness arises from meanings it does not know those meanings.

Darkness is seen, but substances obscured by darkness are not. Thus the reasons for nonawareness are awareness-veiling actions (*jñānāvaraṇīyakarman*) and not darkness.

57 (E19-20) Just as a polished gem, though covered with filth, may be recognized by other means, similarly the increasing awareness of the self is more or less evident through other means.

V: Due to the gradual destruction and quiescence (*kṣayopaśama*) of accrued karma the mind and the senses themselves cause awareness to occur, not light or meanings.

58 (E20) refutes the Buddhist theories that the same form (*tādrūpya*), same effect (*tadupapatti*) or same ascertainment (*tadadhyavasāya*) collectively or individually

become the causes of valid cognition.

59 (E20) Just as meaning is the subject of awareness though it may be caused by something else (than awareness), likewise though arising by itself awareness also knows meaning (without necessarily causing it).

V: Though meaning and perception do not have a causal relationship, they are related (respectively) as grasped and grasping.

60 (E20; S189) "In addition to non-discrepancy, definiteness (*vyavasāyātmaka*) is regarded by him as one of the essential characteristics of valid cognition. He observes that even non-discrepancy of cognition is impossible without its possessing a definite nature." Thus the Buddhists' constructionfree awareness, not being definite, cannot produce constructionfilled awareness,

61 (E21) There are two kinds of knowledge, direct and indirect. Direct awareness is of three kind: sensory (*indriya)*, nonsensory (*anindriya)* and supersensible (*atīndriya*). Sensory awareness is of four kinds, indistinct, directed, determinative and concentrated. Nonsensory is also of four kinds: memory, recognition, anticipative and *abhinibodha.*

Linguistic awareness (*śrutajñāna*) is indirect, and includes presumption, inference and comparison, etc.

62 (E21) Linguistic awareness has two aspects, that of *syādvāda* and of perspective (*naya*). The former term refers to enmeration of all possibilities, the latter term to one possibility among them.

63 (E22) Every sentence should be prefixed with "maybe" and "only/also". If it is not, even then it is implied.

64-65 (E22) Sometimes the letters, words and sentences imply a meaning not intended, sometimes they do not even say what is intended. Even then the Buddhists say that words are merely indicative of what the speaker wants to say. The Buddhists are ridiculed for disregarding public belief.

V adds that though people may not always want to utter bad words, sometimes they come out inadvertently.

Besides, a fool may wish to explain the scriptures, but cannot (due to lack of understanding). Therefore, words may not (always) be indicative of the intended meaning of the speaker.

66-67 (E22-23) Discussion of perspectives.

68 (E23) The conventional view and is apparent fallacies are discussed.

V explains that in the conventional view both qualities and qualified are discussed in detail while in the generic only one of them is.

69 (E24) The generic view.

70 (E24) The commonsense view explained. The *śūnyādvaita* view is fallacious since it is destructive of practicality.

71 (E24) The temporally immediate view discussed. Again, Buddhists are criticized in *V* for postulating apparent (*pratibhāsa*) and natural (*svabhāva*) varieties.

72 (E24-25) The conventional, etc. four views are categorized as perspectives of meaning (*arthanaya*) and words, etc. of three types are labelled word-perspectives (*śabdanaya*).

73-76 (E25-26) Having known the substances through instruments of true cognition, perspectives, locatings or ascription and explanations, and especially having known the qualities of the life-substance (*jīvadravya*) through its conditions, stages of progress and stages of search, the self purifies its right belief and attains salvation by total annihilation (*nirjarā*) of karmic particles by practicing austerities.

A name-location (*nāmanikṣepa*) is that which is ascribed without relation to kind, substance, quality or function. Having mentioned one by name, when the other is represented, it is known as representational-location (*sthāpananikṣepa*). The substance which is on its way to acquiring another mode of the same is known as fluid-location (*dravyanikṣepa*). It is again of two kinds, *āgama* and *noāgama*. That location which is limited to the present time only is conditional-location (*bhāvanikṣepa*).

By location we negate the non-present and affirm the present (factual); therefore locating is very useful.

In view of the liberated conditions as defined by Vaiśeṣika, Saugata and Sāṃkhya theories it has been stated that in the liberated self neither are the specific qualities of a self lost nor is the qualified-quality chain (*guṇaguṇīsantāna*) broken. Nor does the self become totally bereft of enjoyment (*bhoga*).

77-78 (E26) The result of deep study of scripture is the attainment of the exalted 'Jina' state. May that be achieved by those seeking salvation.

31.BHAṬṬA AKALAṄKA, *Nyāyaviniścaya* and *Vṛtti* or *Cūrṇi* thereon

Nagin Shah comments: "*Nyāyaviniścaya*, written in verses and prose, is designed after *Pramāṇaviniścaya* of Dharmakīrti. The original version of *Nyāyaviniścaya* is not available. Dr. Mahendrakumara restored the verse part of it from the commentary of Vādirāja, but the restoration of (the) *Vṛtti* is impossible in the absence of a commentary on it."[86]

The work numbers 480 1/2 verses. Mahendra Kumar provides the following brief outline:

"The first chapter includes the topics: the nature of perception, the refutation of the view that knowledge is non-perceptible, the nature of substance, refutation of views held by other schools regarding...perception, etc."

"The second chapter deals with the study of inference, the empirical elements in inference, the nature of discusssion (*vāda),* ways of losing an argument (*nigrahasthāna*), fallacies of discussion (*vādābhāsa*), etc. related with the topic of inference."

"The third chapter deals with the nature of *pravacana* (the scripture), the refutation of the Buddhist theory of a qualified person, the Vedic dogma of authorlessness (*apauruṣeyatva)*; the proof of omniscience, the refutation of the no-self view of the Buddhists, the conception of liberation

(*mokṣa*), the theory of *Saptabhaṅgī* and *Syādvāda*, etc."[87]

The following summary is compiled from the same "S" of Shah's and from the same "E" as in work #30 above. Topics of sections not treated by Shah are also indicated on the basis of Mahendra Kumar's brief summary on pp. 38-39 of E and the Table of Contents on pp. 109-111.

Summarized by Nagin J. Shah and Mahendra Kumar

CHAPTER ONE: PERCEPTION

6b-7a (E30; S220-221) "The Buddhists including... Dharmakīrti generally define *kalpanā* (conceptual construction) as (a) cognition expressed in words. But...if there can be no *kalpanā* without the relation of words, then *kalpanā* in the form of the memory of words would require other words...and so on *ad infinitum*. Thus *kalpanā* itself remains unproved and unestablished. As a result, it would not be possible for us to determine the nature of perception. In such a situation how can we make use of perception so as to acquire...knowledge of reality? If, in order to avoid this difficulty, *kalpanā* in the form of the memory of words were regarded as arising without requiring the use of other words, then the definition of *kalpanā* as a cognition expressed in words would become (too) narrow, because in that case it would not apply to the *kalpanā* in question. And if the memory of words were not regarded as *kalpanā* on the ground that it arises without being related to other words denoting the words remembered, then on the same ground other determinate cognitions too should not be regarded as *kalpanā* so long as they are not put in words. Thus the sensory cognition determining a thing without the use of words would be proved to be free from *kalpanā* and hence to be a case of perception."

7-18 (E30-31) Contents of sensory awarenesses are well-defined (*vyavasāyātmaka*), direct. Awareness is self-aware (*svasaṃvedana*) of pleasures, etc.

19-26 (E32; S193) "The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that though every cognition is perceptible it is perceived by a cognition other than itself which is called (an) 'after-cognition' (*anuvyavasāya*). Dharmakīrti and Akalaṅka both criticise this peculiar Nyāya view. They observe that if cognition is not self-revelatory but requires another cognition to reveal itself it would involve us in an infinite regress. Akalaṅka has refuted the Bhāṭṭa view also."

28-99 (E33-43) Refutation of *sākāravāda* and proof of *nirākāravāda*. Establishment of external objects, and refutation of idealism.

50-51a (E36; S179) "Akalaṅka observes that there is no nondual pure consciousness. Consciousness never reveals itself as nondual. We experience the duality of subject and object in it. From where does this duality come? It could not be held that its nondual nature is revealed by something other than itself, because that would deprive it of its nonduality. That consciousness is nondual means that it is beyond the subject-object duality. As soon as it is held to be the object of something other than itself it would no longer be called nondual. It becomes one of the two terms. The object term implies the subject term and consequently duality. Moreover, even in the nonreflective state of consciousness it is experienced as dual only."

69a (E39; S176-177)"Akalaṅka points out that it is only the external things that are efficient. Ideas are not efficient...We do not die simply on account of our having the idea of venom."

86ff. (E42; S178-179) "Dharmakīrti rejects the external world pointing out absurdities that are involved in the concept of it. One atom is contiguous with other atoms. If it is identical with the atoms close to it, the aggregate of all the atoms would assume an atomic size; if it is different from them an atom would have six parts. Again, let us take the case of a whole and its parts. Are they identical? If they are identical, the redness of a part would pervade the whole. If

they are different, the question would arise as to whether the whole resides in each of its parts partially or wholly. The difficulties of both the alternatives are patent and require no elaboration."

"Akalaṅka retorts that like external atoms, the internal atomic reflections too could not avoid the defects that are contingent upon their being contiguous with each other. A man perceives a multicolored gem. Reflections of the blue, the yellow, etc. arise in contiguity with one another and are considered to be atomic in size. If the atomic reflections on the six sides of an atomic reflection of the blue were identical with the latter, the complex of all these atomic reflections would also be of an atomic size and if they are different from it, an atomic reflection would possess six parts...Again, if all these atomic reflections were to form one variegated cognition, there would arise the question as to whether this one cognition resides in its constituent parts partially or wholly and so on. Moreover, Akalaṅka is of the opinion that the atoms are somehow perceptible also."

94-95 (E42; S176) "Akalaṅka rightly observes that the reality of the external world cannot be ruled out because like consciousness it also is repeatedly experienced by us. The external world is not unreal as no counterevidence competent to upset its reality is known to us. There is no doubt in our mind regarding its reality. The cognition of the external world is not a delusion created by imagination because it is not contradicted or sublated by other valid cognitions and also because it bears vivid and distinct reflection of the external world. If...ideas are accepted as real and the external world is denied reality we go against, says Akalaṅka, the supreme authority of experience. We do not assume the external world, we perceive it."

96-97 (E43; S178) "Akalaṅka observes that Dharmakīrti should not declare that the cognition of (an) external object arises merely on account of ignorance...Akalaṅka wants to point out that even illusory cognitions have (an) objective

basis. All...cognitions are always generated by external things, though some of them are so generated directly and some only indirectly. Akalaṅka asks Dharmakīrti...why he does not accept traces (*vāsanā*)...as the cause(s) of bodily actions and speech. Dharmakīrti might contend that...traces could not explain the cognition of the bodily actions and speech in a particular locus if there were not external bodily actions and speech. Akalaṅka asks Dharmakīrti to adopt the same attitude towards external objects as he has done in connection with the bodily actions and speech. Moreover, the idealist Dharmakīrti is of the opinion that even...dream reflections of...bodily actions and speech are remotely related to...actual (bodily actions and speech of) other minds. Akalaṅka wants him to apply the same logic in the case of...dream-cognitions of external things. The dream-cogniiton of a particular thing is remotely related to that thing. Has anybody dreamt of a thing whose component parts he has never experienced externally? As a matter of fact, dream implies the experience of a real external world."

98-99 (E43; S177) "Dharmakīrti noted some cases of the reflection of external objects without there being any actual external objects there outside, and on the basis of this he generalised that all the reflections of external objects are devoid of corresponding external objects. All the reflections of external objects are caused by *vāsanā* (the internal force of illusion). Akalaṅka refutes this view of Dharmakīrti. In the state of fear, etc. the reflection of an external object is no doubt sometimes caused by *vāsanā* but in the case of...other states, that is, in the case of the placid state of mind, the reflection of an external object should not be regarded as caused by *vāsanā*; in this latter case the reflection is caused by an actual external object. The reasoning of Dharmakīrti is as fallacious as the one employed by the Naiyāyikas to prove the existence of an intelligent creator of the world. Having seen that some things possessed of a structure have got an intelligent creator, the Naiyāyikas generalise that all things possessed of a structure should have an intelligent creator."

101-110 (E43-44) Refutation of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas on atoms and the difference of the whole from its parts.

111-141 (E44-48) On substances, qualities and modes.

114a (E45; S70) "Akalaṅka says that a substance is permanent in the sense that it never loses its essence and not in the sense that it is absolutely static. It undergoes change no doubt but it retains its essential nature; it is in this sense that it can be said to be permanent--not in the sense of being absolutely changeless. From this it follows that reality is dynamic, it is always in motion, it always transforms itself without giving up its essence."

115b (E45; S70) "The process of transformation involves origination, decay and persistence. Hence reality is said to be of this triple nature."

140b-141a (E48; S70) "A substance and its modes are not absolutely different...as the Vaiśeṣika philosopher's substance and its qualities are; nor are they absolutely identical, one engulfing the other and thus giving rise to the Vedānta eternalism or Buddhist momentariness. There obtains a relation of identity-cum-difference between them. They are identical in so far as one is not found without the other; they are different in the sense that they can be mentally differentiated. Thus the Jaina philosopher's substance is not absolutely changeless, nor are its modes absolutely discrete. The previous mode is related with the posterior mode; between them there obtains a relation of relative identity as between the cause-continuum and effect-continuum."

142-154 (E48-50) On universals and particulars.

143b (E48; S146) "All things experience change. It is possible for a similar character to be common to many things and for one thing to have many modes or characters."

143b-144 (E49; S140) "Only...thoughtless persons hold that the universal is nothing but exclusion from the opposite (*apoha*)...How can this exclusion of the opposite be possible if the individuals are devoid of any similarity or similar characters? So, in the form of the basis of exclusion, even

Dharmakīrti should acknowledge the presence of...positive similar characters like existence, etc., there in things. Let us elaborate this point. How can we exclude some select individuals from all others if the former do not possess some common (i.e., similar) characters or modifications. If the cow *sābaleya* has the same degree of difference from the cow *bāhuleya* as it has from a horse then why only are *sābaleya* and *bāhuleya* held to be having the exclusion of the opposite (of cow) and not the horse too? That is to say, what is the basis on account of which some individuals are selected to have the exclusion from the opposite in common? In fine, what is the principle of exclusion? If it is held that the difference that obtains between a horse and a cow is immensely greater than that which obtains between any two cows and hence the exclusion of the opposite that the cows possess is not possessed by the horses, then this is merely a round-about way of saying positively that the common (i.e., similar) traits or characteristics or modes that are there in any two cows are more numerous than those that are there in a horse and a cow. Thus it is only the common (i.e., similar) characters that urge us to classify things, to give them one name and generate the notion of similarity."

145b-146 (E49; S146) "It is to be noted that in no way can the universal of the Śāṃkara Vedāntins (or the Vaiśeṣikas) go to characterize the particulars or (can) the pure particulars of the Buddhists be characterized by the universal; but it is the nature of things undergoing a similar transformation to have both the universal and the particular, that is, to have both the similar characters and the unique ones. As the universal and the particular are never found without one another, it is to be concluded that a thing is of the nature of both the universal and the particular."

148-149 (E49; S223) "Akalaṅka criticises Dharmakīrti's position that perception positively cognises a thing in its entirety while the instruments other than perception are required only to remove false superimpositions. The criticism

is as follows. Perception does not grasp a thing in its entirety inasmuch as some part or aspect of it remains unperceived. This can be corroborated by what are called perceptual illusions (*pratyakṣabhrānti*) by Dharmakīrti. In perceptual illusions the cogniser perceives a thing partly as it is and partly as it is not. If it were the nature of perception to grasp a thing in its entirety, then in perceptual illusion also the cogniser would have perceived the thing in its entirety with the result that perceptual illusions should not arise at all. Thus perceptual illusions would become an utter impossibility if it were held that perception grasps a thing in its entirety."

151b-153a (E50; S144) "Akalaṅka, like Dharmakīrti, refutes the concept of an eternal all-pervading impartite entitative universal. He rightly observes that, if such a universal were held to be revealed by an individual, then once it is revealed it would remain revealed forever and would be revealed everywhere in all individuals, present, past and future. Just as existence (*sattā*), inherence (*samavāya*) and an individuator (*viśeṣa*) can exist even without any independent universal inhering in them even so all those entities that are called *arthas*, that is, substances, qualities and actions (*karman*) can exist without any independent universal called "existence" inhering in them. The concept of one entative universal residing in many is thus not proper. Otherwise, even time, space, etc., would become universals."

153b-154 (E50; S145-146) "Just as a body is not an independent entity over and above its limbs even so existence is not an independent entity called a universal over and above its species and sub-species. Though all things are equally existent only some, and not others, have a particular set of similar characters, just as though legs, hands, etc., belong to the same body or are parts of the same body a leg is similar to another leg and it is not that even a hand is similar to a leg. A thing has both similar and peculiar characters as is proved by perception, etc.; otherwise change would become impossible."

156-162 (E50-51) There is no constructionfree (*nirvikalpaka*) perception. Nor is there any mental perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*).

160-164 (E51-52; S226-227) "Akalaṅka gives the following arguments in refutation of mental perception recognised by Dharmakīrti and other Buddhists. (i) One finds no difference between sense-perception and mental perception as conceived by Dharmakīrti. (ii) Śāntabhadra (?) is of the opinion that constructionfree awareness (*nirvikalpaka jñāna*), being quite different from constructionfilled awareness (*savikalpaka jñāna*), could not generate the latter directly without mental perception to link them. But it might be asked as to how mental perception that is equally quite different from constructionfilled perception could generate the latter directly. (iii) If as many mental perceptions are accepted as are sense-perceptions, there would not arise the co-ordinating cognition (*pratisandhi*), viz. 'I who have smelt the sweet have eaten it". (iv) If one mental perception were regarded as grasping all types of objects--viz. color, flavor, odor, etc.--there would remain no need of our positing five types of sense-perception. (v) If it were held that mental perceptions arise successively one after another, then Dharmakīrti's thesis that the sense-perceptions of different types arise simultaneously would be contradicted; for on this view a mental perception would intervene between two sense-perceptions. (vi) Even...experience and inference contradict the view of Dharmakīrti that *mere* mental perception directly arises from the preceding sense-perception, for we actually experience conceptual cognitions like 'I experience through eye, nose, etc. color, odor, etc. simultaneously' arising directly from sense-perception. There is an invariable relation between sense-perception and judgment. The judgment 'this is blue' does not establish the existence of mental perception because the judgment is generated directly by sense-perception only; for its generation there is no need of an intermediary mental perception. (vii) If mental perception were regarded as akin to

self-cognition (*svasaṃvedana*) there would arise an over-absurdity (namely, that mental perception will then be a redundant concept). (viii) If it is urged that the definition of mental perception is given in accordance with the canonical texts, then it is to be pointed out that in scientific treatises such unnecessary things (i.e., definitions based on dogmas) should find no place."

"According to Dharmakīrti every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-cognised. Akalaṅka would not contradict this. For him also a cognition is necessarily self-cognitive; but he would not endorse Dharmakīrti's view that all self-cognitions are instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), i.e. valid. Akalaṅka is emphatic on the point that only determinate self-cognitions deserve to be called instruments of true cognition. This is so because according to him an instrument of true cognition has to be a constructionfilled piece of cognition. On Dharmakīrti's view, says Akalaṅka, the cognition of a man even in states of sleep, swoon, etc. would become instruments of knowledge, but this is surely absurd. To avoid this absurdity Dharmakīrti could not maintain that in those states there is no cognition at all, for this would mean a complete nonexistence of repeated meditation on the four noble truths in those states--a position not acceptable to Dharmakīrti."

165-167; E51) Discussion of yogic perception, vs. Sāṁkhya on audition and Nyāya on sense-object connection (*sannikarṣa*).

168 (E52; S228) "Akalaṅka would not object to yogic perception provided it is constructionfilled. To regard it as constructionfree contradicts the following statement of Dharmakīrti himself: 'the people seek that person who knows the means (*upāya*) of attaining *nirvāṇa* so that they desiring *nirvāṇa* follow the advice of this person without any doubt in their minds.' If the yogic perception of the four noble truths were constructionfree the yogi could not relate them to the *vineyas*, the seekers of the truth."

CHAPTER TWO: INFERENCE

170-184; E52-54) Definition of inference, of the *sādhya* and its fallacies.

185b-206a (E54-56; S145) "For Akalaṅka,...similar characters or similar modifications are what constitute the universal. It might be asked as to how a characteristic that is similar but not the same can reside in many individuals and if it does not reside in many individuals how can it be called a universal? Akalaṅka replies that...things are necessarily similar to some and dissimilar to others. Again, he points out that it cannot be said that one character resides in many; it is so because it is identical with or embedded in the individuals.. Nor can it be held that it is confined exclusively to one individual; it is so because like this individual another individual too possesses the character exactly similar to it. The Jaina conception of universal is not vitiated by defects that are pointed out in the corresponding Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception by forming the dilemma, namely, whether it is ubiquitous or...is confined to the concerned individuals, for according to the Jainas the similar character is numerically different in each individual of a class. The universal and the particular, that is, the similar characters and the specific characters, are both identical and different. The universal cannot exist without the particular and vice versa and in this sense they are identical, but they are different also as we recognise them as distinct. Things are not merely identical as they are different also; their difference is established by the cognition of difference in relation to them. Nor are they merely different or discrete as they are identical also; their identity is established on the strength of the cognition of identity in relation to them. In the Jaina system the identity of things means their having similar characters. There is nothing contradictory about a thing having both similar and specific characters because otherwise two things would never become similar nor would they ever be grasped as similar."

187b (E55; S144-15) "Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas certainly cannot escape the horns of the dilemma viz. whether their universal is ubiquitous or it is confined to the concerned individuals."

193b-194a (E55; S141) "Dharmakīrti's view that there arises the cognition of identity in relation to discrete individuals because the conceptual cognition conceals the discrete nature of the individuals is not proper. He himself says that this conceptual cognition reflects the difference inasmuch as it grasps the things as *similar* and not as *identical*. Thus since it does not conceal the difference that pertains to the individuals it should be recognised as valid, and the similarity that it finds in the different individuals should be recognized as real."

199b (E56; S144) "Existence in many cannot be put down as a distinguishing mark of the universal because it would lead to over-absurdity; that is, in that case even...entities like contact and number (two, etc.) would have to be treated as universals."

201-203 (E57; S141-142) "Akalaṅka asks Dharmakīrti...why...people do not have construction-filled knowledge of the uniqueness of particulars even though they perceive them as unique, i.e. as excluded from all other things similar as well as dissimilar. If he were to reply that on account of their similarity we are unable to determine their uniqueness, then he has unconsciously spoken the truth. Now, we ask him if this similarity itself is of the nature of exclusion. He cannot say that similarity is nothing but exclusion as that would prove him incoherent and inconsistent in his talk. The exclusion of a thing from all other things, similar as well as dissimilar, that is, its uniqueness is not determined, because it is similar to other things and this similarity is nothing but the exclusion of the things from others. No sane man would talk like this. Moreover, the view that though there obtains no real similarity between things they are cognised as similar due to their exclusion from others involves the contingency of all the things of the world becoming equally similar inasmuch as each and

every thing possesses...exclusion from all others."

"The similarity obtaining between things should be regarded as real. Otherwise the possibility of illusions would be altogether ruled out. As a matter of fact, on perceiving the similar nature that characterizes two things we are misled into attributing the specific nature of one to the other. For example, in the case of an illusion of silver in shell, we first cognise the concerned similar nature, viz., glitter. This similar nature being connected with the specific natures of shell and silver both, it is quite possible that it revives the memory traces of silver and as a result the cogniser superimposes silverness on shell and mistakes shell for silver. If Dharmakīrti were to say that illusions arise without any external conditions at all then why should he not consider the movement of a ship and the speedy revolution of a firebrand, which are respectively given by him as the external conditions of the illusory cognition of a moving tree and that of a fiery circle, to be of no use in causing those illusory cognitions? If he were to regard ignorance, which is internal, as the cause of illusion then his view that all things are unique may well be set aside, for (someone e.g.) the Śaṅkara Vedāntins[1] would say that the cognition of difference is due to ignorance, the cognition of identity being alone true. Thus there would arise the contingency of the acceptance of quite a different view, viz. (e.g.) the Vedānta view, if the internal ignorance is regarded as the sole cause of illusion. Akalaṅka concludes that a real similarity obtaining between things is necessary to account for illusions."

269-272 (E66-67; S272) Definition of the reason (*sādhana*) and its fallacies. "While discussing the fallacies of (the) reason Akalaṅka has tried to be consistent with his doctrine of 'one-condition-of-a-valid-reason'. Though he accepts all the fallacies of (the) reason recognised traditionally he

1 There is no explicit reference in the Sanskrit text to Advaita Vedānta in this passage, however.

observes that there is in fact only one fallacy of (the) reason and that is called *asiddha* or *akiñcitkara* by him; all the other fallacies are mere species of this one fallacy."

273-386 (E67-81) The many aspects of ordinary objects, i.e. molecules, and reasons. Molecules differ in colors but are not differentiated by their colors. Absences are also knowables.

370b-371a (E79; S272-273) "...(T)wo types of fallacies of the reason (*akiñcitkara*)... (viz.) a reason adduced to prove a thesis that is either already proved or is contradicted by other valid cognitions, cannot really be treated as fallacies of (the) reason. They are in fact fallacies of (the) thesis....Akalaṅka observes that all those reasons that are devoid of a necessary connection with the *sādhya* concerned are to be called *akiñcitkara* in spite of their fulfilling those three conditions of a valid *hetu* (formulated by the Buddhist)."

472b-473a (E93; S297) "If only on the strength of such trivial differences among the various cases of knowledge we were to regard them as results of several independent sources of valid knowledge then there would be innumerable such sources."

CHAPTER THREE: AUTHORITATIVE LANGUAGE

32..BHAṬṬA AKALAṄKA, *Pramāṇasaṃgraha* and -Vṛtti

"...(I)t has a very compact style. From the maturity of judgments and acute analysis, it can be said that it is the last work of Akalaṅka; besides, he includes some of the *kārikās* from *Nyāyaviniścaya*...There are nine chapters and 87 1/2 *kārikās*...dealing with the topics: *Pratyakṣa* (perception), *Parokṣa* (mediate knowledge), *Anumāna* (inference), *Hetu* (reason), its classifications, *Hetvābhāsa* (fallacies of reason), non-existent (*asiddha*), contradictory and inconclusive, *Vāda* (legitimate discourse), *Pravacana* (the nature of scripture), proof of omniscience, refutation of *apauruṣeyatva*, *Saptabhaṅgī* (the seven fold predication), *naya* and its classification, lastly

conclusion on *pramāṇa* (valid knowledge), *naya* (partial standpoint) and *nikṣepa*."[88]

"E" is Mahendra Kumar's edition of the two previous works and this one in the volume titled *Akalaṅkagranthatrayam*, op. cit.

CHAPTER ONE: PERCEPTION

1-10 (E97-99) The identifying qualities of direct perception. The priority of the validity of scripture (*śruta*), i.e., of perceptual, inferential or (ordinary) verbal knowledge.

CHAPTER TWO: INFERENCE

11-18 (E99-101) Memory of an object validly perceived

CHAPTER THREE: REASON

1-10 (E101-103) The ingredients of inference, viz., *sādhya* and *sādhana*, are discussed. Fallacies.

33.BHAṬṬA AKALAṄKA, *Siddhiviniścaya*

A few passages from this work are summarized ("S") by Mahendra Kumar in his edition, with Anantavīrya's *Ṭīkā*, constituting Jnana-Pitha Murtidevi Jaina Granthamala 22-23, 1959. "E" references are to this edition as well. The summary provided is translated by Ratna Lahiri from Mahendra Kumar's Introduction to the first volume of the same edition, pp. 94-95. Translations of section headings are the editor's.

Summarized by Mahendra Kumar and Ratna Lahiri

"1.*Pratyakṣasiddhi* (perception): The topics brought under discussion are: the nature of *pramāṇa*; the result of *pramāṇa*; the proof of external objects; the validity and perspicuousness of constı uctionfilled cognition; rejection of the

validity of constructionfree perception; refutation of the constructionfree nature of self-cognition; the establishment of knowledge on the strength of wide, not whole, application of nondeviance; the possibility of *mati* and *śruti* knowledge, etc., without the application of words; and so on.

2.*Savikalpasiddhi* (constructionfilled awareness). The des-cription of indistinct awareness, etc. Examination of mental perception. Constructionfilled awareness is not the result of constructionfree awareness. Each cognitive member of indistinct awareness, etc. (in order) is the cognitive organ and each succeeding member as the resultant. Impossibility of knowing (an)other person if the Buddhist view is accepted.

3.*Pramāṇāntarasiddhi* (other instruments of knowledge): Establishment of recollection and recognition as separate instruments. Inclusion of comparison (*upamāna*) in recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Justification of *tarka* as instrument of true cognition.

3.2 (S105) "*Tarka* or inductive reasoning is an independent valid (source of) valid awareness, because to know the concomitance there is no other valid means than *tarka*. If concomitance is not known there is no possibility of inference."

--The impossibility of action in the (Buddhist) philosophy of momentariness. Justification of creation (*utpāda*), destruction (*vyaya*) and subsistence (*sthiti*). Destruction as the creation of other modes. The establishment of eternity and identity-cum-difference of substances and modes.

4 *Jīvasiddhi* (self). False awareness, the result of the operation of knowledge-obscuring (*jñāvāraṇīya)* karmas. Causal efficacy. Continuity, etc., untenable in momentariness. With respect to bondage self (*jīva*) and not-self are one though differing essentially in their nature. The causes of influx of karmas. Disbelief in *prajñāsat* and *prajñaptisat*. Criticism of materialist (as in *Tattvopaplava*) philosophy. Refutation of materialism (*bhūtacaitanyavāda*). Nyāya conception of self.

Criticism of the Sāṃkhya theory of *tattvas*--

4.15-20 (E293-300; S113) "Akalaṅka has criticised the Sāṃkhya's oneness of *prakṛti*."

4.23 (E308; S113) "Akalaṅka has criticised the independent *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* which are (the) eternal entities according to Naiyāyikas."

--the bondage of karmas with the formless consciousness (*cetana*). The identity-cum-difference (*bhedābheda*) of awareness (*jñāna*), etc. and self (*ātman*).

5 *Jalpasiddhi* (sophistry). The nature of sophistry (*jalpa*). The four limbs of it. The connotation of *śabda*. *Śabda* is not necessarily an indication of intention. Criticism of the ways of losing an argument (*nigrahasthāna*) due to the statement of (what is) other than an essential condition of proof, etc. Definition of victory (*jaya*) and defeat (*parājaya*).

5.1-2 (E310-311; S1109) "Akalaṅka clearly says that if one is able to establish his own *pakṣa*, it is *jaya* for him and defeat for the other. It is needless to state that according to Akalaṅka, the establishment of one's own theory is possible only by means of right reasoning. This constitutes the essential device in debates."

5.2 (E311; S109) "When there was no place for unfair means in debates, the difference between *vāda* and *jalpa* was reduced to nothing; and as regards *vitaṇḍa*, Akalaṅka has clearly stated that it is the fallacy of *vāda*; so for Akalaṅka, there remains one type of debate, viz. *vāda*, which is also termed (as) *jalpa*."

6 *Hetulakṣaṇasiddhi* (definition of a reason). Impossibility otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*) is the characteristic of an invariable reason.--

6.2ff. (E372ff.; S106, 110) "Keeping in view the three characteristics--*pakṣadharmatva*, etc.--of *hetu* accepted by the Buddhists, Akalaṅka establishes that only the *anyathānupapatti* or the *vipakṣavyāvṛtti* is the essential characteristic of *hetu*. He has explained that *anyathānupapatti* or *vipakṣavyāvṛtti* is nothing else than *avinābhāva* or *vyāpti*.

"Before discussing the validity of *āgama*, it is necessary to know the views about the nature of *śabda* according to the Jains. In Jaina *āgamas* (the) *śabda* has been established as having material nature (*pudgala*). Ācārya Akalaṅka has given arguments in favour of this theory and on the analogy of shadow and sunshine has firmly established the material nature of word and rejected the theory of the Naiyāyikas that (the) *śabda* is a quality of the sky. Further he has vehemently criticised the eternity of the word accepted by the Mīmāṃsakas, and has also criticised the *sphoṭa* theory of the Vaiyākaraṇas."

--Concomitance is not conditioned by identity (*tādātmya*) and causation (*tadutpatti*) only (as in Dharmakīrti). Justification of divisions of the reason.--

6.9 (E383; S107) "Special attention is given to establish *Kāraṇahetu*, because this was not accepted by the Buddhists; Akalaṅka has given many instances where the effect can be inferred with the help of (the) cause (*kāraṇa*)."

--Justification of prior (*pūrvacara*), posterior (*uttaracara*) and simultaneous (*sahacara*). The possibility of *sattva hetu* etc. only in the *anekānta* philosophy.

6.16 (E394; S106) "There are certain cases where *hetu* is devoid of its characteristics of *pakṣadharmatva* just as the rising of *rohiṇi* in (the) future is inferred on seeing the rise of *kṛttikā* (now). Further Akalaṅka argues that their (the Buddhists) most favourite *hetu*, *sattva* establishing momentariness, is such that it has no *sapakṣasattva*; and still they believe that *sattva* is a valid *hetu.* So it is quite clear that *sapakṣasattva* cannot be an essential characteristic of *hetu*."

6.35-36 (E434-436; S107) "Akalaṅka maintains that the meaning *dṛśya* (in Dharmakīrti's term *dṛśyānupalabdhi*) should not be taken as 'perceived' only but it should be taken as 'cognised' by any of the (means of) valid cognition, be it *pratyakṣa* or other than *pratyakṣa*. So according to Akalaṅka the object which is non-sensuous can be negativated as the non-existence of consciousness is inferred in a dead body by

certain signs; otherwise even this cannot be decided whether a person is a ghost or not."

7 *Śāstrasiddhi* (scripture). The value of scripture in the spiritual path. The signification of *śabda*. The consciousness of a self while asleep. Error of selves due to the rise of karmas. Refutation of theism. Criticism of Nyāya conception of liberation (*mokṣa*). The possibility of *par excellence* knowledge in man.--

7.9-10 (E463; S113) "Akalaṅka has criticised the Vedānta's absolutistic theory of one *Brahma*."

--Non-discrepancy of *syādvāda*. Repudiation of *apauruṣeyatva* of Veda, etc.

7.28-30 (E483-487; S110) For the Jains, unlike the Mīmāṃsakas, the scriptures are the collection of the preachings of the Tirthaṅkaras. So it was necessary for Akalaṅka to refute the Vedic tradition of *apauruṣeyatva* and to establish the origin of the *āgamas*. Akalaṅka has rejected the validity of the *āgamas* established on the strength of *apauruṣeyatva*, affirmed the validity of the *āgama* on the strength of the virtues of the speaker."

8 *Sarvajñasiddhi* (omniscience). Knowledge of imperceptible things also is possible. Speaking a language is not contradictory to omniscience. Proof of omniscience on the basis of noncontradictory reasons.--

8.3 (E527; S103) "If a person has no capacity to know all, by means of the Veda also he will not be able to know all."

8.8 (E539; S103) "Akalaṇka, following his predecessors, says that the soul has the inherent capacity to comprehend...substance; if it does not, it is due to the obscuration of that capacity by the veil of Karmic bondage; the destruction of Karmas will result in the perception of all things."

"If supra-sensorial knowledge is inadmissible, how can we have the non-discrepant astrological divinations? Hence it must be accepted that there is a faculty of knowledge which is super-sensuous and this type of knowledge is nothing but

kevalajñāna or omniscience."

"The very progressive gradation of knowledge necessarily implies the highest magnitude of knowledge attainable by man."

--The impossibility of omniscience in the Sāṃkhya theory. Omniscience is the result of the total destruction of knowledge-obscuring (*jñānāvāraṇīya*) karmas, etc.

8.10-18 (E540-552; S103) "(The) impossibility of omniscience cannot be established without the knowledge of persons of all times. That is to say, one who rejects omniscience for all time must be omniscient. In this way, after giving the positive arguments, he relies on the negative argument that it is certain, there is no contradictory instrument of knowledge to reject the established omniscience; he substantiates this argument by examining the various so-called contradictory instruments".

9 *Śabdasiddhi* (language). The material nature of language. Its nature of aggregation as shadow and light. The relation of word and meaning. A word connotes a particular object. Word can even establish the illusory nature of all things. If a particular is not signified by a word it will become imperceptible. If the word denotes only an intention, there will be no discrimimination between right and wrong. Discussion on the expression "*eva*".

9.13 (E619; S103) "Akalaṅka has criticised (the) *apoha* of the Bauddhas, etc."

10 *Arthanayasiddhi* (perspectives on objects).--Perspective is the standpoint of the knower. It is also an instrument of knowledge. Two fundamental perspectives, absolute (*nirapekṣa)* and conventional.

10.1 (E662; S114) "Briefly we can say that *pramāṇa* comprehends one and all; *naya* one, *durnaya* rejects other than one. The aforesaid two *nayas* are further subdivided into seven: *nigama, saṃgraha* etc. These seven are classified again into perspectives on objects (*arthanaya)* and linguistically implied perspectives (*śabdanaya)*; the first four--*naigama,*

saṃgraha, vyavahāra and *ṛjusūtra*--are called *arthanayas*; and the rest viz., *śabda, samabhirūḍha* and *evaṃbhūta* are *śabdanayas*."

"Akalaṅka has attempted to include the various schools of Indian philosophy into *durnayas* related to the seven *nayas*."

10.3 (E666; S113) "The relation between *naya* and *pramāṇa* is discussed by Akalaṅka. He is of the opinion that when one comprehends a substance on the ground of a particular attribute, that is to say, when he cognises the whole reality (*sakalādeśa*) through a particular attribute, it is called *pramāṇa*; and when a person cognises the attributes of reality (*vikalādeśa*), it is called *naya*; the reality as the aggregate of all the attributes is the object of *pramāṇa* while a particular attribute of (the) reality is *naya*. So it is quite clear that *naya* is the outcome of the comprehension of *pramāṇa* and that *pramāṇa* is none other than *śrutajñāna*."

10.4 (E667; S113-114) "It is obvious that (the) various schools of philosophy are the outcome of the absolutist view of a substance giving emphasis on certain aspects with the result that they reject downright the other aspects of reality. Keeping such views in mind Akalaṅka has classified the *nayas* into right (*sunaya*) and wrong (*durnaya*). That is to say that *sunaya*, though (it) gives no preference to one of the attributes, does not reject others; on the other hand, *durnaya* not only prefers but endorses that and rejects the rest."

--Sāṃkhya theory--a *naigamābhāsa* (nonanalytical fallacy). Collective (*saṃgraha*) perspective and its fallacy. Commonsensical (*vyavahāra*) perspective (and its fallacy), immediate (i.e., a view confined to present situations, *ṛjusūtra*) perspective and its fallacy.

11 *Śabdanayasiddhi* (linguistic perspectives). Discussion of the nature of language (*śabda*). Refutation of the doctrine of phonetic explosion (*sphoṭa*). Rejection of the eternalistic view of the word--*śabdanaya*.--

11.5 (E702; S113) "Akalaṅka has criticised the *śabdabrahman* of the Vaiyākaraṇas.

--Description of the etymological perspective (*samabhirūḍhanaya*) and strict constructionist perspective (*evaṃbhūtanaya*), etc.

12 *Nikṣepasiddhi* (locating the meaning).--

12.1-2 (E738-739; S115) "One of the means to know (the) reality is *nikṣepa* or explaining the meaning of the connotation of the word...(W)ords sometimes connote (the) cognition, sometimes (an) external object and also (the) words. So in order to remove the confusion the procedure of *nikṣepa* is essential to arive at the right meaning. Just like *nayas*, *nikṣepas* are also of various types. But briefly they are classified into four: *nāma, sthāpanā, dravya* and *bhāva*....the *nāma-nikṣepa* deals with (the) words without their connotation. The *sthāpanā* deals with the meaning related to knowledge and *dravya* and *bhāva* deal with (the) external objects..."

33 "In common parlance of life, there are certain occasions when we attach importance to the *nāma* only and on other occasions we are concerned (ourselves) with *sthāpana*..."

"The relation between *naya* and *nikṣepa* is also explained. The *nāma, sthāpana* and *dravya* are the objects of *dravyārthika-naya*, while the *bhāva* is the object of *paryāyārthika-naya*."

34.BHAṬṬA AKALAṄKA, *(Rāja)Vārttika(alaṁkāra)* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* with a *Bhāṣya* or *Alaṁkāra* thereon

"The *Tattvārthasūtras*) have undergone two recensions; one as accepted in the *(Tattvārthādhigama)Bhāṣya* and the other accepted in the *Sarvārtha Siddhi*. Akalaṅka accepted the latter recension and has criticised, at certain place, some Sūtras of the *Bhāṣya* recension and the *Bhāṣya* itself. It is also found that he has composed *Vārttika* out of sentences from the *Bhāṣya*."[89]

The work is viewed by Digambaras as the second in the chronological line of commentaries on Umāsvāti's work after Pūjyapāda's.

Summary by Mahendra Kumar Jain with Ratna Lahiri

Mr. Jain's summary is found in Hindi in his edition contained in Jnanapitha Murtidevi Granthamala, Sanskrit Grantha No. 10 (in two parts). This is our "E" for Chapters One through Five. For Chapters Six through Ten "EM" refers to the edition by Manoharalala printed as Saraswati Oriental Research Sanskrit Series No. 16 (Ahmadabad 2002). The summary is summarized for this Volume by Ratna Lahiri. Certain Chapters have been translated by N. L. Jain; "T" references are to these, identified in endnotes after the titles of the relevant Chapters.

CHAPTER ONE

1-4 (E265) Just as medical aid is sought at the advent of a disease, so also to know the self the path to liberation should be sought. Out of the four goals of life (*dharma, artha, kāma, mokṣa*) the last is the one that must be sought and taught.

Question: Should the path be taught, or only the fact that liberation is the highest goal?

Answer: Since the path is sought, the path should be taught.

5-8 (E265) Most contenders have no doubt regarding their goal but they have differences regarding the path. Some contenders aver that knowledge alone is liberating, others think cessation of sense pleasures, and still others think some routine activities are instrumental in this achievement.

Even as to the nature of liberation there are many views. All agree that liberation means the cessation of all sorrow. However, the path according to each contender is different. Some believe it is achieved through knowledge,

others through action and others through renunciation. The Buddhists believe that the stoppage of five aggregates (*rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, vijñāna*) will lead to liberation. The Sāṁkhya system believes that on knowing the difference between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* the subsequent dwelling in pure consciousness will then liberate. The Naiyāyikas insist that uprooting some specific qualities of the self (awarenesses, pleasures, pains, desires, repulsions, efforts, *dharma, adharma* and traces) leads to liberation. Even so, all contenders are in agreement on the fact that the self has to be realized by destroying the bondage to karma. Everyone agrees that on liberation all bondage to karma is totally uprooted.

9-13 (E265-266) Question: If liberation is not seen by a direct perception then why look for its path?

Answer: Although not available to direct instruments of true cognition like the sense organs, even so it can be inferred. An example of the rural water system is given wherein a container tied to a wheel is circulated over a source of water by a bull, whose activity energizes the circular motion of the fulcrum of the wheel to keep it turning. The cessation of the activity of the bull stops the fulcrum, which in turn stops the wheel and the filling of water-containers. Similarly the stoppage of the wheel of karma stops the rounds of worldly life. This is called liberation. If anyone denies the existence of liberation, then all of them will be denying their basic premises.

14-16 (E266) Question: Why then are the causes of bondage not discussed first?

Answer: It will scare the seeker to listen to all that first, so it is better to keep up his hope by relating the ways to liberation, just as the prisoner, if told how he can escape, retains his enthusiasm through the difficulties of imprisonment.

17 (D266) Rather than one path all three combined (right vision, right awareness and right conduct) have been given as the way to liberation.

I.1.1 (E266) Right vision is the rising of faith in the meaning of essentials (*tattvārthaśraddhā*) due to the internal cause of destruction and/or subsidence of certain adhering karmic matter. This internal activation occurs either through natural causes (*nisarga*) or through study of another's preaching. Thus it can have two types of origin.

I.1.2 (E266) Accurate knowledge about the self and the other substances without any doubt and without any contrdiction or inattention, through the instruments of true cognition along with their relative perspectives, is known as right awareness.

I.1.3 (E267) Right conduct is the acquiring of his innate natural state (*svarūpasthiti*) by a man of discrimination, after he has renounced the external and internal mental, physical and verbal activities, knowing them to be the cause of worldly ties of attachment and repulsion. This state of perfection in right conduct cannot be acquired before the eleventh and twelfth stages of spiritual development or by the realized (*kevalin*). Below those stages, the various stages of progress are hierarchical in accordance with the effort involved, for laymen and for mendicants (*sādhu*) who may have reached the tenth stage.

I.1.4 (E267) Vision and knowledge are instruments of the self by which the substances are known. Right faith in essentials (*tattva śraddhāna*) is what is gained in the process. "Conduct" relates to activity by which these actions are regulated.

I.1.5-6 (E267) Question: If knowledge is the instrument (by which the self is known), then shouldn't the subject (self) and the instrument (knowledge) be two different things like the woodcutter and the axe?

Answer: No. Just as fire burns by heat, but fire and its heat are not separate, so also there is no separation between knowledge and the self. The self becomes knowledge action (*jñāna kriyā*) and the self itself becomes vision action (*darśana kriyā*). Fire cannot be imagined without heat. Thus the self is

also of the innate nature of right vision and right awareness from the undifferentiated essential perspective (*dravya dṛṣṭi*).

I.1.7-8 (E267) The question is raised: Is knowledge a quality of the self, or heat a quality of fire, like a man with a stick in his hand, both of which are associated but separate entities?.

Answer: No, since the stick is a proven separate entity before its association with the man, and blueness in a blanket is separate from the things it colors, but fire cannot be established as existing without heat nor the self as existing without knowledge. Thus without heat or knowledge fire or self cannot be separately established as existing entities, nor can the heat or knowledge qualities be established as self-existent. Therefore they should not be imagined to be separate.

I.1.9 (E267) The logic of imagining heat as a separate quality of fire is rejected. So is the possibility of the existence of knowledge as apart from the self.

I.1.10-11 (E268) Vaiśeṣika: Merely through associating with a staff a man does not become a staff. Fire becomes heated through association with heat according to our (Vaiśeṣika) view. Thus a substance and its qualities are separate. Through co-occurrence a quality and what it qualifies appear to be the same; thus heat co-occurring with fire appars to be the same.

Answer: It is not so. Co-occurrence cannot occur in independent substances. If heat and fire are different then why does heat not occur in water? Thus heat must be considered a corollary of the fire substance itself, not a different quality or substance.

I.1.12-13 (E268) Inherence (*samavāya*) is a relation, not a separate category.

I.1.14 (E268) Objection: A lamp is different from its light.

Answer: Even though the lamp lights itself, the co-occurrence of the intrinsic quality of being a substance, along

with its quality, activity, general and specific states, are all modifications of the substance, hence its modes. The substance itself, due to outer and inner reasons, becomes the various modes.

Inherence has no separate existence of its own. If the qualities of a thing were separated, then the substance will become nonexistent. Then where will the quality reside without the substance? So even the quality will then have to be nullified. Therefore, it is logical to consider the qualities inherent in the substance as modal existences of the same substance.

I.1.15-16 (E268-270) Since knowledge is temporal and grasps one meaning at a time, it cannot lead to the discrimination (of substance from quality). Only separately established entities can be in contact (*saṃyoga*), while inseparably-related (*ayutasiddha*) entities (five types in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) are coexistent with the substances. Traces (*saṃskāra*) are also according to experience, so the understandings acquired through one-sided systems will also be one-sided. Thus discrimination may not occur through dispositional trace impressions.

Knowledge, though intrinsic to the self, when perceived as slightly separate from its nature, can become both the subject and the instrument (*karaṇa*).

I.1.17-21 (E269) The unity and separateness of modes and substances should be viewed from the relative-pluralism point of view. Due to external and internal reasons, the self itself modifies into cognitive modes. (Example: mud and mud pots are somewhat similar from the essential point of view but different in practice as pot, plate, etc.) There is no existence of the self without the cognitive modes and no existence of knowledge without the self.

Substances may occur both having form or not having form. Similarly, instrumentation is also of two kinds, with a separate subject and instrument (*vibhaktakartṛka*) or without a separate subject. The same Indra has separate names

according to the action he is performing, but they are various states of Indra, not different Indras. Similarly the same self is somewhat different from the knowledge, faith, etc., and somewhat similar to them. It cannot be said that its cognitive modes are altogether separate from a self.

I.1.22-24 (E269-270) Thus, vision, awareness, and conduct are to be considered as instrumentative aspects of the self. So the difference between subject and instrument should not apply to a self and cognition, etc. Even from the grammatical point of view this is acceptable, as the same suffixes may be used for both (in Sanskrit). Thus objectively speaking visual and cognitive actions are themselves the path.

I.1.25 (E270) Question: If knowledge is the same as a self then the word *jñāna* (meaning knowledge) should be of the same masculine gender as the word *ātman* (meaing self).

Answer: No. Within the same meaning, different genders may apply according to the synonym selected. Examples are given.

I.1.26-29 (E270) Question: Should *jñāna* be taken as the first symptom followed by *darśana* or vice versa, due to the fact that *jñāna* has fewer letters?

Answer: They are all coexistent like the light and heat of the sun; they do not occur in sequence. As soon as right vision occurs, immediately all the other perceptions become right perceptions. Having fewer letters should not be given precedence to knowledge, in fact right vision has to occur first.

I.1.30 (T270) Awareness has been mentioned specifically in this *sūtra* as right vision and right conduct may arise only after right awareness.

I.1.31-34 (E270) In the word *saṃyagdarśana-jñānacāritrāni* conjunction is used to join the three words for vision, awareness and conduct, thus each of them have equal weight. All three are equally important, not one, because the plural number has been used. When an adjective precedes such a word, it applies to all the words in the phrase, so "right" (*saṃyak*) at the beginning applies to all three. Other

grammatical queries resolved.

I.1.35-37 (E270) The word "path" implies seeking, thus right vision, etc. constitute the easy wide road, the "seeking" of the city of liberation.

I.1.38 (E270) Just as to remove the diseases of imbalances in the body the taking of medicines becomes the path to recovery, so also to remove the disease of worldliness of wrong vision right vision becomes the path to recovery.

I.1.39-46 (E271) Question: Since all contenders have accepted false awareness as the cause of bondage, why are three paths given (instead of just right awareness)?

Answer: According to the Sāṃkhya the right path (*dharma*) leads to higher births and *adharma* to lower animal ones. Discriminative knowledge regarding *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* results in liberation and the opposite (nondiscriminating awareness) results in bondage. As long as there is false identification with the body (as in "I hear", "I see") the self is in bondage. As soon as realization dawns that all this belongs to *prakṛti* and the three *guṇas* interacting, discrimination is aroused that they are not my true self, and liberation occurs. Thus right awareness, discrimination, immediately results in liberation.

The Vaiśeṣika claims that desires and aversions create the world of pleasures and pains. The one who knows correctly does not have any longings or jealousies, attachments or aversions. Thus by not having new desires, a new body does not accrue and liberation occurs once the balance of karma is exhausted. Therefore the six categories should be thoroughly known. Again, knowledge leads to liberation.

The Naiyāyikas claim that due to essential knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) all false awareness disappears resulting in subsequent disappearance of faults and inclinations (*pravṛtti*) resulting in birth and sorrow. Again, knowing is liberating.

Buddhism teaches that bondage results from ignorance. To consider all transient, nonself and impure substances that result in sorrow to be the pure, eternal, nature of the self is

false awareness. A detailed analysis of the Buddhist philosophy of dependent origination is given. Destruction of false awareness results in destruction of traces, etc., which in turn results in freedom.

Objection: In the Jain way, too, false belief is a result of ignorance. In common everyday opinion, also, erroneous belief (that one's son is dead) results in sorrow and removal of it (the son arriving, alive) results in happiness or liberation. Thus knowledge alone should be sufficient.

I.1.47 (E272) Answer: This argument is not right, because liberation is coexistent with right vision, right awareness and right conduct. Mere belief in the medicine, mere awareness of it or the mere action of taking it will not result in eradication of the disease. For full effect of the drug, a belief, and the action of taking the medicine are all required. Even so, the disease of worldly attachments can be eradicated only by all three, vision, awareness, and conduct. Thus all three together are to be considered the path to freedom. Awareness without action is useless, as is the action of those who do not know. Many examples are given: a chariot does not move on one wheel, a blind man and a lame one can together escape the forest fire.

I.1.48-52 (E273) Liberation cannot happen immediately after knowledge. Some inherent traces (*saṃskāra*) may remain which have to be brought to fruition, otherwise it may not even be possible to go on pilgrimage, give speeches for the benefit of others, etc. If knowledge were to imediately liberate, then what would be the use of wearing saffron, shaving the head, practicing austerities, repeating the Lord's name, initiation, etc.? Similarly, renunciation alone is not sufficient. Liberation will happen immediately after knowledge, but renunciation cannot liberate immediately.

I.1.53-57 (E273-274) If the self is eternal and all-encompassing it could have no modifications like the arising of awareness, nor any movement. Thus no activity or modifications could take place, such as knowledge,

renunciation, etc. Similarly, if the self is considered to be momentary (as the Buddhists believe), then too, since the substratum is destroyed every moment, no liberation can occur. If the resulting moments are different from the producing one, then too there can be no gaining of liberation. The person who already knows the difference between a post and a man can have a misconception regarding them in darkness or due to faulty sight. However, if he has never known the difference, how can the misconception occur? Thus if *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* were not known to be different earlier, how could the misconception of not discriminating between them have occurred? If Sāṃkhya then says that, yes, at one time they had been perceived as different, then why did the misconception occur? Liberation should have taken place instanteously. Similarly if the Buddhists had a preconception of what is not eternal then they too should have been instantly liberated.

I.1.58-60 (E274) Question: Since awareness and vision take place together, shouldn't they be considered the same?

Answer: Just as heat and light, even if one, are different in their effects and qualities, similarly knowledge of essentials and vision of essentials are also separate in their qualities and effects. There is no rule that those born at the same time are the same entities (e.g. two horns of a cow). In the Jain doctrine the subsantial and the modal perspectives are both taken into account in analyzing a substance. Where the essential view predominates awareness and vision may be the same. The same self-substance is then awareness and the same self-substance is vision. When separated as modes, they are different.

I.1.61-64 (E274) Question: Since there is no temporal gap between awareness and conduct they should be considered the same.

This doubt is countered with examples. Time is shown to be a very subtle thing. Besides, there is a difference in the implications of the two words "awareness" and "conduct". In

the substantial perspective (*dravyārthika*) they are the same, but in the modal view they are different.

I.1.65-66 (E275) Question: If the three (vision, awareness and conduct) are qualitatively different then they should be considered three different roads, not one.

Answer: Even if they have separate qualities, together they create such enlightenment of the self that the elightenment becomes a single unified road to liberation, just as the mud-lamp, the oil, the wick, etc., separate entities, together create light. Examples from the different theories of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, and Nyāya are given wherein different entities are accepted as creating one unity. Similarly, right vision, right awareness and right conduct come together to become one path.

I.1.67-68 (E275) In the trio of right vision, awareness and conduct the later states may or may not occur after the former. They ocur in sequence, but arriving at the first does not necessarily mean that the second will be achieved.

I.1.69-71 (E275) Question: The above statement that right vision does not necessarily mean right awareness cannot be correct. It would imply vision without awareness. But how can vision occur if awareness has not arisen? If awareness is the nature of a self, it is available in large or small measure. It cannot be said that it is still to be acquired. Otherwise lack of awareness will imply the lack of self. As *per* earlier statements, right vision will happen causing the eradication of false awareness. Then, if right awareness does not (automatically) occur, there will be a total vacuum of awareness (of any kind). Thus it will result in the lack of self altogether (since awareness is coeval with the self).

I.1.72 (E275) Answer: Knowledge or omniscience has been stated as the goal to be sought, not partial right awareness. Only the stages of *śrutakevalin* and *kevalin*, realized states, can involve this omniscience. After right awareness, it is not guaranteed that all twelve or fourteen stages of knowledge will be reached. Similarly, the ideal of

conduct (listed as various higher stages of conduct) will always be a goal to be sought and not easily or immediately attainable.

1.2.1-2 (E276) Analysis of the word "right" (*samyak*). It implies praise. It means essential and desirable. The author goes into intricate grammatical logic to affirm these meanings as relating to fundamental matters.

I.2.3-8 (E276) Question: How can "*darśana*" mean "vision", since it would normally mean perception?

Answer: Roots may have many meanings, so this meaning is acceptable. Here, in the context of liberation, the meaning of vision of essentials is relevant.

I.2.17-21 (E277) It is necessary to qualify the word *darśana* with the word *tattva* to indicate that what is meant is vision of essentials as seen by the Jain faith. If that is not emphasized then other wrong ways will become acceptable; this is not desirable.

I.2.22-25 (E277-278) If just one word (*darśana* or *tattva)* were sufficient then the *sūtra* might reflect meanings proposed by Vaiśeṣikas or Advaitins who would then query whose vision or vision of whom? That is why it is emphasized that it is vision of the meaning of what is known as the essentials that is called "right vision."

I.2.26-28 (T288) Some may construe "right vision" as synonymous with "wilful opinion". That is wrong, as scholars of other misguided faiths sometimes study the Jain religion to show their erudition or in order to be able to defeat it in debate. Thus the following definition is acceptable: "That by the occurrence of which the self is able to appreciate the substantial meaning as it is, is known as right vision.

I.2.29-31 (T288) Right vision is of two types: (1) with attachment (*sarāga*), (2) without any attachments whatsoever (*vītarāga*). (1) expresses itself in four ways: attachments quieted down gradually cease (*rāgātiśānti*); fear of worldliness (*saṃvega*); friendliness towards all life forms (*anukampā*); and intelligent awareness in the existential nature of

categories.

I.3.1-6 (T288-289) Question: Since without understanding the fundamentals vision cannot arise, how can it arise "naturally'? Various doubts are raised: (1) if the medicine is not known how can faith in it arise? (2) if knowing fundamentals is necessary for right vision it cannot arise naturally; (3) a *śudra* might have faith in the Vedas by hearing about them or knowing from the *Purāṇas* (which he is allowed to read), but even that devotion cannot be called "arising naturally"; (4) if general knowledge occurs, even then it cannot be called "natural" as even that comes from teaching by others; (5) when right awareness occurs, simultaneously the self becomes aware of the true nature of the instruments of true cognition, just as the heat and the light of the sun appear together. So independent arising of a "natural" manner of right awareness cannot happen. Both happen simultaneously.

Answer: In both types of the rising of right awareness the internal cause is the same: destruction and subsidence of the residual veiling of false awarenesses. When this internal cause arises without outside teaching then it is called "natural". Although it does not happen suddenly, even so, if no outside cause is visible it is deemed "natural".

I.3.7-10 (E289) Question: The self is fated to realize itself sooner or later. So why postulate right awareness through teaching by others if there is no hope that the self will do this before its time has come? So there should be only one kind--natural arousal of right awareness.

Answer: If only these two had been cited as causing liberation then there would be some substance in your query. However, it is only after right awareness and right conduct combine with right vision that liberation is possible. Liberation is not the issue here. Right vision will lead to liberation at some point of time--later, at some distant point in time--or never, depending upon the state of spiritual evolution. However, time is not of the essence in this case since both

internal and external causes are being discussed.

I.4.1 (E280) A substance may be subdivided into from one to infinite categories. One substance has infinite modes.

Self and not-self are two categories.

Meaning, word and knowledge are three categories. Similarly, relative to usage there may be thousands of known relations and relative to the unknown there may be infinite categories. If described briefly, only scholars may understand; if in full detail it may go on forever; so only seven major categories are taken for the understanding of students.

I.4.2-5 (E280) Question: Why are influx and bondage separate, as they are just modes of the self and not-self? Can they not be assimilated as subdivisions of two basic categories of self and not-self?

Answer: Intermingling of the self and not-self creates the world. Therefore, the main causes of the world, bondage to the world and release from it, are categorized as these seven need to be known.

Liberation is the purpose, so the path to liberation will be explained. The self should understand who is liberated. Since the world consists of self and not-self, therefore not-self has to be known as well. The main causes of the world are inflow and bondage and the main causes of release are cessation of inflow and the cleansing off (of existing particles). This is why seven categories must be known. Obviously the influx, etc., has separate existence--else why would the question arise? If they were unreal the question would not arise.

All these categories have to be considered from a variety of aspects. When the essential viewpoint prevails, substance or state, and self and not-self, are the only two divisions, but when the modal view prevails, the influx, etc., of other substances have to be dealt with separately.

I.4.6-13 (E280) A living being or self (*jīva*) is one which by the prevalence of its unique combination of modes uses one or more of the ten life forces (five senses, the powers of the

mind, of speech, of embodiment, aging and breathing) to exist in the past, present or future. Liberated ones (*siddha*) also exist though they don't use all of these ten.

I.4.14 (E281) Life is consciousness. Consciousness is of the nature of awareness and knowledge. This is what differentiates living beings from other substances.

I.4.15 (E281) Objection: Trees, e.g., do not have the conscious power of thinking, so they should not be considered living beings. It is intelligent activity that is a sign of the living.

Answer: There is consciousness in vegetation. The realized beings know this by direct perception and the laymen know it from scriptural sources. Also, we can infer the consciousnes of vegetables from the fact that in the absence of water and nutrients a plant wilts. Intelligent cognitive activity is not found in life in the womb, in those who have fainted or are in the egg, so lack of cognitive activity alone does not make them nonliving.

I.4.28 (E282) Influx and bondage may be either meritorious or sinful.

I.5.1 (E282) A noun ascribed without regard to form, quality, effect, etc. is called a name. E.g., someone may be called "Indra" even though he is not the first of the gods or powerful.

I.5.2 (E282) Representation (*sthāpana*) gives a name to a similar or dissimilar object as such. E.g., one chess piece (the rook) is called the elephant, another (the knight) the horse.

I.5.3-7 (E282) A substance is a thing which has a future possibility of turning into a particular mode and is in that pre-modal state at present.

I.5.8-12 (E282-283) The specific modal revelation at present in a given substance is known as that particular state (*bhāvajīva*). The self using that particular modal revelation is known as *āgamabhāvajīva*.

I.5.13-18 (E283) Thus, even though essentially there is no difference between substance and state, there are

differences with respect to their nomenclature and other qualities of them.

Substance is treated first because the name is posited first for a substance. Representation--the specific meaning of the name invoked--is considered next. State (*bhāva*) comes after them. Name comes before state, which is a detail considered after the name. But the state is nearest to the mode of the substance, though it comes after name and representation.

I.5.19-30 (E283-284) The fourfold analysis just proposed is defended.

I.5.31-33 (E284) Objection: If name, representation, etc., are subjects of the essential view and state is that of the modal view, then apparently perspectives must be discussed later.

Answer: For clever students it can be understood by just these two kinds of ultimate (*dravyārthika*) and modal (*paryāyārthika*) perspectives. However, for others it is necessary to explain what is a perspective and how meanings are ascribed (*nikṣepa*). Thus according to the subject and the cognizer several types are described.

I.6.1-3 (E284) Resolution of grammatical doubts why the instruments of true cognition and not perspectives need to be considered first.

I.6.4 (E285) The theory of relative pluralism is introduced.

I.6.5 (E285-286) When not contradicting the instruments of true cognition a substance is understood also from various perspectives. Sevenfold predication is detailed: (1) maybe it is, (2) maybe it is not, (3) maybe it is both, (4) maybe it is indescribable, (5) maybe it is (1) and (4), (6) maybe it is (2) and (4), (7) maybe it is (3) and (4). Thus a pot can be seen from all the above points of view. Apart from that, whatever is the pot or not the pot (what separates it from others) can also be looked at from all these perspectives:

(1) Whatever has the pot-identification is the self (of

the pot) and all else is "other". It is this differentiation that identifies an object. Otherwise names would not be necessary in practice.

(2) The locus on which the four facets described above (name, representation, substance, state) are imposed is identical to the pot's self. The rest is the not-self vis-a-vis the pot.

(3) A particular pot will be different in structure and shape from other pots. Thus other pots are the "other" from this viewpoint.

(4) A particular pot is existent for a number of moments. While being made, its various stages can be called a "pot" in relation to other things. However, those preparatory stages are other than the pot itself because only after them is a pot, its full qualities, manifested. If all the the pot's qualities were existent before, people would not need to make a pot!

(5) Even while the pot is fully existent as a pot it is constantly undergoing wear and tear. Thus from the temporally immediate standpoint (*ṛjusūtranaya*) the immediate moment is the self for the pot and all other future or past moments are "other".

(6) Within those limits many qualities in the pot, such as its form, scent, and hollowness, are imperative for its identity as pot. If they were not there, there would be no pot.

(7) The shape contains the form, moisture, etc., qualities which are visible to the eye.

(8) The word distinguishes its meaning, so it is a pot when the word "pot" applies to it, not when other words apply. If other things were to be called by the same name it would not be practical.

(9) After the word "pot" is used, the thing can function as a pot. Its functioning as a pot is essential to its self. If it is not there, it cannot be called a pot, else other things not functioning as a pot would be called "pot".

(10) Consciousness has two aspects: (1) as the form of

awareness, (2) as the content of awareness. An object of awareness is known in two ways, by its essential qualities and by what it is not. Both substantial and modal views are elaborated again, but in conclusion it is said that the true nature of a substance can only be determined by using conditioned (i.e., sevenfold) predication. That is the truth, as also the best way to determine what is desirable.

I.6.6-7 (E287) Objection: Then the theory of many aspects can itself be seen from many perpectives!

Answer: Multi-aspectual views are of two sorts: truly relative (*saṃyaganekānta*) and truly absolute (*saṃyagekānta*).

I.6.8 (E287) Why relative pluralism is not a hoax. There is no intention to cheat.

I.6.9-14) Question: How can one substance have opposing qualities?

Answer: Specific qualities of a thing are not rejected even though the essence is also cognized. A man may be a father, brother, son and friend. These are not contradictory to each other and should not cause doubt. Besides, the arguments given from one side always enhance the quality that illustrates their own view, while those of the opposition support the contradictory ones. Thus no one objects to one substance having many qualities.

I.7.1-2 (E288) First, name and nature (*nirdeśa*) are discussed, as that is what first creates curiosity to know the rest of the qualities of things. The others--ownership, etc.--are discussed in answer to questions.

I.7.3-5 (E288) From the modal perspective the self has various stages. From the substantial perspective it is a name, form, etc. From the epistemic perspective both aspects are apprehended.

I.7.6-7 (E288) From the higher standpont (*niścayanaya*) the self is the owner of its modes (as fire is the owner of heat). Since a mode and its possessor are different there is this slight difference between owner and owned. From the practical viewpoint the self can be the owner of all substances.

I.7.8-9 (E288) From the essential standpoint the self manifests its infinite transformational modes until finally realizing its true self. From the practical standpoint, it acquires its form through the conjoining of its parents and food as well as due to the gradual subsidence of karmic states.

I.7.10-11 (E289) From the essential standpoint the self occupies innumerable space-points, while from the practical standpoint it resides within the body that it acquires through past actions.

I.7.12 (E289) From the substantial standpoint the status of the self is infinite. From the modal standpoint it can be a limited space-time event.

I.7.13 (E289) From the modal perspectives of infernal, human, etc., the self can be of numerable, innumerable and infinite types.

I.7.14 (E289) Similarly, nonselves also should be looked into from all these angles of name, possessor, etc. Name and form also may be nonliving. Time, etc. are external causes or instruments. Initiator of movement, initator of stasis, time and space require their own natural qualities of motion, stasis, usability and permeability. Usually their natural form is also their location. From the substantial viewpoint their existence is infinite, from the practical it is limited to a time. From the essential the three (motion, etc.) substances are one. From the modal view, the infinite selves and matter cause the motion, etc., and are therefore numerate, innumerable and infinite. Time is numerable as well as innumerable. Material substances are in general one, but specifically they can be numerable, innumerable and infinite.

(E290) Here the commentator describes in great detail how the remaining essentials of inflow, bondage, cessation of inflow, cleansing of traces and liberation also have their natural ascriptions, ownership, bases, instruments and options. All have been indicated. They are also typed by various criteria.

I.8.1-2 (E291) The word "*sat*" here refers to existence.

Since existence is the first requirement of all substances it is treated first.

I.8.3 (E292) What exists has some measure. Hence the numerable, innumerable and infinite space-points denoting measure are next treated.

I.8.4 (E292) After knowing its measure the area above and below may be demarcated.

I.8.5-6 (E292) Substances may transform in various ways during the three times. Thus to determine the relative occupancy by touch (how many fingers, etc.) is then essential. This is followed by the limiting of the substance in time.

I.8.7-8 (E292) Seven different meanings of the word "interval" (*antara*) are given. Here it may mean a different substance. Usually the meaning of hole or separation is adopted. The difference in time of one modality disappearing due to some cause and appearing after some time is labeled as *kālāntara*.

I.8.9 (E292) (Karmic) state (*bhāva*) is indicative of the transformational states of the quiescence of karmas.

I.8.10 (E292) Even though a thing's number is determined, the relative quantity is differentiated by more or less (*alpabāhutva*) or comparability.

I.8.11-14 (E292) Question: Indication of a name already assumes the existence of the substance. So the mentioning of "existence" here is redundant.

Answer: By mentioning existence here one indicates the life-course, senses, body, etc., that may have been reached in whichever stage of the fourteen phases in evolution. The existence of right awareness, etc., can be thus indicated in a self. However, in the not-self types of unoccupied (*anadhikṛta*) states like anger, and modalities of color, nonliving things need to be identified first as existent.

I.8.15 (E292) Classification (*vidhāna*) and number are necessarily separately specified. The classification aspect enumerates the types of right vision, etc., while all subtypes of the quiescent type of right vision, etc., are counted

numerically.

I.8.16 (E293) Although location and extent are not really different, even so occupied or unoccupied areas of substances need to be demarcated: therefore extent is specifically mentioned.

I.8.17-19 (E293) Question: The presence of extent alone permits touch, so is touch not redundant?

Answer: The word "extent" may indicate the subject, as in "the extent of a king's domain". It does not indicate that he actually touches the whole area. However "extent" (*sparśana*) indicates awareness in totality in all three times.

I.8.20 (E293) To indicate the primary time factor the existence of a substance is separated from its time. Practical time separates the time of the mode and of the substance. In order to comprehend fully every substance, this aspect of "interval" is specified.

I.8.21 (E293) For the proper apprehension of the essentials and their many types all these details are needed. This is for the understanding and peace of the student given his eligibility. Some may understand in brief, others need detailed explanations, while still others are somewhere in between. Otherwise, just saying the word "*pramāṇa*" would be sufficient, all else being redundant.

I.9.1 (E293) After the removal of sense-veiling karma the focus of awareness on meanings with the help of the sense-organs and the mind is known as immediate nonverbal awareness.

I.9.2 (E293) After the eradication of scripture-veiling karma what may be heard from the body of traditional knowledge is linguistic awareness.

I.9.3 (E293) The etymological meaning of *avadhi* is discussed; it refers to downward going and limited capacity. Although all awareness other than omniscience is limited, by convention this is referred to as "extrasensory".

I.9.4 (E293) After the dissipation of the telepathic-knowledge-related veils of karma, the awareness of meaningful

thought arising in other minds is known as telepathic awareness.

I.9.5 (E294) Question: Shouldn't it be referred to as "mental telepathy"?

Answer: The mind here is not an instrument as it is in sense-awareness, since telepathic awareness rises out of purity of the self and the presence of the mind is incidental, just as in the perception of the moon the sky is incidentally seen.

I.9.6-7 (E294) The purpose for which all austerities are undertaken is called "complete awareness" (*kevalajñāna*). The word "complete" refers to the lack of any other type of unveiling related awareness. For example, "rice only" means rice without any other accompanying vegetable.

I.9.10 (E294-295) Buddhists do not accept the existence of a self. This means they cannot use the instrumental case to mean "by which a thing is known". Similarly, they cannot refer to awareness as a state (*bhāva*), since the person who is aware is nonexistent.

The Buddhist idea of momentary awarenesses each unrelated to the next is also not tenable. If the subsequent moment is the product of the previous, then the existence of a self is proved. The mind cannot be called an instrument according to them, as its existence according to them is merely the moment prior to awareness, and not a separate organ of perception. Since the existence of the doer is momentary according to them, there cannot be any cause-effect relationship, no knower who exists through the subsequent moment of awareness. The Buddhist view of momentariness is refuted totally by various grammatical and logical howlers. For example, a person who does not cognize either black or white cannot differentiate between them or decide this is black and that is not. Since (for Buddhists) the cognizer of the white color does not exist in the subsequent moment of cognizing the black color, how can he differentiate them then?

I.9.11 (E295-296) Even after cognizing the existence of the self, if it is perceived as eternal and immutable, then too

its instrumentality cannot be proved. A nontransforming self cannot be a cognizer. Since the self is an independent entity, and awareness too is an independent thing rising coevally with a self, awareness cannot be an instrument for cognizing the self. This also means that if the self is different from awareness then, as an independent entity, the self will be bereft of consciousness like a pot. Cognition without a self (a knower) and a knower without knowledge cannot be proved.

Objection: That which knows is knowledge.

Answer: Then the mind and the sense-organs (which know) become knowledge too.

Since the self is omnipresent, it is without action; knowledge too is a quality, so it is without action, since change is possible only in a substance. So the self can neither be a doer nor an instrument.

Sāṃkhya says the the *puruṣa* is different from *prakṛti*, eternal, pure and imutable. Even so, instrumentality is not possible. Sense-organs, mind, ego and the *mahat tattva* and all their interactions are other than the pure immutable self. How can intelligence become an instrument of such a self?

I.9.17-20 (E296) Of all the three types of direct perception (i.e., the last three kinds of awareness) extrasensory perception is the least pure. Telepathic awareness is purer and occurs only in self-controlled living beings.

I.9.21-25 (E296-297) Question: Since immediate awareness and linguistic awareness are alike why aren't they two varieties of the same category?

Answer: Since they both happen to the same person it is obvious they are separate and should be treated as such. Linguistic awareness can happen only to those with immediate (perceptual) awareness, so they have a cause-effect relationship. Although their subjects are similar, the manner of their being acquired is different.

I.9.26-29 (E297) Objection: But both sensory awareness and linguistic awareness occur through the mind and the sense-organs. Like sense-perception linguistic awareness also

emanates from the mouth of the speaker, is received by the ear and mind of the hearer. So, having arisen from the same source they are the same.

Answer: No, since they do not have the same cause. The tongue of the speaker is merely helpful in articulating the words, not in the awareness of them. Simlarly, the ear of the listener is instrumental in hearing the word, but not in apprehension. Thus in linguistic awareness the sense and mind are not the real conditions. The meaning arrived at through the mind is the real cause. Scriptural awareness is thus not sense-related but mind-oriented. Directed awareness (*īha*) also arises from the mind. Linguistic awareness relates to things other than what is merely heard. With the help of perspective and other means it also cognizes what is not spoken through analogy, innuendo, etc.

I.10.1 (E297) The word "*pramāṇa*" is properly used in all three forms of subject, instrument and state. When state is implied a correct awareness (*pramā*) is called a *pramāṇa*. In the subjective sense it is primarily the power to apprehend that is implied, while in the instrumentality (*karaṇa*) sense the separation of the apprehender from the apprehended and the instrument of apprehension are implied.

I.10.2 (E297) Replying to a query related to the independent illumination of awareness it is said that awareness is like a lamp which does not need another light to show itself. It is the light, the source of light and that by which all around is illuminated. There is no contradiction in this.

I.10.3 (E298) Awareness is self-experiencing. If it is not then it will be a further object, awareness of which has to be ascertained. If it were not self-experiencing, the self would not be experienced as "I was the knower" at a later time in memory. Also the apprehended meaning would not be recalled if it were not so. We do not remember the perceptions of other persons since we did not have their initial awarenesses.

I.10.6-7 (E298) Is the resulting state of awareness the

result (*phala*) of the experience? No, the result is the pleasure of knowing the meaning. The main result is the removal of ignorance.

I.10.8-9 (E298) Question: In the subjective sense, the instruments of awareness become the knower (*pramātṛ*), but the self is the knower and the awareness is the quality of the knowing self. Thus knowledge and the knower have to be different. Also, it has been said that awareness is a separate result of the coming together of the self, objects, mind and sense-organs.

Answer: If awareness is considered to be a separate thing from the self, then the self will become an inanimate and ignorant object, like a pot. However, it is not so. If the illuminating property were not the self's intrinsic nature it would not be able to comprehend even in the proximity of knowledge, just as a sightless person may not see even in the presence of light.

I.10.10-13 (E298-299) Objection: Just as the lamp and the pot are separate, the instrument of true cognition has to be separate from the object of awareness. Therefore their defining marks (*lakṣaṇa*) are different.

Answer: The object of awareness or awareness itself is the instrument of true cognition, though outwardly they may seem different. Intrinsically, if the instrument of true cognition does not have the quality of awareness it will not be able to prove itself, since it will require another as evidence and then a third to be able to prove its existence. Relatively, due to nomenclature, objectivity and qualitative difference, there is separation between the cognizer, the cognized and the instrument of true cognition, but while the object of cognition (*prameya*) is spoken of as different, the instrument of true cognition (*pramāṇa*) is actually both the instrument and the resulting thing cognized (*prameya*).

I.10.14-15 (E299) Points of grammar are explained. Immediate awareness and linguistic awareness have been treated as indirect while extrasensory and telepathic

awarenesses have been treated as direct knowledge, hence two basic awareness-types are referred to in the grammatical dual number form. By the use of the word "*tat*" it is indicated that these types of awareness are themselves the instruments of true cognition and not the proximity of the self with the organs, e.g.

I.10.16-22 (E299-300) If proximity (*sannikarṣa*) is considered an instrument of true cognition and the subsequent awareness of meaning the result, then there can be no omniscience, since all things cannot be in proximity. In the case of the omniscient, then, the proximity of four, viz., the self, mind, sense-organs and meaning, or the proximity of just three, viz., the self, mind and meaning, cannot become the cause of the omniscience. This is because the mind and the senses do not always come to the same place and their objects are limited.

There are infinite possible objects of awareness, and since they cannot all come together, their knowledge will not be possible.

Even the argument--that the self can go everywhere and thus there will be proximity to all objects--cannot hold, since that quality of the self cannot be proved experimentally. Similarly, the impossibility of the sense-organs coming together with all meanings is ruled out, thereby denying the status of proximity as an instrument of true cognition. According to the school of thought promoting proximity as a cause for knowledge, even the self is without the knowledge before the awareness of meaning comes to it, and then subsequently the meaning should become a quality of the senses as well as the mind. This is denied, as it is not logical to then say that only the self acquires the meaning thereafter, and not the senses. If without proximity no meaningful perception can take place, then it can be said that proximity itself could bring meaning to other substances as well. Thus proximity cannot be an instrument of true cognition.

I.11.6-7 (T300) Light, senses, preaching, etc., are

primarily indirect instruments of true cognition. Just as a stick is used to enable walking, these instruments are used to gain knowledge after the self has been released from the knowledge-veiling karmas. It is indirect because it is dependent on others.

I.12.4-5 (T301) Question: How can any knowledge occur without the external and internal instruments of the mind and the sense-organs?

Answer: For the incompetent, instruments are required to make an object like a chariot, but the adept can create one without using them just by determined desire (*saṃkalpa*). After the self has reached a certain level of evolution and its knowledge-veils are completely destroyed, it can become aware without these external or internal instruments.

I.12.6-8 (T301) Objection: Awareness not involving the senses is accepted as indirect and that related to senses as direct by almost all schools. Buddhists view undifferentiated awareness as direct, and awareness involving words, properties, etc. is called "construction" (*kalpanā*). The type of awareness is then named in accordance with the relevant organ. The Naiyāyikas believe that the awareness arising due to proximity of the sense-organs with objects is called "direct" awareness. Sāṃkhya views the fluctuations (*vṛtti*) of the sense-organs as direct awareness. Mīmāṃsakas believe that the intelligence arising from the proper use of the organs is direct awareness. So direct awareness should be that acquired by the senses, not vice-versa.

Answer: If sense-awareness is called direct then the truth will never be perceived directly. Omniscience will not occur, since the omniscient knowers of truth do not perceive by sense-organs. One cannot assume that all extrasensory awareness stems from linguistic awareness, since the scriptures are the product of renounced individuals having direct awareness. Since the directness of extrasensory awarenes is not proved, how can scriptural learning become a proof of it? The nonpersonal origin of the scriptures is also not proved.

The Vedas cannot be considered a valid instrument as they prescribe violence, etc.

I.12.9-10 (E301-302) The view of the Buddhists that yogis perceive everything without the help of the senses or scriptures is not tenable. One cannot imagine an undifferentiated substance. The existence of yogis is also not proved, since in the Buddhist stage of *nirvāṇa* there is the concept of nothingness. The Naiyāyika's statement that the self can become omniscient without the senses with the help of his yogic nature is not acceptable, as in that state the yogi is neither the doer nor the knower. There can be no activity in him, since then he is the supreme inner self, eternal and nontransforming.

I.12.11 (E302-303) The Buddhist concept of perception, involving construction, cannot be an account of direct perception--even if accepted partially there is a definite contradiction there.

Buddhist Logician: We agree--direct perception is constructionfree.

Answer: The first experience of something is called *vitarka*; the subsequent consideration of it is *vicāra*. Remembering those experiences of that object is called *anusmaraṇa*. They all have an identical content, which cannot happpen if the content is momentary. Further, by the Buddhists' own logic, if those awarenesses are momentary and simultaneous they cannot be cause and effect. If awarenesses are sequential then in the duration of the awareness there is no substance, and in the duration of the substance there cannot be awareness: so there can be no subject-object relationship, and thus no awareness at all!

I.12.12 (E303) The Buddhists view knowledge as awareness of an object for the very first time. But this is wrong since all knowledge is valid. The light of a lamp initially illumines an object in the dark and keeps it illumined in subsequent moments; similarly knowledge in general remains valid all the time whether understood or not. If continuous

change implies a new and unique knowledge at each moment, then awareness cannot ever be valid at any time, since remembering, past desire, jealousy, etc. cannot be present at present.

I.12.13-14 (E303) The Buddhists advocating the nondualist account of knowledge believe that knowledge appears in both the shape of the subject as well as of the self that apprehends it. They consider self-apprehension as the result or the fruit of knowledge. However, a product is different from a cause: they are naming both the understanding and its validity as the same thing, so this contention too is not valid.

I.12.15 (E303-304) It is not proper for the Buddhists to subsume all three aspects of the object, the subject and the act of perception into one principle of validity: this too-closely resembles the Jain principle of many aspects. That one substance has many aspects is the principle of the Jaina system. If knowledge can have many aspects then why cannot all other substances in the world? If fearing the many-faceted principle they accept many aspects of knowledge then the question should arise--the shape of what? A shape cannot exist without a substratum. So the substance will cease to exist. If shape and substratum occur simultaneously they will not stand in a cause-effect relationship. Momentary shapes cannot occur in succession. If this kind of logic is accepted, then their contention that "each distinct thing in succession merely exists as the momentary form/shape of knowing and not as such" cannot hold good, as the perception thereof will also then be in sucession each time at a new moment. If the external existence of substance is denied and only its epistemic existence accepted there will be no system needed to distinguish between truth and merely apparent truth, since there is no difference in the internal shape of each awareness. When the nonexistent is apprehended as existent it is a true aspect (*pramābhāsa)* and when it is apprehended as nonexistent then it is valid. If such reasoning is followed then

it will be difficult to say why it does not follow that perception and inference are both false. The two types of knowing are based on the existence of their objects. "Direct perception targets the pure particulars, it is without construction, and is definitive, while inference is based on the general." This way of thinking cannot be acceptable to those who believe in the nonexistence of everything (*sarvābhāvavādins*).

The contention of those who believe in the nonduality of perceived experience (*saṃvedanādvaita*) is that "all knowledge is without a substratum and therefore only undifferentiated self-experience is valid: all this detail about valid and invalid awareness is an extension of ignorance--knowledge is beyond argument and reveals itself". This has been refuted as follows: What can be said of a person who believes in the experience of a totally unproven unity of subjective experience that cannot be perceived directly or through inference? Thus *saṃvedanādvaita* is to be shunned.

I.13.2 (E304-305) Though the words "*smṛti*" and "*saṃjñā*" (in the *sūtra*) are different they have the same meaning in routine usage. From the Jain perspective these words are similar as well as dissimilar. From the substantial viewpoint they are the same; from the modal viewpoint they are different. They are all part of the cognitive process but differ as modes.

I.13.6-7 (E305) Modes are not qualities. These modes, the words for which are synonyms, can be the same in quality. A quality cannot be differentiated from the substance. Only the intrinsic, internal mode can become the defining quality, not the outer mode--e.g., heat is intrinsic to fire, not smoke.

I.14.2-3 (E306) "Not (from the sense-organs)", i.e., from the mind. It does not mean that the mind is not a sense-organ, but that it is a little like the senses, but its subject is not determined as is the case for the sense-organs; thus it is different from them.

I.15.1-5 (E306) The first meaningful perceiving is the primary stage known as "indistinct". After that first perception-

-e.g., that this is a man--there is a curiosity about his age, shape, language, etc., and this stage is known as "directed" (*īhā*). Understanding the specification of language, e.g., that this is a South Indian, young and fair, etc., is the next stage, of "determinative" (*avāya*) awareness. And when these specifications are remembered later it is "concluding" (*dhāraṇa*).

I.15.6-10 (E306) Question: Since there is still some doubt and no complete cognition in the first two stages they shouldn't be called valid perceptions.

Answer: Indistinct awareness (*avagraha*) concentrates on just one perceived item; it is not doubt and is therefore a definitive step towards perception. It may be likened to a doubt due to its inconclusiveness regarding specific features; however, it only cognizes a specific thing.

I.15.11-13 (E306-307) Although not quite decisive, even the "directed" stage cannot be called doubt, since there is already a propensity toward decisive perception of specifics. It merely leans towards one decision, thus cannot be called a doubt. Doubt itself has not been listed in this *sūtra* since in doubt no meaningful conclusion is reached.

Question: Is the name "determinative" (*avāya*) proper or would *apāya*, "rejecting the wrong conclusion", be more correct?

Answer: Both are correct, since in determining the right answer the wrong one is forfeited automatically.

Question: What is the difference between vision (*darśana*) and determining (*avāya*)?

Answer: Vision occurs at the unveiling of the karma veils due to the dissipation and quiescence of the wrong types of karma (*darśanāvaraṇīya*) at the first moment of the subject and perceiver coming together. It is a fleeting moment of awareness that there is something here. Afterwards it becomes known that this is a form, man, etc., in the "indistinct" stage. This requires the dissipation of the knowledge-veiling particles and the obstacles of the subtype of karma particles known as

vīryāntarīya. The causes of indistinct awareness and vision are different, since the dissipation of knowledge-veiling karmic particles is poles apart from the dissipation of sight-veiling ones. The sighting of a thing by the eye occurs just before the first stage of perception of it as a form. Then the speculation about its color, etc. finally results in the complete perception and retention. Knowledge-veiling karma has innumerable secondary configurations (*uttaraprakṛti*) that veil all such sense-oriented perceptive stages like indistinct awareness, etc. As and when the veils are dissipated these perceptions are revealed.

Question: Sensory perception occurs via the sense and the mind, but these "directed", etc. categories come about through the first stage of indistinct awareness; therefore they should not be labeled "thoughts" (*matijñāna*).

Answer: But they emanate from the mind; therefore, they are in fact thoughts.

Although verbal awareness also emanates without sensory mediation, the first stage of perception is traditionally accepted as emanating from the senses. Certainly in directed awareness the senses are used.

I.17.1 (E310) That substance which is caused to become the basis of modes is called an "object" (*artha*).

I.17.2 (E310) Naiyāyika: Qualities, (and not only substances) are perceived by the sense-organs (and are thus objects).

Answer: An abstract thing like a quality cannot be connected with a sense-organ. Even collectively qualities are still subtle, so how can they be grasped (by sense-organs)?

I.19.2-7 (E311-313) Smell, taste and touch need to come in contact with their respective sense-organs where those organs are located, unlike the case of visual and mental awareness. The eyes reach out to the spot where the object is; they cannot see themselves. E.g., the kohl applied to the eye cannot be seen by that eye itself.

Question: Is the eye like a magnet--able to attract

objects at a distance, but not if they are covered up--or is it like the skin, which needs some contact with its object to be felt/perceived; or is it like fire, since it is physical.

Answer: It is not exactly like any of those: it is not physical like the magnet; the feeling subject within is the perceiver, not the skin; it is not like fire just because it is physical, since a magnet, too, is physical.

Objection: The eye is a fiery substance; it has rays and the rays touch the object and cause visual perception.

Answer: No, for the eyes are not effulgent or hot. An eye is not by itself warm or bright. If it were it would not require external light for it to see. The eyes are unique in that they can see both what is near and what is far at the same time. Furthermore, an eye, unlike the ear, does not see an object within itself, since it sees the distance between itself and the perceived object.

The eye does not go out to grasp its object. A sick eye is treated within for any medical problem. If it were to go out to see, then even after closing one's eyes one should be able to still see the object, since the rays have already gone out. The senses perceive with the help of the internal organ or mind, but the mind is an internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and cannot go out to help the senses to perceive. And if the internal organ is atomic in size how can it help the visual organ which has already spread outside?

The Buddhists say that the ears similarly go out to grasp far-away sounds. This is also untenable. An ear's range for hearing sounds is limited. Like the nose, the ear perceives the sound aggregates of matter that come within its range of perception, and can be heard only after they enter the auditory cavity.

Objection: Sound is a quality of *ākāśa*.

Answer: No, since *ākāśa* is an abstract thing like bliss, and not perceptible at all.Even when we recognize that hearing takes place at a particular point in space, the distance and direction of the sound is known due to the loudness and

distance of the sound's origin. Sound particles of matter are extremely suble and spread out in every direction; they can be affected by reverse air currents, walls, etc.

Question: Since the mind does not depend on anything other than the senses in cognizing, why is it not a sense-organ?

Answer: The mind is not visible to others like the eye and the other organs. It is subtle and internal, unlike those organs. Its existence is proved by the fact that without its functioning the external stimulation of the organ is not sufficient to produce cognition. But whichever organ the mind applies itself to will cognize, react. Furthermore, that organ by which sense-perception is remembered is the mind, whereas unmanifest things are known only by inference.

I.19.8-9 (E3130 Although the self has cognitive and conative powers it needs the sense-organs for different kinds of perception, just as a painter needs brushes and paints to paint. Due to type-determining (*nāma-*) karma body parts and their ancillary organs are produced--the ear like the spiral barley straw, the nose like a pearl, the tongue like a spade, the eye like the seed of the lentil called *masoor* but black and star-like, and the skn spreading all over the body; each sense-organ is shaped differently, and can only cognize their specific kinds of things, not others.

A mathematical analysis of the ranges of the several sense-organs is offered.

I.20.3-5 (E314) Question: A mud pot is made out of mud. Similarly, linguistic awareness, since it occurs with the help of the sense organs, should also be called sensory perception.

Answer: Sensory perception is merely instrumental in linguistic awareness, not a material cause. The material in this case is the self that transforms into the mode of linguistic awareness. The presence of the potter's wheel or stick cannot make a mud pot out of sand--clay is the necessary material. Linguistic awareness cannot occur in a self that has not yet

unveiled the barriers of karmic adhesions, i.e., without releasing (*kṣāyopaśamika*) linguistically-related karma.

I.20.6 (E314) Objection: If linguistic awareness is "heard" then only auditory awareness should be called "linguistic", not knowledge acquired through the eyes, etc.

Answer: No, that is merely a tradition. All other linguistic awarenesses acquired through the eyes, etc., are also termed *śruta*, i.e., "heard", i.e., linguistic.

I.20.7 (E314) Question: Whatever has a beginning has an end. So linguistic awareness should not be termed beginningless (*anādi*), and since humans are its authors, it may not be valid.

Answer: Compared to ordinary substances language is without beginning, since no one has seen a time when it was absent. However, each piece of linguistic awareness has a beginning and an end, and may not be true. Even lack of human authorship is not sufficient to prove language's validity--otherwise stealing and adultery would be valid since they have no first-known advocate. Immediate awareness may be transitory but that does not raise a doubt about its validity..

I.20.9 (E315) The individual capacity to hear language is unique for each self. Depending on the degree of the unveiling of the barriers of karmic adhesions, each individual perceives according to his/her own capacity.

I.20.10 (E315) Question: On hearing the word "pot" the first awareness of the pot occurs, followed immediately by a second awareness (say) of its ability to hold water. That second awareness is not sense-related. Similarly, if smoke is seen and fire is inferred, the inference is not sense-related.

Answer: In heard linguistic awareness, at first the sense-organ is involved, and even later the related sense-organ is understood to be operative because of the word (in the text) "*matipūrvaka*" (i.e.," preceded by thought"). Thus whether it is direct or through tradition, in any case linguistic awareness is termed "heard" (*śruta*).

I.20.12 (E315-318) Linguistic awareness from tradition

has two subtypes, (1) with inner limbs and (2) with outer limbs. (1) comprises the twelve texts which have been collated into books by those erudite and realized beings (*gaṇadharas*) who have had the privilege of having purified their selves through the direct sayings of Lord Mahāvīra. These are the twelve *aṅgasūtras*. Their contents are explained.

I.20.13-14 (E318-319) The disciples of the *gaṇadharadevas* have written other scriptures for the enlightenment of lesser intellectuals or people with less time and energy. They are called (2) the outer limbs. They are of many categories. Those that have certain rules by which they have to be studied are called *kālika* and those that have no prescribed time limits are *uttarakālika*. There are another twelve such outer limbs.

I.20.15 (T319) There are three types of inference: (1) *pūrvavat*, e.g., the inference of fire from (this) smoke by one who already perceived the causal relation between fire and smoke; (2) *śeṣavat*, e.g., the inference that other animals of this type have horns by one who knows the relation between animals of this type and hornedness; (3) *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, e.g., the inference that the sun has moved by one who has learned that it is motion that causes something to appear in a different place.

Comparison (*upamāna*) occurs, e.g., when one who knows that milk comes from cows like Bossie concludes that the cow Dotty gives milk. Verbal testimony (*śabda*) is also accepted as an instrument of true cognition, as are presumption (*arthāpatti*), concurrence (*sambhava*), and absence (*abhāva*). However, all these five are kinds of inference, not separate instruments of true cognition.

Perception is of two types: spatially limited (*deśa*) and unlimited (*sarva*). The first kind includes extrasensory perception or clairvoyance and telepathy, and the second kind is omniscience. Clairvoyance occurs when the relevant veiling karma particles have subsided or been sublimated through austerities. Clairvoyance subtypes include: cognition of the

world (*bhavapratyaya*), of qualities, of limited space-time and of general space-time.

I.21.1-6 (T319-320) On being born in hell or heaven the karmic veils of extrasensory awareness subside; hence this type of cognition can take place easily. Just as birds fly in the sky, so the sky is the instrumental cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) here.

In humans and animals this type of extrasensory awareness can take place if there is sufficient merit due to nonviolence, austerities, etc. However, they do not require any fasts, etc., as their subsidence occurs along with their modes.

I.21.7 (T320) Question: In scriptures the hells are mentioned first, so shouldn't they be mentioned before heaven here?

Answer: The word "*deva*" (for "heaven") is shorter and respectful, so it is correct to have it first.

Here the commentary details the exact points in space occupied by each type of extrasensory field. The measurements are given according to Jain mathematics and describe in which direction the area of clairvoyance extends in each of the higher, middle or lower worlds. The time frame of each mode also changes accordingly.

I.22.1-3 (T321) One should not infer that all other beings have extrasensory peception. Those that are incompetent do not have it. Even amongst those who are competent, if they do not adhere to right awareness they cannot have this kind of cognition. All extrasensory awarenesses can be caused by the subsidence and sublimation of the relevant karmic veils, but it is clear that humans and animals do not have it merely in virtue of their kind of existence.

I.22.4 (T321) There are six kinds of extrasensory perception: (1) that which accompanies, (2) that which does not accompany, (3) that which increases over time, (4) that which decreases over time, (5) unchangeable and (6) changeable. Examples are given. Also they can be divided into three kinds: relating to place or area, to time, and all-

encompassing. Further subtypes of these are detailed along with their space-points and areas, in what proportion they may increase or decrease, and what are the time limits of each type and subtype. These details are outlined for each type of life form, human, animal, celestial and infernal.

I.23.1-6 (=I.22.1-6 of Umāsvāti) (T323) "Two varieties", viz., simple and intricate. Due to subsidence and destruction of the veils covering telepathic awareness, and the occurrence of subsequent limbs and signs, the self that knows the thoughts of others in relation to itself has telepathic awareness. It is relative to oneself because it is within the areas of the self that the veils to this awareness have to be removed. Telepathy is not dependent on sense-organs or the mind: therefore it is not sense-related. Just as in the sighting of the moon in the sky the sky is just an additional condition, not the primary one, so also the mind of the other is incidental to the awareness of its thoughts, and not instrumental in the rise of telepathic awareness. Similarly, it is not inference like reasoning from smoke to fire, since it knows the thoughts of others, not its own awareness, and it neither arises from sense-organs nor from the teaching of another. Inference is indirect awareness, but telepathy is direct.

I.23.7 (E324) The simple kind of telepathy can be classified into three subtypes: mental, verbal and bodily.

The first, mental, telepathy occurs, e.g., when a person A of clear simple awareness says, thinks or does something and himself forgets it, and the telepathist later is asked to relate it, he will know exactly what was said, thought or done by A. But he can know only the thoughts of simple people, not of complicated awarenesses.

The complicated kind of telepathy knows the thoughts, words and bodily motions of another person even of complicated mind.

I.24.1 (I.25 of Umāsvāti) (E324) The meaning is that the two types--simple and complicated--differ in that the simple kind is impure and subject to backsliding, whereas the

complicated type is not. The telepathic awareness of complicated minds is purer and finer than the simpler awareness from every point of view--relating to substance, time, area and state.

I.26.4 (I.27 of Umāsvāti) (E326) Initiators of movement, space, initiators of stasis, space and extrasensory objects may also be the subject of mental awareness. Therefore both sensory and riptural awareness can have any substance as object.

I.27.1-3 (I.28 of Umāsvāti) (E326) Extrasensory awarenesses range over not only color and touch, but shape, taste, and smell as well.

"Not including all modes" (*asarvaparyāya*) is implied in this *sūtra*. There can be extrasensory perception of some modes but not all. Through it one can be aware of a substance and some of its modes, as well as the rising, subsiding or dissipating karmic state, since some visible form of karma is associated with these. However, one cannot thus know the formless karma-annihilated states, or the initiators of movement or of stasis.

I.29.1-3 (I.30 of Umāsvāti) (E326) The independent entity that transforms into modes is a substance. The same substance is both subject as well as object, since it is somewhat different from its modes. If it were totally similar, it would not be possible for a substance to be both subject and object for a unified undifferentiated thing.

I.29.4 (E326) A particular transformational state of natural or incidental contradictory or similar stage of a substance is known as its mode. Those that are due to motion, substance, time, state, area or occupation are obtained-causes (*upāttahetuka*), and those that adhere to their natural existence at all times are nonobtained causes (*anupāttakahetu*) like the rising states of the self. Some initiators of movement are contradictory, others are not. For example, upward moving consciousness and operative karmic states (*audāyikabhāva*) may not be contradictory, but anger and peace, or animal and

human or infernal existences cannot occur simultaneously, and are therefore contradictory.

I.29.9 (E327) In this world and beyond, at all times, whatever infinite substances and their infinite modes may have been or will be, all are known to the omniscient *kevalin*. Even if there were infinite similar worlds like this one, the omniscient would know them.

I.30.4 (I.30 of Umāsvāti) (E327) Objection: If "one...type" here means sense-awareness then this type excludes linguistic awareness.

Answer: No. They are not contradictory and go together, so linguistic awareness may also be understood.

I.30.8-10 (E328) Objection: On gaining omniscience the other types of awarenesses do not disappear but may appear nonexistent just as the stars are not seen in sunlight.

Answer: Since omniscience means a state of total karmic annihilation and is totally pure, how can any impure type of awareness exist in its presence? There may be any combination of sensory, linguistic, extrasensory and telepathic awareness, but not with the fifth--omniscience.

I.31.1-3 (I.32 of Umāsvāti) (T328) Due to false beliefs the self may have sensory, linguistic or extrasensory awareness which are fallacious, just as milk kept in a bittter gourd becomes bitter. The falsity is removed by gaining right beliefs.

I.31.3 (I.33 of Umāsvāti) (T329) The reason why "awarenesses, even though true, are in a sense false" is that different schools hold and preach different types of view on the nature of fundamental substances. Some (the Advaitins) say there is only substance, that forms do not exist at all. Others (Buddhists) say there is only form, no substance. Still others (Vaiśeṣikas) say qualities are separate from substances. All three are fallacious. Form and substance cannot be proved independently of each other. Without substance the indeterminate form cannot come into contact with the sense-organs and their cognition will be impossible.

I.31.4 (E329) The contending schools differ not only

about the nature of substances but regarding the basic cause of the world as well. The Sāṃkhya believes that from formless nature arises the *mahat*, from that comes ego, from ego the five organs, etc., and that these compose the visible world. This view is not tenable as from the formless, inactive qualities all the opposite qualities are said to arise. The unconscious *prakṛti* cannot create this intelligently conceived universe. If the *puruṣa* is itself inactive it cannot inspire *prakṛti* to create. Moreover, there seems to be no purpose for the *pradhāna* to wish to create. If the reason given is for pure pleasure then again the logic does not hold water as a perennial and all-encompassing self needs nothing and cannot transform as the enjoyer. An unconscious *prakṛti* cannot create intelligently even if somehow inspired.

The Vaiśeṣikas believe that the material substances are made up of different types of atoms. Unseen activities take place among the atoms and bifurcation occurs. This logic is also false since the atom is perennial and cannot transform into activity producing an effect. However, no independent product or effect is achieved apart from the atoms. It is not proved that the atoms of substances are of many types as stipulated by this theory. It is known that distinct substances produce entirely different things, e.g., water produces the pearl, and fire can be produced by wood. If the self is inactive and untransformable, then it cannot be the doer (of actions, *kartṛ*). Thus it cannot produce activity in different substances.

Buddhists believe that a collection of the form of colors, etc. together produces the effect that is "seen" by the sense-organ. This is also not possible, because if every atom is beyond the senses then even their collections would be the same. Since the atom is momentary and inactive, it will not be able to produce any effect. Those atoms of different abilities cannot come together in any relationship nor can there be another doer instead.

Right conduct is the primary force behind liberation and will be discussed in the section on liberation. Even after

omniscience is achieved, there is no possibility of liberation until a certain category of total meditational good conduct is achieved.

I.32.1 (I.33 in Umāsvāti) (E330) Perspective is the awareness that illuminates with validity the special nature of substances with reference to their many modes. There are two main perspectives, substantial (*dravyāstika*) and modal (*paryāyāstika*). The substantial looks only at the meaning of the substance, while the modal looks at the meaning of the mode. It can also be said that the awareness of the meaning of the substance with its qualities and activities is substantial meaning, and that of only the modes is modal meaning. The modalist believes that since the past is dead and the future not yet there, the present conditional mode is the only true existence. The substantialist believes that since the basic nature of the substance cannot be taken away it must be the only primary meaning.

I.32.2-3 (E330) The viewpoint that accepts intended meaning as valid is known as the conventional type of perspective. For example, if a seated person says "I am going" his intention is to go and is understood as such. However, it is not just a future possibility that is indicated; it is the intention that is being referred to.

I.32.5 (E331) That which identifies with a similar general perspective of aggregates is the generic perspective.

I.32.6 (E331) Defining and delineating specific entities from among those specified in the generic perspective is known as the commonsensical perspective, e.g., what is viewed as "a substance" from the generic perspective is differentiated as "living" or "nonliving", e.g., from the commonsensical perspective.

I.32.7 (E332) The immediate perspective targets the simple and presently available mode. It is simple, straightforward and its subject is limited to the single temporarily available present, since the past or future modes cannot be dealt with in practice. For example, the rice is

cooking but is not quite cooked. According to this perspective no practical considerations are made. Every moment the modes are changing, and one cannot be the other. So the present one should be specified.

I.32.8-9 (E333) The linguistically implied perspective emphasizes the need for proper usage of gender, number and tense. It does not worry about grammatical correctness, but insists upon the purity of word usage. Various examples are given of misfit gender, number, person, tense, etc., which are not acceptable to this perspective in spite of grammatical or accepted usage.

I.32.10 (E334) Abandoning all other possible connotations and synonyms, when one single conventional meaning is established that is the conventional perspective (*samabhirūḍhanaya*). For example, the word "*gau*" has eleven other possible meanings, but when it is commonly used for the four-legged animal cow, it should not be interpreted as the earth or any of the other eleven. Words are for communication and there should be one clear meaning.

I.32.11-12 (E334) The strict constructionist's perspective (*evaṃbhūtanaya*) accepts only the presently applicable literal usage of the word indicating the current mode. The cow is literally a cow ("*go*", the word for cow comes from the root meaning "to go") only when it is moving, not when sitting. In the previous or later stages if the mode is different then the same word should not be used to indicate it.

These perspectives are progressively finer and sequentially described. Initially they are contradictory and comprise large topics; subsequently of complementary and finer ones. Relative to the infinite variety of substances and their qualities, they are of infinite veriety. They become helpful in acquiring right awareness and proper aims of life. Together they are successful in leading to right awareness, not individually, just as the warp and woof threads of a cloth cannot cover or warm the body individually by themselves.

CHAPTER TWO

("T" references for this Chapter are to the translation contained in N. L. Jain, *Biology in Jaina Treatise on Reals* (Chennai 1999). The summary, based on the translation, is by Potter.)

II.1.1 (E336; T37) Just as by administering the cleansing nut to the water the impurities settle down by themselves, similarly by the purity of modifications, when the karmic traces cease to arise it is known as "subsiding" (*upaśama*). What gives rise to this state is calle "*aupaśamika*".

II.1.2 (E336; T37-38) Just as if the water in which the impurities have settled is distilled into another jar it becomes even clearer, similarly with the total absence of karmic impurities an ultimate clearness of the self is achieved. This state is called "*kṣaya*", and states leading to it are called "*kṣāyika*".

II.1.3 (E336; T38) Due to weakening of transformational results (*pariṇāma*), some karmic matter may be annihilated while some remains. This mixed state is called "*kṣāyopaśamika*".

II.1.4 (E336; T38) When karmic fruition occurs according to substance, area of occupancy, time, and stage, it is called the rising (*udaya*) of the same and any related states are known as operative karmic states.

II.1.5-6 (E336; T38) Those states that occur by themselves without regard to subsidence of karmic matter are known as transformational or *pāriṇāmika*.

II.1.7-15 (E336; T38-39) In order to give priority to the potentially accomplishable (*bhavya*) selves the subsiding states are discussed first although the other states rise both in potentially accomplishable and nonaccomplishable life forms. At first right vision is a subsiding state, that is, subsidence occurs first; then it comes into the combination (*kṣāyopaśamika*) state; and in the last stage, total annihilation of karmic matter occurs.

From the point of view of number as well, the subsiding

state is treated first because it takes a shorter time than the other stages.

II.1.23-25 (E337; T40-41) Question: If the self ultimately abandons the intrinsic qualities of itself, then it creates a vacuum as when heat abandons fire; otherwise, if it continues to have the rising and other phases how is it emancipated?

Answer: In the theory of relative pluralism (*anekāntavāda*) it is possible to have both. From the eternal substantial consciousness (*anādi pariṇāmika*) point of view the self does not abandon its qualities, and in the temporary rising mode it is released from the quality. Even if fire abandons its heat quality, the aggregates of matter remain existing on the basis of other matter aggregates relative to form, touch, etc. For example, in sleep, even if the eyes do not see, the person is not considered blind. Similarly the rising karma phases, though destroyed, do not cause nonexistence of the self.

II.2.3 (E338; T48-50) Subsidence of seven types of effective karma (*karmaprakṛti*) leads to the right awareness of subsidence. The seven are the three types of false belief--deluded visions (*darśanamoha*) known as falsity of belief, right falsity of belief (*saṃyakmithyātva*) and right inclination (*saṃyaktva*), and the four character deficiencies (*cāritramoha*) of lifelong anger, ego, deceit and greed. This right awareness of subsidence happens on the ripening of time even to the potential (*bhavya*) self with lifelong false belief. This ripening of time is of many types.

Subsidence leading to vision can occur in all four types of life forms. In all seven hells the infernal habitants can begin to have the first degree of right inclination (*saṃyaktva*) after a certain time (*antarmuhūrta*). Up to the third hellish region, remembering of class, feeling pain, and listening to the right path can lead to serenity=right inclination. Details are given of age, stage and habitat of various life forms that can acquire the basic rightness on listening, holy viewing of the images of Jinas, etc.

Character-related subsidence occurs only after twenty-eight types of effective karmas have subsided. Lifelong nonrejection, rejection, sudden passion, anger, ego, deceit, greed, sixteen passions (*kāṣāya*), laughter, attachment, nonattachment, sorrow, fear, hatred female, male and bisexual types of passions--the nine passions' helpers, and the three deluded views (*darśanamoha*) are the twenty-eight types of subsidence necessary for right action or character (*saṃyakcāritra*).

II.4.1-6 (E340; T52) Total annihilation of knowledge-veiling karma leads to omniscience. Total annihilation of vision-veiling matter leads to omniscient vision. Total annihilation of charity-obstructing matter leads to divine auspiciousness and pure matter-aggregates associating with the omniscient one who lives on lotus flowers. This is ultimate gain. When all experiencing-obstructing matter is destroyed, the extreme form of luxury comes in the form of raining flowers or perfumed water from heaven, lotuses appearing at the feet, and perfumed cool air, mild sun, etc. When all repeatedly-experienced subsidiary indulgences are destroyed, other miraculous indulgences occur, like the gods playing music, halo, throne and other royal appendages, appearing and divine sounds. At the annihilation of all energy-obstructing matter, the eternal energy-annihilating karma is revealed.

Question: Does this happen to those liberated (*siddha*)?

Answer: Yes, they automatically attain it.

II.5.3 (E341; T55) Details how certain unripened totally destructive karmic super-variforms (*anudaya prāpta sarvaghāti spardhaka*) become the contenders after the destruction of similar risen ones, and how further, partically destructive variforms (*deśaghāti spardhaka*) also rise, and how they can both be completely suppressed before the total annihilated-subsided (*kṣāyopaśamika bhāva*) can be achieved.

II.5.4 (E341; T55-56) Details concerning how infinite space-points of risen karma are measured in liberated ones and in unattained (*abhavya*) selves. The text defines the

measures of gradually increasing or decreasing groups of variforms, how similar sections of these are put together to form groups. (In the structure of the super-variforms the lower ones are associated with low energy and upper ones with high energy. After annihilating many upper super-variforms associated with high energy, the ultimate particles therein are mixed into the lower ones in sequence. Then there is reduction in the energy of ungracious configurations owing to attainment.) The sequences of how these energy-splits form groups gradually are described. The unattained selves have these balanced quality-variforms (*saṃguṇa vargaṇā*) in a certain proportion while adepts have them in infinite measure.

II.5.5 (E341; T56) It is explained how the risen, then subsided, and now annihilated particles lead to proper sensory and scriptural knowledge when the related obscuring or veiling ceases after the primary and secondary stages of rise, subsidence and annihilation, leading to grouping of the super-variforms. Mathematical details given of various stages wherein finite aggregates of super-variforms undergo an energy (*anubhāga*)-split, and the subsidence and annihilation of karmic particles occur in proportion to them. It happens in a similar manner in extrasensory as well as telepathic forms of perception.

II.5.6 (E341; T56) Due to increase in erroneous awareness karma, three types of illusive perception occur, namely fallacious sensory perception, fallacious scriptural perception and fallacious contradictory perception.

II.5.7 (E341; T56) Visual perception, extravisual (*acakṣus*) and extrasensory perceptions happen due to the removal (by subsidence or annihilation) of their veiling particles.

II.5.8 (E341-342; T56-57) Five types of attainments occur due to the removal of giving-obstructing particles. They are attainments related to giving, to gain, to experiencing, to secondary experiencing and to energy. Details of how these types and their subtypes of right vision occur on subsidence of

twelve diffferent types of passions and nine passions' helpers.

II.5.9 (E342; T57-58) Minute details regarding which subsidence merges with which type of annihilation state, such as right fallacy merging in proper religious belief (*saṃyaktva*) or yoga in the attainment of energy.

II.6.1 (E342; T59) "Four kinds of rebirth": hellish, animal, human and celestial.

II.6.2 (E342; T59) "Four of passion": anger, pride, attachment and greed.

II.6.3 (E342; T59) Sexual feelings are of two types, substantial and state-related. The female passions (*strīveda*) lead to yearning for the male and the male passions for the female, while bisexual appetites arise for both.

II.6.4 (E342; T59) The rise of awareness-deluding particles leads to disinterest in knowing or believing in the fundamentals. This is called "erroneous awareness".

II.6.5 (E342; T59-60) The all-destructive (*sarvaghātin*) super-variforms of sense-perception-veiling particles arise in single-organed beings leading to ignorance of taste, etc. Apart from "speaking birds" (parrots) the syllabic-linguistic-knowledge-veiling super-variform particles are risen in all animals and some humans. The rising of the passions-helpers' veils related to lack of perception is included in this. Similarly, all veils of extrasensory perception, etc. are the causes of ignorant operative karmic states.

II.6.6 (E342; T60) The inclination toward violence and sensory indulgence is due to the rise of character-veling particles and is called "lack of restraint" (*asaṃyama*).

II.6.7 (E342; T60) The eternally bound self has all its karmic particles rising (causing impurities and obstructions), so it is in the nonrealized mode. In the tenth stage of progress all eight have arisen; in the eleventh and twelfth all seven except deluding have arisen; and in the volitionful omniscient (*saṃyogin*) and volitionless omniscient (*ayogin*) stages four *aghātin* (destructive afunctional) karmas rise to generate the nonadept phase.

II.6.8 (E343; T60-61) The tendencies toward particular associations (*yogapravṛtti*) colored by passions result in karmic colorings. Differences are detailed. Relative to their effectiveness on the purity of the self a coloring can be one of six: black, blue, dove-gray, yellow, lotus-pink and white. They do not occur in the omniscient stages, but there may be some residual white coloration in the last two stages of progress.

II.6.9-11 (E343; T61) False perception includes nonpercep-tion due to the rise of veiling of right awareness. Such nonpassions as laughter and attachment are classed under "sexual feeling". Motion toward progress or regress is a result of the rise of *aghātin* particles.

II.7.1-2 (E343; T63) Those resultant phases that are not relative to the rise, subsidence, annihilation or annihilation-subsidence of karmic particles occur due to the intrinsic nature of the self and are known as the transformational (*pāriṇāmika*) phase.

II.7.7-9 (T343-344; T64) Those beings in whom right vision, right awareness and right conduct has become apparent are those capable of liberation (*bhavya*). Those in whom this is not manifest are not capable of liberation. This is a difference in the inherent power of the substance. Thus the incapable cannot ever be capable.

II.7.12-13 (T344-345; T64-67) The word "*ca*" ("and") indicates that various qualities of a self occur in substances other than selves as well. Such qualities include existence, separation. agency, imbibability, synonymy, universal mobility, natural affinity, spatial limitation, unformability and essential perpetuity.

II.7.14-20 (E345; T67-68) Question: Doesn't the "and" also include rising states like movement?

Answer: Movement is not a transformational state but one that leads to the rise of karmic fruition. There are only the three transformational states mentioned in the *sūtra*.

II.7.24-27 (E347; T72-73) Question: Since the self is not embodied, should it not be separate from the karmic

material?

Answer: Due to eternal binding with karmic matter it accrues a special power. Thus the forever-transforming conscious self remains conscious in its modes even in the hellish and sensory-awareness forms as well. It is somewhat embodied due to its karmic affiliations, while being somewhat formless due to not relinquishing its knowledgeable self. Just as due to excessive intake of alcohol a man may become unconscious and lose his memory, similarly the rise of karmic matter veils the natural knowledge- qualities of the self. It is not right to say that the sense-organs become unconscious or faint due to alcohol, because if they are already unconscious how can they become so after drinking?!

Cārvāka: Just as a flower or raw sugar become inebriating wine when they are putrified, similarly mixtures of earth and water produce the happy or sad feelings of consciousnes, there being no separate entity called "consciousness".

Answer: There is a vast difference between happiness and form. Form and taste are qualities of the earth and become less if the earth is divided. But when body-parts are divided up there is no division in the experience of happiness or sadness. If happiness is a quality of earth then it should be available even to a dead body. It is not logical to say that some subtle elements have escaped from the body, and that therefore the dead person cannot have awareness. If that were so then those sublte elements should be qualified by knowledge, not the entire body. Thus the example of wine is not tenable since the quality of inebriation is present in every drop of it. Furthermore, only something conscious can be affected by alcohol.

II.8.1 (E348; T76-77) Two types of outer and two types of inner causal conditions come together to result in the conscious transformation of a self. The outer causes may be inside (e.g., the eye) or outside (e.g., a lamp) the body. Inner vibrations arising out of mental, verbal or bodily variforms of

karmic particles are inner causes--causes foreign to the self though internal to the body--whereas purificatory feelings are internal causes natural to the self.

These causes come together as required. A human may need light to see at night, but not a cat.

II.8.2-4 (E348; T77) The distinguishing feature of a substance, by which it may be separated from a group of otherwise similar things, is called its mark (*lakṣaṇa*). The body and the self, though both bound, are separated by the mark of awareness in the latter. A mark may be intrinsic or not intrinsic. Heat is the intrinsic quality of fire, while the staff is an external mark of a man holding a staff. Actually, an intrinsic quality is not totally different from the substance itself. There is no consciousness without a self, nor vice versa.

II.8.5-6 (E349; T77-78) Objection: The qualified thing and its qualities are distinct. Thus a self and its consciousness must be separate.

Answer: If they are considered totally separate then there will be a problem of either's very existence, since otherwise another sign for it will have to be found, and then another sign to point to that.

II.8.7-12 (E349-350; T78-79) Objection: Just as milk does not transform into milk, but does transform into curds, similarly the transformation of the conscious self cannot be into knowledge.

Answer: Since there is no separation between consciousness and self, the self is cognized as consciousness. The Jain view is different from others in which the self transforms as awareness only. On the Jain view it transforms sometimes into awareness, sometimes as vision, and other times as happiness, etc.

II.8.13-15 (E350; T79-80) Objection: Since the self is said by you to be without a cause it must be nonexistent, like a frog's horns.

II.8.16-18 (E350; T80-83) Answer: Since a self cannot be found except in a mode such as human or hellish, and

these modes are due to fallacious beliefs, it is not altogether noncausal. So in some sense a self is both existent and nonexistent. In a certain sense even the horns of a frog can be proved to exist.

Objection: But a self is not perceptible.

Answer: Not normally, perhaps, but a pure self can be perceived by the omniscient, and impure selves can be cognized by extrasensory and telepathic awareness.

All substances definable by words have positive and negative facets. Nothing can be totally negated. Relative so some other substance a thing may be nonexistent, but otherwise it exists.

II.8.19-20 (E351; T83) Awareness through different sense-organs results in unified perception of a thing. The one who is seeing is the same one who is tasting, therefore the unifying factor proves the existence of the perceiving self. Even if the awareness of a self is called contradictory it is still proved, since what is nonexistent is not contradictory!

II.8.21 (E351; T83) The contention of the Buddhists, that numerous moments of awareness in succession result in a stream (*santāna*) due to which memory or recognition takes place, is wrong, since according to them the continuity itself is imaginary, not real. If they consider it real there will be only a marginal difference between it and the self, not a substantial one, since the substratum of multimodal knowledge is just the self.

II.8.22-23 (E351-352; T84) Objection: But consciousness ceases from time to time, and thus there is no persisting self.

Answer: Again, that is the case from one viewpoint but not from another. If consciousness is considered to have completely ceased, it will be difficult to remember or recognize it at a later time, since memory can be only of objects experienced by oneself, not by another. And in the absence of memory, all customary interaction will disappear.

II.9.1-2 (E352; T88) "It" in the *sūtra* refers to cognitive

application (*upayoga*). It has "two..types", formless (*nirākāra*) and formfilled (*sākāra*). Awareness (*jñāna*) is formfilled while vision (*darśana*) is formless. Awareness may be one or another of eight types: sensory, linguistic, extrasensory, telepathic, omniscient, and fallacious sensory, fallacious linguistic or fallacious extrasensory. Vision may be of four types: visual, nonvisual, extrasensory and omniscient. These can occur in the omniscient simultaneously and in others consecutively.

II.10.1-2 (E352; T91) Those who undergo modal transfor-mation due to their own actions are bound to the world. The self is itself the doer and enjoyer of its activities. The contention of Sāṃkhya that *prakṛti* is the doer and the *puruṣa* the enjoyer is totally untenable, since there can be no doership in *prakṛti*, which is devoid of consciousness.

II.11.1 (E353; T94-95) There are two kinds of internal organs. One is substantial and the other a modification. The substantial internal organ rises due to a type-determining karmic product. The purification of the self, through removal of impediments to effort and the subsidence and annihilation of mind-veiling karma, results in pure mental modification.

II.11.2 (E353; T95) Question: Do you mean that the bound have internal organs and the free lack them?

Answer: No, since if it were so animals and immobile beings would have to be included among the "free", causing confusion.

II.13.1 (E354; T99-100) There are five static types of selves: earth, water, fire, air and vegetation.

II.14.2-4 (E355; T104-105) Two-sensed beings have six vital breaths--those of taste, touch, production of sounds, physical capacity, age-limit and breathing. Three-sensed beings have seven breaths--the six plus a nose and the resulting sense of smell. Four-sensed ones have eight, adding the eyes. Five-sensed ones, when without the internal organ or mind (*manas*), are animals who have ears along with nine vital breaths, and when with mind, they are animals, humans, celestial beings and hellish ones who have mental energy

along with ten vital breaths.

II.15.3-4 (E355-356; T106) Although the *manas* is also the result of past karma and is helpful in the self's cognitive processes, still it is not located in one place like the eyes and other senses. Therefore it is not included among the sense-organs. Even before the eyes perceive the *manas* has acted. When the self wishes to see, it turns toward the object of vision, and only after that does the action of the eyes take place. So the *manas* is not a sense-organ.

II.17.1-3 (E356; 109) That which results in the genetic code determining the finished form or personality acting is known as the "outwardly visible". It is of two types, external and internal. A space in the self that is as it were a blueprint of the eye is the internal type. When the material body aggregates take the shape of the eye, etc., it is the external type.

II.18.1 (E356; 109-113) The "initial sense-organs as states" refers to the activity of the self when it creates the instrument of perception in accordance with the removal (annihilation or subsidence) of knowledge-veiling karmic matter.

II.18.2-4 (E356; T109-113) The intellectual activity in accordance with that activity of perception results in cognitive application (*upayoga*). Although resulting from the senses, since the cause is often referred to as the resulting effect, so it is acceptable to call the cognitive application itself the sense-organ.

II.19.3-10 (E357; T113-114) The sense of touch is spread all over the body and exists in all worldly beings. Thus it is treated first.

The eye occupies the least area, the ears a numerate multiple, smell a litle more, and taste innumerable points of space.

II.20.4 (T358; T117-118) The Vaiśeṣikas hold that earth has the properties of color/shape, taste, smell and touch. Water has color, taste and touch, fire has color and touch, and

air has only touch. But this classification is false, since all the senses have all the qualities. The air has form, since it has touch, as in the empty pot. Fire has taste and smell, since it has color, as in jaggery. Water has smell since it has taste, as in a ripe mango. It is imagined (by other schools) that water has no smell, and that the smell comes due to additional material particles being introduced. We aver that water has smell as a quality. Otherwise, why not call the taste also a result of such particles? Then there would be no basic difference of genus between, e.g., earth and fire. The earth itself, when causes are present, becomes fluid, water also can freeze to become ice. Fire becomes kohl, etc. True, some qualities are sometimes obvious, sometimes not.

II.21.5 (E358-359; T118) In themselves the sense-organs are somewhat similar and somewhat different. If they were totally similar then with the experience of touch taste would also be experienced.

(E359) (A *sūtra,* not found in Umāsvāti, is read by Akalaṅka here as "The subject of verbal awareness is (also) the subject of the mind".) Knowledge derived from simple hearing by the ear cannot be termed "verbal awareness", as what is heard by the ear is simply the sense-organ-related sound. After hearing, the analysis and understanding that comes from the mind is what is termed "verbal awareness" (*śruta*).

II.23.4 (E359; T122) (=II.22 of Umāsvāti) The sense of touch is implied by "one". This arises at a stage when energy obstacles are removed and suitable subsidence and annihilation of touch-veiling matter particles have been attained. The form of a body is achieved by the personality-regulating (*nāma*) particles, and then the one-sense genus gives rise to the one sense of touch.

II.24.4 (E359; T124) (=II.23 of Umāsvāti) Touch and taste arise in the worm, smell is added for the ant, eyes for the bee and hearing for the human.

II.25.1-7 (E360; T127) (=II.24 of Umāsvāti) Question: Since "*saṃjñā*" means the awareness of what is beneficial or

harmful, awareness being an activity of the internal organ, why is the specification "possessors of an internal organ" necessary?

Answer: The word "*saṃjñā*" has many meanings, which are applicable to things other than living beings. Everything has a name, so if we mean awareness through name all beings have this awareness. Therefore, those without an internal organ have to be known as "*amanaska*". Thus, in the womb, as in the egg, in sleep or fainting, one cannot know what is beneficial or harmful--but even then the internal organ is present.

II.26.1-4 (E360; T131) (=II.25 of Umāsvāti) Due to the rise of normal material particles, the association with or acceptance of appropriate aggregates is known as "rebirth" (*vigraha*), which applies also to the nonacceptance of quasi-karmic matter. All these produce the individual identification and (new) body with the relevant vibrations caused by the space points in the self to which these aggregates have adhered and risen.

II.27.1-5 (=II.26 of Umāsvāti) (E360; T132-133) From the center to the upper and lower regions, and diagonally, the space areas are systematized into arrays or series. The direction of migration of aggregated beings is in accordance with these arrays. All beings that are in the migratory cycle are intended by this, and their births are referred to rather than their movement.

II.27.6 (E360; T133) The instants and areas of the subseries (*anuśreṇi*) are predetermined. Apart from this it is also possible to have cyclic movements (*viśreṇi*) that are not in linear arrays in these worlds. Their karmic destiny is intended here by the word "*gati*" rather than any motion or stasis. At the time of death of living beings, while they are acquiring new modes, and at the time of the upward movement of emancipated beings, the movement is in these sub-arrays. All movement that rises from the highest regions, lowest regions and diagonal regions are similarly in sub-arrays.

Matter aggregates that end at the time of the end of the worlds also are in accordance with these sub-arrays. For other movements there are no rules.

II.28.1 (E360; T134) (=II.27 of Umāsvāti) The following *sūtra* concerns the bound self: therefore this one is obviously about the emancipated ones. It becomes necessary to say this separately as the others in array-movements also have straight paths (without deviations).

II.29.2 (E36; T135) (=II.28 of Umāsvāti) Realized selves move on a straight path and worldly ones on a deviating path.

II.29.3-4 (E361; T135-136) A bound self's movements can be of four types: like the arrow, like water released from the palm, like the plough, and like the cow's urine. The first is without deviation, the other three with deviations. The first, moving straight like an arrow (*iṣugati*), happens only to free selves and some worldly adepts. Movement like water relased from the palm is of two time frames and one deviation. The third type has two deviations like the plough and takes three time frames to be completed. The path taken by a cow's urine, having three deviations, is the fourth type of progression that is completed in four time frames.

II.30.1 (E361; T137) (=II.29 of Umāsvāti) The straight path is without bend and within one moment. From the end sections (*agrabhāga*) of the worldly regions the matter aggregates of the selves (in this path) reach within one instant of time.

II.30.2-6 (E361; T137-138) The self should not be considered without activity and motion, since it is omnipresent by nature. Just as, due to internal and external causes, even stones can move, so the self when associated with karmic aggregates becomes embodied, becomes active. Without the body it remains like a flame in its natural active state. If the self were considered inactive since it is omnipresent anyway, then there would be no bondage. Liberation can happen only with action.

II.31.4 (E362; T138) (=II.30 of Umāsvāti) Receiving matter-aggregates in accordance with the three bodies (physical, transformable and assimilative) and the six developments (assimilation, body, sense, respiration, language and mental) is known as assimilation (*āhāra*). The aggregates of the (subtler) phosphorescent (*taijasa*) and functional (*kārmāṇa*) keep on adhering to the self until final liberation.

II.31.5-6 (E362; T138-139) Only adepts have assimilating bodies. Therefore in one migratory, bent life course one cannot gain such a body. In the deviating life course there is no development of the remaining types of assimilation as these take time and there would be a temporal discrepancy if they did. Even a heated arrow will have to assimilate the pouring rain while on its way to its destination. Similarly, at the time of death, due to the sorrow arising from leaving this body, the subtle functional body composed of eight type of matter aggregates assimilates quasi-matter particles and thus becomes assimilating while leaving the body. In the paths with deviations it remains nonassimilative for three moments. In the straight-arrow path it goes in one instant while accruing karmic helping aggregates, and thus becomes assimilating. In the two-instants path with one deviation (*pāṇimuktā*) it remains nonassimlative in the first moment. In the pough-like path taking three moments with two deviations (*lāṅgalikā*) it remains nonassimilating in two moments. In the path with three deviations and four momens, it remains nonassimilating in the first three and becomes assimilative in the fourth moment.

II.32.1 (E362; T141) (=II.31 of Umāsvāti) When atoms of matter aggregates come together from all directions to become a body, it is known as agglutination.

II.32.2-3 (E362; T141) The mixture of semen and blood in the womb of a woman is uterine. When nourished by juices resulting from the intake of food by the mother, there is birth

from the womb.

II.32.4 (E362; T141) The place (in space-points) of the birth of celestial and infernal beings is called *upapāda*.

II.32.5-10 (E362; T141-142) The agglutinative body is concrete, lives for a short time and its causes of flesh and the resulting body are visible. Therefore it is considered first. Next comes the uterine birth as it takes a longer time to complete. The *upapāda* life, being extremely long, is therefore treated last. Due to combination of varied sets of karmic matter undergoing transformation beings are born in these forms. Birth occurs in accordance with past actions.

II.33.18-26 (E363; T147) (=II.32 of Umāsvāti) The gods and the hell-beings have consciousnessless places of birth, since their rising places (*upapāda*) have matter aggregates that are bereft of consciousness. Those born in the womb, due to a mixture of the consciousnessless semen and fluids with the conscious self, are of mixed birthplaces. Among those of spontaneous generation most are conscious by birth. But others are not conscious and still others of mixed origin. Gods and hell-beings have cold and hot origins, fluorescent beings have hot origins, and others are of mixed origin. Gods, hellish and one-sensed beings are of covered (*saṃvṛta*) origin, while those of impaired senses are of convoluted origin and the uterine ones are of mixed origin.

II.33.27 (E363-364; T147-148) Altogether eighty-four million birthplaces are implied by the word "and" (in the *sūtra*). The omniscient knows all of them, and for the less knowledgeable, they may be known from the scriptures. The eternally vegatating, the lowest form of life, have seven million birthplaces, the not-eternally vegetating have another seven million, earth, water, fire and air each have 700,000, trees have a million, those with impaired senses have 600,000, hell-beings, gods and the five-sensed animals have 400,000 each and humans have 1,400,000 birthplaces.

II.34.1-5 (E364; T150-151) Within the uterus is a sheath of flesh and blood covering the placenta. The egg is as

hard as the foremost part of a nail, encircled with blood and sperm, and white in color. Those that can immediately start moving around after being born, and have no covering sheath in the womb, are called "bare" (*pota*), since such a being is not born of any other thing, but is merely the transformation of the self.

II.34.6-10 (E364; T151) (II.33 of Umāsvāti) Since those born from the womb in a sheath have unusual powers such as language, more accomplished beings like Cakravartins and Vāsudevas are usually born in that way. They are the ones that attain liberation and are thus treated first. Among those born of an egg, the parrot and the mynah bird are capable of uttering syllabic sound: therefore the egg-born have been treated before the *pota* type.

II.35 (E364; T153) (II.34 of Umāsvāti) Sudden manifestation perhaps shouldn't be called "birth", since it may not involve the acquisition of aggregates.

II.36.1-3 (E365; T155) (II.35 of Umāsvāti) A "body" (*śarīra*) is constantly decaying and capable of personality development (*nāmakarmodaya*).

II.37.4-9 (E365; T155-156) (II.36 of Umāsvāti) The material body is "generous" (*udāra*), i.e., of concerete dimensions and purpose. The transformative body can become big, small, levitate, etc. For acquiring the subtle realities and negation of noncontrol of the self, the imperfectly regulated (*pramattasaṃyata*) type of aspirant creates a procuring body. The fiery body causes effulgence. And the karmic body is the group of karmas.

II.37.10-13 (E365; T156) Just as different vessels made of mud such as a pot or a plate are different by their names, looks, usage and purpose, similarly though all these five kinds of bodies are formed by karma, even then they are different in name, qualities, appearance, and size.

II.37.14-17 (E365-366; T156-157) Just as the oil lamp illuminates others as well as itself, similarly the karmic body is the cause of the physical body. In the karmic causal body

there is a constant flux of accruing and dissipating particles, so that it is constantly decaying, and thus a "body".

II.38.1-5 (E366; T159) Space is atomic. Spatial divisions are atomically based. Though increasing by geometric progression they have less density. From the material to the procuring, a body has innumerable space points. Just as the area occupied by cotton and iron, though equal, is of different density due to intimate or loose closeness of the atoms within, similarly the transformative, etc., bodies are consecutively denser and thereby occupy less space and are subtler.

II.39.1-2 (E366; T159-160) Something infinite again has infinite options and so must be considered infinitely infinite. Thus the fiery should be taken to occupy infinite times more space-points than the procuring, and so on.

II.39.6 (E367; T162) Although in the fiery and causal bodies the atoms are so many, even so, due to their excessive density and subtle transformations they are not perceptible to the senses.\

II.40.1-3 (E367; T164) (II.41 of Umāsvāti) Just as fire enters the ball of iron, the fiery and causal bodies cannot be stopped by the hardest of materials and thus enter everywhere. Although the transformative and procuring bodies are also permeable within limits, these two (the fiery and causal bodies), being able to go everywhere, are known as nonresistant.

II.42.1-2 (E367; T165) (II.43 of Umāsvāti) All mundane selves have a fiery and karmic body. Without them they cannot be of this world.

II.44.1-3 (E368; T169-170) (=II.45 of Umāsvāti) Experiencing of tastes, sounds, etc. by the sense-organs is called *upabhoga*. Although it is posible for the causal body to give away its karma (*karmadāna*), dissipate karmic particles (*nirjarā*), and experience sadness and happiness, even then in the transformative path new substantial senses (*dravyendriya*) are not created. Therefore extended enjoyment is not available in the karmic body. The fiery body also is for the purpose of

yoga, and does not cause any vibrations in the space-points of the self.

II.47.4 (E368; T171-172;) (=II.48 of Umāsvāti) Transformation (*vikriyā*) does not mean destruction, since the body which is disintegrating all the time is also producing new forms constantly. Transforming is of two types: single and separate. Transforming into another life-form like that of a lion or deer is the single type, and into a house is the separate type. *Bhavanavāsi* astrologers and gods of the sixteen heavens can all transform both ways. Others such as the higher *graiveyaka* gods of the *sarvārthasiddhi paryanta* worlds are well-versed in the first, single, type. The seventh hell-beings can change into huge insects, blood, etc., which is also a single type of transformation. Changing into weapons is also singular. In animals the transformation into a peacock, etc. is also of a singular type. Even humans can perform the singular type of transformation through special knowledge and austerities.

II.48.1 (E369; T172) (missing from Umāsvāti) The fiery body type can cause all the attainments, though for brevity it was mentioned with the procuring type earlier.

II.49.1-3 (E369; T174) Just as grains, being the cause of breathing, are (figuratively) called breaths (*prāṇa*), so also the body required for attaining the auspicious assimilating stage is called "procuring". This body occurs due to the rise of the purest karmas. It does not obstruct anyone nor is it obstructed by anyone (*avyāghātin*).

II.49.4 (E369; T174) The word "*ca*" (in the *sūtra*) implies that a partly realized being like an imperfectly-realized (*pramattasaṃyatta*) aspirant cannot go with his physical body to ask subtle questions of realized ones like the omniscient beings, because he does not live in the proper region. He lives in the gross body (*mahāvideha*) region and it would not only be impossible but impertinent to go there with his physical body, so the imperfectly-regulated aspirant creates a procuring body to understand the subtler conclusions or the proper

nature of the special attainments (*ṛddhi*).

II.52.1 (E371; T183-184) (Lacking in Umāsvāti) "The rest (of the beings) are of all three (sexes)."

II.53.1-5 (E372; T185) "Excellent body" refers to Cakravartins and Vāsudevas. "One who is destined to live for uncountable years" is one who lives very long, as in the upper *kuru* region, and does not die due to poison or weapons.

II.53.6-9 (E372; 186) Question: One hears of the untimely death of highly evolved bodies like Vāsudeva and Kṛṣṇa, so what you say cannot be universally applicable.

Answer: It applies to the ultimate, not just the best. Untimely death does not happen to those having reached their ultimate embodiment.

II.53.10-13 (E372; T186-187) Just as paper and straw can be used to ripen a mango before its time, so also, before the natural (karmic) time of death, due to the excessive fast rise (*udīraṇā*) of age-related matter untimely death does happen. In the Āyurveda texts medicines are described taking of which avoids this untimely death. Just as with emetic medicines the poison can be expelled forcibly, so also due to poison and weapons bodies can die prematurely. Even when this fast rise happens, the karmic matter runs its full course of divine fruits according to action. They do not dissipate by themselves. Neither does one have to suffer the fruits of actions not done, nor can one avoid the fruits of actions done. Otherwise there could be no liberation, nor would one have any enthusiasm for good works. But just as if a wet cloth is kept bunched up it takes longer to dry, but if spread out it dries faster, so also due to fast rise of karmic fruits age may dissipate faster before its time. That is untimely death (*akālamṛtyu*).

CHAPTER THREE

III.1.1-4 (E373) The seven hells (earths?) glow with progressively darker colors. Darkness has its own color, and a certain luminescent charm (*prabhā*).

III.1.7-8 (E373) The heavens are above each other without needing a base, but the hells are not so and have an earth for a base. These earths in turn rest on the ring-cushion (*vātavalaya*) of the dense air envelope named *ghanodadhi*, which is in turn encircled by the ring *ghanvātavalaya*, and the latter by the ring named *tanuvātavalaya*. All three rings of air are twenty *yojanas* (a *yojana* = 4,000 miles) thick.

The Ratnaprabhā world is 180,000 *yojanas* thick, and has three sections called *karabhāga* ("rough"), *paṅkabahula* ("muddy") and *abbabahula* ("watery"). The rough one is 16,000 *yojanas* thick and dazzles due to the luminosity of sixteen types of precious gems. The muddy one is 84,000 *yojanas* thick, and the watery one is 80,000 *yojanas* thick. Above and below the rough section of this world, beyond 1,000 *yojanas* on either side in the central section of 14,000 *yojanas*, live the seven gods called *vyantara*, viz., transvestite and dancing gods (*kinnara*), eunuchs (*kiṃpuruṣa*), demons with big bellies (*mahorāga*), singing celestials (*gandharva*), water gods (*yakṣa*), departed souls awaiting rebirth (*bhūta*), and fiendish beings (*piśāca*). The nine types of *bhavanavāsin* (lit. "residing in palaces") gods are the snakes (*nāga*), lightning (*vidyut*), goldenwinged (*suparṇa*), fiery (*agni*), airy (*vāta*), mammary (*stanita*) oceanic (*udadhi*), of islands (*dvīpa*) and of the directions (*dikkumāra*).

In the muddy regions live *asuras* and *raksasās*.

The watery regions have the deep burrow of hell (*naraka*).

III.3.1 (E375) Compared to animals and to the upper regions, the lower hells have even worse color, being progressively inauspicious.

III.3.4 (E375) In the first two hells, the hue is grayish like a dove, in the third it is dovish on top but bluish at the bottom, in the fourth it is blue, in the fifth it is blue above but dark at the bottom, and in the seven it is a very dark color. There are in all six colorings and they keep changing constantly. Everything in the hells is the cause of great pain

and suffering. The bodies there are disgusting due to the rise of inauspicious personality-making matter, and they are also transforming and migrating but are full of feces, urine and pus.

The height of the dwellers of each of these hells is detailed.

Four hells are hot, a fifth has heat and cold, and the other two are cold. Hell-beings, even when they decide to do well, cannot, as whatever they do results in double suffering due to the rise of bad karmic matter.

III.4 (E376) Beings in the hells are like dogs

III.5.1-5 (E376) *Asuras* belong to the community of gods due to the rise of their godly-modification-causing karma. They can go up to the third earthly domain only.

III.5.8 (E376-377) *Asuras* indulge in the following activities: making each other drink molten iron, tying to a red-hot iron pillar, beating with an iron mace, slashing with swords, knives and similar weapons, boiling in hot oil, dry-roasting, cooking in iron pots, crushing in an oil-crusher. But they do not die.

(The Digambara and Śvetāmbara *sūtras* of this Chapter deviate widely, and the analysis of the sections and constituents of the universe vary likewise. There are a total of 39 *sūtras* in this Chapter as interpreted in the present Śvetāmbara commentary, with most of the extra ones falling between II.13 and II.14 of the basic text of Digambara Umāsvāti. While the details are fascinating, we skip over them as they are not "philosophical"!)

CHAPTER FOUR

IV.1.1-2 (E401) "Gods" are those who at the time of the personality-making (*nāmа*) karma of celestial birth become beings with outer radiance who can play at will and are divine.

IV.1.3 (E401) There are four groups of them: Bhavanavāsins, Kinnaras, Jyotiṣkas and Vaimānikas.

IV.10.1 (E403) (=IV.11 of Umāsvāti) (Here (in contrast to III.1.7-8) ten types of Bhavanavāsin gods are listed, with the *asuras* now comprising the tenth type.) These gods are called "Bhavanavāsin" because they live in palaces.

IV.10.4-6 (E404) The *Asuras*, though they fought the gods (*sura*), are not bad as envisaged in Hindu mythology. They always worship the Jina and do not indulge in abducting women, etc.

IV.10.76-8 (E404) All these gods are called "*kumāras* as, like young folk, they are perpetually playful and dress well.

IV.11.1 (E404) (=IV.12 of Umāsvāti) This time there are eight kinds of *Vyantara* gods, the additional type being *rakṣasa*. *Vyantara* gods are so-called since they live in many regions.

IV.11.4 (E404-405) Question: Aren't they so-called because of their bad reputation among people?

Answer: No, they possess pure transformational bodies. All that is heard about them is just their play. They do not eat meat or drink alcohol. They eat with their minds. Their locations in various areas in the innumerable islands, mountains, seas and cities are detailed, along with the number of their queens.

IV.12.1 (E405) (=IV.13 of Umāsvāti) The Jyotiṣka deities are the sun, moon, planets, constellations, and miscellaneous stars. They are called "luminous" because light is their natural quality.

IV.12.4-10 (E405-406) Details showing, e.g., the distance to the stars and planets from the earth.

IV.13.1-4 (E406) (=IV.14 of Umāsvāti) These gods move around Mount Meru at a distance of 100 *yojanas*. The number of their suns, moons, planets and stars are given.

IV.15 (E408) (=IV.16 of Umāsvāti) "Outside this region they are static", i.e., they are outside the human world.

IV.16-17 (E408) (=IV.17-18 of Umāsvāti) The basic division of Vaimanikas is into three types--*indraka, śreṇī, prakīrṇaka*, each of which in turn has two types: classed and

nonclassed, referred to as higher and lower respectively.

IV.18-21 (E408-411) (=IV.19-22 of Umāsvāmi) Contrasting attributes of the various types of gods. These are discussed (in IV.22.10-IV.23) under the following headings: description, result, transformation, activities, signs, motions, lordship, instruments, numbers, area, adjacence, difference, state and comparative count.

IV.27.1-7 (E417) (IV.28 of Umāsvāti) "*Tiryak*" means being underneath, e.g., as beasts of burden. It also means those who have regressed due to karmic rise. They are divided into moving, stationary, etc., as shown earlier. They dwell everywhere and do not have specified areas like the gods. There are two subtypes: minute and gross. The minutes ones dwell all over in air, water, etc., but the gross are limited to the earth, water, fire, air and regions of those with handicapped senses (*vikalendriya*) and five-sensed ones. Since all three worlds have this species of dwellers they have been discussed here and not in the second Chapter, since the remaining *sūtras* (below) can only be understood after understanding the division into humans, gods and hell-beings.

IV.28-41 (E417-419) (=IV.29-52 of Umāsvāti)

IV.42. (E419-429) The commentary here reviews the modes and qualities of a substance in general, on which is based the difference between the sequential (*vikaladeśa*) and the unified (*sakaladeśa*) ways of viewing a thing. The unified relates to the instruments of true cognition, the sequential relates to perspectives. Every quality has a sevenfold perspective--the seven perspectives are reviewed, their relevance is explained. The word "maybe" (*syāt*) that appears in many of the seven perspectives is to be understood as the opposite of "only" (*eva*). These seven are paired off with the seven points of view described earlier.

CHAPTER FIVE

("T" references for this Chapter are to N. L. Jain, *The Jaina World of Non-Living (The Non-Living in Tattvārthasūtra)*

(Varanasi: Plano, Texas 2000). The summary on its basis is made here by Potter.)

V.1.6 (E644; T45-46) "Nonliving" does not merely imply the absence of life, but it indicates a kind of positive substance instead.

V.1.7-8 (E644; T46) Just as the physical body is formed when the personality-making matter matures, and is formed of many aggregated atoms, similarly the substances that are the topic of this *sūtra* (initiators of movement, initiators of stasis, space and karmic products) also occupy timelessly modifying space-points or many parts and are therefore said to have bodies (*kāya*).

V.1.9-14 (E654; T47-48) Question: Why is it necesary to mention their many space-points since having a body would suffice to indicate the same fact?

V.1.15-16 (E654; T48) Answer: The two initiators are specified as occupying many space-points, but time does not. Just as an atom, not having more than one space-point, is considered not to be occupying space, similarly time is also said to be not occupying space, even though it occupies one space-point.

V.1.24-26 (E654; T49-50) The kind of substance that divides and decays by combination, and the results of such division and decay, are matter aggregates called "karmic products" (*pudgala*). Since the number of atoms increases, decreases and changes in quality, there is no harm in considering karmic products to be modifiable.

V.1.27 (E655; T50) Motion and stasis occur by themselves, and space and karmic products are substances independent of living beings or matter aggregates. They are instrumental in the movement of living substances and matter-aggregates and are not instigated by them.

V.1.28-30 (E655; T50-51) Initiators of stasis cause the formation of the humanoid shape of the worlds. If such a substance were not postulated, then living substances and aggregates would be all-pervading and there would be no

shapes of things possible.

V.1.34-35 (E655; T51-53) Question: Shouldn't space be treated first, since it is the substratum (*ādhāra*) on which all else subsists?

Answer: The worlds have existed from time immemorial; there is no precedence or antecedence among the worlds. So, even though scriptures say that space is self-existing, in space there are the rings of air (*vāyu*) known as *tanuvātalaya*, in the latter there is the *ghanavātalaya*, in that the *ghanodadhivātalaya*, and so on. As the contained in the container there is no dichotomy in this. However, whether matter is viewed as container or contained depends on the perspective; e.g., from the strict constructionist perspective there is no container-contained relationship. However, it is also true that from the practical perspective it would not be wrong to say that the *tanuvātalaya*, for example, subsists in space, and that space has no container since it is all-pervading and infinite. Only a finite, nonpervading tangible and embodied substance can have a container or have another as substratum.

V.1.36 (E655; T53) Although time is also a nonliving substance it is not enumerated here since it will be discussed below.

V.2.1 (E655-656; T63-64) That which undergoes birth, decay, etc., and that which is the result of such modifications is a substance. Substance, area, time and state are external factors and intrinsic power is the internal factor. Even if external causes exist, if intrinsic power is not conducive to such modification it will not occur. Thus, though the modes of birth, decay, etc., are not really different from the substance itself, still due to the difference in nominative and accusative roles that which keeps flowing through these modes is a substance.

V.2.3 (E656; T65-67) Question: Shouldn't earth be interpreted as substance due to its association with a substance rather than its having modifications?

Answer: No. If a thing does not have an intrinsic ability to modify it cannot be held to be substance. However, substance should not be considered existent by itself (*svataḥ sat*); it is by its collocation with existence (*sattā*) that it becomes existent. If not, even the horns of a rabbit will be real.

Substantiality is eternally transforming. It is not right to suppose that a substance is the substratum of qualities and motions, since a substance is not self-existent and cannot be the substratum for another. Only a previously existing pot can be a container of water.

V.2.6-8 (E657-658; T69-70) If substanceness is eternal and unembodied, how can it reside in earth, etc.? If it resides there substanceness will become concrete and many. Substance is not like space even though it may be huge. Space occupies infinite space-points so it can pervade many substances and many substances can be in it. Substance is not so.

V.2.9 (E658; T70-72) The assumption that substance is that which is realized by its qualities is also a one-sided view, therefore not correct. If quality and substance are one then they should not be indicated separately. If totally identical, then either the quality or the substance will remain. If only quality remains then without a locus it too will disappear. If only substance remains, then without qualitiy or nature it will have no existence.

The *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* say: "Spatial direction, time and *ākāśa* are inactive (*niṣkriya*), as are motions and qualities." Then inactive substances cannot flow towards qualities, so the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) "flowing" (*saṃdravati*) cannot be accepted either. So qualities have no separate existence from substances.

Vaiśeṣika objection: When material atoms are inflamed, then their dark color, etc., are destroyed and they assume the red form; so qualities are assumed by substances.

Answer: If one assumes that the substance remains as

such while its shape changes and decays, then qualities (such as shape) will become separate from the substance. If the qualities are assumed to be a collocation and self-existent, then like substances qualities will also become eternal. If they are stipulated to exist when their substance exists then either both substance and/or qualities will become ephemeral or both will be permanent. If they are considered totally different from each other then again they will not always be associated.

The Vaiśeṣika also says "a lamp can light itself and needs no second lamp." Do they not know that this is contradicting themselves as well as scripture? Do they really know their own views? They also say: "Self is known by appropriate contact of self and internal organ." But they do not accept omniscience, so how can one who does not (already) know oneself know other things? So one should not accept the self-substance (*dravyātmaka*) mode.

Thus all extreme (*ekāntika*) views are negated by argument as untenable.

V.3.1-2 (E659-660; T78) The same line of argument holds against the relation of selfness (*jīvatva*) to self (*jīva*).

V.3.3 (E660; T79-80) Motion, stasis, space, matter, self and time are the six substances, and there is no seventh. This negates all other views. Vaiśeṣikas stipulate nine substances, which can be assimilated to our six. Earth, water, fire, air and mind having form, taste, touch, smell and touch are all part of the matter aggregate. Air (*vāyu*) is formed since it has touch.

Mind is of two types, substantial (*dravyamanas*) and mental states (*bhāvamanas*). The latter are of the nature of awarenesses, and therefore are parts of the self. The substantial mind is made of the matter-aggregate (karmic product, *paudgalika*), and has a shape. That mind has shape is proved by the inference that mind is an instrument of true cognition and therefore has shape like the eyes, etc. Sound is also a karmic product and has shape. The material atoms in air and mind also have the capacity for formations into groups or matter-aggregates. There is no basic difference between

solid and liquid matter, since the moonstone (*candrakāntamaṇi*) can create water and water can create pearls. Spatial directions (*dik*) are included in space.

V.4.3-5 (E661; T86-87) The substances never cease to be six. The space-points they occupy do not change. They have many transformations. Still, they do not change their nature, for example stasis does not ever have consciousness or shape nor are the selves ever unconscious. There is no dichotomy due to the fact that these substances have many transformations due to the substantial and modal perspectives.

V.5.1-2 (E661; T88-89) The word "*rūpa*" (form) has many meanings. Shape (*mūrti*) is the transformation into sight, taste, smell and touch and triangular, square, long, wide, etc.

V.5.3-6 (E661; T89-90) Or else "form" should be understood as that which can be visually perceived. Taste, smell, etc., are corollaries of sight, so they should also be understood. Although matter is not different, in its modal forms it is somewhat different. Matter remains while the forms appear and decay.

V.7.1-2 (E662; T94-95) Activity (*kriyā*) is that mode of a substance which due to internal or external reasons moves it from one area of occupancy to another. Activity is not the perpetual nature of a substance. The activity is not apart from the substance, but the resulting transformation is another mode. If it were not so then substances would be inactive.

V.7.3 (E662; T95) Instigators of stasis, etc., do not have origination or decay in one sense, but they should not be considered as having no origination at all. Origination is of two types, for the self and for others. Infinite differences in qualities like size, etc., create originations within all substances.

V.7.4-6 (E662; T95-96) Question: Since activity has been seen to cause activity, like the moving water causing movement of fishes, then how can inactive substances like initiators of movement and of stasis cause motion or stasis in

other substances?

Answer: The self wishing to see creates the power in the eyes to see. A dead person without the presence of the self does not have this power to see. So it is obvious that the self is the seer and the senses are merely reservoirs of its power. Similarly, the substances that have the power of movement move or stay, but space and the initiators of movement and of stasis are merely instrumental though themselves inactive. Thus, though space is called all-pervading since it is in contact with everything, it does not go anywhere but is merely instrumental.

V.7.7-13 (E663; T96-97) Question: Since the self is all-pervading and therefore inactive, it is only instrumental in the activity of other substances due to its collocation with qualities, etc. Thus it is not logical to call it active.

Answer: No. An inactive self cannot be instrumental in another's activity. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* also says that spatial direction, time, space, motions and qualities are inactive in contrast to substances, which are active.

V.7.14-16 (E663; T07-98) If the self is considered inactive, then like space-points it will not be able to cause activity in the physical body either. Jainism considers the association of the self with the karmic body as an activity-causing factor, and therefore once all eight types of karma are destroyed the self becomes free from embodiment or activity. However, the natural quality of the self to move upward is accepted even in the emancipated self, as well as the activities of eternal power, knowledge, faith and bliss.

V.7.18-19 (E664; T98) Activity is the same as the acting substance since it is a particular transformation of it, like the heat of fire. If fire is considered different from heat then fire becomes inactive but also nonexistent, being an activity-less substance.

V.8.1-2 (E664; T105) Instigators of motion and of stasis, along with a single self, have innumerable space-points, since they cannot be counted. They have exceeded the possible

numbers that can be enumerated.

V.8.3-4 (E664-665; T105-106) The area occupied by an undivided atom is known as one space-point. The instigators of motion and of stasis pervade countless space points. They are inactive. Although a self also occupies countless space-points, it is possible for it to take small or large life-forms due to its flexibility in assuming size. When it is time for its completion (*lokapūrṇa avasthā*) and it rises to the *samudghāta kāla,* its central eight space-points occupy the *citra* and *vajra* strata under the central Sumeru mountain. The remaining space-points spread over, above and below and on all sides.

V.8.5-6 (E665; T106) Although a substance is indivisible, it is not conjoined, and the space-points in it are actual, not figurative. The space-points occupied by a pot are distinct from the space-points occupied by a cloth; else space would not be called all-pervading. Thus substance is indivisible, but not without space-points. However, it does not consist of parts like a pot, so there is no problem in calling it indivisible, limbless, and whole.

V.8.7-9 (E665; T106) There are infinite numbers of living beings, so one self has been mentioned to indicate that each being has countless space-points. There is a difference between a substance and the space-points it occupies.

V.8.10-13 (E665; T106-107) The space-points in the instigators of motion and of stasis are also real, not figurative.

V.8.14-15 (E665; T107) Objection: If motions, etc., are primarily occupying space then they should be treated as such. The area occupied is in accordance with the material atoms that occupy the space. So they should be considered to have primary space-points too.

Answer: No, these are abstract and therefore cannot be seen even if they do primarily occupy space-points. Hence they are presented through the space-points they occupy.

V.8.15-16 (E666; T107-108) The scriptures taught by the *arhats*, remembered by the *gaṇadharas*, and passed on by the tradition of teachers describe the space-occupany of these

substances as follows: In each space-point of a self there are infinite karmic space-points of knowledge and other veiling karmas. In each of these karmic space-points there are infinite material bodily space-points. In each bodily space-point there are infinite decaying atoms like dust adhering to wet jaggery (i.e., inseparable). Thus one should know *dharma*, etc., to have primary space-points.

The central eight particles or points of a self remain stable whatever the condition. In the realized states of an omniscient (*kevalin*) being, with or without activity of body and mind, all the points are stable. In the remaining points, except for the central eight, the particles are unstable during exercise or agitation due to sorrow, etc.

V.8.19 (E666; T108-109) According to Vaiśeṣika philosophy the area of space in the ear is the hearing medium. This, conditioned by *adṛṣṭa*, gains the ability to hear. If space-points are not stipulated the entire space will have to be an ear. In that case every being should be able to hear every sound. If, however, a specific area is called the hearing organ, then labeling the space as without separate points is refuted. Or else, does one atom get connected with all space? Then one atom will have to be as large as space. And if not then it is clear that space has primary space-points.

V.9.1-2 (E666; T112-113) "Infinite" should not be confused with "countless".

V.9.3-5 (E667; T113-114) Being infinite should not be feared to be unknowable, since it is known by the immensely knowledgeable omniscient beings.

Question: If the omniscient knows the infinite to end then the infinite does not remain unending, so becomes finite. Again, if the omniscient does not know the infinite to end then he is not omniscient.

Answer: Since the annihilating knowledge of the omniscient is infinite squared (*anantānanta*) it is able to fathom the infinite by itself. The omniscient knows the infinite as infinite, so its knowledge by an omniscient does not limit it

in any way. All contenders accept both omniscience and infinity. A list of Buddhist, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika ideas of infinity are enumerated to prove the point. Knowing them does not make the idea of infinity finite. If substances are not everpresent then both the world and liberation from it will disappear. If selves are limited then when all selves become emancipated the world will cease to be.

In each self there are an infinite number of karmic and karma-helping aggregates. If they are considered temporal (not eternal) then again both the world and liberation will disappear. Similarly, the past and present are also infinite. If they are considered finite then too there will be no practical use of time left. However, this is not logical, since the origination of nonexistence and the total termination of existence both are illogical.

Similarly, if space is postulated as limited, then something tangible will have to be postulated beyond that. If not, then accepting space and space only there will not be a finite space.

V.10.1-2 (E667; T117) The infinite is included in the "and" (*ca*) of the *sūtra*. "Infinite" also includes all three types: the peripheral infinite (*parītānanta*), yoked infinite (*yuktānanta*), and infinite infinite (*anantānanta*).

V.10.3-6 (E667; T117-118) Objection: If the worlds are of countless space-points, then how can they include the infinite space-points of aggregates? This is a contradiction in terms.

Answer: Due to the transformational powers of very subtle matter and the infinite penetrability of space, it is possible for infinite matter aggregates to penetrate everywhere. Besides, it is no exception that a larger size of a substance may be contained in a smaller vessel. It is possible for a small bud of a *campaka* flower to spread its fragrance far in all directions.

V.12.2-4 (E668; T124) The world space (*lokākāśa*) is the substratum for all others but space itself has no other locus

as there is nothing larger than it.

V.12.5-6 (E668; T124) From the strict constructionist perspective all substances reside in themselves; there is no supporter-supported relationship. It is only from the practical perspective that the supporter-supported concepts are imagined. Thus, in practice, air is supported by space, water by air, earth by water, all living beings by earth, selves and nonselves by each other, karma by beings and beings by karma, and finally, space is the support of movement, stasis and time.

V.13.1-3 (E669; T128) Intiators of motion and of stasis are inherent in the entire worldly universe like oil in oilseeds. The pervasion is total. When concrete things like ashes, water and sand can pervade one place then there can be no contradiction (in space-points) for abstract things. There may be some space-point separations in gross aggregates that come into first contact at one point in time, but those which are forever existent together, such as initators of motion and stasis, are nonsequential and abstract. Thus they have no contradiction with regard to space-points.

V.14.1-2 (E669; T130) One atom occupies one space-point. Two, if bound together, also occupy one point; otherwise, they occupy two separate points. Three atoms may be similarly bound or unbound, occupying one, two or three space-points. Thus, depending on the specific binding, the aggregates of numerate, innumerate and infinite (atoms) may pervade one, numerate or innumerate space-points.

V.14.3-6 (E669-670; T130-131) Question: Since initiators of motion and of statis are abstract, they can occupy one space-point, but how can gross large aggregates pervade just one space-point? If that is possible, then either the space-points will have to be further divided or a unity in the aggregates will have to be stipulated.

Answer: It has been said before that due to certain accumulations, transformations and the pervasive quality of space, many may be situated together. Just as within the same

room, the light of many oil lamps may pervade the same space without losing their separate identities, similarly, even infinite aggregates may be able to retain their individual natures without affecting one another, due to extremely fine transformations (*pariṇamana*). Just as the fire will burn and the straw will get burnt due to their innate natures and no other logic prevails, similarly it is in the nature of certain gross aggregates to be able to pervade the same space-point.

V.15.1-3 (E670; T133-134) The worldly universe has countless space-points, each of which has countless parts. A being may live in one or more countless areas and the entire world is pervaded by beings.

V.15.4 (E670; T134) Objection: If one countless part also has countless space-points, and two, three or more parts also have countless points, then there should be no special quality of pervasion in beings.

Answer: The nonminimal maximals are countless and of countless options. Since the minimal-maximal countless things have countless options in turn, there is a difference between the pervasion of beings as well.

V.15.5 (E670; T134) Objection: If a being dwells in one countless area of the world, but in substance-measure it is of infinitely infinite quantity, then how can it be contained in the worldly universe?

Answer: Beings are of two types, gross and subtle. The gross beings have bodies of a particular obstructive type (*sapratighātaśarīra*), but the subtle-bodied beings have very subtle transformations and therefore do not collide with either gross bodied or other subtle-bodied ones. That is why where one subtle vegetable body exists there exist an infinite number of subtle-bodied general (*sādhāraṇa*) beings. In the gross bodies of humans there live many such living beings like those born of perspiration, etc. If all beings were gross, there may have been a problem in pervasion. However, it is well-known from experience that the embodied self is also nonobtrusive. At the time of death the self departs with the

subtle body even through iron-walled homes with doors of adamantine. This subtle body is a lump of the personification of knowledge-veiling karmas (due to past actions). The luminous body also always remains with this (subtle) body. At the time of death this body leaves the room without causing any hole in it. Similarly the subtle vegetable life should also be considered noncolliding or frictionless (*apratighātin*).

V.16.1-3 (E670; T136-137) Although the self is abstract, due to its timeless association with karmic matter it is also somewhat formfilled. Its space points are equal to that of the worldly universe, but even then it stays within the boundaries of its karmic subtle body. The shrinking of the space-points, like the shriveling of dry skin, is known as *saṃkoca* and the expansion of the space-points, like oil spreading on water, is known as *visarpa*. Due to these causes a being can fit into countless parts. Just as the light of a lamp, when left under the open sky, spreads into many space points, if covered by a mud plate it remains limited therein. What appears to be a fault in this comparison--that the lamp is not immortal--is not a fault for the Jains, because from the modal bodily (*karmāṇa*) viewpoint the self in this formfilled state is mortal, but from the substantial viewpoint, in spite of its contraction and expansion, it is immortal. Thus this is not a fallacious comparison.

V.16.4-7 (E671; T137-138) Objection: If the worldly self were to have contraction and expanison like the oil lamp, then it should also undergo breakage like the earthen pot and have space-point descriptions accordingly.

Answer: Even though the self is one with the karmic body due to its bonds being still unbroken, in essence it does not abandon its true abstract nature. Due to difference in features they are definitely different. In this case too, manifoldness prevails. From the eternal transforming consciousness or substantial viewpoints neither is there any destruction or shriveling of space-points, nor does it have any limbs (that do so). Yes, maybe there is contraction and

expansion of space-points necessary for the explanation of the rise of the modal construction that results in the forming of the gross body. In this way of timeless binding with karmic matter, it also has limbs. In fact, the things that have parts, rising due to a certain cause, also suffer destruction or decaying of those parts, just like a cloth that decays due to the decay in the threads that are a part of it. However, the points of the self have not formed due to the coming together of other substances; they are causeless. E.g., the location-point of the atom is without cause, therefore, it does not become transient due to decay in its parts, but when it comes into contact with other atoms, it becomes modifiable (or loses its eternality). Similarly, the location-points of the self do not have compression (*saṃghāta* with other substances. Therefore, although it may have points and therefore limbs, the self does not lose its eternality due to decay in its parts. It can be called transitory only in the modal sense, such as when in motion, etc. Thus the special expression of happiness or sadness, cannot be seen in the space-points of the self. The qualities of things that are made out of association or conjunction with other things like the pot can be embedded in each space-point. Had the points of the self come together due to causes other than itself, then it too would have happinessor sadness in its space-points and then there would be a question of many selves within one body. Just as in the atom there can be only one type of quality like white color, similarly in the self there can be only one type of happiness quality at one time. Thus the argument that heat and cold may afftect the skin but do not affect space is negated, since if the self were to become like the skin then it would be ephemeral. And the argument that "if it were like space then there would be no karma (merit and demerit) attaching to it" does not hold, since it has been said that from the substantial point of view the self is eternal, but from the modal it is ephemeral (*anitya*).

V.16.8-9 (E671-672; T138-139) Since the worldly self acquires a small or large gross body, and since the smallest

gross body is the countless division of one finger length, therefore the self cannot pervade one space-point as a karmic product can. Although liberated beings do not retain a body, their self-points are shaped a little smaller than the last physical form they had assumed, and neither decreases nor increases subsequently, because in that realized state there are no more activities that cause decay or surface-expansion (*visarpa*). Therefore, realized selves cannot be treated as having one or more space-points like matter.

V.16.10 (E672; T139) Objection: If the area in which the instigators of motion and stasis as well as space are the same, and if their shape is the same, and even their time is the same, the touch-types (*sparśana*) are equal for all of them, and even the knowledge of the omniscient (*kevala*) is all the same. Then why not consider the instigators of motion, etc., to be the same substance?

Answer: The very reasons that you have appealed to to show the similarities of these substances are obviously the causes of their differences. Since they are otherwise different, that is why the above possible similarities have been pointed out. Had they been one and the same, these issues would not have been raised. Just as shape, taste, etc., though having comparable spatial and temporal applications, have separate specific characteristics and are therefore separate, similarly motion, etc. are also characteristically different.

Question: The pervasion of matter in space-points is understandable. However, the pervasion of the instigators of motion and stasis in the entire world space, even while having countless space-points like a self, is difficult to understand.

Answer: Just as water facilitates fish to swim, and without water a fish cannot swim, similarly the natural and experimental motion and stasis of beings and matter is facilitated by the two instigators (viz., motion and stasis). Since matter and beings move all over the world, it is obvious that the medium thereof also pervades everywhere.

V.17.20-23 (E673; T145-147) Question: Space is both

all-pervading and flows easily, so the instigators of motion and stasis could be considered aspects of space.

Answer: Space is the substratum of all instigators of motion, stasis, etc. It is the base for the five substances. As space definitely has the characteristic quality of providing for pervasion, these other qualities cannot be ascribed to it. Otherwise, the heat quality of fire, and the fluidity of water, will have to be ascribed to earth as well. If space were to be the helper in motion, then even the nonworldly space would also be available to the self and matter. There would be no distinction between the world and the nonworld. There has to be a nonworld. Just as a fish can swim only in water and without it not on earth, similarly, even in the presence of space, being and matter can be in motion or stasis only because of the presence of one of these instigators. They are the general causes of motion and stasis even though other external causes like water may be present.

V.17.24 (E673; T147-148) If the quality of one substance is ascribed to another, thus reducing the number of substances, then all systems of thought will suffer from various fallacies, since all schools of thought have postulated many substances.

E.g., the Vaiśeṣikas postulate four universal substances: space, time, spatial direction, and self. They too can reduce spatial and temporal direction to space. Similarly there would be no need to have many selves. just one with different attributes would be enough. Thus many things stipulated by the scriptures will be nullified.

Sāṃkhya postulates three basic *guṇas*: *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*. All three are coextensive. If space can fill in for the motion and stasis instigators, then *sattva guṇa* can fill in for the drying and heating effects of *rajas* as well as the covering and veiling effects of *tamas*. There will thus be no need for three *guṇas*. Again, all selves have one common quality of consciousness, so there should be just one self, not infinitely many.

The Buddhists postulate five aggregates. But if one is accepted as having the characteristics of the others, only consciousness (*vijñāna*) need be postulated. That alone will be able to function as aggregates, feelings, identifications and traces. But after replacing the other four, even consciousness cannot exist without any basis--so there is only emptiness. Therefore, even though extended all over, space should not be considered to have the ability to cause the functions of the instigators of motion and stasis.

V.17.25-27 (E674; T148) Just as light cannot be the primary cause of vision, or the walking-stick the primary cause of motion, so also the instigator of motion or of stasis of being and matter aggregates are assisted by these media, but they do not cause them. Thus they neither cause the two opposites together, nor do they forbid them. If they had been the causes then both motion and stasis would cause obstruction to each other. Sometimes, even when an external cause like water is not present, there is motion, as with birds flying in the air due to their *dharma*. Space (*ākāśa*) is not the instigator of motion, as its primary function is to provide extension.

Then again, it is not necessary always to have light for the eyes to see. Cats can see without any external source of light. For humans light is necessary, as they do not have this abililty. People do not always need a staff to walk. Similarly, it is not necessary for beings and matter to always have an external cause for movement or stasis, they happen helped by these media automatically. For some, just these are enough; for others, these plus outer causes are needed.

V.17.28-31 (E674; T148-149) Just because the instigators of motion and stasis are perceptible they should not be considered nonexistent. Otherwise, even the omniscient, merit and demerit, and the other worlds will also have to be considered nonexistent. Furthermore, the omniscient lord has spoken of them in the *āgamas*.

V.17.34-35 (E675; T150-151) If it is contended that all things not available to the senses are nonexistent the

contenders' own theses will be contradicted. For example, the Buddhists believe that every atom of color/shape (*rūpa*) is beyond the senses; it is only when many of them come together that perception occurs. They consider consciousness and mental associates to be invisible to the senses. Sāṃkhya believes that the modalities of *prakṛti* function like earth, etc., to cause perception, while the causal attributes like the three *guṇas* and the highest self are imperceptible. Vaiśeṣikas say that certain factors combine to make the perception of shape possible. Thus the combination of many atoms giving rise to gross forms of earth, etc., plus the collocation of qualities like shape, number, quantity and division, cause perception, while an atom and *ākāśa* are imperceptible. So, if imperceptibility were considered to be a condition of existence, then each of these schools would be involved in self-contradiction.

If atoms are inferred from their function, then where is the problem in inferring initiators of movement and initiators of stasis also? Just as your own birth and death are unknown to you but are known to the omniscient, similarly, they know the instigators of motion and stasis, and therefore those must exist.

V.17.36 (E675; T151) Question: Just as awarenesses, being transformations of the self, and curds, being transformations of matter, do not require anything imperceptible to help, similarly shouldn't the motion and stasis of matter and beings also not need the help of these imperceptible instigators?

Answer: Even an awareness requires general causes like time; likewise, for motion and stasis, a general external instigator is required.

V.17.37-40 (E675-676; T151-152) *Adṛṣṭa* is a property of the self. In order to cause it pleasures and pains, the fruits of action and their ancillaries, accrue to the self. The *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* says: "The upward motion of fire, the diagonal flow of wind, the first functions of atoms and the mind, all happen due to *adṛṣṭa*. Going up or down, the combination of

the humors, and which body one goes to are all due to this *adṛṣṭa*." Can't motion and stasis also not be caused by this same *adṛṣṭa*?

Answer: Material aggregates are unconscious, they can have no *adṛṣṭa*. Therefore if *adṛṣṭa* is considered to be instrumental in motion and stasis, then material particles will not be able to move or remain fixed.

Suggestion: The matter that assists the self will assume movement or stasis in accordance with the *adṛṣṭa* of that self.

Answer: No, since a property of one substance cannot cause activity in another substance. We have already said that that which cannot cause activity within itself cannot also cause activity in another substance. If *adṛṣṭa* is considered to be instrumental in motion and stasis, then realized beings, who have already destroyed their merits and demerits, will have no movement or stasis--but they certainly do have them.

Being abstract does not necessarily imply not being the concomitant instrumental cause of motion and stasis as in the case of the instigators of motion and of stasis, since there is no example of being noncausal to activity due to being abstract. In fact, space, which is abstract, is instrumental in giving extendedness to other substances. Abstract consciousness is instrumental in causing name and form (a Buddhist contention). Thus *adṛṣṭa*, though abstract, is instrumental in generating utilities for the self to enjoy. Similarly, the abstract instigators of motion and stasis are general instrumental causes of motion and stasis.

V.18.1-2 (E676; T155) All three--instigators of motion, of stasis, and space--are ubiquitous.

V.18.3-4 (E676; T155) Question: Only separately existing substances can have the container-contained relationship. In this case, instigators of motion, of stasis, and space are not yet separately proven to exist.

Answer: Even inseparable (*ayutasiddha*) things can have the container-contained relationship, like the lines on one's palm.

V.18.5 (E676; T155-156) The beginningless relationship (*anādisambandha*) and inseparability are just manifold (*anekānta*) aspects. Maybe they are nonseparately proved and eternally related, as in the case of the substantial viewpoint being primary, since there is no rise or decay from that perspective. Maybe they have a beginning in time and are separately proved in the case of the modal perspective being the primary view, since modalities rise and decay.

V.18.6 (E676; T156) Being and matter have primary co-pervasion, like the swan in water, since they are both active.

V.18.7-9 (E677; 156) Even though space is pervasive, gross things collide among themselves and this does not affect the pervasiveness of space. Subtle substances may pervade each other. If the earth becomes the support for the horse, it does not affect space.

V.18.10 (E677; 156-157) Question: Since space was never born, isn't it nonexistent like the horns of a rabbit?

Answer: Space is not necessarily unborn, since, in the subsidiary role of the substantial view and the primary role of the modal view, space continues to experience transformational activities of matter and beings including their birth, decay, etc. Just as when someone suddenly becomes omniscient, that part of space unavailable to and therefore nonexistent for him becomes suddenly available and therefore "born" or existent at that point of time for him, so also space may be said to be unborn to his awareness or born to his awareness.

V.18.12 (E677; T157-158) Sound is material, not a characteristic of space. Therefore it is incorrect to infer space from the quality sound.

V.18.13 (E677' T158) The Sāṃkhya assumption that space is a modification of *prakṛti* is also not correct. Eternal, inactive and infinite *prakṛti* cannot have modifications, since it is neither born nor decays.

Sāṃkhya: *Prakṛti* is a balanced state of the three *guṇas*, and in this balanced state has the capacity to bring forth

modifications, and those modifications are the *mahat (=buddhi)*, etc. along with space.

Answer: No, for just as a pot when it becomes modified is destructible, tangible and nonpervading, so also, when modified, space too would become so: but it is known to be the opposite.

V.19.1-2, 9-11 (E677; 160-161) (The *sūtra*, as understood here, reads "body, speech, mind and breathing are functions of matter"). The order ("body, speech, mind, breath") is justified with reasons.

V.19.3-8 (E677-678; T160-161) Objection: Sense-organs, e.g., the eyes, are also functions of matter, so they should be taken up here too.

Answer: In a future *sūtra* the word "and" will indicate this. A different objector: No. Since the eyes are not within the space-points of the self they are not implied here.

Answer: Since bodily parts are formed due to the rise of personality-making karmic matter, the substantial sense-organs are material aggregates.

V.19.12 (E678; T161-162) Question: Why should the functions of visible matter be discussed? This is stating the obvious.

Answer: Some groups of matter are invisible. Out of the five functional varieties of the body (material, transformative, procuring, fiery and karmic) only gross physical bodies are visible, whereas other kinds of matter are subtle and invisible. Speech and breathing are also in some cases visible, in others not. Mind is also not perceptible to the senses.

V.19.13-14 (E678; T162) Body types have been already described. The causal body (*kārmaṇaśarīra*), though without shape, is material since it gives rise to the results of material action and is thus connected with them. Just as rice is material since it ripens due to its association with the sunlight and water (concrete material objects), similarly, due to association with sweets and thorns (which are concrete material substances), the actions of the self give rise to karmic matter,

hence they too are material. No abstract thing ripens due to its association with a concrete thing.

V.19.15-17 (E678; T162-163) Language can be seen in two ways, as substance (*dravyavacana*) and as occurrent state (*bhāvavacana*). Both are material in nature. The occurrent state of language rises due to a certain amount of subsidence and destruction of sound and intellect-veiling karmic matter. Thus, being caused by matter it has to be material. Substantial, i.e., physical speech, that occurs once the propensity to speech is there, also occurs due to efforts of the palate within the mouth, and is available to the ear. Just as lightning disappears after being seen once, the sound of a word too disappears once pronounced and cannot be heard again. Sound is not available to the eyes.

V.19.18-19 (E678; T163-164) Objection: Language is abstract because it is a quality of space, which is also abstract.

Answer: No, because being accepted, obstructed or intiated by material concrete things it also must be material and concrete.

Objection: Sound is like space, abstract. Thus the abstract may receive the abstract.

Answer: No, since sound can be thrown about by wind, stopped by obstruction, or redirected in the opposite direction; thus it is not abstract.

V.19.20 (E678; T164-165) Mind also can be seen in two ways, substantial and occurrent. The occurrent mind is of the nature of attainment stages and cognitive application. It also belongs to material groups, since it is both caused by and depends on matter aggregates. The substantial mind consists of the specially-empowered matter that, becoming the mind, helps or supports the self, while engaged in discriminatory cognition or recognition to attain the subsidence-annihilation of the knowledge-veils and hindrances to attainments. So it is also of the nature of matter.

V.19.21-23 (E678; T165) Just as, relative to the knowledge-veiling subsidence-annihilation and hindrances of

power attainments (*vīryāntarāya*) the areas of the self transform into the eyes, etc., therefore the individual self is no different from the sense-organs, but on the destruction of the senses the self is not destroyed. Similarly the mind is also the transformatory aspect (*pariṇamana*) of the self and the annihilation of mind does not cause any modification to the self. The mind is no permanent structure since the matter groups that had transformed as mind disappear after having engaged in their mental functions of discrimination between qualities, faults or recognition functions; they do not remain as mind after that.

V.19.24-26 (E678-679; T165-167) Vaiśeṣika: The internal organ is a separate substance. It is atomic, and each internal organ is attached to a distinct self. One self does not engage in many activities at the same time and neither do all the sense-organs function together. Thus the internal organ is the controller of this sequence.

Answer: This is not correct, since being just atoms (or groups of them) such an internal organ has no ability of its own. It needs to be considered whether it connects one part of itself while dealing with the self and its categorical instruments like the sense-organs or connects itself as a whole. If it connects partially that is wrong, since it is atomic (and atoms have no parts). So either the internal organ will have to be construed as extended or the self will have to be limited to atomic size. Again, if it connects partially the self must have divisions, which will mean that some parts of the self will have knowledge and others not, in which case one may wonder whether the parts that do not are self at all. On the other hand, if the internal organ is totally connected with the sense-organs, then again the senses will have to become atomic-sized or the internal organ will have to be larger. Vaiśeṣikas believe that the quality and the qualified are separate entities: if the internal organ is eternal, then since it cannot transform itself into connection or by dividing, neither will it be able to connect with the self or with the senses. But if we accept

modifications the internal organ cannot be eternal. If the internal organ is without consciousness, then the discrimination "this self or this sense-organ should be connected with that and this other should not" will not be possible, so the internal organ cannot connect with a self.

V.19.27-29 (E680; T167) It is not correct to assume a beginningless relationship between the internal organ and its self, since the relationship between them is that of contact (*saṃyoga*), and you hold that contact occurs at a point in time to things that are not associated. So there cannot be any beginningless contact on your own assumptions. On the Jaina view, however, the mind is of the nature of subsidence and annihilation and so it cannot be beginningless, else it would have to remain forever attached and could not be ever relinquished. Even karmic matter, which is bound to the self from the beginning, can finally be dislodged, because it gets attached at some point of time due to false belief, etc., and so, when right vision, awareness and action combine to result in serenity, the contact involving those karmic adhesions are relinquished. However, it is not so for your internal organ.

V.19.30-31 (E680-681; T167-168) Question: Can't it be said that the mind is an associate cause of the senses, since when the senses grasp favorable or unfavorable objects, the internal organ's association with the sense allows one to experience pleasure or pain? Indeed, that is the only function of the internal organ.

Answer: Actually, the senses, being transformational aspects of a self and thus being of the nature of consciousness, experience feelings by themselves. If they could not do so then one-sensed, handicapped-sense and the nonintellectual five-sensed beings would not experience pleasure or pain. Discriminatory analysis, etc., are independent functions of the mind. The self that has qualified for attainment of mind-particles has the mind to assist it in discrimination and remembering in spite of various external obfuscating reasons. Therefore, mind has an independent existence.

V.19.32 (E681; T168-169) Buddhists do not accept the separate existence of the mind but consider it a psychical aggregate of consciousness. According to them mind is the moment of recognition of prior knowledge. Since mind is a momentary phenomenon for them, it cannot even continue to cognize the present--then what of the past? If present cognition cannot connect with past and future moments of consciousness then how can it analyze good or bad, or think and remember? Only the same person can remember what has already been experienced in the past, not what has not been experienced or has been experienced by some other entity. But given momentariness the sequence of such remembering cannot take place. If the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) is considered persisting, then their contention of momentariness is compromised. If even it is momentary, then it too cannot be the source of memory.

V.19.33-34 (E681; T169) Sāṃkhya considers mind to be a modification of *prakṛti*. However, if *prakṛti* is unconscious, then its modifications too will be unconscious, and then it cannot have cognitive processes such as judging and analyzing. Then who will be the doer of such activities, *prakṛti* or *puruṣa*? The *puruṣa* is qualityless, so it cannot experience the modifications, analyze or remember. *Prakṛti* is unconscious; it cannot have cognitive processes either.

V.19.35-37 (E681; T169-170) Relative to removal of obstacles in evolution, subsidence, annihilation and consequent removal of knowledge-obstructing veils, and the rise of personality-making matter, the air that is released out of the body by the self is known as breath (*prāṇa*) and the air that is taken in is known as *apāna*. These are the cause of the life of an embodied self. However, it is seen that fear or lightning can cause the mind to be obstructed, and alcohol can cause it to be overpowered. Breathing can be obstructed by covering the mouth and nose, or overcome by phlegm in the throat. All these are concrete substances and therefore, being obstructed or overcome by material causes, these breaths too are matter

aggregates.

V.19.38 (E681; T170) The presence of a self is proved by the activity of inhaling and exhaling. These activities cannot occur without cause and are known to occur regularly. They cannot be caused by consciousness, since consciousness is abstract and cannot inspire activity. Since the material aggregate is not conscious, it too cannot be the cause of this activity. If all substances are deemed to lack activity then they will lack movement in space from one place to another. Other fallacious theories regarding the causes of movement or activity in substances are rebutted. It is not correct to negate activity by invoking momentariness, since momentariness has been proved to be contradictory.

V.20.1-4 (E682; T175) When the karmic matter adhering to a self that relates to pleasant feelings adheres to a self and results in fruition due to external causes, then the pleasure experienced by that self is known as happiness. Similarly, that matter relating to unpleasant feelings causes the experience of pain or unhappiness. The rise of age-determining karmic matter causes the breath of a living being to continue until its cessation causes death.

V.22.4 (E683; T181-182) Persistence (*vartanā*) is the continuity of awareness of its identity that every substance feels in each of its modes. Though the flow of the substances are continuously creation-subsistence-decay, a substance knows its existence through each of these modes. Each substance has its separate awareness.

V.22.5 (E683-684; T182) This awareness continues to occur at every moment in each substance. This is proved by inference from the fact that if rice is cooked in a vessel in thirty minutes, it cannot be said that nothing happened until twenty-nine and a half minutes and suddenly it was cooked in the last moment. Subtly it was being cooked from the very first moment on.

V.22.6 (E684; 182) Persistence is a property of time. Time is inferred from this continuity of awareness.

V.22.10 (E684; T183) The natural matter-decaying (*pudgalavikāra*) changes that take place in a substance without it losing its intrinsic character are called transformation (*pariṇāma*). The subsequent stage of modality of a substance, without leaving its basic characteristic of substantiality (*dravyatva*), is thus the resultant transformation. Again this can be seen from two viewpoints, substantial or modal.

Transformations are of two types, with beginning and beginningless. The construction of the universes, the shape of Mt. Sumeru, etc., are beginningless. Things with beginnings are again of two types, due to application (*prayoga*) or due to collapse (*visraṃsa*). The subsidence-related stages that occur in conscious substances due to subsidence of karmic matter, not requiring any human effort, are due to collapse; Those occurring due to knowledge, practice and instructions from the preceptor are those due to application.

V.22.11 (E684; T183-184) Objection: Is the seed present in the sprout or not? If it is, then it cannot be called a sprout. If it is not, then it cannot be said that the seed became the sprout since the sprout no longer has the quality of seed. In this way both existence and nonexistence can be refuted, and then there can be no transformation.

Answer: From the relative point of view the conclusion is acceptable, From the substantial point of view, since the seed of rice is a seed, if it has been totally transformed into the rice sprout why is it still called "rice"? From the modal point of view it has no seed, since if the transformation from the seed stage had not taken place where would the sprout come from? In the theory of relative pluralism there can be no such objections.

V.22.12-13 (E684-685; T184-185) Intense, argumentative, hair-splitting questions are raised regarding the very existing of transformations. If the result of the transformation is negated, then what is the transformation into? If it is already there, then even the negation of the result is there, so the negation itself will be negated too. Then the

transformation will be proved to actually exist. You cannot negate both the arguments. If you think the negated transformation is not negated, then the transformation will actually remain without negation. If there is no transformation, even then, like the nonexistent horns of a rabbit, it cannot be negated altogether. Besides, who then speaks of the negation, what is the status of such words, and what is their meaning? If no speaker or meaning exist, then what transformation is negated?

The question is: is the seed different from the sprout or not? If it is different, then it cannot be called the sprout; if it is not then it must still remain like the seed, and therefore cannot be called a sprout. However, we know it is different. Then we cannot call it a transformation or a sprout, or these problems will occur.

Answer: This has been answered before. We do not subscribe to the one-sided views. We believe in relative pluralism. Before the birth of the sprout, the modality of sprout did not exist in the seed; it occurred afterwards. Therefore from the modal perspective it is a sprout and different from the seed. Since the sprout is of the same kind as the seed, therefore, from the subsantial persepctive, the sprout is not different from the seed.

V.22.14 (E685; T185-186) Objection: If the result is the sprout, then there can be no stable seed left; otherwise, if the seed remains stable transformation into sprout is blocked.

Answer: Again, multifold perspectives are acceptable. Due to the rise of age-related and personality-making karmic matter a self acquires limbs, body, etc., and is known as the finger-like individual self (*aṅgulyātman*). That self expands or contracts in accordance with (or relative to) the removal of obstacles and subsidence-annihilation of karmic matter. At that time, as the eternal tranformational consciousness substance it is existent, and even as the materially transformed limb of the finger-self, it is existent, nondifferent and unchangeable. From the changing (modal) view it is nonexistent, different

and changeable. Similarly, the one-sense-organed vegetation type of personality-making rise of self is labelled as the seed. From the eternal transformational substance perspective it is existent, and from the one-sensed-matter aggregate of the seed with form, taste, smell modalities also, it is existent, and therefore also stable and different. Thus, in relative pluralism there is no problem.

V.22.15 (E685; T186-188) Transformation does not mean increase. If the sprout were merely the transformation of the seed, it would be equal in size (as in milk to curd), not larger. It is not correct to believe that the earthly nutrition and water have joined to it to increase its size, just as the accumulation of lac on wood increases the portion of the lac, and not the size of the wood. If that is so then what does the seed do?

Answer: Just as the human child, being born, grows due to sunlight, mother's milk, external causes and its internal digestive power, similarly the personality-making karmic matter that is born to the life of a seed makes the earthly and watery juices grow into a sprout with the help of its internal digestive power and fertilizer. Thus growth is not dependent upon the seed but on other factors.

This problem can arise only for those who have one-sided extreme views. For those who consider substances to be eternal there cannot be any transformations or modifications. In the Buddhist momentariness view of dependent origination as well there cannot be an effect larger than the cause, so there will be no increase. In this case, will the earthly juice be destroyed before or simultaneously with the seed or spout? If together, then what will increase? If by increase they are being destroyed, then how will they cause other decaying substances? If consecutively, then what will the earthly and watery nourishments do with the seed that has already been destroyed? On the relative pluralist theory, the seed and the juices are all substantially permanent but modally destructible. Thus increases may occur.

V.22.16 (E686; T188-189) Other doubts are raised regarding the possibility of increase in the case of the possible states in Buddhist thought. The reply given shows the fallacy. Whether the simultaneously existing will be entertained, or the simultaneously nonexisting ones, or one existent and the other nonexistent, is not clear. In the momentary view, since the earlier stage will disappear before the subsequent one, there can be no such considerations of continuity. Only existent substances can be arranged. If we accept their existence, then the contention of momentary existence is proved fallacioius. It is not correct to say that like the two sides of a balance origination and decay take place simultaneously, as they cannot happen together like one horn being the cause or effect of the other.

V.22.17-18 (E686-687; T189-190) Objection: "The cessation of one quality in a stable substance and the subsequent rise of another is known as transformation". In substances having relative stability the cessation of the milk-like quality happening before the curdling into yogurt is known as transformation.

Answer: This definition is not very good either, as it leads to many faults. If apart from the collection of qualities there is any separate entity that remains stable, then merely the group of characteristics must not be considered the substance. The one that is born, that remains or that dies, is a collection of qualities in all three cases. If they are the same as the substance, then the intrinsic qualities that were there before remain after the transformation: then the question remains, which will be the transformation of what? If one quality dies and the other is born, the one-sided view of eternal existence is proved wrong. Thus multifaceted relativism has to be accepted. From the modal view, then, there may be transformation and from the substantial view, stability. Substantially the stable substance itself will then have modal destruction of one quality and creation of others as it transforms.

V.22.23 (E687; T191-192) Abiding, transforming, etc., are signs by which one infers the time substance. It has been well said that the substance by which concrete things increase or decay is known as time.

V.22.24 (E687; T192-193) Objection: One feature, such as abiding, is enough to entail the existence of time, since transformation, etc., are varieties of progressing or staying.

Answer: The text (23) indicates the difference between primary time and the practical use of time. Just as the instigators of motion and stasis indicate movement or stability, similarly primary time is the prime helper of subsistence/abiding (*vartanā*). In the space-points of each worldly region one primary time-particle substance (*kālāṇudravya*) is situated. They are not interrelated. They do not have a heap of primary space-points like those of motion, etc., or secondary space-points like matter aggregates. They are single-space-pointed. Not having both type of point-groupings these are not collections. Not having any cause for decay, they are eternal. However, other substances are born, abide and decay in them, so they are temporary. Although permeable, they are abstract, since they do not have form, taste, or smell. Since they do not move to another point in space, they are inactive. Practical time (*vyavahārakāla*) is identified due to transformations, activities and sequence (*paratva/aparatva*). Being the basis of these activities is called time. It is instrumental in the division (limitation) of others but is not limited by them.

V.22.25 (E688; T193-194) Past, present and future are relative to each other. Just as a traveling Devadatta sees the trees passing by, coming and passing him again, similarly, atoms of time in sequential modes cause past, present and future in substances. In primary time the past, etc., are subsidiary, and in practical time they are of prime relevance. The past, etc., is relative to another. The transformational activity of a substance (*kriyāpariṇatadravya*), having a particle of time, is called "present" due to its present-time- related

quickening activity (*vartanā*). When the same substance ceases to feel the abiding of that time-particle it is past, and that time-particle is also known as the past. Similarly, relative to the sun's motion in every moment the time divisions of trail (*āvali*), breath (*ucchvāsa*), moment (*lava*), twenty-four minutes (*nālikā*), forty-eight minutes (*muhūrta*), day and night (*ahorātra*), fortnight (*pakṣa*), month (*māsa*), season (*ṛtu*) and solstice (*ayana*) are adhered to in the world of humans since the sun moves there. It is from these that beings of all the three worlds have their durations of activity, existence, and aging. From this stems the numbers up to innumerate and infinite

V.22.26 (E688; 194) Objection: Activity itself is time, no other. The activity itself is instrumental in causing division in the substance by dividing itself, therefore it is time. The duration of change of the atom within the substance is itself time; there is no other measure of subtler time as such. The cluster of time-measure taken in activity is the measure of trail, the cause of trail-measure a breath, and so on. Within the trail, the duration of the particles of activity (*paramāṇukriyā*) is the time. In folk usage also this is indicated in duration measures like time of milking, cooking-time, etc. One activity divided by another becomes known as time.

Answer: Right. However, the activity itself is not time. Time taken implies the instruments of time within it. Otherwise the usage of time would disappear. For example, a man with a staff is called "*dandī*" in relation to the staff he holds; if there is no staff he will not be called so. Similarly when associated with the substance of time (duration) an activity becomes time. Therefore one has to postulate time-substance.

V.22.27 (E688-689; T194-196) If activity were to be considered to be the only substance of time, then there would be no present. While weaving a cloth the thread that has been woven becomes the past, and that which still has to be woven

the future. Between them there is no past or future activity that can be called the present. Since past and future are relative to the present, if there is no present there will be no past or future.

Objection: The group of activities from the beginning to the end of an action is the present.

Answer: That contradicts your own statement. Earlier it was stated that action itself is time; now you say a group of activities is time. Then it cannot also be a group of momentary activities. Those who consider staying (the sign of abiding, *vartanālakṣaṇa*) to be different from time believe that from the beginning of the first trail onwards to the second instant the actions in time are considered to be subsisting from the substantial perspective and thus can be considered a group of activities. The group of activities of creating a pot, for example, is until completion labelled as a present continuous (as the pot is being made, it is happening) action. If, due to not being separated from an activity, time is denied existence, then the action and group of actions will also cease to be. Certain inclinations (*pravṛtti*) of the various declensions of nouns (*kāraka*) are known as their actions. The inclinations are not separate from the declensions and so likewise the parts of actions are also not different from the activity itself, just as crookedness is not separate from the serpent. Then both the action and the group will cease to exist. Action cannot divide anything other than action. We do not consider the lamp or its flickering to be purely momentary activities, since the light emanating from it is spread over many moments. In a group of activities there cannot be the divider-divided relationship since there cannot be a group of momentary actions.

Objection: Why not? Just as a group of momentary syllables become words and sentences, similarly actions can also form groups.

Answer: The momentarines of syllabic sounds is not proved, since spatially separated hearers can hear them. It is also not correct to assume that further new sounds are the

cause of this hearing. If the moment of the sound is produced it cannot produce another similar one, and it ceases to exist in the next moment. A substance is known as originating when it is about to come into existence. However, if it is not going to exist in the next moment, it cannot be said to have originated. If intelligence is also momentary, then the earlier awareness and the traces derived from past awarenesses cannot cause this intelligence. Groups do not have delimiting or piercing functions because momentary things do not have groups.

V.23.1-5 (E689-690; T201-202) The order in which sense-data are listed in the *sūtra* is defended.

V.23.7-10 (E690; T202) Soft, hard, heavy, light, cold, hot, rough and smooth; these are the eight basic varieties of touch. Taste is of five types: pungent, bitter, sour, sweet and astringent. Smells are of two varieties, fragrant and malodorous. Colors are of five types: blue, yellow, white, dark, and red. All these have transformations of one, two, three, four, numerate, innumerate, and infinite types.

(V.24. Pūjyapāda's text of this *sūtra* differs from Umāsvāti's, and lists a number of examples of modes of matter differing from Umāsvāti's.)

V.24.2-5 (E690-692; T209-213) (1) Words are of two types, linguistic and nonlinguistic. Linguistic words are of two types, syllabic and nonsyllabic. The scriptures are expressed through syllabic words, and they are in Sanskrit or other languages due to differences in usage by noble (*ārya*) and nonnoble speakers. Nonsyllabic words belong to the two-sensed, (etc.,) beings. Transcendental knowledge and omniscience causing apprehension of the self is in nonsyllabic words. Nonsyllabic sounds are of two types, experimental (*prāyogika*) and natural (*vaisrasika*). The sounds of clouds are experimental, and of four types: percussive, stringed, stuck and wind-blown. The sound of the instruments where skin is stretched over a drum is the percussive type. The sound from plucking instruments is the second. Striking on solid metal

instruments like a gong and cymbals is the third, and the flute and the conch-shell have the fourth kind of sound.

Mīmāṃsaka: Sounds are momentary, caused in succession and destroyed at the next moment. They get weakened in expressing their own nature, so they are themselves not capable of meaning. If sounds were capable of conveying meaning, then like a substance, each letter or syllable would be meaningful. If one syllable could convey meaning, then another would not be necessary as a material cause to form the word. Syllables in succession being collocated and thus becoming meaningful are also not possible. Therefore, in the expression of these sounds one has to recognize the eternal essence (*sphoṭa*) of a word expressed through sounds, an essence capable of expressing meaning, intangible and abstract, eternal, transcending the senses, without parts and inactive.

Answer: This view is not correct, since sound and meaning cannot be related as expresser-expressed. Is this *sphoṭa* established in itself or not? If yes, then what is the reason why the *sphoṭa* is not available before and after the sound? Is it too subtle, or is there some contradicting factor? If too subtle, then like space the *sphoṭa* should remain unavailable even during the time of the sound being produced. If the grossness of sounds appears with the removal of subtlety then sounds will not remain eternal, being modified. There is no obfuscating cause in this case like that of darkness in perceiving a pot. Darkness is not merely the absence of something, but has, like dark blue color, possibilities of increasing and decreasing, Therefore it is substantial. If the essence of words is not present and stable intrinsically, then meaning cannot be implied, nor are sounds capable of implying meaning; on the contrary, due to being available due to the sound-configuration it will be considered a function of those sounds. Besides, if the first sound reveals the *sphoṭa* of the word then what is the purpose of the subsequent sounds? If they reveal the area filled by the word then it will become

a whole having parts and not remain division-free. Again, if sounds were capable of revealing the *sphoṭa*, then do they help the *sphoṭa* or the ear or both? The sounds cannot help the *sphoṭa* (as the scent of the earth is revealed on watering the earth) because a sound is eternal and nothing can modify or increase it in that case. The abstract, eternal and suddenly revealed *sphoṭa* cannot have any modifications. A *sphoṭa* also cannot be compared to the kohl that aids the eye, since in deaf ears the *sphoṭa* cannot cause sound or meaning. A healthy ear may be helped so that it will hear the word. And if this function is possible also by sound the postulation of *sphoṭa* becomes unnecessary. Thus neither of the two is aided. Then again, if a sound can reveal a momentary *sphoṭa* where is the problem in their directly revealing meaning? Since they get destroyed immediately, how can they reveal a *sphoṭa*? Even the lamp is not momentary, as locations/substances distant from it are also lit. We do not accept difference in substance and function, and from the substantial point of view we accept it as abiding, not momentary. Also a sound *sphoṭa* cannot exist separately. A concrete and functional lamp is able to light up concrete and active pots, etc., but neither sounds nor their essence are concrete or functional. Also, if the *sphoṭa* is not separate from the sounds, then too, being the same, it will not have the capacity to reveal meaning. If different, then it should not be available to the organ of hearing. No example is available which can be both abstract, eternal and yet concrete, noneternal and with parts. Therefore it should be accepted that a word is of the nature of sounds, both eternal and noneternal (as *per* relative pluralism). It is eternal from the material substance point of view, and noneternal in its modal forms as being temporarily available to the organ of hearing in its changing modes.

V.24.6-8 (E692; T213-214) (2) Bonds are of two types, experimental and natural, and the latter is again of two types, having a beginning and beginningless. Forms of matter having harsh, smooth, etc. qualities include lightning, comets,

waterfalls, rainbows. What is beginninglessly bound includes time atoms, the space-point areas of a self, the media of motion, stasis and space, and various living beings.

V.24.9 (E692-693; T214-216) Effort (*puruṣārtha*) demands method (*vidhi*). "Natural" (*visrasā*) is the opposite of *vidhi*. Experiment (*prayoga*) means the coming together of a man's body, mind and speech. Effort fully done is called experimental (*prāyogika*). It is of two types, one relating to living beings and the other to nonliving. The bondage of lac, wood, etc. is that of nonliving things. Karmic matter and karmic helpers are related to both living and nonliving bonds. Bondage of karmic matter is of eight types beginning with veils of ignorance. Quasi-karmic bonds are related to the physical body. Bondage is again of five types. Securing chariots, with iron chains illustrates the (1) *ālapana* type of bondage. Joining bricks and mortar to build a wall or a house exemplifies the (2) *ālayana* sort. The lac in the wood is the (3) *saṃśeṣa* bondage. The bodily bindings of the material are fivefold, or fifteen types if the joint (4) *(sāṃyojaka)* bonds are also taken into account. Bodily bondages are of two types: having beginning and beginningless. The eight middle regions of space-points occupied by a being do not separate from each other, so they have a beginningless bond. Others, as *per* their karmic state, expand and contract, so those bonds have a beginning. Fifteen (5) *śarīra or* bodily bonds accrue to the body. Karma is that which is done by the collocation of the self in the body; therefore it is the primary cause of the slavery of the self. The time-periods of the stability of each type of bodily variety (material, transformative, karmic, fiery, and so on) is given in detail.

V.24.10-11 (T693; T216) (3) Subtle and (4) gross things are of two types, final and relative. The final subtlety is in the atomic particles; the relative one is in berries, rice grains, etc. Similarly with the other grossness, the final is in the *mahāskandhas* or large matter group, and the relative in the berries or fruits.

V.24.12-13 (T693; T217) (5) Forms can be of six types: sliced (as in cut planks of wood), powdered (as in granules of cereals), pieces (like the broken pieces of a pot), pulverized (like lentils), *pratara* (like slivers of mica), and ?-*anuchatana* (like sparks of fire when a hot iron is beaten).

V.24.16-17 (E693; T217-218) A body blocking the light causes (6) shadow. It is of two types. Those in clear substances, as in a mirror, are just shadows. The view of the Mīmāṃsakas, that the rays of light from the eyes collide with the mirror and return to see themselves, is not correct. There is no reflection as such. If there were then the eyes should be able to see their face when sight collides with bare walls. Similarly, when the rays return, then the face that faces east should be facing east and not west (as in a mirror). These rays from the eyes cannot perceive without the assistance of the mind.

V.25.1 (E695; T232) Those which transform by merely touching a space-point and are thus the subject of sound are atoms. They are very fine (subtle) and their beginning, middle and end are the same.

V.25.2 (E695; T232) More gross things, that can be received and kept, are aggregates or particles. Systematic explanation of why even a two-atom aggregate, though not visible, is included in this description.

V.25.3-4 (E695; T232) Both atoms and aggregates are plural to indicate their many varieties. Touches, tastes, smells and colors are atoms; sounds are groups (*skandha*) of atoms.

V.25.5-12 (E695; T232-234) The immediate atom is the cause, it is subtlest, eternal, has one taste, one smell and one color, has two noncontradicting touches. It is not correct to say that atoms are always causes, since as aggregated they become effects as well. Smoothness and other qualities continue to originate and decay in an atom, hence it is somewhat noneternal and cannot therefore be called exclusively eternal. If the effect has not taken place it cannot be called a cause. A father can be called a father only after the

son is born. An atom cannot have a shadow. The effect of an atom is invisible.

V.25.15 (E696; T234) Those atoms that have bonded together are called groups (*skandha*). They are of three types: *skandha, skandhadeśa, skandhapradeśa*. Infinite-infinite type of a particular bond is a group. Half of that is a *deśa* and a quarter of that is a *pradeśa*. Earth, water, fire and air are subtypes of these. Touch and sound variations are its modes. A pot and a cloth are the earth types of tangibles, Water too is a modification of matter, and it can have smell. It is incorrect to say that other scents create the scent in water and that it is by itself without any smell, since nowhere is there any water without smell. Smell is a corollary of touch, therefore of matter. Water has smell because it has taste, as in a mango. Fire too has touch and sound. Due to being the effects of matter, food when partaken creates the imbalances of the humors. Similarly air also has modes of touch and sound. *Vāta* means wind. Thus wind also has touch. So the contention of the Naiyāyikas--that earth has four qualities, water has only three, fire only two and air has only the quality of touch--is wrong.

V.26.1-4 (E697; T240-241) The separation of united aggregates due to external or internal reasons is called disjunction. Different things coming together and unifying is the opposite, conjunction (*saṃghāta*). The plural indicates that both might occur as causal conditions for the origination of matter groups.

V.26.5 (E697; T241) Grammatical detail: The contact of two atoms causes two-atomed groups. The contact of that with another atom causes a three-atomed group and so on. Similarly, numerate, innumerate and infinite space-pointed contacts cause that-many-atomed groups.

V.28 (E697; T245) Some groups become visible, others do not. If a group remains subtle, it will not be visible when other contacts occur; it must be gross to be visible.

Question: Why are motion and stasis called

"substances"? Earlier they were indicated as qualities.

V.29 (E698; T247) That which exists is substance. To answer the question as to what is the characteristic of substance, it may be said that any category that is within or outside the purview of the sense-organs and that due to external or internal causes has origin, existence and decay is a substance. Since the initiators of movement and of stasis were referred to as substances because they exist, the next *sūtra* defines "existence".

V.30.1-3 (E698; T247-248) When any conscious or unconscious substance, while not abandoning its intrinsic type (*svajāti*), undergoes modifications, that is origination, like a pot arising out of mud. The cessation of the earlier mode is decay (*vyaya*). In their eternal transforming nature substances do not decay or originate: as in a lump of clay and the pot, the clay remains.

V.30.4-7 (E698; T248-249) Question: Quibbling, one may speak of a man with a staff (*daṇḍin*) but they remain two separate substances.

Answer: Here the contact is a unity of existence. That origination, abiding and decay is existence is right; they are not something different from substance.

V.30.9 (E698; T249-250) Question: If they are not different from substance and substance is eternal, then origination, abiding and decay will be eternal. So we therefore say that origination, etc. are both different from and nondifferent from the substance.

V.30.10 (E699; T250) (Answer:) This involves a contradiction. Whatever arguments you use to deny our stipulations will also in turn negate your own. So your own opinion is fallacious!

V.30.11 (E699; T250-251) The substance that arises, subsists and decays and its modal variations are somewhat similar and somewhat dissimilar. So none of the extreme fallacies can occur. Just as due to relation the same man is father, son and husband, so there are many modes of

substance that are different from the substance as such, while in their substantial existence they are somewhat nondifferent.

V.31.1-2 (E699; T253-254) So apparently contradictory statements are not contradictory; rather, they represent recognition of different aspects of a thing from different perspectives.

V.32.1-4 (E699; T255-256) Every entity has many aspects. Some are prominent at one time, others at another. Some are cognized from a modal aspect, others from a substantive one.

V.33.1-5 (E700; T259-260) "Smooth" and "rough" are defined. They admit of degrees.

V.34.1-2 (E700; T60-261) "Quality" has many meanings. Here it refers to the having of parts. So one smooth atom canot combine with another smooth atom or with several smooth atoms, since in order to combine both entities must have parts.

V.35.1-5 (E701; T261-262) Thus atoms with similar numbers of parts or of the same size do not bind.

V.36.1 (E701; T262) Bondage can occur between things with more than two qualities, whether of the same or of different type. Examples are given.

V.37.1 (E701; T268) "Larger degree" here means having more qualities.

V.37.2 (E701; T268-269) "Transforms" means changing into another state. Together the binding creates a third unique aggregate. For example, yellow and blue will create green.

V.37.3-4 (E701; T269) The Śvetāmbara reading of the text here implies that two smooth entities can transform as two rough ones. But since this contradicts earlier statements it is not tenable.

V.37.5 (E701; T269) Similar and dissimilar of minimal number cannot combine. All this detail of binding is necessary to explain that within the space-points of the self these smooth or rough transformed infinite space-pointed karmic items are able to bind due to the joining capacity of the self

(*yogavyāpāra*).

V.38.1 (E702; T272-273) Even though qualities and modes are different from substance, still, just as, though there is no ring without the gold still a ring is different from gold, so it is here.

V.38.2 (E702; T273) Objection: "Quality" is a category of other schools, not of the Jain system. If there are qualities there should be a qualitative perspective in addition to the substantial and modal perspectives.

Answer: Scriptures mention qualities. A substance has two forms, specific and general. The general form is with respect to quality, the specific with respect to mode. Thus since quality is inherent in the substance the substantial perspective covers it--there is no need of a separate qualitative form.

V.38.3-4 (E703; T274) Or else, quality itself is modal, not origination, decay, etc., because there are no qualities other than modes.

V.39.1-2 (E703; T276) Since origin and decay is existence and modality (quality) is substance, time also must be a substance. Persistence (*dhrauvya*) is the primary characteristic of time, as time always persists. Time has the general qualities of being abstract, unconscious, subtle, and has special qualities such as causing things to happen. Decay and origination take place in time. Thus time is a substance.

V.41.1-4E703; T280-281) Qualities need a receptacle, a base. That which forever abides in a substance is its quality. Modes, though inherent in a substance, are revealed temporarily; thus substance is not their abode.

V.42.1-3 (E704; T282-283) The Jaina way does not agree with the Vaiśeṣikas who consider a quality to be separate from a substance. So we define transformation (*pariṇāma*): The metamorphoses of instigators of motion, etc., into their selfhood is transformation. Earlier the intrinsic natures of all substances have been told. Transformations are of two types: with and without beginning. The transformations

of the instigators of motion and stasis are without beginning. Ever since they were substances they have had these transformations. The other external devices have a beginning in time.

V.42.4 (E704; T283) Some say that media of motion and stasis, space and time have transformations without beginning, and matter aggregates are those with beginning. This is not correct. Since all substances have to be considered with perspectives, substantial and modal. Thus all will have *ab aeterno* transformations as well as those in time. The difference is that the four supersensible substances have both types of transformation as known through the scriptures, and those of living beings and matter are somewhat visible.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The summary is made by Ratna Lahiri on the basis of the edition and Hindi translation ("E" and "T" respectively) by Mahendra Kumar Jain (Bharatiya Jnanapith, Sixth edition 2001).

VII.1.1-3 (E533; T825) The definition of vows (*vrata*) is given as an intelligent renouncing of violence, falsehood, jealousy, non-self and accumulation (*parigraha*).

Intrinsic qualities of violence, etc., will be taken up later. Their cessation *(virati)* is defined as the condition arising naturally on removal, or automatic cessation (*kṣaya, kṣayopaśama* or *upaśama*) of character-veiling matter that occurs on the rising of right character leading to automatic renunciation.

VII.1.4-5 This refusal to indulge in violence arises out of an intelligent understanding of its consequences.

VII.1.6 Nonviolence is the first factor mentioned as it is the key factor. Like an encircling fire used to protect the rice-fields, all other vows merely protect nonviolence as the central value.

VII.1.7-9 A cessation should be applied to each of the renounceables separately. Each of the cessations could be of a

number of varieties according to the difference in the kind of violence, etc. that is given up, but here they are meant in general, therefore the singular ending is used.

VII.1.10-14 Question: Shouldn't austerities be discussed in the section dealing with stoppage of influx (*saṃvara*), since the eight type of purificatory controls (humility, walking, rules for eating, sleeping, sitting, truthfulness, etc.) would include these?

Answer: Vows should not be discussed with influx since these vows are a prelude to the stoppage of influx, which then automatically occurs, since the inflow of matter particles is stopped. Vows are not identical with inflows because they (vows) have a vibratory phase/state (*parispanda bhāva*).

VII.1.15-20 (E534; T725) Early evening meal is listed as the sixth subsidiary vow. However, since it is included in the rules for daylight meals, it is not mentioned separately.

Question: Since light is necessary, why can the light of a lamp or of the moon, not be permissible? Reasons are given why this is not acceptable.

VII.2 Great and Subsidiary Vows.

(E536-538; T726-728) The conceptualization of the vow of nonviolence and of the vow of truth. Conceptualization of the vows of nonstealing, abstinence and nonaccumulation. Analyzing the facets of nonviolent behavior. Analyzing the potential suffering in violence. Contemplation on friendliness, compassion, etc.

(E539-541; T729-730) The need to ponder upon the nature of the world and that of the body in order to arrive at the desire for emancipation and renunciation. Contemplations are possible in the permanent-nonpermanent self. Qualities (signs) of violence. Endorsement of violence is usually by ascetics having some negligence (*pramatta yogin*).

(E541-545; T730-733) Violence is not possible given the doctrine of momentariness. Qualities of falsehood. Qualities of non-stealing. Accepting things is not stealing. The non-negligent ascetic may accept objects through sense organs

without incurring the fault of stealth. Qualities of nonself, of nonaccumulation (acquiring knowledge, vision and good conduct is not accumulation), and qualities of undertaking vows. Nature of *māyā*, untruth, etc.

(E546-548; T733-735) Two types of vows--ascetic and householder, and the subsidiary subtypes. Delineation of vows related to directions, qualities and education, time-bound vows (*sāmayika*), nature of fasting related to auspicious festivals, nature of enjoyment, qualities of a guest, and the higher vows outside the limitation of directions.

(E549; T735) Five penalties, nature of false meditation, nature of exposition of sins, nature of wrongful trade, nature of indirect trade, nature of direction to kill, nature of performing a task, nature of indolent character, nature of accruing violence, of inauspicious hearing and avoiding bathing on fasting days.

(E550; T736) Causes of indolence, violence to insects, etc., four types of hospitality/guests, according to provision of food, medicine, space, and facilities.

(E550-551; T737) Description of voluntary death and its subtypes. Query answered regarding why it is not sinful like suicide. Method of voluntary death.

(E551-553; T738-739) Excesses of right faith. Difference between praising and adulation. Why only five excesses when there are eight limbs (*aṅga*)? Five possible excesses of seven vows and good conduct. Difference between the two. Excesses of subsidiary vows (for householders) of nonviolence, truth, non-stealing and abstinence.

(E555; T739) Definition and qualities of marriage. Excesses in vows related to accumulations during marriage. Excesses of directional vows and their subtypes according to intention.

(E556-557; T40-41) Excesses of place-related vows and other quantifying vows regarding indulgence, voluntary death, administering to guests, and festival fasting

(E559; T741) Qualities of auspicious donation

(generosity). Special qualities due to difference in method, substance, giver, and receiver. These do not apply to momentary or eternal aspects.

CHAPTER EIGHT

(This Chapter has been translated by N. L. Jain in *Jaina Karmology*, Parsvanatha Vidyapith Series No. 109, Varanasi 1998. This is the "T" for the corresponding following section of the following summary, made on the basis of T by Potter. Section numberings correspond to T.)

VIII.1.1-5 (T40-48). False belief, indiscipline and negligence were discussed under Chapter Six, section 5, and activities were discussed at 6.1.

VIII.1.6-1 False belief has two kinds: natural perversity, and that gotten from bad instruction. The latter is of four kinds: (1) advising action (e.g., Kaukila), (2) advising inaction (e.g., Ulūka, Kapila), (3) agnostics (e.g., Śakalya, Jaimini), (4) advising faith (Vasiṣīha). There are 363 wrong faiths in the world.

Objection: Jaimini and others teach about rituals described in the Vedas, so how are they "agnostics"?

Answer: Because they allow the killing of animals.

VIII.1.13-15. Objection: Sacrifical killing of animals is taught in the Vedas.

Answer: The Vedas are not scripture, since they advise violence. They are also inconsistent when they advise violence and also speak against it. Anyway, the Jain scriptures prohibit killing.

VIII.1.16-27 Doubts about the authority of the Jain scriptures are answered. More expressing abhorrence of violence whether in the course of a sacrifice or elsewhere. Taking life earns demeritorious karma whatever the motive. Vedic injunctions indicating any exceptions to this should be rejected as inauthentic. VIII.1.28 False beliefs are of five sorts: (1) exceptionless, denying the multiplicity of viewpoints;

mistaken, when one adopts a viewpoint opposite to the correct one, (3) doubtful, not being sure about the true tenets, (4) reverential, accepting all gods and texts uncritically, and (5) agnosticism, refusing to take sides on a question.

VIII.1.29-31 Indiscipline has twelve varieties, passions have twenty-five, and activities are of thirteen (or fifteen) kinds. Negligence has many varieties: examples are provided. All five cause bondage collectively as well as individually. Examples are given.

VIII.1.32 Objection: There is no difference between indiscipline and negligence.

Answer: There are fifteen types of indiscipline: four kinds of idle tales, five kinds of sense-objects, four passions and affections, and these are sometimes found in non-negligent beings.

VIII.1.33 Objection: There is no difference between passions and indiscipline: both are types of violence.

Answer: No. The passions cause one to indulge in violence, so they are different, as cause is different from effect.

VIII.6.4[1] (T84) Objection: Are the five (sense-perception, etc.) kinds of awarenesss when concealed existent or nonexistent? If existent how can they be concealed? If nonexistent, like a hare's horn they cannot be concealed!

Answer: There is no problem here. A thing can be existent in some respects and not in others. As substances visions may be concealed, though they are nonexistent--concealed--with respect to one or another of their modes. Only existents can be obscured. So it is not that awarenesss-concealing karma appears in the self; rather, we can be aware that there is such karma there, though it does not appear.

VIII.10.3-4 (T112) Objection: It is the proper or

1 Since Akalaṅka counts what Umāsvāti treats as two verses 2-3 as only one verse (2), all the subsequent verses are numbered one less in N. L. Jain's translation than the number of the passage in our summary of the *Tattvārthasūtra*.

improper intake of food which causes life or death of a living being (and not one's life-span (*āyuṣ)*.

Answer: Food is only the helper. Just as it is dirt that is the fundamental cause of the jar, and not the potter, likewise the fundamental cause of one's length of life is his life-span. This is shown as well by the fact that though hellish and celestial beings do not ingest food their birth and death cannot be due to food.

VIII.11 (T114-123) Each of the forty-two kinds of karmic outcome are defined.

VIII.13 (T130-131) :...donation, etc.": the five kinds of obstructing karma are: (1) donation-obstructing , (2) gain-obstructing, (3) experience-obstructing, (4) repeated experience-obstructing, and (5) energy-obstructing. The difference between "experience" and "repeated experience" is explained as the difference between an experience had only once, such as a particular food or drink, and a type of experience enjoyed several times, such as sleeping.

VIII.15-20 (T136-140) The minimum and maximum duration of the karmas of each of the eight sorts distinguished in VIII.6-14 are calculated.

CHAPTER NINE

("E" and "T" references for this and the tenth Chapter that follows are to page numbers from the Bharatiya Jnanpith (Sixth Edition, 2001) as previously. The summary, based on the translation from M. K. Jain's Hindi, is by Ratna Lahiri.)

(E586; T760) 1-3 Stoppage of influx of karma is known as *saṃvara*. All such activities of mind, body and action that may produce influx cease.

6-9 Nature and types of influx. When false visions, etc. cease due to adequate controls, both substantial and modified types of influx stop.

10-11 It is necessary to understand the fourteen stages of progression in order to know the nature of cessation of influx.

(E587-590; T760-762) The fourteen stages are explained in detail.

(E591; T763) The natural causes of each stage are gradually eradicated, thus resulting in the cessation of inflow.

(E592; T764) Other causes of cessation of inflow are restraint, caution (*samiti*), virtue (*dharma*), reflection, endurance of afflictions (*pariśahajaya*), and moral character (*cāritra*). Austerities also cause destruction of karmas. Even though austerity results in spiritual evolution, its primary effect is dissolution of karmic particles.

(E493; T764) Signs of liberation.

(E593; T765) Precautonary disciplines while walking, in speech. Fourteen conditions of the living self (*jīvasthāna*). Precautions in speech, desire, eating habits. It is preferable not to have a place, as it would cause accumulation.

(E595-596; T766-767) Forgivenness, etc.: ten types of virtuous living. The need for virtue. Higher forms of forgivenness: lack of ego, simplicity, total lack of greed, and four types of lack of desire for life, health, indulgence or pleasures. Truth and its related controls. Types of controls to be practised while walking, going for alms, especially nonviolence, cleanliness. Type of house from which alms should be sought. Lack of interest towards dress, etc., of the giver or the type of vessel in which alms are brought.

(E596-598; T767-768) Eight type of purificatory rites should controls lapse at any time. Austerities, renunciation, poverty, celibacy, seven types of repentance.

(E600-602; T770-771) Types of contemplation of the ephemeral, unity, multiplicity, etc. Their subtypes and details. Purity and impurity. Contemplation of pros and cons of influx, control, dissolution, etc.

(E604-606; T777-784) The fourteen paths. The corresponding order of the stages of progress and the condition or state of mind.

(E608-612; T777-784) Importance of enduring afflictions. Twenty-two types of afflictions.

(E613; T782) Other views on afflictions, their subtypes and detailed analysis.

(E616; T784) Four types of right character; five types of vows pertaining to attainment, and abandoning all sinful acts.

(E618; T784) Fasting, etc.: six types of outer austerities.

(E620-621; T785-788) Six types of internal austerities like expiatory practices. Nine types of atonement; need for atonement and detailed analysis of its subtypes. Prescribed atonements for various types of transgressions. The four types of humilities. Service to the traditional teachers.

(E623; T788) Nature of the ideal preceptor (*ācārya*). Nature of teachers, *sādhu, kula*, family of the tradition of renunciates to be included.

(E624; T789) Types of self-study--lecturing, asking relevant questions, contemplation, traditional treatises, and sermonizing. Need for self-study.

(E624; T789) Renunciations and subtypes thereof. Need for renouncing all these.

(E627-633; T791-795) Four types of meditation; detailed analysis of each, subtypes of each, and indications of omniscience related to type of meditation, the last being the highest.

(E634-635; T795-796) Secondary verbal awareness transitions (*vicāra*) and scriptural knowledge (*vitarka*).

(E636; T797) Phases in rise of right vision.

(E636-638; T797-799) Five types of passionless ascetics (*nirgrantha*). Details of each stage of their evolution.

CHAPTER TEN

(E639; T800) Causes for the rise of omniscience in stages. Phases in the dissipation of attachments; their three instruments.

(E640; T801) Causes of liberation. The universe has an end even if no beginning. Two methods of actionlessness and phases thereof.

(E643; T802) Liberated beings (*siddha*) do not backslide. Their interaction. Their utterly blissful existence.

No transition of space-points due to absence of personality-producing karma.

The state of emancipation is not negative. With destruction of karma-related bonds, the self rises upwards to higher regions. Causes of rising upwards.

(E645; T803-804) Examples of rising upwards. Reason for not exceeding the outer limits of the universe.

(E646-648; T804-805) Subtypes of liberated beings with a view of their areas of occupation.

(E649-650; T806-808) Phases of states from arousal of right vision to ultimate liberation. Stages of contemplation of the ultimate essentials. Infinite bliss of the free.

HARIBHADRA SŪRI (770)

H. R. Kapadia in his Introduction to Vol. 105 of the Gaekwad's Oriental Series (Baroda 1947) (hereafter referred to as Kapadia 1947) discusses the dating of this author, especially as regards his relation to Śaṃkarācārya, who is frequently regarded as having lived at the same time.

S. R. Bhide and V. B. Inamdar, in their edition and translation of Haribhadrasūri's *Samarāichchakathā* (Sixth Embodiment), Poona 1953, pp.3-4, provide the following information about the author's life and times. "He was the pupil of Jinadatta who was an ornament of the Vidyādharagaccha. He obeyed the command of the Śvetāmbara Ācārya Jinabhaṭa or Jinabhadra according to Munichandra, a commentator of one of our author's works. He was born (in) Chitrakūṭa, the modern Chitor. He was a Brahmin by birth since it is mentioned in the *Prabhāvakacarita* of Prabhācandra that he was the *purohita* of king Jitāri or Jitashatru...(I)t was chiefly Haribhadra who was responsible for the use of Sanskrit by many Śvetāmbaras in their writings

and discussions. He was converted to the Jaina faith only after he had received the customary orthodox training of a Brahmin pundit."

"After his initiation into the Jaina order he left Chitor and started his peripatetic career like all other monks. The principal scene of his activity was North Gujarat and Rajasthan...He must have wandered for a considerable length of time and studied the Buddhist philosophy also, side by side with the propagation of his own."

He is known to students of Buddhist thought for his commentary on Dignāga's *Nyāyamukha*.

35. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Anekāntajayapātaka* and *Ṭīkā* or *Vṛtti* thereon

This work and its commentary are edited with Municandra Sūri's commentary by H. R. Kapadia in two volumes (#s 88, 1939 and 105, 1947) of the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda. In the second, 1947 volume, pp. xvii-xxi (Kapadia 1947), some information about this work is given (p. xix): "Subject--Exposition of *avagraha* etc. occurs in Vol. I, p. 175 and ff." (i.e., in Vol. 88 of the Gaekwad's Series containing the first part of Kapadia's translation of the work), "and examination of the definition of *pratyakṣa* and its *nirvikalpatva* is dealt with in this section. Refutation of *samavāya* is met with on pp. 93-94 and that of *sphoṭa* on p. 391 & ff. *Apoha* is treated on p. 318 and ff. In the last section the Jaina view about austerity is stated. It emphasizes the fact that mortification of flesh is not the goal of the Jainas. On the contrary, it is to be discouraged, in case it interferes with the natural working of sense-organs and the mind. Holy reflections are also a part and parcel of austerity which has been clearly and correctly defined in Vol. II" (i.e., the Volume from which this passage is quoted) "on pp. 218-219."

"Style--Though Haribhadra is not a grammarian (at least no work on grammar is attributed to him), he is concise in

expressions, chaste in language and precise in thoughts as if he is writing a work on grammar. He gives examples and mentions *nyāyas* to illustrate the discussions in question..."

As for the commentary, which Kapadia knows as *Uddyotadīpikā* or *Vyākhyā*, the following information comes from the same source: "It is in prose intercepted by verses most of which are quotations. Dissolution of compounds, elucidation of difficult words and that of relative pronouns, incidental mention of the source of quotations, and the things indicated by *ādi* are the most prominent features of this commentary."

Kapadia also attributes to Haribhadra still another commentary in Sanskrit, basing himself on two references, one in the previously-mentioned commentary itself. He says that there is a manuscript of this commentary at the Bhandrakar Oriental Research Institute and that he has described it elsewhere.[90]

Kapadia also notes that this work and its commentary mention at least five others of Haribhadra's works, viz., *Anekāntasiddhi, Ātmasiddhi, Sarvajñasiddhi* and its *Ṭīkā, Syādvādakucodyaparihāra* and *Śāstravarttasamuccaya* are referred to. Of these, the fourth is not known to the Editor of this Volume.

It should be noted that several works not listed here are attributed to Haribhadra Sūri. Our list should be viewed as a sample based on our judgment that the works listed below are among the more philosophically-oriented than others.

36. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Anekāntapraghaṭṭa*

NCat I, 220 directs us to p. xxviii of (the first volume of) Kapadia's edition of Haribhadra's #35 above, constituting Gaekwad's Oriental Series 88, for information on this text.

37. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Anekānta(vāda)praveśa*

Kapadia 1947, p. xxii, notes: "This is a very small work in Saṃskṛta. It is composed probably with a view to helping the beginner to master the bigger and more difficult work *Anekāntajayapātaka*. This looks like its epitome with reproductions word for word in several places with this difference that here the Yogācāra section of AJP is not at all treated."

"The total extent of *Anekānta(vāda)praveśa* is 720 *ślokas*, and it mainly deals with five topics viz. (1) *sadasattvavāda*, (2) *nityānityatvavāda*, (3) *sāmānyaviśeṣatvavāda*, (4) *abhilāpyānabhi-lāpyatvavāda*, (5) *mokṣatvavāda* The views of the non-Jaina schools regarding these topics are represented in the beginning. The major portion of the work is occupied by the refutation of these views; for, it covers pp. 9 to 65 out of 1 to 65."

"This work together with *Ṭippaṇaka* was published at Pattan in the Hemacandrācārya Granthāvalī in 1919 A.D. It was translated into Gujarati by the late Manilall Nabhubhai Dvivedi in 1899 A.D. and this translation was published by Baroda, Educational Department."

38. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Anekāntasiddhi*

V. P. Johrapurkar, in his Introduction (in Hindi) to his edition of Bhāvasena's *Viśvatattvaprakāśa* (Sholapur 1964), p. 62, identifies this work as by the author of work #35. Kapadia is not so sure; see p. xxiii of Kapadia 1947, ibid.

39. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Laghuvṛtti* on *Anuyogādvārasūtra*

Kapadia 1947, p. liii, finds a number of titles used to designate this commentary--e.g., *Vivṛti, Śiṣyahitā, Vivaraṇa.* He indicates (p. liii) that the work has been published by R. K. Samstha, Ratlam 1928.

40-41. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, Two *Vṛttis* on the *Āvaśyakasūtras*

Kapadia 1947 says (p. liv) "The extent of (the *Bṛhadvṛtti*) is mentioned as 84,000 *ślokas* in *Añcalagacchapaṭṭāvalī*"; the length of the shorter (*Laghu*) he gives as merely 22,500 *ślokas*! He also reports that the shorter commentary "contains elucidation of *Jñāṇasaya* (Skt. *Dhyānaśataka*) of Jinabhadra Gaṇi."

The smaller commentary has been edited a number of times; cf. Bibliography, Third edition, for details.

42. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Dharmabindu*

On this work we have a brief description by H. R. Kapadia 1947, pp. xxvi-xxvii: "This is a Saṃskṛta work. It is divided into eight *adhyāyas* (sections). It is mostly in prose. It opens with a verse. The treatment is in a *sūtra* style. Section I deals with the duties of an ordinary house-holder whereas the next with those of a special one. In the latter is pointed out the way in which a religious sermon should be delivered. Section III explains the vows of the Jaina laity, their transgressions, etc. Sections IV and V furnish us with a picture of the Jaina monastic life. Activities of the two types of the Jaina saints form the subject-matter of section VI. Section VII deals with the fruits of religion, and the next with the description of a Tīrthaṅkara and the nature of the liberated." Numerous editions are noted in our Bibliography, Third edition, p. 332.

43. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Laghuvṛtti* on the *Jīvājīvābhigamasūtra*

Kapadia 1947, p. lix: "There is a palm-leaf Ms. of it in *A Descriptive Catalogue of Mss. in the Jain Bhandaras at Pattan* (by L. B. Gandhi on the basis of the notes of the late C. D. Dalal), Gaekwad's Oriental Series 76, Baroda 1937.

44. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Lokatattvanirṇaya*

Kapadia 1947, pp. xxxiv-xxxv: "This is a small work in Saṃskṛta. From the opening verse it appears that the title of this work is *Nṛtattanigraha*; but its popular title is somehow *Lokatattvanirṇaya*, and it occurs in the colophon. This work comprises 147 (75 + 35 + 37) verses in different metres. Thus this work gets divided into three sections. In I, 23-31 undesirable activities of Viṣṇu, Śambhu, Śakar, Haladhara, Skanda, Ārya (Ambikā), Vinayaka, Brahman, Sūrya, Anala, Soma and Indra are referred to. The author condemns these acts; but he is sufficiently broad-mineded to bow to one who is really dispassiontate, though he may be named as Brahman, Viṣṇu, Śaṅkara or Hara. This work describes the nature of the universe (I, 42-75) and states various views about its creation. The next topic is the nature of the soul (II, 3-11). This is followed by the exposition of the doctrine of *karman*, etc., as propounded in the non-Jaina schools of philosophy (II, 12-35). Here the universe is explained according to the views of those who lay undue emphasis on *svabhāva*, *niyati* or *pariṇāma*. It then states the Jaina view (III, 1-37) and thereby refutes the

non-Jaina ones previously noted...It may be observed that some of the verses of this work practically tally with those of *Bhagavadgītā*". These are listed (p. xxxv), as well as parallels with certain Upaniṣads.

In addition to the editions listed in Bibliography, Third Edition, p. 333 Kapadia mentions an edition with Gujarati translation published in 1921 as Haṃsavijayaji Jaina Free Library Series 10.

45. HARIBHADRA SURI, *Vivaraṇa* on the *Nandīsūtras*

This work is referred to by Kapadia 1947, p. lx, as Nandyadhyayanaṭīkā. "It has certain Paīya passages in common with *Nandīcuññī*. There are quotations in Saṃskṛta and Paīya. Of them, one on p. 81 is the first verse of *Āptamīmāṃsā*, and one on p. 53 is from *Pramāṇavārttika* (I, 36)...(T)here is mention of the names of Jinabhadra Gaṇi, Siddhasena and Vṛddhācārya. Of these, the first is referred to as the spokesman of those who believe that *kevala-jñāna* and *kevala-darśana* do not co-exist, the second that of such persons who hold the opposite view, and the third, of those who look upon these two *upayogas* as non-distinct....Siddhasena, here referred to, is not to be confounded with Siddhasena Divākara..., for his view tallies with that of Vṛddhācārya."

The work is published by R.K.Samstha from Ratlam in 1928.

46. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Vyākhyā* on a *Pañcasūtraka*

The *Pañcasūtraka* is one of many Jain works of unknown vintage which are revered for providing sound advice for the Jain aspirant. The name of its author is unknown; some suspect that Haribhadra himself may have composed it.[91] In any case Haribhadra has written a commentary on it. We provide Jambuvijaya's summary of the work itself, which no doubt leans heavily on the commentary.

"E" references are to the edition contained in Jambuvijaya's publication and the summary itself appears on pp. 33-37.

Summarized by Jambuvijaya

1. (E1-23) *Pañcasūtraka* opens with an homage to the Arhats (Tirthaṅkaras) who thus expound their doctrine: Here (in this world) the soul is eternal; and because of its association with *karman* since beginningless time, it wanders in this external *saṃsāra*, which is full of misery, suffering, and grief. One can put an end to this *saṃsāra* by adopting the right *dharma* (which consists of right faith, knowledge and conduct). One can obtain this *dharma* by annihilating sinful *karmans*; and these are destroyed by ripening (or fully developing) *tathābhavyatva* which is inherent in each individual. To ripen or fully develop this capability there are three means: (i) *Catuḥśaraṇa-gamana* (taking the four-fold refuge, namely, that of the *arhats*, the *siddhas*, the *sādhus* and the (Jina-) *dharma*. (ii) *Duṣkṛtagarhā* (Censuring one's evil deeds) and (iii) *Sukṛtāsevana* (Praising or approving of good deeds of others).

One should cherish ideas and feelings like the following: "I am ignorant and sinful and subjected to delusion since eternity; I am ignorant of what is advantageous or disadvantageous to me. May I know it (through the grace of the Arhats, etc.) and may I refrain from doing what is disadvantageous and practise only what is advantageous. With the conviction that it is to my advantage may I always and ever be of service to all beings."

The inauspicious *karmans* of one who reads or hears and reflects on the import of this *sūtra* are destroyed and the auspicious *karmans* produce good results like a sovereign drug, when taken as *per* physician's prescription.

2 (E24-33) When a strong desire to adopt the *anuvratas* (partial renunciation of violence, etc.), meant for a *śrāvaka* (householder) rules one's heart, one should first reflect on

their nature, their inherent goodness, their fruit accompanying one in one's next birth, their beneficence, their being the indirect cause of liberation, their being difficult to practise and also the dreadful consequences of violating them such as being subject to delusion, and other difficulties in the way of adopting them. One should, thereafter, adopt them in accordance with the prescribed rules and to the best of his abilities. These vows are: Partial renunciation or abstention from (i) any injury to living beings (ii) telling lies (iii) theft (iv) sexuality and (v) possessing property. He should also adopt the three *guṇavratas*: (i) *dig-virati*--limiting one's movements to a particular direction, east, west, etc.; (ii) *bhogopabhoga*-(or *upabhoga-paribhoga)parimāṇa*--setting a limit as to articles of use, such as food, drink, clothing, etc.; and (iii) *arthadaṇḍaviramaṇa*--refraining from all unvirtuous or unprofitable acts; and the four *śikṣāvratas*: (1) *sāmāyika*--equanimity or inward peace obtained by desisting from all evil; (ii) *deśāvakāśika*--limiting every day the distance to be traversed in that particular direction (to which one has limited one's movements under the vow of *digvirati*); (iii) *pauṣadhopavāsa*--observing fast on the eighth and the fourteenth day of each fortnight and on the full-moon day and the new-moon day (thus a Jain layman is asked to observe six fasts in a month); and (iv) *atithi-saṃvibhāga*--offering charities to guests (*atithi*) or to pious men of the Jain sect, such as monks, nuns, laymen and laywomen.

After adopting these vows the *śrāvaka* should strive hard to practise them. He should always study and reflect on the doctrine of the Jinas. For the doctrine is the greatest antidote against the poison of delusion, water that extinguishes the fire of hatred (and other passions), medicine for the disease of *karman* and the wish-yielding tree which produces the fruit of liberation. He should avoid all evil things, contact with irreligious people, and all immoral habits acquired from beginningless time. Compassionate to all beings, he should avoid whatever is disliked by men in general and is

against the ways of the world. He should take to religious people who are his friends. He should observe the code of conduct prescribed for a householder always and ever guarding the activities of his mind, body and speech. He should avoid all sinful activities. He should not even think of causing harm to others. He should make gifts, enjoy himself, keep retinue and make savings in proportion to his earnings. He should not torment his attendants but should be compassionate to them. He should develop, however, no sense of attachment to them. All the souls are separate from one another and the sense of ownership or mineness is the root-cause of bondage. He should be circumspect in carryng out his duties as householder keeping all the while in mind his station in life, the family to which he belongs, the preceptor whose pupil he is, and the vows he has made. He should think of his age and the duties that are proper for that age. He should reflect on the harsh realities of life: "The pleasures of the senses are worthless, transient and bitter or unpleasant in the end. Death is dreadful, all-destructive and strikes one at any time, and that it is irresistible, and that it leads to the cycle of birth and death again and again. The only remedy against death is *dharma*, which is all pure, practised by great personages, beneficial to one and all and the source of the highest happiness of liberation."

3 (E34-44 The *śrāvaka*, who has deeply reflected on the stage of a monk, who is disgusted with *saṃsāra* and who is intent on attaining liberation, should strive to enter the ascetic order without offending others, say one's parents. Offending others (one's parents) is an obstacle in the way of entering the ascetic order. No good results from a wrong beginning. If the parents are not already enlightened, he should first try to enlighten them with the following arguments: "The life, which is successful both here and hereafter, is really praiseworthy. *Karmans* done in company yield the fruit in company. If we take to asceticism in company, we would not be separated from one another for many births to come. Otherwise, we

would be separeated from one another like the birds who frequent a tree and the fly away. Death is irresistible and imminent. Human birth is as difficult to obtain as a gem fallen in an ocean. There are many other states of existence, no doubt, but they are full of sorrow clouded by delusion, end in misery and are not suited to the practice of *dharma*. It is in human existence also that one can attain liberation. The state of liberation is fit to be attained as it is free from birth, old age, and death and as there is no separation from desired things nor union with undesired things; there is neither hunger nor this nor any other trouble or suffering. In that state the soul is totally independent and free from the feelings of love, hatred, etc., and is full of peace and happiness and free from all kinds of trouble.

Contrary to this state of liberation is the nature of *saṃsāra*. It is unsteady. Even the so-called happy are really unhappy; the existent is non-existent; and every thing is transient or unreal like a dream. Therefore one should not be attached to this *saṃsāra*."

If the parents refuse to be enlightened he should arrange for their maintenance. It is gratefulness indeed. Compassion is the very mother (source) of the elevation (exaltation) of *dharma*. He may, if need be, employ deceitful means to obtain the consent of his parents to enter the ascetic order. For, after all, following the *dharma* contributes to the welfare of all. If they refuse permission, he should desert them with a view to bringing the medicine of true belief (*samyaktva*) to them. They might, perchance, be saved. He should, however, give no offence to his parents--keeping in mind the glorious example of Lord Mahāvīra who did not enter the ascetic order during the life-time of his parents, who were very fond of him. He should however, remember that any separation from the parents for a beneficial purpose or a good cause need not be understood as desertion, though it really is so. The cause however is more important when he sees the long-term benefit of his ascetic life.

Thus without causing pain to others he should first worship the Jinas, pay homage to the monks, give gifts to the needy, put on auspicious garments and at an auspicious hour enter the ascetic order in the presence of a good (spiritual) preceptor. He should scrupulously practise the rules of conduct prescribed for a monk and never violate them.

4 (E45-65) To a monk who seeks liberation, a clod of earth and gold are alike, a friend and a foe are the same. Such a monk becomes free from the sorrows resulting from attachment and enjoys happiness and peace of mind (resulting from non-attachment). He stays with his spiritual teacher. He is devoted to him, he is modest, knows the true nature of things and rightly believes that nothing else is more beneficial than a stay with his preceptor. He attentively studies the sacred texts and carefully observes various injunctions. He knows that if the religious injunctions studied by him are not observed, they are as good as not studied at all. The non-observance leads neither to liberation nor heaven; trangression leads, no doubt, to calamities but this transgression may be regarded as the remote means of liberation--as it forms the first step on its path. The monk observes the five *samitis* (carefulness in walking, speech, etc.) and the three *guptis* (restraint of body, mind and speech), together regarded as the eight mothers of the Doctrine. He knows that just as a child deserting its mother perishes, even so a monk who repudiates these eight mothers perishes.

He knows very well that right conduct is like a safe island in this ocean of *saṃsāra*, a lamp in the darkness of delusion. Without any delusion and any eagerness for attaining the fruit of liberation, he observes the rules of right conduct.

Becoming purer and purer day by day he is released from sinful *karmans*. Thereafter with his mind all pure, he practises self-control and austerities and undistracted by troubles and suffering caused by hunger, thirst, etc., he gets rid of *karmans* and experiences the joys of peace of the soul like a leper who has been restored to health through

treatment.

Knowing the mind of his preceptor he acts up to it and thus honors him. "One who accepts me from the bottom of one's heart also respects his preceptor"--this is the teaching of the Lord. Any religious acts performed without respect to his preceptor are really as good as not performed. Such acts, like the fasts, etc., observed by an unchaste woman, do not bring him the fruit of liberation but make him wander in this *saṃsāra* and therefore are condemned by the wise.

Respect for one's preceptor is the surest means to attain liberation. The monk, who has the highest respect for his preceptor, never swerves from the right path to liberation. He comes to possess spiritual qualities and he excels even gods in respect of happiness. He swims against the current of this worldly life and as he observes thoroughly the duties of a monk he is called a *yogin*

5 (E66-81) The *mumukṣu,* strictly observing the rules of conduct for an ascetic, attains perfection, realises his true self. He is neither sound, nor color, nor odor, nor taste, nor touch (because of his *siddha* state he is absolutely free from these qualities of *pudgala*-matter). He exists eternally without a form--in a formless state. He is all bliss. This bliss of a *siddha* (a liberated soul) is absolute and independent of anything and everything else. He has absolutely no touch or contact even with space. It is the very nature of soul to rise upwards when completely freed from *karmans* and enjoy its innate and infinite (faith, knowledge, power and) bliss. This bliss cannot be compared with anything else. An idea of it, however, could be given by an illustration. The bliss or perfect happiness of a *siddha,* attained after conquering the internal enemies like attachment, hatred, etc., is infinitely greater than the happiness one gets when all of one's enemies are destroyed, diseases cured, the riches attained and the desires fulfilled. The perfect happiness of a *siddha* cannot be known to others, just as the happiness of an ascetic cannot be known to a non-ascetic or as that of good health to a sick man. The

soul, even if bound by *karmans* from beginningless time, can be separated from them as gold from ore (in accordance with the illustration of *kāñcana* and *upala*). The concepts of bondage and liberation are best--satisfactorily and logically--explained if they are related to the different states of the soul without bringing in the (Sāṃkhya) concept of *didṛkṣā* (desire to see). Again, *karman* is neither identical with the soul, nor is it imaginary; and liberation is not just the absence of worldly existence. It is not of the nature of the destruction of *santāna*--like the blown-out/extinguished flame of a lamp (as held by some followers of Buddha).

In brief, the perfect happiness enjoyed by a liberated soul is infinite. The liberated souls--*siddhas*--dwell at the top of the universe (*lokākāśa*). Infinite liberated souls dwell in as much place as occupied by one *siddha* (liberated soul). The liberated soul, as soon as freed from the eight-fold *karmans*, rises upwards to the top of the universe just as a gourd-fruit, with its eight layers of clay completely loosened, rises to the surface from the river-bed.

This doctrine of the Jinas is free of all defects and is appreciated by persons who do not attract *karmans* afresh and who follow the path of right conduct. Never should it be imparted to undeserving or unqualified persons. This instruction is issued with a view to favoring the undeserving or the unqualified in accordance with the illustration of *āmakumbhodakanyāsa* (pouring water in an unbaked earthen jar). Just as water when poured in an unbaked jar destroys that jar even so the imparting of secret doctrine ruins the undeserving or unqualified. Not imparting it to them is, indeed, compassion shown to them.

47. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*

A brief survey of some philosophical systems. "ET" here is the edition with translation by M. Sivakumara Swamy, Bangalore 1977. There are many other editions, see Bibliography, Third Edition.

1-3 (ET3-5) After a salutation to Jina, the propounder of the doctrine of viewpoints, it is said that there are only six *darśanas*: Buddhism, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Jain, Vaiśeṣika and "Jaiminīya", i.e., Pūrvamīmāṃsā.

4-11 (ET11-20) Buddhism. The four noble truths; five aggregates; twelve sense-bases, two instruments of true cognition. Perception is defined as free from conceptual construction and nonerroneous.

12-32 (ET24-51) Nyāya. God (*deva*) is described as creator and destroyer, all-pervasive, eternal, omniscient and eternally knowing. Sixteen categories (*tattva*) (as in *Nyāyasūtra* I.1); four instruments of true cognition; three kinds of inference (*pūrvavat*, etc.); fallacies; ways to lose an argument.

33-43 (ET55-65) Sāṃkhyas are divided into theistic (*seśvara*) and atheistic (*nirīśvara*). Twenty-five principles (*tattva*); three *guṇas*; three instruments of true cognition.

44-58 (ET70-81) Jainism. Jina described as passionless, omniscient, having destroyed all karma. Nine categories (*tattva*); right awareness, action and yoga; two instruments of true cognition, immediate and mediate. Their objects have endless properties.

59-67(ET84-89) Vaiśeṣika. They are said to agree with Nyāya about god(s) (*devatā*). Six categories (*tattva*); nine substances; twenty-four qualities; five kinds of motion; two kinds of universals, higher (*sattā*) and lower (substanceness, etc.); individuators and inherence standardly explained. (No mention of absence as a category.)

68-77 (ET92-98) Jaiminīyas deny an omniscient, authoritative god; so the meaning of the eternal Vedas needs to be ascertained through studying the Vedas and inquiring into *dharma*, i.e., Vedic injunctions. Six instruments of true cognition.

78-end (ET99-end) Cārvāka. This is the sixth system if you count Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika as one system; it denies God, liberation, merit and demerit and their results. There is

nothing beyond what is grasped by the senses. The body is only an aggregate; consciousness comes when earth, water, air and fire (or light) combine. It is foolish to seek the unseen (*adṛṣṭa*).

48. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Sarvajñasiddhi* and *Svopajña* thereon

Kapadia 1947, pp. l-li, tells us: "The text is a Saṃskṛta *prakaraṇa*. It opens with..(a)...verse whereby the author salutes a Tīrthaṅkara...The purpose of composing *Sarvajñasiddhi* is dilated upon in v. 2-9. Verses 10-21 state the arguments usually advanced by those who do not admit an omniscient being. These are refuted in prose passages followed by 25 verses. Then we have a prose passage and then again 22 verses...The text "has been published in 14 pages...by R. K. Samstha, Rutlam, in 1924 A.D." The com(mentary) is so far unpublished."

49. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Śāstravārtasamuccaya* and *Dikpradā* thereon

Kapadia 1947, pp. xxxviii-xli: "The text is in Saṃskṛta in verses. It examines, refutes and reconciles some of the views of the non-Jaina schools and sects in a spirit which is highly laudable as the author respectfully refers to the opponents and does not stoop low as some critics do...The text consists of 700 verses whereas the extent of this commentary (*Dikpradā*) comes to 2,250 *ślokas* (one *śloka* being equal to 32 letters). The main topics dealt with in this work are:"

"(i) The establishment of the existence of 'soul' and refutation of the Lokāyata system of thought, (ii) the Jaina viewe about violence (*hiṃsā*), and the denouncement of the *hiṃsā* sanctioned by the Vedas, (iii) the theory of causation-

five factors examined, (iv) refutation of the Sāṃkhya system, (v) criticism of the views of Dharmakīrti and other Bauddhas, (vi) the Jaina view about reality, (vii) refutation of Brahmādvaita, (viii) establishment of omniscience and refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka view in this connection and (ix) the nature of liberation."

Kapadia identifies a number of passages quoted by Haribhadra in this work from Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Bhartṛhari, Kumārila and the Bhagavadgītā.

The work has been edited many times; cf. Bibliography, Third Edition, p. 334.

50. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Ṣoḍaśakaprakaraṇa*

Kapadia 1947, pp. xliv-xlvi, discusses this work, and we quote him: "This is a small treatise written in Saṃskṛta, in verse, in Ārya. It is divided into 16 *adhikāras* each of which is styled as *ṣoḍaśaka* in the printed edition..."

"The subject of each of the *adhikāras* is as follows:--"

"(1) Examination of dharma (*dharmaparīkṣā*), (ii) preaching (*deśanā*), (iii) characteristics of *dharma* (*dharmalakṣaṇa*), (iv) characteristics of one desiring dharma (*dharmaicchukaliṅga*), (v) attainment of transcendental principles (*lokottaratattvaprāpti*), (vi) a Jaina temple (Jaina *mandira*), (vii) a Jaina idol (Jaina *bimba*), (viii) ceremony of consecration (*pratiṣṭhāvidhi*), (ix) nature of worship (*pūjāsvarūpa*), (x) fruition of worship (*pūjāphala*), (xi) characteristics of *śrutajñāna*), (xii) renunciation (*dikṣā*), (xiii) modesty to a preceptor (*guruviṇaya*), (xiv) types of yoga (*yogabheda*), (xv) nature of one to be contemplated (*dhyeyasvarūpa*) and (xvi) balance of mind (*samarasa*)."

In addition to the several editions listed in Bibliography, Third Edition, p. 334 one should add "edited by R. K. Samstha, Rutlam, *saṃvat* 1992."

51. HARIBHADRA SURI, *Laghuvṛtti* or *Ḍupaḍupikā* on Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra

Kapadia 1947, p. lxiii-lxiv: "For some reason or other the entire commentary, if composed by Haribhadra, is not available. What we have is a composition of at least three persons. The commentary at least up to a portion of VI, 23 (i.e. pp. 1-275) is by Haribhadra. It is named as *Ḍupaḍupikā*..." Kapadia assigns the remainder of the text as he finds it to Yaśobhadra Sūri and Gandhahastin Siddhasena (the author of our #63). The publication referred to above (of 'what we have') is from Ratlam in 1936.

52. HARIBHADRA SURI, *Upadeśapada*

Kapadia 1947, p. xxiii: "This is a work in Paīya in 1039 verses in Ārya." (Kapadia refers to it by its name in Paīya, viz., *Uvaësapaya*.) "It is mainly related with *dharmakathānuyoga*. It points out, by means of the ten well-known illustrations, the immense difficulty one experiences in securing a birth as a human being. This is followed by the topic, viz., the study of the Jaina scriptures. Then we have a detailed exposition of the four types of intelligence and subsequently the treatment about the method of receiving and imparting religious instruction..."

53. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Yogabindu*

"ET" refers to the edition and translation by K. K. Dixit in L.D.Series 19, Ahmedabad 1968. The summary is by Potter.

Section One: Introductory

1-7 (ET3-4) Omniscience to Śiva, beginningless and endless. The work does not contradict Yoga texts; indeed, it shows their consistency. The consistency stems from their common aim, which is to lead one to liberation.

8-11 (ET5-6) If the self (*ātman*) were the only entity there is, it would always have selfness (*ātmatva*) without differentiation, and both bondage and liberation would be only conceptual constructions. And bondage and liberation also require that a self be capable of connection with karma. Since this capacity is beginningless the connection must also be beginningless.

12-16 (ET6-7) An "agent" is so-called because of his capacity, without which he would not be called so. An atom cannot be a self even by a god's agency. Otherwise all usage becomes merely figurative, which is absurd, since a "figurative" use depends on their being a literal one. The yogic path is possible only if one knows how things really are.

17-18 (ET7) The self goes under different terms in different systems--e.g., *puruṣa, kṣetra, jñāna*--and what is other than the self is called, e.g., *avidyā, prakṛti, karman*. The connection between these two is called, e.g., *bhrānti, pravṛtti, bandha*, while the agent who favors the self is called *śāstṛ, vandya* or *avikārin*.

19-23 (ET8-9) Right yoga is established when the above factors have properly functioned. But if the self either existed or did not exist from all points of view all effort (toward liberation) would be futile. (Right) yoga is that which violates neither common experience nor scripture--it should not be accepted on sheer faith.

24-29 (ET9-10) One should base oneself on scripture that does not contradict perception or inference. Then one can gain both sensory and supersensory insights. Otherwise one will remain confused by verbal differences--e.g., avoidance of killing is called *yama* by some, *vrata* by others.

30-35 (ET10-12) Four different kinds of yoga, each superior to its predecessor, are called "self-concerning" (*adhyātman*), "helping through fulfilling vows" (*bhāvanā*), "concentration" (*dhyāna*) and "destruction of (all mental) operations" (*vṛttisaṃkṣaya*).

Other ways of classifying are into fundamental

(*tāttvika*)--i.e., not merely to please common folk--vs. nonbasic, continuous (*anubandha*) (i.e., uninterrupted)/not continuous, and involving defilement (*sāsrava*)/not involving defilement.

36-41 (ET12-13) The greatness (*mahātmya*) of yoga is celebrated in similes.

42-67 (ET13-19) The dreams of yogis come true. It is not unreasonable to believe in the existence of things such as the self that are supersensible but vouched for by those capable of yogic perception. The merits and good results of yoga are developed.

68-85 (ET19-23) The self-concerning way (*upāya*) is the highest (*parama*). But it can only be practiced by one in the last half of his last life as subject to karmic products (*pudgalāvarta*) and who practises (proper) conduct. The karma adhering to oneself differs from that adhering to another, and this is due to the self concerned.

Objection: That is essentialism (*svabhāvavāda*), and amounts to a denial of causality altogether.

Answer: No, since it is not one's nature (*svabhāva*) alone that is the cause, but that nature as occurring at a time, (a place), etc., since the effect does not arise at any time, (place,) etc., but only when the appropriate conditions occur.

86-108 (ET24-30) Prior to the last half of his last life a person is subject to *saṃjñās* and is frustrated. Such persons may observe *dharma* but just to please the populace (*lokapakti*). Thus they are not prepared for the self-concerning way, any more than a plant is prepared to be a god. Such a person is not prepared to practice yoga. So what others have called preparatory performance (*pūrvasevā*) is as I see it something that happens prior to the last half of the last life, since it still involves attachment. But this rule does not apply to those who will not be bound again (*apunarbandhaka*), who have become disgusted with worldly existence. (Gopendra is quoted, using Sāṃkhya terms (*prakṛti*) to make the point.)

109-149 (ET30-40) Preparatory performance consists of

four things: worship (*pūjā*) of teachers (*guru*) and gods, good conduct, penance, and nonhatred of liberation. These are explained.

150-163 (ET40-43) Prior to the last half of his last life one is attached to life and unwilling to try to escape it. During that last half of the last life he is free from these and only acquires minimal karma. Five types of yogic performance are described: (1) "poison that kills immediately", desire for immediate benefits (*viṣa*); (2) "poison that kills slowly", desire for benefits to come (*gara*) (3); failure to act at all (*anuṣṭhāna*); (4) the cause of failure to breed further karma by acting (*taddhetu*), (5) the nectar of proper performance enjoined by the *jinas* (*amṛta*). The performance of those in the last half of the last life tends to be of type (4).

164-177 (ET43-46) The self's penchant for acquiring karma is natural and beginningless, and is to be known as defilement (*mala*). As it diminishes in the last half of the last life that penchant is reduced to the point where one becomes free from restrictions even though still acquiring karma. That is why that self is no longer as much disturbed by the atoms (of karmic matter); he experiences great joy.

Section II: One Who Will Not Be Bound Again

178-193 (ET47-50) Such a one is described as one whose qualities oppose the faults of an ordinary world-enjoyer, whose merit is increasing. A technical and a broader use of the term are distinguished. The meaning of the term is that such a one has the minimal qualities that ready him for preparatory performance.

194-199 (ET51-52) How such a one should consider his state.

200-202 (ET52-53) All activities from this state onward constitute yoga.

203-209 (ET53-55) One who has "untied the knot" (*bhinnagranthī*) is oriented toward liberation; all his activities constitute yoga, for he has perceived the highest state.

210-251 (ET55-65) The three attributes (of yoga) are (1) thoroughly pure performance, whose object, nature and eventual results are pure; (2) reliance on correct scriptures, (3) display of the conditions of right conduct derived from attention to one's own thoughts, to his teacher's, and for good omens. These last contribute to successful completion of a task (*siddhisādhana*). The one who will not be bound again is worthy of great praise.

Section Three: Right Vision

252-262 (ET66-69) When the knot has been untied one achieves right vision, fondness for studying scriptural texts, devotion to *dharma*, to sages, gods, etc.

263-269 (ET69-71) Such a man is said to have passed through three sorts of transformation called *yathāpravṛtta*, *apūrva* and *anivṛtti*. The first of these lasts as long as ignorance does; the second occurs when the knot begins to be untied. The man of right vision, one who has passed this point, can only acquire a fraction as much deluding karma as one who has not progressed this far.

270-274 (ET71-72) This man of right vision is called by others a Bodhisattva. Such a one will become a Tīrthaṅkara.

275-279 (ET72-73) Normally acquisition of right vision involves passing through successive different states.

280-286 (ET4-75) The untying of the knot indicates that self will not be reborn.

287-290 (ET75-76) Whereas a Tīrthaṅkara has compassion for all others, a Gaṇadhara is one whose knot is untied but who confines his compassion to his relatives, and a Muṇḍakevalin one whose knot is untied but acts for his own liberation.

291-317 (ET76-83) There are various views about the factors that determine one's progress through these various stages. One view is that it depends on the distinctive causal conditions which happen to operate from time to time; another view is that it is because of the particular moral

behavior displayed at a specific time by the aspirant; still another attributes the specific occasion for progress to God or to *prakṛti*. However, if these last-mentioned views are interpreted as meaning that God or *prakṛti* brings progress about without regard for the aspiring self's accomplishment, this involves a mistake: neither God, *prakṛti* or karma operate independently of the self's intentional action. Kālātīta has remarked: "What we refer to as 'God' above is called by different names in other systems--'liberated' (*mukta*), 'enlightened' (*buddha*), 'perfected' (*ārhata*). The differences of opinion among the various schools as regards the nature of the supreme self or God are to my way of thinking meaningless, being the functions of poor and misplaced arguments about matters beyond our comprehension whose claimers are really arguing about which terminology to use to speak of a commonly agreed upon topic." While this is well said, it must be remembered that talk about a distinction, e.g., between God, *prakṛti* and selves only makes sense if each individual of these sorts has a specific nature, since whether the behavior of each is predestined (*sāṃsiddhika*) or not is known if at all only to *yogins*; the rest of us can only appeal to scripture.

318-339 (ET83-88) Discussion of the problem of free will, i.e., whether how things happen is due to fate (*daiva*), i.e., karma, or to a person's intention (*puruṣakāra*). Both are required for an action to take place. Sometimes one is prominent, sometimes the other. Now some have said that karma alone determines events at a specific time. But this must be clarified: the karma that is "fate" is previously performed action, while one's intentional action is an act performed now, and since the former cannot operate except through the latter it follows that both are required. Furthermore, each of the two can render the other undetermining, though neither can completely erase the other's operation, since "erasing" is itself an action and requires both, as previously indicated.

340-351 (ET88-91) Final words in praise of the one who has right vision.

Section Four: On the One of Right Conduct

352-371 (ET92-97) One of right conduct has belief, respects wisdom, admires merit, is persevering, and performs noble actions that are within his capacities. The man of right conduct is examined from five viewpoints, comprising the four viewpoints distinguished in 30-35 above plus one more, viz., evenness (*samatā*), which is made the fourth of five. Then the question may arise: how are these virtues related as found in (1) one who will not be bound again, in (2) one of right vision, and in the present case of (3) one of right conduct? To answer this the distinction previously drawn between fundamental (*tāttvika*) and non-fundamental is applied to yoga as practiced by these three kinds of seekers. Thus (1) (and presumably (2)) are commonsensically held to be self-concerning and vow-fulfilling while (1)s have those traits from the higher point of view. A once-returner's (*sakṛdāvartana*) yoga is not fundamental, but one of right conduct has fundamental concentration, evenness and destruction of all operations.

Section Five: Miscellaneous

380-404 (ET100-106) There are different sorts of self-concerning (*adhyātmika*) seekers. (1) There are those who repeatedly recite (*japa*) *mantras* to some deity. (2) There are those who practice a properly considered ritual followed by self-assessment. (3) There are those who worship a deity accompanied by repentance and who develop friendliness, etc. toward all living beings.

405-418 (ET106-110) Destruction of all operations (*vṛttisaṃkṣaya*) is the state where one no longer is able to be beset by karma. The qualities of a self who has attained that state are described, as well as the means to gain it, viz., study of scripture, inference and repeated meditation by one who

has achieved the required preparatory steps.

419-437 (ET110-115) The distinction between *samprajñāta* and *asamprajñāta samādhi* is explained as the distinction between complete awarenesss and knowledge. Some yoga specialists have, however, questioned the possibility of attaining knowledge, while others say that it cannot be equated with liberation. But since consciousness is the essential nature of a self, and since consciousness is the same as knowledge, the self must naturally have knowledge. Only if this is so can there be any awarenesss of anything. So failure to know must be due to obstructing (*pratibandhaka*) factors, and when they are absent awarenesss is unobstructed and so, complete.

The analogy between consciousness and fire is only partial, since (e.g.) that there are things that are incapable of being burnt is not intended to imply that there are things incapable of being known. Indeed, since we can know the general properties of any object whatsoever it should follow that any self can know the specific features of any thing whatsoever, and in that sense the self is a knower.

438-457 (ET115-120) Objection:[1] No one knows everything; who cares how many insects there are in the universe? Rather, the wise man knows the worthwhile things; otherwise we should worship vultures!

Answer: To know the difference between the worthwhile things and those that are not is impossible for one who is not a knower.

Objection (by a Sāṃkhya): The self cognizes what is determined by *buddhi*.

Answer: But since Sāṃkhya attributes essential consciousness to the self (*puruṣa*) we fail to see why it shouldn't be capable of cognition whenever there is nothing blocking.

1 Identified by K. K. Dixit as Dharmakīrti: indeed, 439-443 are verses I. 31-34 of *Pramāṇavārttika*.

Sāṃkhya: The liberated self cannot have awareness at liberation, since the internal organ is absent then. And anyway, what we call cognition is a property of the *buddhi* (here, *mahat*) which is itself produced from *prakṛti*.

Answer: How does it get this property?

Sāṃkhya: It is analogous to the way a crystal takes on the color of an object reflected through it.

Answer: But the crystal will not shine unless there is something shiny nearby to be reflected in it. (Likewise, a self will not experience things unless it can reflect things presented to it--thus, it must have the capacity for "reflection", i.e., consciousness.)

Sāṃkhya: However, a liberated self cannot cognize anything since the required instrument(s) (analogous to the shiny thing) are absent then.

Answer: Certainly not--the whole world is present then!

Sāṃkhya: But there is no internal organ (analogous to the crystal) then!

Answer: However, consciousness at the time of liberation does not need an internal organ, being rid of defilements. And if it isn't conscious of the world when rid of the defilements it is not yet free from those defilements.

Sāṃkhya: At the time of liberation the self has no desire to know, and thus does not know anything!

Answer: If so, your own thesis that a self is just consciousness is refuted. Your texts which speak of the cessation of awareness in a liberated self must be speaking of ordinary, worldly awareness. After all, those same texts of yours teach that a self attains liberation through self-knowledge.

458-477 (ET120-125) Buddhist: By realizing that there is actually no self at all, no ego, one stifles attachment and obtains liberation.

Answer: Do you mean that there is no self at all, or just that the self is a momentary entity (like everything else, according to you). If there is no self at all then all thinking

(about philosophical matters) is purposeless, since there is no one to propose or teach any views whatsoever.

Buddhist: All of that (thinking, teaching, etc.) is error (*bhrānti*), like a virgin's illusion of childbirth.

Answer: Even an illusion is something! There wouldn't even be such an illusion if there is no virgin--a barren woman's son doesn't have experiences!

As for the second reading (of your claim, viz., that a self can at best only exist for a moment), this runs afoul of the problem that in order for something to cause an effect it must persist long enough to do so, i.e., it must persist to at least a second moment, the moment at which it causes the effect in question. And since there is the continued existence of a self through at least those two moments it can also continue to exist through subsequent moments at which the subsequent events in its existence take place.

Furthermore, self-attachment is not merely the result of bad karma (and so is not avoided by this (Buddhist) thesis of the momentarinesss of the self), since the thought of oneself as "I" can perfectly well arise at a moment even given the no-self theory. Self-attachment in fact can be terminated only by achieving liberation through developing complete nonattachment.

Besides, if there is only consciousness, and if karma is merely a conceptual construction, why is liberation not always present?!

476-489 (ET125-128) The theory that the self is eternal is also mistaken. To say of something that it is eternal is to attribute to it essential unchangingness. But if a self is unchanging it cannot be both a doer and an enjoyer, since given that the self is eternal it must be continually one or continually the other but not both, for otherwise it would have to be admitted that the self undergoes transformation. Furthermore, if a self is eternal it cannot be first bound, then liberated. So the path of yoga would be merely illusory on this view.

490-506 (ET128-132) So a self must be capable of undergoing transformation when involved with karma, and so yoga becomes a meaningful operation capable of bringing about liberation, for liberation has been described as "freedom from ignorance", "wisdom" (*buddhi*), "destruction of all karma". Experiencing the trance state called *śaileśī* one gains the state called "destruction of all mental operations" (*vṛttisaṃkṣaya*) (i.e., the fourteenth stage of progress, the absence of a self's fitness to come into contact (with karma) (*saṃyogatābhāva*)).

Objection: If fitness for contact is a self's very nature how can it be absent?

Answer: That is just what it is to be "fit". And a natural quality of a thing can stop without the thing's stopping. Consider a new jar: the jar's newness is its nature, but eventually it loses that nature while itself continuing to exist--this is a matter of ordinary experience.

511-527 (ET133-137) Final criticism of some opposing views. Someone holding a view designated as *puruṣādvaita*, that only the self exists, cannot distinguish a bound self from a liberated one, since there is allowed nothing other than the self which could make the difference, and since a self is allowed no parts, etc.

Concluding remarks.

54. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Yogadṛṣṭisamuccaya*

"ET" references are to the edition and translation by K. K. Dixit in Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 27, Ahmedabad 1970). The summary is based on the table of contents provided in ET p. 12 and the paragraphs of the summary which follows.

Summary by K. K. Dixit

I. Introductory Remarks

1 (ET16) The benedictory stanza.

2-11 (ET17-21) The three types of yoga: (1) yoga by intention (*icchāyoga*), (2) yoga by scripture (*śāstrayoga*), (2) yoga by self-exertion (*sāmarthyayoga*). The latter, which is superior to the others and provides omniscience, is beyond words.

II. A. General Account of the Eight Yoga Viewpoints

12-20 (ET24-29) The eight are divided into two groups of four; see below.

III. The First Four Yoga Viewpoints

21-40 (ET30-38) The first (*mitrā*). Here vision is weak; vows are observed (cf. stanzas 214-218 below); one tirelessly performs one's religious duties and accepts one's fellow beings. One who has arrived at his final embodiment prior to release commits only pure acts involving association with saintly personages, offering them service and benefitting therefrom. All this occurs at the stage, called *yathāpravṛttikaraṇa,* the first part of the process one passes through while progressing through the first four stages; the last such part is followed by *granthībheda* or "untying the knot", and leads thence to the fourth stage.

41-48 (ET38-40) The second (*tārā*) features practice of restraint, intense liking for works on yoga and reverential service to pure yogis.

49-56 (ET40-42) The third (*balā*) involves development of meditative postures to combat distraction and maximize attentiveness.

57-64. (ET42-45) The fourth (*diprā*) features breath-control.

IV. Transitory

65-75 (ET46-51) The state of mind where the nature of things is determined is called *vedyasandyapada,* a subtle understanding that conduces to liberation, destroys karma and cognizes an object fully. This state of mind is lacking in those

in the first four stages of progress but present in the next four. Those without it are subject to karmic frustrations leading necessarily to unhappy states, even though they may be (in the first four stages) listening to scriptures, etc. One in this state knows good from bad.

76-85 (ET51-54) Denunciation of persons who lack the subtle understanding described in the preceding section.

86-152 (ET55-72) Attainment of this subtle understanding releases a person from dependence on bad reasoning (*kutarka*), which is responsible for lack of faith and produces vanity. This bad reasoning is found mainly in the form of futile rejoinders (*jāti*). They are futile because the actual nature of things is beyond our comprehension, so that between two alternative claims there is no definitive way of settling the issue. E.g., one might claim that fire when near water makes things wet and water when near fire burns things, since that is their nature, and the issue cannot be settled merely on the basis of examples; on that basis any proposition can be justified. And logic is of no help for providing knowledge of supersensible things, while scripture can help there. Indeed, a combination of reliance on scripture, right belief and conduct, and practice of yoga does provide knowledge of such things. (Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya* quoted).

Since there cannot be several omniscient beings who cognize things in different ways, one should place his faith in the omniscient person even though one may not fully understand him. Similarly, the commonplace distinction between devotion to variegated and nonvariegated gods does not refute the thesis of an omniscient person: variegated gods are worshipped by those who want to be reborn in that way, while those who wish to transcend worldly existence worship a nonvariegated deity. Thus there are various religions, but they all reach the same end by different paths, leading to different grades of understanding: *buddhi* based on sense-objects, *jñāna* based on scripture, and *asammoha* based on proper action. Action based on the first results in rebirth,

action based on the second leads serially to liberation for *kulayogins* (cf. vv. 210-211 below), while proper actions, being pure, lead immediately to liberation. This liberation has various names--*sadāśiva, parabrahman, siddhātman, tathatā*--but they all denote the same thing; there is no real difference about the highest truth as is supposed to exist among different beings (counted as) omniscient (by the various schools).

The differences among the teachings of the schools only appear different because of the force of the karma of their speakers and/or listeners, and are useful each for their appropriate level of hearer. Ordinary folk like us cannot fathom it. But saints speak only what is true and beneficial to others. The truth is not available through inference (quoting Bhartṛhari), so those desiring liberation should not depend on reasoning (*tarka*); indeed, for such a one it is wrong to be attached to anything at all. Rather one should emulate and honor great persons, avoiding inflicting pain even on those full of evil.

V. The Last Four Yogic Viewpoints

153-161 (ET74-76) The fifth (*sthirā*) viewpoint unties the knot of ignorance and comes to see the world as child's play, a juggler's trick, a mirage, a dream.

162-169 (ET76-78) The sixth (*krāntā*) viewpoint involves focussed concentration undertaken for the joy of others. Devoted to pure conduct through the power of *dharma* one is beloved by others and devotes himself to that *dharma* derived from scripture alone, realizing all sensory things as illusions. Because of the presence of cogitation (*mīmāṁsā*) delusion does not arise, and only good things result.

170-176 (ET78-81) The seventh (*prabhā*) viewpoint is that of concentration where one enjoys the pleasure arising from the mastery derived from discrimination, peace. From this standpoint frustration, including pleasure, is just what is dependent on another, while satisfaction comes from one's mastery born of meditation. This is the great path of no

return called by yogis by various names such as *praśāntavāhita*, *visabhāgaparikṣaya*, *śivavartman*, and *dhruvādhvan*.

177-186 (ET81-84) The eighth (*parā*) comprises that supreme altered state of consciousness (*samādhi*) that is free from attachment even to itself, completely natural, beyond likes and dislikes. This state begins with the second *apurvakaraṇa* (= the eighth stage of progress), and after it one gains knowledge, omniscience, and soon realizes liberation.

VI. Liberation

187-206 (ET85-91) This liberation is a taking on of new properties in place of older ones (the self retains its nature).

Objection: A thing does not exist before or after it occurs.

Answer: Then it may be either eternal or nonexistent.

Objector: Why can't we say "this object does not exist now": after all, you say "the object has become otherwise now".

Answer: But on your view, unlike ours, this will involve contradiction. Furthermore, if an entity that existed becomes absent, that absence must have a beginning, so it should also have an end; thus the entity will reappear once more!

Objection: Destruction is just the factor's state of destruction.

Answer: Then it cannot last beyond that moment, or if it does, the same problem will remain.

On the other hand, if an entity is eternally existent there can be no liberation from it or of it. So the self must have certain features, e.g. the desire to see, that literally cease so that (for Sāṃkhya) liberation from the transformations of *prakṛti* can cease. Otherwise transformation will be eternal and apply to everything and everyone eternally, and no liberation will be possible.

Objection: The appearance of difference is illusory.

Answer: Then why is it experienced? There is no evidence for difference being illusory.

Objector: Yogic awareness provides the evidence.

Answer: But if yogic awareness is really different from other awareness your position if contradicted.

One who is still bound cannot be free, nor vice-versa.

7. Concluding Remarks

207-228 (ET93-98) There are four kinds of yogis. Among them only two--viz., *kulayogins* and *pravṛttacakrayogins*--are eligible (for the study of this treatise); the other two are either underqualified or overqualified. *Kulayogins* are those who are either born in a family of yogis or practice yoga, not others, e.g., *gotrayogins* (who are merely born into the right *gotra*). These *kulayogins* are enemies of none, are devoted to teachers, gods and twice-born ones, kindhearted and humble and of controlled senses. The *pravṛttacakrayogins* are those who have mastered two kinds of external restraint (*yama*) and aspire to master the other two, thus desiring to listen to scripture, etc. Each of these two types, then, are entitled to practice yoga

Like the five noble traits (of noninjury, truthtelling, nonstealing, sexual control and lack of greed), the four kinds of external restraint called intentional are also well known. The first, intentional restraint, consists in the desire to practice restraints, to hear words concerning them, etc. (The second), active restraint, is the neverending practice of restraints with a calm mind. (The third), firm restraint, is practice of restraint without fear of counteragents, and (the fourth), accomplished restraint, is restraint by a pure self for the assistance of others.

Three unfailing circumstances are: modelling oneself after good persons, performing vows, etc., and receiving from the noble ones a series of favors leading to liberation.

Concluding claims and disclaimers for this text.

55.HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Yogaviṃśikā*

"ET" references are to the edition and translation by K. K. Dixit in Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 27, ibid. The summary is found in Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 4, ibid.

Summary by K. K. Dixit

1-2 (ET113-114) "This work gives a very brief sketch of Yoga. It does not refer to the initial stages, but discusses only the advanced stages of spiritual development. All spiritual and religious activities are considered by Haribhadra as Yoga. But special importance should be attached, he says, to these five kinds of activities: (1) practice of proper posture (*sthāna*), (2) correct utterance of sound (*ūrṇa*), (3) proper understanding of the meaning (*artha*), (4) concentration on the image of a Tīrthaṅkara in his full glory (*ālambana*), and (5) concentration on his abstract attributes (*anālambana*). Of these five, the first two constitute external spiritual activity (*karmayoga*) and the last three internal spiritual activity (*jñānayoga*)."

3-4 (ET114) "These activities can be properly practised only by those individuals who have attained to the fifth or a still higher stage of spiritual development progress. One reaches the consummation of these activities in the following order. At the outset one develops an interest in these activities, and comes to have the intention to practise them. Then he takes an active part in them, and begins actual practice (*pravṛtti*). Gradually he becomes steadfast in them and achieves stability (*sthavirya*). Finally he gains mastery (*siddhi*) over the activities."

5-17 (ET114-119) "Each of the five activities is mastered in this order. First of all one is to master the posture, then correct utterance, then the meaning. After that one should practise concentration upon an image, and finally one should attempt at mastery over the concentration upon the abstract attributes of an emancipated soul."

18 (ET119) "This is a full course of Yoga practice. One

may practise these spiritual activities either out of love or reverence or as an obligatory duty prescribed by scriptures or without any consideration. When a spiritual activity is done out of love or reverence it leads to worldly and other-worldly prosperity. And when it is done as a duty without any consideration whatsoever, it leads to final emancipation."

19-20 (ET119-120) "Of the five-fold activities mentioned above, the last two, viz., concentration of the mind upon the image of a Tīrthaṅkara or upon the abstract attributes of him are the most importance. The word *anālambana* does not mean 'devoid of any *ālambana* (object)' but only 'devoid of a concrete *ālambana*'...The distinction, therefore, between the *ālambana* and the *anālambana* Yoga is that in the former one concentrates upon an object with form while in the latter on a formless object...."

56. HARIBHADRA SURI, *Yogaśataka*

"E" and "T" references are to the edition by Muni Sri Punyavijayaji and translation by K. K. Dixit found in Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 4 (Ahmedabad 1965). The summary is found at pp. 23-24 of the same volume.

The subject matter of this work closely resembles that of the *Yogabindu*, and most of the topics found in that work are summarized in the *Yogaśataka*.

Summary by K. K. Dixit

1-8 (E1-5; T77-78) "This work opens with an exposition of the nature of higher-view (*niścaya*) and commonsense (*vyavahāra*) yoga. The coming together in one soul of the three attributes, viz., right vision[1], right awarenesss and right

1 Prof. Dixit renders *saṃyagdarśana* as "right faith" and *saṃyagjñāna* as "right understanding". We replace this, following our established practice in this Volume, translating the former as

conduct is *niścayayoga*, because it brings about connection or union with *mokṣa*, while those things which lead to and are thus the causes of these three, viz., the right vision, etc. constitute *vyavahārayoga*. It includes such things as attendance on and worship of the preceptor, a desire to listen to the scriptural topics and the obeying of the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions as *per* one's capacities."

9-16 (E6-9; T78-79) "Next, the question as to who are the persons qualified for yoga is discussed in the manner of the *Yogabindu* using Sāṃkhya and the Jaina terminology. The classification of the seekers into *apunarbandhaka* and *saṃyagdṛṣṭi*, etc., as also their characteristics, are described precisely in the same manner as in the *Yogabindu*."

21-22 (E11-12; T80) "The spiritual discipline of each seeker is not described in detail, but it is broadly pointed out that the spiritual discipline of each seeker suitable to his own stage is nothing but Yoga because it is generally devoid of bad or evil thoughts and further because it satisfies the definitions of Yoga as recognized in all the systems."

25-26 (E13; T81) "The preliminary preparation finds mention here in a different manner and not under the name of *pūrvaseva* or *yogabīja*. It is called *laukikadharma*, which comprises non-oppression of others, charity to the poor and helpless, worshipful treatment of the preceptor, the deities and the guests."

38-50 (E19-24; T82-84) "Then Haribhadra describes certain rules, principles and means, both external and internal, by means of which the seeker can bring about his spiritual development from the existing stage to the next higher stages."

51-52 (E25; T84-85) "One should decide the propriety or otherwise of one's own activity on the basis of introspection, on the basis of what other people say about him and on the basis of the purity of body, mind and speech (*śuddhayoga*). Further, he should keep company with those

"right vision" and the latter as "right awarenesss".

who are superior to him in spiritual development, should reflect on the nature of worldly existence and the passions that bind the soul. He should resort to external means such as penances, self-surrender to the preceptor, etc., for the removal of inauspicious karmas like fear, etc. These are the means to be employed by developed seekers. A novice, however, should first benefit from such means as the study of scripture, going on a pilgrimage, etc."

59-80 (E28-35; T86-89) "After knowing the meaning of the scriptures he should take recourse to introspective self-inspection, to find out if there are, in his own self, the inner flaws like attachment, aversion, delusion or false belief, etc. Further, Haribhadra gives an elaborate description of the method of reflection on the objects of attachment and aversion, etc., and their results for securing a better concentration of the mind."

81-82 (E35-37; T89) "Lastly, Haribhadra gives us a glimpse into the mode of eating and drinking proper for a seeker. This part of the work mainly describes the characteristics of the proper mode of begging alms from the householders."

83-85 (E36-37; T89) "All the aforesaid means gradually bring about the annihilation of inauspicious or sinful karma and eventually liberation through the acquisition of auspicious karma."[92]

88 (E37) "A Bodhisattva can commit a bad bodily act but never a mental wrong, since his mind is pure."

92-100 (E39-44) "If one completes his yoga in this life he is released from bodily, vocal and mental acts and achieves liberation of an absolutely pure type. If he has not completed yoga in this life he is born again as a human being and continues his yogic practices, just as some people pick up their activities from their dreams when they wake up."

"The time of one's death is indicated by various signs (a deity, a star or constellation). One should be careful to purify one's mind through fasting, etc., at the time of death, for the

colorings in the next life are detetermined by one' s final actions here, even if one has good colorings in this and previous lives."

57. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Brahmasiddhāntasamuccaya*

The manuscript of this work was discovered by Puṇyavijaya Muni when sorting through old leaves of Jain Bhandaras. Dalsukh Malvania reports that "Rev. Punyavijayaji is of the opinion that this treatise too may be the work of Āc. Haribhadra"[93] The text is published with Puṇyavijyaya's edition of #56. *Yogaśataka*, pp. 47-76.[94]

58. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Saṃyaktvasaptati*

Kapadia 1947, p. xxiv: "This is a small work in Paīya in 70 verses, and it deals with right faith and its purity...In Paīya it can be...named as *Sammattasattari, Daṃsaṇasattari* and *Darisaṇasattari* as well...."

The work has been published along with a commentary by Saṅghatilaka Sūri called *Tattvakaumudī* in the D.L.J.P.Fund Series as No. 35 in 1916.

59. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Darśanasaptatikā*

Kapadia 1947, pp. xxiv-xxv: "As suggested in the opening verse, this Paīya work...explains in verse the religion to be practised by the Jaina laity."

It is not published as far as we know.

60. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Dharmasaṃgrahaṇī*

Kapadia 1947, pp. xxv-xxvi: "It is composed in Paīya in 1396 verses. It deals with various topics such as the definition of *dharma* and its *nikṣepas* (connotations or aspects),

refutation of the Cārvākas, establishment of the existence of the soul and its characteristics, exposition of the eight kinds of karman, attainment of right faith, its varieties, distinguishing features, five kinds of knowledge, vows of the clergy, establishment of omniscience and bliss in liberation."

On p. xv Kapadia remarks, in connection with a discussion concerning the temporal relations between the lives of Haribhadra and Śaṃkarācārya, "Neither Haribhadra has mentioned, the name of Śaṅkarācārya in any works of his nor has the latter that of the former in any of his works. But this proves or disproves nothing about the priority or posteriority of one or the other. On the contrary the exposition of the topics such as *bhūtavaicitryasiddhi, bhūtacaitanyotpatti, kṣaṇikatvanirāsa, bāhyārthasiddhi* and *samavāyanirāsa* treated in *Dhammasaṅgahaṇi* (v. 65-67, 76, 77, 168, 310 and 228-330) and in *Pañcāsaga,* is an imitation of *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* of Śaṃkarācārya. So I am inclined to infer that this *bhāṣya* was seen by Haribhadra..."

Kapadia reports the work together with the commentary of Malayagiri Sūri in two parts in the D. L. J. P. Fund Series 1916 and 1918, and the text is published in Rsabhadevaji Kesarimalaji Samstha, Ratlam 1928, and an alphabetical index of this and other works is published from Ratlam in 1929.

61. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Viṃśaviṃśikā*

Kapadia 1947, pp. xxxv-xxxviii: "This work in Paīya consists of twenty sections. Each one of them except the fourteenth comprises twenty verses (*gāthās*) and is hence known as *vīsiyā* (Skt. *viṃśikā*)."

In section (*adhikāra*) 1, "verses 11-15 enumerate the names of the twenty *vīsiyās*, and they give us an idea of the contents of this work."

Section 2 (*anādi*) "proves that the world is made up of five *astikāyas*, is beginningless and is not created by any superhuman agency."

"Some social practices and observances based upon the family traditions and customs of the country form the main theme of" Section 3 (*kulanīti*).

"The last existence preceding final emancipation is called *caramaparivarta*, known also as *apunarbandhaka* and *nivṛttādhikārapravṛtti*. Herein every activity of the human being is directed towards the attainment of salvation. This is the theme of" Section 4 (*caramaparivarta*).

"In v. 14-15 five views regarding the causality of the universe are noted and evaluated."

Section 5 (*bījādi*) "compares the religious life with a tree."

"Attainment of right faith is the main subject of" Section 6 (*saddharma*).

Section 7 (*dāna*) "deals with three kinds of endowments, viz., right knowledge, safety and religious utility."

"Worship of the Deity and its varieties and sub-varieties are treated in" Section 8 (*pūjāvidhi*).

In Section 9 (*śrāvakadharma*) "the life of the Jaina laity is expounded."

Section 10 (*śrāvakapratimā*) "deals with the postures of a Jaina householder."

In Section 11 (*yatidharma*) "there is exposition of the life of the Jaina monastic order."

In Section 12 (*śikṣā*) "religion is compared with a kingdom and a perfectly religious monk with a monarch. Religious instruction is its central theme."

Section 13 (*bhikṣā*) "explains the forty-two faults to be avoided by the Jaina clergy while accepting alms."

Section 14 (*tadanarāyaśuddhiliṅga*) discusses the factors which act as obstacles in partaking the alms obtained in a faultless manner."

"Confessions of faults and atonements are the respective topics of" Sections 15 (*aloyanā*, Skt. *alocanā*) and 16 (*prayaścitta*).

In Section 17 (*yogavidhāna*) "v. 1: *yoga* is defined as an activity leading directly to salvation. Verse 2 mentions the five divisions of *yoga*. Of them the first two comprise *karmayoga* and the last three *jñānayoga*). Each of these divisions has four varieties, and each of them four sub-varieties. Thus *yoga* is of eighty types. In v. 8 there is mention of *anukampā, nivveśa, saṃvega* and *pasama* respectively. Verses 17-20 mention the four varieties of good practice. This *vīsiyā* does not deal with the initial stage of spiritual development but rather the mature one..."

"Omniscience is the central theme of" Section 18 (*kevalajñāna*).

"Various type of the liberated souls form the subject of" Section 19 (*siddhavibhakti*). "These have for their basis the condition of life in their last birth as a human being. That emancipation is not the sole right of males but is equally shared even by females is ably discussed in v. 6-12."

Section 20 is titled *Siddhasukha*.

The text of this work, together with a number of other Jain treatises, is published by R. K. Samstha, Ratlam in 1927.

62. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Tattvaprakāśikā*

Kapadia 1927, p. 50: "This is practically a Paīya work in verse. It is divided into twelve sections (*adhikāras*). They consist of 335, 352, 102, 41, 115, 155, 9, 30, 109, 51, and 140 verses respectively. Their respective topics are: nature of God, characteristics of pseudo-preceptors, nature of a real preceptor, right faith, the Jaina householders, postures (*pratimā*) of the Jaina laity, their vows, instincts, *leśyās*, meditation, wrong belief and *ālocanā*."

The title of this work in Paīya is *Sambohapayaraṇa* or *Tattapayāsaga*. Some *gāthyās* are published by Jaina Grantha Prakāśaka Sabhā from Ahmedabad in 1916.

63. HARIBHADRA SŪRI, *Aṣṭakaprakaraṇa*

Kapadia 1927, p. xxiii: "This work...deals with thirty-two *aṣṭakas*. Each of them except the last consists of eight verses, and the last has ten verses. Only the first sixteen *aṣṭakas* have each a significant title. Of them *Ātmanityavādāṣṭaka, Kṣaṇikavādāṣṭaka* and *Nityānityāṣṭaka* may be here noted."

"The work has been commented upon by Jineśvara Sūri in *saṃvat* 1080 (i.e., 1028 A.D.). The Paīya portion occurring in this commentary has been rendered into Sanskrit by his disciple Abhayadeva Sūri. The text together with the commentary and the Sanskrit rendering was published by the late Mansukhbhai Bhagubhal, Ahmedabad." No date of publication is provided.

64. GANDHAHASTI SIDDHASENA (760), *Ṭīkā* or *Bhāṣya* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

M. A. Dhaky comments: "The third Siddhasena is Gandhahasti (c. A.D.690-770)...He was both an *āgamika* as well as a *dārṣaṇika* pandit".[95] This author has frequently, though probably erroneously, been identified with the author of the *Nyāyāvatāra* (see #22 above)..

The following summary is culled from Nathmal Tatia's edition and translation of Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtras* with the combined comentaries of Umāsvāti, Pūjyapada and Siddhasenagaṇi (San Francisco 1994), our "T". Verses are numbered as in the summary above of the *Tattvārthasūtras*. As usual, we have substituted our translations of technical terms for Tatia's.

Summary by Nathmal Tatia

CHAPTER ONE

8 (T11) "The number one does not lend itself to being

counted (and so remains in its own classification of 'one'). Two, three, four and so on, are numbers proper which are classified as numerable, innumerable and infinite. Numerable numbers are those which can be named. Innumerable are beyond naming and fall into three categories: minimum, intermediate and maximum. Beyond the innumerable are the infinite numbers which fall into the same three categories."

CHAPTER TWO

1 (T34) "...draws attention to a sixth, 'combined', modification, a mixture of two or more of the above states, which it says is also mentioned in the scriptures."

11 (T41) "(The internal organ as functional activity) is attributed to the partial elimination and partial suppression of the karma which obscures articulate awareness."

"(The substantial mind) pervades the whole body of a being."

14 (T42) "...(T)he fire-bodied and air-bodied (selves) do not move of their own accord and as such, truly speaking, do not belong to the class of mobile creatures."

19 (T44) "The applied sort of (sense-)organ functions in both the perception of external objects and the experience of one's own pleasures and pains."

22 (T45) "(Knowledge of verbal contents) is empirical...(cognition) beginning with the stage of directed inquiry (cf. I. 15). This empirical knowledge is by the mind and not by any sense organ such as the ear or eye. It is a mental perception that understands the scripture."

37 (T55) "The material body is described...as the visible bulky body made from the suitable class of material clusters..."

44 (T57) "According to those who accept that only (5) the karmic body is associated with the soul from beginningless time, the possible combinations are eight (according to earlier commentators). Siddhasena rejected one of these combinations, viz., that of karmic and fiery."

48 (T59) "..(B)oth karmic and fiery bodies are

permanent but the power of the latter is activated by superordinary power."[1]

51 (T62) "Each of the four classes of gods are either female or male...(T)he mansion, sylvan and luminous gods and the empyrean gods dwelling in Saudharma and Aiśāna, the first and second heavens (see 4. 1, 4. 20), are of either female or male disposition. Higher gods than these are always of male disposition. As the levels of celestial life become higher because of greater spiritual attainment in previous lives, there is a gradual sublimation of sexual disposition."

CHAPTER THREE

5 (T72) "...(T)hree agonies (viz.,) of...ghastly environs, the vengeance which they inflict upon one another, and the gods of evil thoughts and deeds who revel in inciting the infernal beings (to torture one another), prevail up to the third hell. The lower hells have only the first two agonies as the gods have no access to these hells."

CHAPTER FOUR

2 (T97) "...(I)t is only the physical colour that is defined with respect to different classes of gods; their psychic colour may be any one of the six colours--black, blue, grey, red, yellow or white."

27 (T110) "This (commentary) notes and rejects the view that the last re-birth in the celestial realm must be in Sarvārthasiddha, the highest and most sublime of the five highest heavens. Nevertheless, those who are born in Sarvārthasiddha are assured of only one further life as a human being in which they will attain liberation."

1 Superordinary power "is the capacity for action, from the mundane doings of daily life to supernatural acts such as hurling fire, emanating rays and creating protean bodies." (T, p. 59)

CHAPTER FIVE

6 (T124) "Some commentators interpreted 'inactive' as immutability, but" this commentary "rejects this interpretation on the grounds that, according to the Jaina scripture, all substances are subject to the three cardinal phases of origination, cessation and continuity. There is nothing that is absolutely permanent or absolutely impermanent."

19 (T130) "...(S)peech is possible only for souls who have attracted clusters of matter suitable for the body to make the speech organ, transform the clusters into sounds and pour them out as language through the properly developed vocal chords, etc. The physical mind is a cluster of matter that sustains the psychic mind which is of the nature of sentience and knowledge, capable of thought and memory."

28 (T134) "How can two atoms, both of which are partless, combine together to make a single cluster? How can many imperceptible units create a perceptible one?" This commentary "discusses this problem at length (5. 1, 5. 11, 5. 25, 5. 26) and attempts to solve the issue by distinguishing two aspects of atoms: an atom as partless matter (matter without parts) and an atom as the integrated qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. These two aspects are respectively called 'matter-atom' and 'quality-atom'. The integration of the qualities of touch, taste and so on, to a point of saturation, may result in perceptibility."

30 (T135) This commentary "brings out the positive aspects of the four kinds of traditional absence:"

1. prior absence "is existence in another form, e.g. before a golden pot exists, the gold exists."

2. posterior absence "is also existence in another form, e.g. after the golden pot is destroyed, the gold exists."

3. "the mutual absence of two things is because of their existence, e.g. this gold pot is not that gold pot and that gold pot is not this gold pot."

4. "absolute absence refers to that which can

never exist by definition of what does exist, e.g., the 'square circle' is understood as impossible because both square and circle exist independently."

"These four kinds of traditional absence are used to show the continuity between origination, cessation and persistence, between modes and substances. In the cessation of one mode there is the origination of another and through this, substance persists."

30 (T136) "...Origination and cessation co-exist with persistence. Origination and cessation would have no foundation without persistence and persistence would be void without origination and cessation."

31 (T138) "(A)n entity is a single whole and it has the dual aspect of change and permanence; the categorization of it as substance and mode is only a device for the enlightenment of the novice."

This commentary "then discusses the Law of Contradiction and shows the absence of any opposition between permanence and impermanence, existence and nonexistence as attributes of the same entity. It is our experience, not abstract logic, that is the proof of the compatibility or incompatibility between attributes."

33 (T140) "The implications of this *sūtra* are that atoms of two or more degrees can integrate with each other whether they are both of the same quality, or one is viscous and one dry...(A) one-degree atom can integrate with a two-degree atom of a different quality."

34 (T141) says that combination can take place between components whose degrees differ by two units or more. "This commentary illustrates this law with the example of two wrestlers. As two wrestlers of equal strength cannot win in wrestling, so two equally viscous atoms or equally dry atoms cannot integrate with each other..." This commentary "also rejects the view that a one-degree atom can integrate with a two-degree atom of the same quality."

CHAPTER SIX

5 (T152) "...(A)n ascetic with very thin passions also experiences this fleeting (karmic) inflow, provided he meticulously observes the monastic code. Activities accompanied by passion cause karmic bondage that, in turn, causes the soul's long-term worldly wanderings."

CHAPTER EIGHT

1 (T190) (T)he commentary "names as upholders of deluded doctrines about thirty great non-Jaina philosophers of ancient times, such as Bādarāyaṇa and Jaimini, the famous Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā advocates. The doctrines were deluded because they were absolutist, allowing for no other viewpoints."

24 (T203) The commentary "...identifies two varieties of karma: 'ripening' and 'falling off'. The first is due to the usual process of maturity in which the karma bound in the past produces its result at the destined time and then ceases to exist. Sometimes, however, by special effort, the soul enjoys the result of the karma before the destined time. This second variety of maturity is like the artificial ripening of mangoes and jackfruits."

26 (T204) The commentary "finds difficulty in accepting the (near-perfect) enlightened world-view as beneficial karma because it is one of the four destructive karmas; it is due to the rise of purified view-deluding karma (see 8. 10)." The author "is also discomforted by laughter, relish and male disposition--identified in 8. 10 as quasi-passions (conduct-deluding karma)--being designated beneficial. Neither the scripture nor the ancient literature on karma mentions these four types of beneficial karma. Nor does 8. 25 acknowledge these four karmas as beneficial. Only the forty-two varieties of bondage listed below are confirmed by all traditions as beneficial."

CHAPTER NINE

22. (T234) The ninth type of atonement is specified as 'reordination'. "The commentator clarifies that reordination is preceded by two further states of penance: unfitness for reordination and then fitness for reordination due to the practice of requisite austerities."

65. KUMĀRANANDI BHAṬṬĀRAKA (776), *Vādanyāya*

Mahendra Kumar writes: "Vidyānanda refers to him in *Pramāṇaparīkṣā* (p. 72) and in the *Tattvārthaślokavārttika* (p. 280) which suggests that Kumāranandi was the author of *Vādanyāya*...; further, *Pātraparīkṣā* (p. 3) also refers to him. In one of the records of a gift by Pṛthvikoṅgaṇi (Śaka 698-716 A.D.) to Candranandin, there is a genealogical list of teachers of Kumāranandi. It seems he lived near about 776 A.D."

"Kumāranandi's *Vādanyāya* explicitly bears the influence of the *Ślokavārttika* of Akalaṅka. Though *Vādanyāya* is not available, the quotations from it bear the testimony that it is influenced by Akalaṅka-nyāya."[96]

66. VĪRASEṆA and JINASENA (837), *Jayadhavalā* on Guṇadhara's *Kāṣayaprābhṛta*

This vast work--some 60,000 *granthas*, it is said--is available--in an edition by Phulcandra Jain, Mahendra Kumar Jain and Kailash Chandra Jain (Mathura 1944).

67. JINASENA and GUṆABHADRA (870?), *Ātmānuśāsana*

On the author cf. A. N. Upadhye, H. L. Jain and Balchandra Siddhanta Shastri's Introduction to the edition ("E") published as Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala No. 11, Sholapur 1961. We are informed that Jinasena was the

student of Vīrasena and himself the teacher of Guṇabhadra. These three "lived in an age of political prosperity and stability as well as literary fertility...The contemporary Rāshṭrakūṭa rulers were Jagattuṅga, Nṛpatuṅga and Amoghavarṣa (815-877 A.D.) and Akālavarṣa (and his feudatory Lokāditya). Amoghavarṣa was a great devotee of Jinasena whose ascetic virtues and literary gifts must have captivated his mind. He soon became a devout Jaina and renounced the kingdom in preference to religious life as mentioned by him in his Sanskrit work *Praśnottararatnamālā* and as graphically described by his contemporary Mahāvīrācārya in his *Gaṇitasārasaṃgraha*"..." (Introduction to E, p. 10)

There is a translation (T) by J. L. Jaini published in The Sacred Books of the Jainas Volume 7, Lucknow 1928.

The summary here is taken from E, pp. 2-5, with technical terms rendered into our chosen terminology as usual. The quoted passages are taken as numbered from T.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye

Everyone shuns frustration and yearns for satisfaction; but the way to satisfaction is shown to the deserving by a worthy teacher who expounds the principles of *dharma*. "Every one desires to attain true happiness at the earliest; that arises from the destruction of all karma which results from right conduct which is dependent on right awareness. This right awareness is acquired from scriptures which are based on the discourses of the *āpta* who is free from all blemishes such as attachment, etc. Therefore, after duly reasoned out scrutiny of him, the source of all happiness, let the worthy resort to him for their benefit." (9)

Dharma should be the highest pursuit to which all others are subservient. Such thought-activities must be cultivated as accrue merit in the absence of which one suffers under the stress of one's karma in the past from which even the so-called gods are not exempt. There are many even today

who are above attachment.

The pursuit of sense-pleasures is a mirage: the pleasures are just a result of past merit, so one should be sensible enough to fix one's eye on future prospects.

The life of a householder has its limitations from the ultimate point of view--one has to reflect on the past and future and give up all attachment and aversion. Desires are a bottomless depth and only lead to further travails in this worldly whirlpool. "Fire burns when fed with fuel and is extinguished for want of it. But it is surprising that the terrible fire of infatuation blazes strongly in either way (on getting or not getting the objects of desire)." (56).

The human body is a veritable prison for the self; it is a folly to be attached to it. "Birth is the mother; death, father; mental and physical sufferings, brothers; and decrepitude is the friend of this living being in the last stage. And yet there is love for the body!" (201)

The kith and kin are not in any way permanent associates; so one should pursue the path of *dharma*. Wealth and other external accessories are temporary. "The poor are discontented for not obtaining wealth, and the rich too are (so) for want of contentment. Alas! all are in distress; but only a monk or an ascetic is happy" (65), for his happiness alone is self-dependent. The happiness that is dependent on anything else necessarily leads to privation and pain.

The life of a monk has something unique about it. Neither the body nor the period of life is long-enduring; the monk makes the best use of them, for death is certain. "Living beings are like fruits, falling down from the palm-tree of birth. How long can they be in the intervening space before they reach the ground of death!" (74) Every opportunity, therefore, must be snatched to practise religion, since there are many handicaps, temptations and pitfalls on the way. It is by the practice of penances, for which the human birth alone is suited, that karma is consumed and real happiness is reached. "An ascetic, in the first stage, chiefly radiates light (of

knowledge), like a lamp. Later on he glows with light and glory (of omniscience) like the sun. The wise (ascetic) who resembles a lamp becomes resplendent with right awareness and right conduct, and removing the soot of karma makes the self and nonself manifest." (120-121)

A woman is a temptress; she has taken many a victim in her trap; any attachment for her body means irretrievable fall; so one who is in pursuit of spiritual progress must avoid her from a distance. A householder is superior to a monk who becomes a victim to womanly temptations.

A worthy teacher has to be sought and followed, because merited monks are rare in these days. Many are tempted by worldly pleasures and have become mean supplicants: "What can karma do to saints who see with discrimination, whose wealth is possessionlessness and to whom death itself is life" (162) Self-restraint is the highest treasure; penances, the great pursuit; the many-aspects doctrine, the lovely resort; and self-realization the ultimate good. "An ascetic, endowed with spiritual knowledge, perceiving the natures of things as they are, extending his right knowledge again and again, and exterminating love and hate, should contemplate (upon the supreme self)." (177)

The passions like anger, pride, deceit and greed deserve to be subjugated, because even great men have succumbed to them. "One should be apprehensive of the deep pit of deceit enveloped in the pitchy darkness of falsehood. The horrible cobras of anger, etc. (the passions) living in its depth are not visible." (221) "Love and hate constitute worldly addiction (*pravṛtti*), and doing away with them is renunciation. They both are associated with external objects, and so they should also be discarded." (237) One should rise above attachment and aversion; then alone penances are fruitful; then alone the self is distinguished from the body; thereafter proper application to meditation destroys all karma, and then the self is realized in full effulgence.

68. RĀJAŚEKHARA (900), *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*

Summary by Bhagchandra Jain

This Rājaśekhara is a different personality from Rājaśekhara the author of *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*. He was the fifty-second Paṭṭadhāra of *Tapagaccha Paṭṭāvalī* (p. 43) and the *Dīkṣāsūtra* published from the Vinayacandra Grantha Bhandara, Jaipur, p. 15. Lakṣmīsāgarasūri was his immediate successor. This is also supported by the epilogue of *Prabandhakośa*, another work of Rājaśekhara.

Rājaśekhara composed his *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* in imitation of Haribhadra's work of the same title. He tried to introduce the philosophical views of the Jaina, Sāṃkhya, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists (Saugata). These philosophies believe in the existence of a self and are therefore called *astika*, as opposed to the Cārvāka philosophy, which is called *nāstika* as it does not believe so. This is the subject-matter of the work. It is published by the Yasovijaya Jain Granthamala, Varanasi.

69. JINACANDRA (900?), *Siddhāntasāra*

Ed. in Manikacandra Digambara Jaina Grantha 21, 1923. It is merely a list of categories.

70. SIDDHARṢIGAṆI (900), *Vivṛti* on Siddhasena Mahāmatī's *Nyāyāvatāra*

This is the earliest known commentary on the *Nyāyāvatāra*. It has been edited and translated by Piotr Balcerowicz; see the reference cited under the summary of the

Nyāyāvatāra above. This is our "ET". Numbering of sections below corresponds to the numbering in that summary.

The Sanskrit text of the commentary was published earlier, by A. N. Upadhye in *Siddhasena's Nyāyāvatāra and Other Works* (Jaina Sahitya Vikasa Mandala, Bombay 1971), but without translation.

The work is voluminous, and it is not possible to provide a full-scale summary here. We choose only a few sections for treatment.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

0 (E323-327; T1-4) Dharmottara: Since a word cannot be related to an object by either identity or causality, this opening passage is to incite students to study, not to claim validity.

Answer: If so, ordinary people would not study, since they are not motivated by a statement deemed by them to be false.

Ārcaṭa: This opening statement is intended to show the unsoundness of the opponent's arguments.

Answer: If the opening statement has no validity itself it cannot show the unsoundness of opponents' arguments.

On the Buddhist assumption that everything is momentary no relation of causality is possible, since a momentary thing cannot produce an effect before, during or after its momentary occurrence. Nor can there be a relation of identity or even similarity between an awareness and its content. An awareness cannot have the same form as its content, since it would have lost that form by that time, and anyway one couldn't see an object larger than one's own body, and one's head would split apart with all those forms. And as for similarity, you yourself cannot accept similarity, since you do not accept the similarity of distinct ultimately real things.

Grasping of an object can either mean the object's conceptualisation or its direct perception. But you do not

accept that particular things can be conceptualized (citing Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* 2. 133-134).

(E327-332; T5-9) Buddhist: Conceptualization that arises from traces brings about grasping of an unreal universal, whereas direct perception grasps an external object directly, free from any connection with universals.

Answer: Then perception cannot be causally conditioned or a causal conditioner, and language cannot be valid on your view, as it involves universals. But we do not have any such problem: we can distinguish perception whose grasping of an object is produced by a specific sufficient condition, whereas linguistic awareness grasps both specific and general features since it is not confined to a specific condition. (This distinction is then reformulated in accord with Jain terminology.) So we have no problems about O's designating real objects, an ultimately real purpose and the actual relevance of the one to the other, which are the topics of O.

The opinions of other theories (viz., Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Cārvāka) about the definition of "instrument of true cognition" are reviewed, as well as their respective opinions about the contents of instruments of true cognition, especially whether they grasp universals as well as particulars or not.

1 (E333-337; T10-13) The definition provided in the first sentence of 1 is analyzed to show which elements in it refute which alternative theories. Thus "reveals both itself and something else" refutes the views of the Vijñānavādins, who view awareness as only self-illuminating, and the Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas, who view awareness as capable of illuminating something different from awareness.

The Yogācāras (or Vijñānavādins) deny external objects and hold that all awarenesses are of awarenesses, like dreams. But even dreams are caused by traces of past waking experiences.

Yogācāra: Yes, and those past experiences are likewise

caused by others in a beginningless series, and all the items in the series are unreal.

Answer: Is the trace that causes an experience itself an experience or not? If it is, how do you know it? and if it is not, this refutes your position.

Yogācāra: That trace is only different from an experience which is defiled by the knower-known dichotomy; it is nevertheless itself an experience.

Answer: There is no evidence for such a trace.

As for the second kind of position (of Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas), which denies self-illumination, that is incoherent, since a thing cannot be known as illuminated by another unless that other is self-illumined. A lamp cannot illuminate a pot unless it illuminates itself.

Objection: The cognition grasps another without grasping itself.

Answer: Then Devadatta's cognition would be grasped by Yajñadatta!

The definition (in 1) also says that an instrument of true cognition is itself an awareness. This serves to preclude the Nyāya specification of sense-object contact as an instrument of true cognition. Sense-object contact is itself insentient: if it could be an instrument of true cognition any causal element, e.g., the body, would be an instrument too.

"Without sublation" excludes, e.g., the double-moon illusion from the definition of an instrument of true cognition.

(E337-340; T13-15) The whole definition (of 1) refutes the definitions of others. E.g., the Mīmāṃsā definition, which requires that a content of perception must not have been previous cognized, is open to the following objection: Previously cognized by whom? Not by another, since that would exclude all ordinary experiences from the range of the term "instrument of true cognition". But if it is construed to mean that one must not have cognized the object previously himself, that fails as well however we construe the thing cognized--as a substance, a mode, a quality or a universal--

eight alternatives in all, each shown to be unacceptable.

A Buddhist definition has it that an instrument of true cognition is a cognition that does not wander (*avisaṃvādaka*). The term "nonwandering" is ambiguous. If it means "unattained", then awareness of an object about to disappear, like a bubble, would not be covered. If it merely means "capable of being attained" then distant stars would qualify. But if it means being unsublated (*abādhita*) you accept our definition!

The Nyāya definition of an instrument of knowledge as a cause of experience (*upalabdhi*) would allow in anything at all--bodies, sense-organs--to the purview of perception.

(E341-343; T17-18) Objection (by a Cārvāka): There is only one instrument of knowledge: perception.

Answer: No, since one would be unable to show that some awarenesses are valid and others not, which demonstration is not a matter of perception and needs to be done by inference. Furthermore, you are in no position to prove that there are no such things as heaven, *adṛṣṭa* (i.e., karma), gods, etc.

(E343-348); T18-23) There are other instruments of true cognition but they are all subsumable under either perception or inference. And in the case of absence (*abhāva*), which the Mīmāṃsaka claims is an instrument of knowledge, it serves no purpose and can either be excluded altogether or included among these two (viz., perception and inference). However, comparison (*upamāna*), presumption (*arthāpatti*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) fall under inference.

Mīmāṃsaka: How could absence not be an instrument of knowledge?

Answer: Because it has no content (*gocara*).

Mīmāṃsaka: But perception can only grasp a positive part (*aṃśa*). Awareness of an absence is not brought about by a sense-organ, since a sense-organ is only capable of connection to existent things. So after the presence of a thing has been grasped, it is later recalled by the mind alone as

being the counterpositive of an absence.

Answer: Is this positive part the same as or different from the negative part? If it is the same, how can it not be grasped when the negative part is grasped? If it is different, "then (to say) that the surface of the ground is grasped by the first perception as detached (free) from the absence of pot, etc., implies that the pot, etc., is (indeed) grasped (on the surface of the ground) because non-grasping of the absence of this (pot) is invariably coequal with grasping its existence."[1] Moreover, if you invoke absence (as an instrument of knowledge) to grasp an absence because there is no other instrument of knowledge to grasp it, what instrument of knowledge grasps that absence of an instrument of knowledge? You are involved in infinite regress or vicious circle.

(E348-351; T23-25) Objection: The doctrine that there are just two instruments of true cognition, perception and inference, is that of the Buddhist.

Answer: But the Buddhist is not in a position to show that there are only two, whereas we are. The Buddhist can only appeal to identity and causality to show a conclusion, but neither one is capable of showing the absence of any additional instruments, nor are perception or inference themselves capable of showing that. Perception cannot grasp an absence (as was admitted above). Inference through identity and causality proves only actual entities. And the absence in question cannot be shown by inference from nonperception (*anupalabdhi*), which is capable of proving only limited absences and not absolute absence.

What shows the validity of perception and inference (for the Buddhist)? Not perception, since it is constructionfree. The wareness that immediately follows perception cannot confirm perception's validity, since that awarenesss deals with general (i.e., constructionfilled) things, not pure particulars.

1 This is Balcerowicz' translation of the pertinent passage.

Buddhist: That validity is shown by inference.

Answer: But inference deals with constructionfilled things. And is the inference that is supposed to show the validity of perception and inference itself an instrument of true cognition or not?

4 (E358-364; T31-36) Sāṃkhya: Perception is the operation of (sense-organs such as) the ear, etc.

Answer: No, since it is something sentient that grasps an object through awareness: the ear, etc., are insentient.

Buddhist Logician: Perception is free from conceptual construction (*kalpanāpoḍha*) and is nonerroneous (*abhrānta*). It grasps an object that is proximate and capable of efficient action. Awareness of it is nonlinguistic: if it were otherwise, since there is no way of connecting a word with an object except through memory, one could never perceive an object.

Answer: The argument is that perception is nonlinguistic because an object is nonlinguistic; but the same kind of reasoning would show that perception is insentient because its object is insentient. And how can individual atoms bring about awareness of a whole that is not momentary? But actually we know that in everyday practice when an object becomes perceived language becomes relevant to it fully. And this everyday practice requires admission of universal properties, and is impossible on the assumption of momentariness.

As for your definition of perception as nonerroneous: if "nonerroneous" means grasping an object as it actually is nonerroneousness never occurs, since it cannot represent reality which (according to you) consists of infinitesimal atoms. But if you take "nonerroneous" to mean awareness which does not make one err with regard to a particular thing like a pot, then since such things do involve conceptual construction the other part of your definition (viz., "free from conceptual construction") must be eliminated.

(E365-366; T37-38) "...in its manner of grasping", i.e.,

inference is an immediate awarenesss on the part of the cognizer, but "indirect" in that it grasps an external object through inferential signs and linguistic items. Thus "the other" has two varieties: inference and verbal testimony (i.e., language).

5 (E368-372; T39-43) The definition given in 5 shows the childishness of definitions of inference such as (Dignāga's) that there are three kinds of inference: through nonperception (*anupalabdhi*), through identity (*svalakṣaṇa*) and through effect (*kārya*), and that (of Kaṇāda), and that which analyzes inference into three types: *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. For in all these cases it is just the inseparability (of the *h* from the *s*) that is crucial, since without that relationship none of those definitions would apply. And this will apply in any other definitions as well.

Buddhist: Inference is erroneous (*bhrānta*) since it uses the erroneous concept of a universal property, which is unnecessary given the relations of identity and difference. Nevertheless, since without an object there can be no mark (*liṅga*) related as identical or as cause, without a mark the object cannot be cognized, and without cognition of the object it cannot be remembered, and without its being remembered there can be no inference. Thus inference is an instrument of knowledge even though erroneous, since it is nondeviating from its object.

Answer: No. Among (you) Buddhists, the realists, since they accept perception as valid, cannot demonstrate the erroneousness of objects. As for those (Buddhists) who believe that everything is momentary, since they deny everything they are not able to prove this thesis. Is the sentence "everything is nonexistent" existent or nonexistent? If the former, the Buddhist gives up his position; if the latter, then the existence of everything follows, since there is nothing that can refute it.

6 (E374-377; T44-47) Yogācārin: It is not a contradiction to say "error is an instrument of knowledge". Perception and inference make us reach an object in a

practical way, but since they misrepresent their contents as wholes or parts, and as things grasped or graspers, which relations do not stand to reason, they are erroneous. The only real entity is consciousness.

Answer: There is no instrument of true cognition to prove what you just said. We do not experience our consciousness as becoming bifurcated into knower and known, not even in our dreams. And it is evident that there are wholes and parts.

27 (E421-423; T80-82) Objection: What is the proof that there is any such thing as this "pure" perception?

Yogācārin: Here are two proofs. (1) A pure perception (*viśadadarśana*) whose content consists of all actual entities is possible, because there can be inference proving that content, for example, fire can be both perceived and inferred; there is such an inference, and so there is pure perception.

Question: What is the inference proving that actual entities are experienced?

Yogācārin: In this world what exists is experienced as undergoing continuity, birth and death, because it is an actual entity, just as bending and straightening one's fingers; thus things that exist have those experiences. But when those actual entities are rid of their karmic obstructions ("veils", *āvaraṇa*) there is nothing to block awareness and one becomes omniscient.

(2) The self is such that complete purity is possible, because the means to its purification exists, like a jewel which is purifiable in a furnace (*puṭapāka*), etc. And the completely purified self is called "pure", in that there is no difference between subject and object of cognition. The means to its purification is repeated meditation.

Objection: How can repeated meditation cause purification?

Yogācārin: Because it counteracts the karmic obstructions, as you yourselves admit.

29 (E425-474; T83-125) That a thing can have a

multiple nature (*anekāntātmaka*) is proved as follows: In this world an instrument of true cognition grasps a real entity having many properties, because only such a thing (having a multiple nature) is experienced, like a red flower which looks rosy.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: A property-possessor is completely different from its properties, so there cannot be a thing having a multiple nature.

Answer: How can a thing have many properties, then?

Naiyāyika: Each property inheres in the thing.

Answer: Then the thing has a multiple nature! And parallel arguments show the preferability of our theory of multiple nature to the theories of Sāṃkhya, Sautrāntikas, Yogācārins and Madhyamakas.

The seven perspectives (*naya*) are now expounded at some length, and each of the seven associated with the view of one or more other schools. It is argued that each perspective fails if it is taken to be right and the other viewpoints wrong. The concluding portion of this section sums up the position: "Whatever the propounder of the doctrine of (seven-fold) modal description, who is conversant with (both) viewpoints and instruments of true cognition, predicates with the intention of demonstrating the intrinsic nature of the real thing--while taking into consideration (both) the complete and the incomplete accounts--that is true, because the domain (of his predications) are possibly existent objects. However, whatever propounders (of simplistic theories interpreting reality) in the absolute sense, who cling to opinions of a defective viewpoint, argue is false, because the province (of their predications) are possibly nonexistent objects."

31 (E478-482; T127-131) Buddhist: A thing like, e.g. a pot is seen to become extinct, to get destroyed by being smashed with a club, for example. But the essential nature of a thing, being eternal, can't be destroyed by a club. So a thing's essential nature must be such that it will be destroyed at the same time the thing is destroyed. Then is that

is it produced by that same essential nature? If by chance the causal nexus that destroys it is not needed. If the thing is destroyed by its essential nature, then since an essential nature is eternal it will persist after the destruction, so the thing is not destroyed after all. So momentarinesss must be the correct conclusion.

Answer: On your view extinction takes place at every moment without cause. But why don't you say instead that duration and origination occur at every moment without cause? The same reasoning that you use to show that extinction can have no cause can be used to show that duration and origination can have no cause.

Objection (by a third party?): It is evident from perception, etc., that the sufficient conditions for origination, maintenance and destruction occur all the time.

Answer: We don't deny causation altogether, but we point out that causality pertains to things, (not to the Buddhists' pure particulars).[1]

(E482-488; T131-135) "...(A)ware of himself and of what is not himself" refutes the Mīmāṃsaka who denies the possibility of self-cognition, and also refutes the Yogācārin, who denies the existence of anything external to (one's) consciousness.

"...(T)he agent, the experiencer" refutes Sāṃkhya.

Sāṃkhya: The appearance that the *puruṣa* is an agent is due to the proximity (*upadhāna*) to *prakṛti*.

Answer: No, since the *puruṣa* must be subject to one form and then another, and this is a mark of agency.

"...(He) changes" refutes the opinions of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, who construe the self as not subject to change of any sort.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika: The self changes in the sense that it has different awarenessses inherent in it.

1 The intent of this section is not entirely clear to us: one should take what may seem to be implied with a grain of salt!

Answer: We have already refuted inherence, and no other relation will serve to help explain the matter.

"...(Is) not made of earth..." refutes the Cārvāka, who is subjected to an extensive treatment.

AMṚTACANDRA SŪRI (925)

A. N. Upadhye discusses this author in the Introduction to his edition and translation of the author's *Pravacanasāra-Tattvadīpikā,* op. cit., pp. 94-96. He says: "...(S)o far as we know, he is the first commentator on the authoritative works of Kundakunda. He does not aim at verbal explanation, but he wants simply to propound the philosophical contents of the *gāthās*...His zeal for *anekānta* logic is very great...he shows close acquaintance with Digambara as well as Śvetāmbara works...(He) is more a poet than a prose writer...(A)s a spiritual poet (*adhyātmakavi*) his position is simply unique and unequalled by any Jaina author before or after him."

Upadhye addresses the question of Amṛtacandra's date.. Noting that "There is very scanty material for sealing the date of Amṛtacandra", he reviews what little evidence he can locate and concludes that "The traditional Paṭṭāvalis put Amṛtacandra at the beginning of the 10th century A.D.", which is where we therefore put him.

71. AMṚTACANDRA SŪRI, *Tattvārthasāra*

According to P. S. Jaini this work, which he estimates as the earliest of Amṛtacandra's works, is "merely a summary of the aphorisms of the *Tattvārthasūtra*."[97] A. N. Upadhye describes it as "a running metrical exposition of *Tattvārthasūtra*. Excepting the concluding verse, it is in Anuṣṭubh metre. The name of the author is not mentioned; but at the end...the author happily expresses his modesty that the letters have formed the words, the words the sentences, which in turn have made the book; so he is no more the author."![98]

72. AMṚTACANDRA SŪRI, *Puruṣārthasiddhyupāya*

"ET" refers to the edition and translation by Ajit Prasad, with the editor's English commentary, published by L. Chhunna Mal Jain from Delhi in 1956. A. N. Upadhye (ibid.) says this work is also known as *Jinapravacanarahasyakośa* and that it "exhaustively deals with the duties of a house-holder in a highly philosophical tone."[99] The summary is by Potter.

5-9 (ET6-8) A *niścaya naya* is one whose object exists (*bhūtārtha*); a *vyavahāra naya* is one whose object does not exist. Kevala teachers point to the latter as guide to the ignorant. But *vyavahāra* alone is of no help to one who only knows it. One who knows both gains neutrality.

9-10 (ET8-11) A person (*puruṣa*) is a conscious self (*cidātman*), unconnected with sensory qualities, undergoing origination, disappearance and continuity. Eternally undergoing transformations it performs acts and enjoys its own acts and own experiences.

12-14 (ET14-15) These transformations, occasioning activities of the self, themselves constitute karmic products (*pudgala*). It is the self itself that modifies itself; the karmic products are only instruments. Thus a self is not the same as the modifications caused by karma, though the ignorant suppose it is. This is the seed of *saṃsāra*.

23-30 (ET26-30) One who has right vision must not doubt whether any of the various things people say are true or not, or whether they proceed from the omniscients. One should not desire greatness in this life as a Cakravartin or Nārāyaṇa, or accept one-sided views. He should not be disgusted at (a) source of unhappiness, or believe in false scriptures...

31-34 (ET30-32) Those of right vision, having mastered the Jain system and its logic, should with effort acquire right awareness, which can only be gained after right vision.

37-41 (ET34-36) One who has mastered right vision

and right awarenesss must necessarily practice right conduct. He may be either a saint (*yati*) in complete cessation, or a seeker (*upāsaka*) of only partial restraint.

44-48 (ET36-39) Attachment (*rāga*), etc., is the arising of violence (*hiṃsā*) and its nonappearance is nonviolence (*ahiṃsā*). Violence only occurs when there is violence to the instruments of life (lit. breathing, *prāṇa*)--it does not require injury to another person, but occurs when a person acts out of passion, or even while abstaining from violence, if one is careless.

50-57 (ET40-44) One who though not understanding the truth tries to practice the path is childish, causing any worthwhile conduct to come to an end. One may not commit an injury but may still bring violence about, just as one guilty of violence may not suffer its results. But trivial violence eventually breeds heavy results, just as serious violence may cause only mild results. It all depends on the agent's intention; a person with bad intentions will suffer whether or not his actions bear the intended results. One who sympathizes with a wrongdoer will suffer the consequences of that one's act, and those who coerce others into acting wrongly will wreak the majority of the sufferings consequent thereon. Whether an act is violent or not is a matter of the agent's intentions.

61-75 (ET45-48) To avoid doing violence one should give up drinking spirits, eating flesh or honey, and eschew the five kinds of fig. Alcoholic spirits make one liable to commit violence; one cannot eat flesh without being responsible for loss of life; eating honey represents the death of bees; and figs are the birthplaces of mobile beings.

76-90 (ET49-57) Perfect renunciation (*autsargikī nivṛtti*) involves nine aspects (not explained here). Imperfect renunciation (*apavādikī nivṛtti*) is of various kinds. For example, a householder has to ingest a certain number of *nigoḍas* (minute living beings, like bacteria), but should nevertheless try to avoid killing any more than he must (to get on with the ordinary functions of life, such as eating).

And one should not be hard on such a one, nor be misled by advice, e.g., that one may commit injury for the sake of one's religion. True religion does not involve sacrifice to the gods, nor should one attempt to please one's guest by offering him a meal of meat under the mistaken notion that it is all right to kill, e.g., goats. Nor should one kill others who are themselves guilty of killing, even under the notion that one is saving (or prolonging) the lives of others by doing so. For the same reasons, one should not participate in mercy-kllings, or kill someone in the act of meditation or under the mistaken impression of the Kharapaṭikas that one achieves liberation immediately on being released from his body. Likewise, feeding another one's own flesh as sacrifice is still violence, as is any suicide.

91-101 (ET59-62) Carelessly false statements are classified. Again it is the speaker's intention that determines how bad the act is, as in general it is the agent's intention (*pramatta yoga*) that determines sin. What is bad for the perfect renunciate may be allowable for the householder. And a moral speech that causes mental suffering to the listener is not bad, since it is motivated by good intentions.

102-110 (ET62-65) Intentionally taking what has not been given to one is an act of violence. A saint's breathing in bits of karma unintentionally is not violent. Unnatural ways of answering sexual passions are violent. Even the householder who is not ready to renounce sex altogether should confine himself to his wife.

111-119 (ET65-68) Appropriating (*parigraha*) is attachment. It is of two sorts, internal and external. Internal includes falsity, sexual desires, laughing, etc., and four passions. External appropriating is of two kinds, for living and for nonliving things. Appropriating of both sorts is violence; renunciation of both constitutes nonviolence.

120-226 (ET69-104) The remainder of the work proceeds in like fashion to discuss a number of specific do's and don'ts, commitments to which are implied by commitment.

to Jaina vows.

73. AMṚTACANDRA SŪRI, *Tattvadīpikā* on Kundakunda's *Pañcāstikāyasāra*

Summary by K. C. Jain

"E" references are to the edition found in the Srimad Rajchandra Jain Shastramala Series, Third edition. The summary has been translated from Hindi by Ratna Lahiri.

3 (E9-11) In this section the author has introduced three collocations (*samaya*), word (*śabda*), meaning (*artha*) and knowledge (*jñāna*), and (in the second half) he has touched upon the distinction between the world (*loka*) and what is beyond (*aloka*).

Of the five collections (*astikāya*, existents in relation to many spatial points), that which is balanced, i.e., without any favor or aversion, and consists of syllable, phrase or sentence, is known as the collocation of words (*śabdasamaya* or *śabdāgama*). When the advent of false vision is destroyed, knowledge of them is called the collocation of knowledge (*jñānasamaya* or *jñānāgama*). What is known by that is called the collocation of meanings (*arthasamaya*), which means the group of all substances. The collocation of meanings is twofold, worldly and beyond-worldly, that is, the infinite beyond.

4 (E11-13) Self or soul, karmic products, initiators of stasis and initiators of movement and space are the five collections. Their general and specific characteristics--arising (*utpāda*), maintenance (*vyaya*) and dissolution (*dhaumya*)--are already known to exist. They are all undifferentiated yet specific.

There are two perspectives, substantial (*dravyārthika*) and modal (*paryāyārthika*). Entities, though they may be

separate entities from the latter perspective, are nondifferent from the former.

"Atom" here means one space-point or indivisible unit. All substances are accumulations of space-points and therefore, occupying space, are known as bodies (*kāya*). Although an atom of matter is one-space-pointed, yet it becomes many-space-pointed on mingling with other atoms. Atoms of time, though existent, are not embodied to the absence of space-pointedness. So time as substance has not been dealt with in the section on the collections.

5 (E13-16) Collections are not different from their various qualities and modes. Existence occurs due to the demolition of one mode or the arising of another and association of a substance with its stages of creation and dissolution. In case a substance is totally without any qualities or modes, it means another substance is being created, destroyed or perpetuated. Then it will be nonexistent.

Now embodiment is described. Selves, karmic products, initiators of stasis and movement, and space are embodied. They occupy points in space, and these space-points are distinctive parts and therefore known as modes. The identification of those parts with those substances indicates embodiment (*kāyatva*). Although an atom is without parts, it has the capacity to have parts, so is shown to have a body.

Excepting karmic products, the other substances are unformed and are therefore indivisible. Yet it is not impossible to envisage them as divisible because it has been seen that though space is indivisible we may imagine it as space in a pot or total space, etc., If we could not imagine divisions in space, then pot-space, etc. all would become one. Therefore, except in the atom of time, every other substance has the quality of being embodied and thus has limbs or parts.

6 (E16-17) The collections plus time are labelled substances. A substance is the base for the coexisting qualities and serially occurring modes. Therefore, the modifications (*bhāva*) which have occurred, are occurring, or will occur, and

those that will become modes (like all the five collections plus changes, reasons, and time), are substances. Time being the cause of the modifications in karmic products, etc., it is here just another mode of it and therefore it is called the changing reason (*parivartanaliṅga*).

8 (E19-23) "Existential character". Existence is being, or the state of being. Existing things are neither eternal nor temporary. In eternal things, there cannot be a state of sequentiality and therefore there cannot be any modifications there. Momentary things cannot be recognized as "this is the same one" and thus cannot have continuity. Therefore a substance has three contemporaneous stages of existence, having an eternal mode due to being recognizable as itself at the next instant, and being continuously modified as evolving and devolving simultaneously through different states of its being. So, existence also has a continuous form of arising, existing and dissipating, since state of being and being are the same. Existence occurs in all substances, which is why it is called "omnipresent". It is infinite in its modes.

There are two types of existence (*sattā*). In the above section the "higher being" (*mahāsattā*) that dwells in all substances has been described. The second is the "lower" (*avāntara*) type of being. From the relative point of view of subsidiary being higher being is nonexistence and from that higher point of view the "lower" is nonexistence.

9 (E23-24) Although there is a little difference between existence and being a substance (*dravya*, that which flows) due to signified qualities and states, etc., substance and being are really the same.

10 (E24-26) However, the nature of substance, being many, is not only being. A substance is also the receptacle of the creation-maintenance-destruction process of modal qualifications. So being is of the nature of permanence/impermanence (*nityānitya*). Therefore, by "being" (*sat*) is implied oneness with both the permanent qualities along with the changing modes. Similarly, in the other

qualifications the occurrence of one implies the occurrence of the other two (i.e., of creation-maintenance-destruction).

11 (E27) Substance is eternal and without birth or destruction. It does not have a beginning or end. But its qualities of birth-maintenance-destruction, consecutive modes, do arise and get destroyed. So from the substantial perspective a substance is neither born nor does it die. However, from the modal perspective it is born and dies.

12 (E28-29) Since substance and mode are essentially unified there cannot be one without the other.

13 (E29-30) A substance and its qualities are also the same.

14 (E30-32) Here the word "*syāt*", connoting relative pluralism, has been used to imply "sometimes" or "perhaps" (*kathaṃcit*).

A substance exists in relation to its own state of points in space and time, but from the relative view of other substance (*paradravya*) is does not exist. (Perhaps it is.)

Thus, sequentially it does and does not exist from the one to the other state. (Perhaps it is not.) Together, both cannot be expressed. (Perhaps it is indefinable.)

In relation to its own time (*svadravyakṣetrakāla*) and of both of them together its existence cannot be expressed. (Perhaps it both is and is not.)

In relation to the time of others and of both of them together it is inexpressible. (Perhaps it is, and is indefinable).

In relation to both its own time and that of others and both of them together it is and is not inexpressible. (Perhaps it both is and is not, and is indefinable.)

But this sevenfold set of alternatives is not unproved (*anupapanna*). Every substance is, in relation to its form, etc., non-zero, in relation to the other, zero, in relation to both itself and the other it is zero and nonzero, and together, it is indefinable. In relation to the topic (*bhaṅga*), they are non-zero-indefinable, zero-indefinable and non-zero-zero-indefinable.

This is the seven-aspected logical predication (*saptabhaṅgī*) of Jaina logic.

15 (E33-34) An existing substance does not get destroyed as substance, nor does a nonexistent other substance get created as a substance. Coming into existence or destruction, substances generate destruction and creation of qualities and modes without actually creating nonbeing or destroying being, just as with the clarified butter arising out of the essence of milk the substance of milk does not cease to be. Nor is something other than the substance of milk created. However, without the destruction of existence or creation of nonexistence the fluidity, etc., qualities of the erstwhile milk are modified from their earlier state. The secondary stage or butter mode, etc., is also destroyed to produce the mode of clarified butter. It is the same with the modifications in all substances.

16 (E34-36) The qualities of a self are consciousness and cognition, perception and knowledge. Consciousness is of two kinds, pure and impure. Knowledge-filled consciousness (*jñānānubhūti*) is pure consciousness. Action-oriented consciousness (*kāryānubhūti*) is impure. Cognitive application (*upayoga*) is also of two types, construction-filled and construction-free. Modes are also pure and impure. Extension or diminution in either light or heavy qualities lead to pure modes.

20 (E42-44) On liberation there is no creation of ultimate nonbeing. The generation of, say, a godly mode of a self temporarily existing in one mode and devolving to produce another mode of existence does not produce nonexistence. Similarly, even if for a long time a self has dwelled in *saṃsāra* and in the absence of its causes ceases to be so, thus creating a state unknown to him before (*abhūtapūrvasiddha*), that too does not create nonbeing.

21 (E45-46) Substances are forever indestructible and unborn. Therefore, the self is eternal as a substance. The same, when born as a god, etc., is called the doer of that state.

The same, when destroyed as a human, is the doer of nonexistence. The same, when destroying the existence modes of the gods, etc., is known as the doer of nonexistence of existence. The same, when generating human, etc., modes, is the doer of existence of nonexistence. This is the result of the theory of manifoldness, that even in this apparent contradiction there is no real contradiction.

27 (E56-61) From the ultimate perspective (*niścayanaya*) the self assumes the *bhāva* breaths and from the practical perspective (*vyavahāranaya*) he accrues the *dravya* breaths to become a self. From the ultimate perspective he is of the nature of consciousness, and from the practical perspective he is one with consciousness and possessor of its power (*citśakti*). Ultimately consciousness is undifferentiating, practically it is differentiating consciousness resulting in awareness and therefore cognizable. Ultimately it can control the *bhāva* actions, practically it controls the *dravya* actions and their outflow, bondage, stopping inflow, cleansing and emancipation by itself and is therefore the Lord.

Ultimately the self is the doer of the karmically-related results and practically he is the doer of matter-accruing actions for self-related results; therefore, the self is the ultimate doer (*kartṛ*). Ultimately he is the experiencer of the good-bad results of pure-impure actions and practically he is the experiencer of good results from good acts and bad results from bad acts. Thus he is the enjoyer (*bhoktṛ*). Ultimately it may be by worldly measurement (*lokapramāṇa*) but practically it is due to name karma; he is either in a small or a big body and so is embodied.

Practically he may be associated with form but ultimately he is formless by nature, and therefore incorporeal. Ultimately he is associated with conscious actions associated with karmic matter, while practically he is associated with results accruing from conscious actions: thus he is karmically conditioned (*karmasaṃyukta*).

28 (E62-63) The moment the self is completely released

from karmic bondage due to its rising nature he goes up to the top of creation (*loka*) and stays there because there is no reason to go on further. He is not liberated from knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) or complete vision (*kevaladarśana*) as they are his very nature. They both reside in him and he revels in the eternal pleasures beyond the senses. This liberated soul has certain kinds of material selfhood (*rūpajīvatva*), consciousness, cognition, lordship, agency, enjoyment, size in keeping with the size of the physical body in which he had attained liberation, and an incorporeal quality without attributes. However, the liberated self does not have any association with karma.

31-32 (E68-69) Every self, being an indivisible entity, occupies points of world-space. Every self has lightness/heaviness qualities that cause the form he is in. At any moment in time, the possible modifications in size of this are infinite. The points in space are also innumerable. The amount of space occupied by an indivisible atom of karmic matter is known as a space-point (*pradeśa*). Some selves, through their complete manifestation of spiritual qualities, may extend to the whole world. Most others (not so fully manifested) do not fill the world. These are filled with false faith-binding emotions and erroneous awarenesses. Those who have been liberated from these are the liberated beings (*siddha*).

34 (E72-73) Just as in this world the self resides in a body as part of the never-ending consecutive procession of bodies, so also does it then sequentially go to its other bodies. In this, his existence is thus in each of these bodies in sequence. Yet, within a body, he does not become the same as the body, just like milk in water, remaining separate due to his not being of the same nature as the body.

36 (E75) Liberated beings are not born like the worldly self who is filled with effects of actions of mind, body and speech generating karma, nor do they cause substantial results which in turn usually cause rebirth in the forms of gods,

humans or animals. Liberated beings do not get born like that. Due to the eradication of substantial actions (*dravyakarman*) one is born by oneself and due to some other cause. The other-worldly being becomes a cause due to the fruits of his actions of *bhāvakarman* and resulting karmic products, which in turn cause the forms of gods, humans, animals or hell-beings. It does not cause liberated beings: those generate themselves on having expended both types of actions.

38 (E78-79) Some selves experience only pleasure and pain due to being soiled with deep delusion; and those who have strong awareness-obstructing traces experience the pleasure-pain fruits of karma because their capacity to act has been destroyed by strong hindrances (*vīryāntarāya*). Others, who also have their conscious nature veiled with attachments as well as awareness-obstructing karma but have some residue of capacity for action due to elimination of hindrances, experience the pleasure-pain of karma arising out of the results of action.

Some selves, who are clear of soiling due to attachments born of deluding karma, have also destroyed all their awareness-obstructing karma and have thus unveiled their total powers: they are of infinite power due to the eradication of all hindrances. They experience the natural pleasure of knowledge as part of their self because the fruits of their actions have been erased, and they experience bliss.

41 (E81-82) Knowledge obtained by congenital mental capacity (*abhinibodha*) when occurring with false vision is called *kuśrutijñāna*, and extrasensory awareness when arising with false vision is *vibhaṅga*.

43 (E84-85) The knower is not different from knowledge, as both having the same existence they are one substance, and both occupying the same space-points they have one-space-ness. Both having the same time-frame have cotemporality. However, even if this be said, there is no contradiction in saying that one self may have many types of knowledge because substance is of the form of the universe

(*viśvarūpa*).

44 (E88-89) Qualities must belong to something. They belong to and reside in substances. If they are separated from one substance then they will belong to something else and that too will be another substance. In this way the eternal nature of substances is revealed. A substance is a conglomeration of qualities. If the collection of qualities exists separately, then where does it exist? So if substances are considered separate from the qualities substances will become nonexistent.

45 (E89-91) The space-points occupied by a substance and its qualities are the same, so they are said to have the similarity of undivided space-pointedness (*avibhaktapradeśa-rūpatva*). To explain: Just as one atom, occupying one space-point indivisibly, is nondifferent from that space-point, so also the one atom is not differentiated from its sight, smell, touch, taste qualities coexistent in those space-points. However, just as far-off places like the Vindhya mountains are divided in space and therefore are separate from other mountains, that kind of separateness does not reside in substances and qualities since their space-points are not different.

46 (E91-93) Examples are given to show that different designations or representations do not prove difference in substances and their qualities.

56 (E105-107) The rising of the fruits of actions is called *udaya*. Nonarising is known as *upaśama* (calming of result-giving actions). Nonarising and arising is known as *kṣayopaśama*. Complete separation from karmas is known as *kṣaya*. An evolute (*pariṇāmya*) is that which is caused by the very nature of a substance, not by action. The state consisting of the rising action is known as (1) operative karmic state. The one which has calming mode is known as (2) subsiding. One with depletion and nonarising of karma is known as (3) *kṣayopaśamika*. That with depletion is (4) *kṣayika*, and with results it is (5) *pariṇāmika*). These five are the qualities of the self. Four of these are differentiated and one is inherent by nature.

57 (E107-108) From the practical viewpoint the self as the experiencer of *dravyakarmans* and those actions that come to him as experience are called the instrumental cause (*nimitta*). By its instrumentality the doer-self does the action-object. Thus in whichever state of being or emotion the action is performed the self becomes the subject of that state.

58 (E108-110) Without performing actions the modes (1-4 of 56 above) do not arise. So they should be considered as caused by karma. The fifth mode is the natural undifferentiated, eternal, infinite mode of the self. A mode of type (4), though infinite due to the self being associated with a personality, nevertheless is born of the dissolution of karma: therefore it is not eternal and is thus said to be caused by karma like the other three. A type (2) mode is also born of the gradual quietening of karma and is destroyed if quiescence does not take place: therefore, again, it is karma-caused. So types (1-4) are all various stages of *dravyakarman* itself, but not type (5) the ultimate resulting higher self.

59 (E110-111) If states (1-4) are caused by karma the self does not become the doer of those actions. But the self cannot be accepted as the nondoer either. Therefore, the conclusion must be that the self is the doer of the *dravyakarmans* also. But how is that possible, since from the ultimate standpoint the self does not indulge in anything except its natural state?

60 (E111-112) This verse resolves the problem posed in the last one. From the practical standpoint, being the instrumental cause, karma is the doer of *jīvabhāvas* and vice versa. From the ultimate higher viewpoint neither karma nor the *jīvabhāva* is the doer. It is not that they happen by themselves without a doer because ultimately (from the higher standpoint) the self is the doer of its resultant ultimate state and karma is the doer of the resulting deeds.

65 (E116-117) Even without releasing its true conscious *pariṇāmika* nature in this world, the self is entangled in eternal bondage of eternal delusion, passion and aversion.

Contaminated by them it roams the worlds in this sullied state. Whenever he indulges in these states of attachment, jealousy, etc., at that time, using that very cause as instrument, he generates the products of karmic matter and interfaces with its space-points and thus acquires the nature of that karma.

67 (E118-120) Thus from the ultimate viewpoint karma is the doer of itself and from the practical viewpoint it is doer of the *bhāva*-states of the self. The self, too, from the ultimate viewpoint is the doer of its own states while from the practical point of view it is the doer of its actions. However, from both points of view karma is the doer and from neither is it the experiencer, because by being nonconscious it cannot have experience. Therefore, due to having consciousness, only the self can be the experiencer of the self engulfed in the fruits of actions such as pleasure and pain or sometimes desirable or undesirable things.

71-72 (E123-125) That great self (the self in the liberated state) is eternal consciousness itself and therefore it is one. From the difference between relative awareness and vision it has two divisions. From the point of view of the awareness of awareness, of karma and of karmic results it has three divisions. Due to having four movements it is one with fourfold motions. Due to having five major conditions (*bhāva*, see 56 above) it has five primary qualities. On dying it may go to the four directions, above or nether worlds, thus it has six series of orbits. It has sevenfold predications, thus it has seven existential states. It is the receptacle of eight type of karmas and eight qualities; it deals with nine substances in nine ways, so has nine meanings. It resides at ten levels, viz., in earth, water, fire, air, vegetation in general, in each plant specifically, in two-, three, four- and five-sense-organed life forms, and in the ten places of the five organs.

76 (E129-130) Due to six types of decrease and increase, the atom may have the nature of completion-dissolution. Otherwise, due to the appearance and disappearance of aggregates, the atom may have the

completion-dissolution stages: thus it can be determined to consist of karmic products.

Aggregates are many karmic products having the same mode and are nondifferent from those products, which is why they are called "*pudgala*".

78 (E132-133) Due to the embodiment of an atom touch , taste, smell and color are separate from it in name only. Actually, its space-points, etc., are the same in the middle or at the end. Thus, the substance and its quality being nondifferent in space, the space-point of an atom is the same as the space-point of the touch, the taste, the smell and the color. Therefore, if in an atom there is a decrease of smell-quality, in another of smell and taste-qualities, and in another of shape-quality, then the atoms are destroyed as a result of having shared the same space-point of those qualities.

Therefore it is not logical for an atom to decrease. So the cause of the earth, etc., are all four fundamentally one and the same atom. The transformational quality of an atom is unique. In some instances one quality may manifest and others not manifest, and thus have unique transformations. For the same reason, in some the smell, etc., qualities may be unmanifested. The resultant transformation is not the word, because the atom is single space-pointed while the word is many-space-pointed.

80 (E136-137) Being located in one space-point the atom is indestructible and therefore eternal. It is with space as it lends space to the qualities that are nondifferent from it. It is without space because it does not have two or more space-points. It is the divider of aggregates as by having only one space-point it is instrumental in their division. It is for the same reason of the formation of aggregates their generator (*kartṛ*). The time it takes for one space-point to travel over one space-point of space is called a "moment" (*samaya*); therefore an atom is the divider of moment. By the reason of having one space-point, it indicates the number of space-points in the aggregates, and thus is the divider of numbers.

86 (E143-144) Just as the nature of the initiator of movement has been described, know the nature of the initiator of stasis to be similar. The difference is just this: the substance that initiates movement is instrumental like water in the mobility of the karmic matter of the mobile selves (*kīvapudgala*). However, the substance that initiates stasis, like the earth, is instrumental in causing the stability of static life matter. Just as the earth, being still by itself, does not inspire others to be still, but continues to be benign to the (by itself) still horse as a noninterfering enabler, so also does *adharma*-substance remain static by itself without inspiring others to be still, but benignly becomes an instrument to help those who are still of their own accord.

87 (E145-146) Both initiators are substances, because without them the world and nonworld cannot be divided (exist). The totality of all substances like selves, etc., is the world. The one pure space alone is nonworld (*aloka*). In the world, the selves and karmic matter by their own natures continue to reach their various states or results. If the initiator of motion and of stasis, in arriving at their deserved or resultant states of being, were unregulated, who is to stop them from escaping into the nonworld?

100 (E159-160) The time-mode that occurs in sequence is known as practical time (*vyavahārakāla*). The essential basic substance of it is ultimate time (*niścayakāla*). Although practical time is a mode of ultimate time, even so, due to ultimate time's being measured by the transformational states (*pariṇāma*) of *jīvapudgala* transformations, these transformations occur due to external instrumental past time-substances (*dravyakāla*). Therefore it is said that they are born of *dravyakāla*. In summary, practical time is determined by the selves, karmic matter transformations, and since such a transformation cannot be otherwise, the time substance is determined. Practical time is momentary because the subtle modes are limited. Ultimate time is eternal, and due to its being the base of its own qualities and modes, it is

indestructible.

121 (E184-185) The one-organed, etc., and earth-bodied creatures that are called selves are so-called in practice because in the intermingling of eternal karmic matter and the self there is a predominance of the self. From the ultimate perspective the earthly body or sensation of touch lacks the nature of consciousness, so they are not selves. Within them, those who know themselves as different from others, are known as selves due to the quality (cognition) being somewhat coexistent with the holder of that quality.

128-130 (E191-193) Due to the attribute of eternal bondage of the worldly self there are some smooth (*snigdha*) transformations. By transformations karmic matter is attached. Due to karma, the hell states, etc., happen. Therefrom the body, organs, objects and attachment-jealousies, etc., arise. The attachment-jealousies in turn cause more smooth transformations. From a smooth transformation arises the karmic matter transformations, from karma, again the state of hell, from hell again another body, from body, again sense-organs and sense-objects, and from them again attachments and jealousies are born. Thus mutually being cause and effect, the self and karmic matter transformations continue in the net of karma and wheel of rebirth eternally, infinitely and without beginning or end, again and again.

131 (E194) Where there is laudable attachment and the mind is calm, there is good transformation. Where there is false apprehension, jealousy and unlaudable attachment, there is a bad transformation.

132 (E195-196) The doer of laudable transformations (*śubhapariṇāma*) is the *niścayakarman* of the self. It is itself a good transformation, and causal due to being instrumental in good transformations. That is, the inflow of the substance of merit (*puṇya*) begins having found the instrumental cause of good transformations. After its inflow, it is known as the "merit-satate" (*bhāvapuṇya*). Similarly, after the inflow of demerit, karma is known as demerit-state (*bhāvapāpa*). The

niścayakarma agent of the karmic product is the doer of the transformation of effective karma (*viśiṣṭakarmaprakṛtirūpa*). That substance is merit and is instrumental in good transformations of the self, or demerit and instrumental in producing bad transformations of the self.

136 (E200-201) Good attachment happens to an ignorant devotee who has only gross qualities of devotion. Even some of those knowledgeable aspirants who cannot rise to higher planes sometimes need this kind of attachment, in order to stop it from occurring towards the wrong object or to dislodge it from the excessive fever of worldly attachments.

137 (E201-202) To be upset in the mind due to pity on seeing an excessively hungry or thirsty being, and to desire to do something about it, is the pity of an ignorant person. Those knowledgeable persons living in the lower planes have this slight sadness in the mind seeing the world inundated in this wheel of rebirth.

142 (E206) Stopping of all false attachments and negative transformation is known as *bhāsaṃvara*. And due to that, the cessation of all karmic matter entering due to activity and causing good/bad karmic transformations is known as *dravyasaṃvara*.

145 (E209-210) Meditation is the main cause of the cleansing off of traces. One who has succeeded in complete cessation of good/bad transformations, one who knows well the nature of substances, one who has been able to refrain from other objectives and is actively focussed on his self-objective alone, achieves the self by his own experience. Seeing no separateness in the qualities and the qualified, he meditates unwaveringly on the self-knowledge and, becoming completely devoid of softness (*nissneha*), dissipates his earlier acquired karmic particles. Thus, meditation is the mainstay of cessation.

147 (E213) The good-bad transformations of the self soiled with misapprehensions, attachments and jealousies, is known as the *bhāvabandha*. The good-bad transformational

matter (*pudgala*) caused by them and adhering to and intermingling with the self are known as the *dravyabandha*.

148 (E213-214) The external cause of the accrual of karmic matter is activity (*yoga*), and the internal cause of this karmic matter having special power and existence is the state of the self.

154 (E222-224) The basic nature of the self is perennially emancipated. Its nature is right awareness and right vision which are not separate from the self. They are not different from the self as both are specific and general aspects of its basic consciousness nature. Within that innate knowledge and vision the rise and fall and status (*utpādavyayadhrauvya*) that exists is laudable because it is not of the nature of attachment, etc. That is right conduct and that verily is the path to liberation.

159 (E229-230) That lord of yogis (*yogīndra*) who is able to shed all misapprehension of the other substance nature and follow his own natural substance and who realizes his self by knowing it to be one with his innate knowledge and vision, he is the real follower of the self-path.

This is the exposition of the path to liberation on the basis of the *niścayanaya* that relies on the pure substance and nondifferentiated ends and means. And that which was discussed in verse 107 was the practical perspective to the path of liberation based on modes of self and nonself and relying on separate means and goals. There is no essential difference in the two because there is a means and end relationship between the *vyavahāra* and *niścaya* viewpoints. This is why the Lord Jina has given the exposition from both points of view.

74. AMṚTACANDRA SURI, *Tattvadīpikā* on Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*

Our "E" is the edition contained in A. N. Upadhye, *Śrī Kundakundācārya's Pravacanasāra* edited with commentaries of Amṛtacandra and Jayasena and Hemarāja's Hindi

commentary, Station Agas, Post Boria, Via Anand, W. Rly. 1964. "T" is the translation by Barend Faddegon published as Jain Literature Society Series 1 (Cambridge University Press 1935).

10 (E10-11; T6) No actual entity (*vastu*) becomes a supporting object (*ālambana*) of existence (*sattā*) without evolving (*pariṇāma*), and evolution occurs only in actual entities. An actual entity involves substance, which marks its continuity; qualities which are its individual accompaniments, and modes, the particular stages it passes through, and it arises, continues and perishes.

14 (E15; T9) "...considers satisfaction and frustration the same", i.e., he no longer undergoes the evolutions which arise from feeling-producing karma.

15 (E17; T9) "...omniscient", i.e., since the self is just knowledge and knowledge is just knowable things, the self that knows reaches the summit of all things knowable.

16 (E18-20; T10-11) "*Svayambhū*" is interpreted in two ways: as having the capacities indicated by each of the six *kārakas* (cases--nominative, accusative, instrumental, dative, ablative and locative); or as throwing off the *ghātīyakarmans* in their respective order.

But there are actually no case-relations between the self and anything else, the self not being dependent on the means to its realization.

19 (E24; T12) Since awarenesss and bliss constitute intrinsic characteristics of a self they arise in the liberated self even without sense-organs.

21-22 (E27-28; T13-14) "...without sensational stages", i.e., the knower's cognition is not analyzable into stages (such as indistinct, directed, determinative), but at the moment the obstructions are at an end he enjoys direct vision of everything perceptible.

32 (E38; T19) "...neither loses nor gains", i.e., there is no grasping or releasing but an immediate (*sākṣātkaraṇa*),

nonwavering awareness, and so the omniscient one is involved while remaining isolated.

45 (E52-53; T28) The actions of a perfected being do not cause changes (delusion, atachment, aversion), and at the same time they annihilate karmas and thus cause liberation.

CHAPTER TWO

1 (E108; T60-61) "An object", i.e., a verbally denoted thing "is made of substance", a substance being an aggregation (*samudāya*) of particulars (*viśeṣātmika*) classifiable in terms of persistent features (*vistārasāmānya*) and specific features (*āyatasāmānya*). Substances "by their natures have qualities", those persistent features, and both (substance and quality) "again have modes", viz., the specific features.

A substantial mode (*dravyaparyāya*) comprises the thought of a unity of several substances which in turn may be homogeneous (e.g., several material atoms) or heterogeneous (e.g., self/karmic product, or god/man).

A qualitative mode (*guṇaparyāya*) comprises the thought of a diversity of specific features, which in turn may be natural (*svabhāva*) or nonnatural (*vibhava*). A natural qualitative mode of all substances is being subject to increase and decrease. A nonnatural qualitative mode is, e.g., color, etc.

These examples are dilated upon.

3 (E112-114; T65-67) The unity of a substance comprising the qualitative differences of the modes relating to birth, maintenance and destruction are illustrated by the example of a dirty shirt's becoming clean.

4 (E115-117; T67-70) The essential nature of a substance is existence (*sadbhāva, astitva*), since it does not depend on anything else, exists beginninglessly and endlessly as well as occurring in time, is different from its nonnatural modes, and is not spatially analyzable. To illustrate the relations of a substance to its qualities and modes the example of gold is adduced.

5 (E118-119; T70-71) "...one mark", viz., existence (*sat*), the common property of all things. It is elaborately shown that unity and sharing a common property are compatible characteristics of a thing.

6 (E120-121; T71-73) Substances do not arise from other substances, since a substance is "realized through its own nature", as indicated by their beginninglessness and endlessness.

Existence (*sattā*) is not a distinct entity from (an) existent (*sat*) (as in Vaiśeṣika)--they can neither be said really to be separated (*yutasiddha*) nor unseparated (*ayutasiddha*), since to cognize two things as separated they must first be cognized as unseparated.

7 (E122-123; T73-75) Just as a substance, by nature single, has many space-points as its parts determining its spatial extension, so the occurrence of a substance, by nature single, involves changes (*pariṇāma*) in its parts and controlling its orderly positive activity. And just as these space-points come and go while the whole stays of the same volume, so the changes constitute collectively the birth, maintenance and destruction of a thing despite each itself being single.

8 (E125; T76) So it is necessary to accept a substance as having the three features (of birth, maintenance and destruction) going on unopposed and inseparably connected with the creation of posterior absences, the destruction of prior absences, and persistence throughout.

10 (E127-128; T78-79) Objection: A moment of birth is neither a moment of persistence nor a moment of destruction, etc. So a substance originates, persists and decays of its own nature.

Answer: No. Why do you assume that origination, persistence, and destruction each must have different moments of occurrence? The moment of birth of a pot is the same moment as that of the death of the lump of clay, etc. And thus the substance is all these moments (which we call modes).

16 (E136-137; T84-85) If nonidentity were just

nonexistence of one thing in the other the result will be that one substance will be many, or emptiness (*śūnyatva*), or *apoha*. All involve contradiction.

52 (E185-187; T118-120) (Faddegon at T, p. 118-119, gives the following analysis, which we quote, of the argument of this section of the commentary:) "A. Thesis. Existence or occurrence without space-points cannot belong to time, and still less can time be occurrence itself. B. First part of the argumentation: Time canot be the occurrence itself, for the occurrence must rest on something which possesses the occurrence. And if we supposed that time were identical with the occurrence, then oneness of origination, annihilation and persistence would be impossible. C. Argument for the conclusion, drawn at the end of B: If the unity of origination and annihilation, with reference to a substance, were to consist in an uninterrupted series of origination and annihilation, without something in its modifications subject to these aspects, then the Buddhistic theory of momentariness, *kṣaṇabhaṅga--horribile dictu*!--would hold true. Time, therefore, consists of (one or more) space-points. D. Second part of the argumentation: Should time consist of many space-points, then (as we must read between the lines) the only supposition allowed would be that it consists of an innumerable number of space-points, equal to the space of the universe. But this is excluded, because the moment could not come into existence. E. Final conclusion (or return to thesis). Time consists of one space-point and, as such, according to the *gāthā* it possesses existence. Had it not possessed even one space-point it would not have existed."

CHAPTER THREE

(E246; T152) The commentator considers the body of the *Pravacanasāra* to terminate at the end of Chapter Two: what follows is an Appendix (*cūlaka*).

2 (E146-151; T153-155) How one desiring to be a

monk should bid farewell to his family is set forth at some length, detailing the five aspects of studentship--knowledge, vision, right conduct, penance and energy--in each case insisting that none of the activities referred to belong to the purified self.

The commentator indicates that at 31 the section on conduct (*ācaraṇa*) ends and new section on the path to liberation (*mokṣamārga*) begins, terminating at 44. Section 45-70 is characterized as the section on good cognitive application (*śubhopayoga*). 71-73 are termed, respectively, the truth of rebirth, liberation truth, and the truth of the means to the liberation truth.

75. AMṚTACANDRA SŪRI, *Ātmakhyāti* on Kundakunda's *Samayasāra*

As far as can be ascertained, this work has not yet been translated. A. N. Upadhye describes a portion (*-kalaśa*) of it as "a veritable mine of finely phrased and carefully polished melodious verses containing the essence of *Ātmavidyā*",[100] and P.S.Jaini comments "Amṛtacandra's poetical eloquence finds real expression in the commentary on the *Samayasāra*."[101] It has been edited several times.

76.AMṚTACANDRA SŪRI, *Laghutattvasphoṭa*

Edited and translated (our ET) by Padmanabh S. Jaini as L.D.Series 62, Ahmedabad 1978. Prof. Jaini provides an analysis of the contents (pp. 4-24) from which we draw in what follows. Some technical terms are rendered through the translation adopted in the present Volume rather than in Prof. Jaini's analysis.

Summary by Padmanabh S. Jaini

"The first chapter is...the most formidable part of the

entire work, as the poet turns quite a few of its verses into veritable riddles. The doctrine of *syādvāda* affords him unlimited opportunity to exploit the figure of speech called *virodhābhāsa*, whereby he can describe the Jina in apparently contradictory terms such as "empty-nonempty", "eternal-noneternal", "being-nonbeing",. (etc.). All Jaina poets employ these dual attributes for the soul in the spirit of manifoldness, i.e., from the 'conventional' (*vyavahāra*) and 'higher' (*niścaya*) points of view. What distinguishes Amṛtacandra from the rest is his eloquent espousal of the *niścayanaya* without departing from the manifoldness doctrine."

"The second chapter continues with the problem of the dichotomy created by the *vaiśvarūpa* and *ekarūpatā* which characterizes the cognition of the Jina. As if anticipating the Sāṃkhya objection that cognition of objects might destroy the unitary nature of consciousness, the poet asserts that the *puruṣa*...remains distinct from the world of objects even when he cognises them, undisturbed from the innate (*sahaja*) unity of his consciousness (*caitanya*). This is of course possible only for the Jaina, who adheres to the doctrines of manifoldness and *syādvāda*: the absolutist Sāṃkhya must deny any cognition by the self, for this would imply contamination. The poet therefore calls the *ekāntavādin* a *paśu* or ignorant person, literally an "animal". This term, although rather strong and of rare occurrence in other Jaina works, occurs ten times in the *Laghutattvasphoṭa*. It is invariably applied to an *ekāntavādin*; this could be an adherent of any of the classical *darśanas*, or even a Jaina who has strayed from the true path either by clinging to the commonsensical (*vyavahāra*) discipline at the cost of cultivating the higher (*niśaya*), or by abandoning the external in the misguided belief that he has already attained the higher. The Poet characterizes the *paśu* as "destroyer of the self", "devoid of insight", "one of closed heart", etc." [102]

"The second chapter closes with a further affirmation of the variegated nature of the self."

"The third chapter provides one of the finest accounts

of the spiritual career of a Jina found in the entire Jaina literature. This career consists of the gradual progress of the self from its lowest state, that of falsity, to the highest state of spiritual growith, marked by omniscience. This path of purification has fourteen stages called *guṇasthānas*, beyond which lies the total isolation (*kaivalya*) of the self, the Jaina ideal of a perfect being (*siddha*). The turning point is the fourth stage, *samyaktva*, which marks the entrance of the aspirant onto the path. Amṛtacandra hails the moment of entering that path (*mārgāvatāra*) as one of great bliss. (51). The (fourth stage of) *samyaktva* consists of insight into the true nature of the self, which is defined as nothing but "pure intuition and knowledge" (*dṛgbodhamātra*). The author equates this *samyaktva* with *sāmāyika*, a Jain technical term for the tranquility of the self which is gained only by such insight. *Samyaktva* leads to the relinquishing of all evil activities, activities which give rise to attachment and aversion and thus injure the self. It has two stages, being first partially achieved while living as a layman (*śrāvaka*), and then totally while an ascetic (*muni*). These changes are indicated by the fifth and sixth stages, called *deśavirata* and *pramattavirata* respectively. Through these stages the aspirant cultivates sight conduct, which to the nascent Jina comes so spontaneously that he is called the very embodiment of *sāmāyika*."

"It might be argued by certain overzealous advocates of the higher viewpoint that the noble aspirant, endowed with such insight and equanimity, could dispense with the 'mere formalities' of becoming an ascetic (i.e., the commonsense path). As if to correct such a notion, the poet makes the pointed observation that external (*dravya*) and internal (*bhāva*) controls (*saṃyama*) are interdependent, and that the nascent Jina demonstrated this by first establishing himself in the discipline of the ascetic (53). The sixth stage, called *pramattavirata* is marked by numerous ascetic activities, particularly the practice of such austerities as fasting and long hours of meditation. But these are all actions, albeit worldly

wholesome ones, and must yield results according to the law of karma. Further, the word *pramatta* itself indicates more than simple carelessness in ascetic activities; it implies lack of mindfulness regarding the true nature of the self. Hence the true aspirant must turn "completely inward", "creating vast distance between the *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*" (61), i.e., between the self and karma, and attain the firm stage of pure consciousness (*śuddhopayoga*), in which no new karma is generated."

"The chapter ends with the author's devout wish that he too may become an omniscient being (75)."

"The fourth and the fifth chapters continue with the theme of the omniscient Jina, seated in the holy assembly. He is described as a mass of knowledge, of which his cognition is a mere sport (83). Although he has not transcended the mundane condition, the Jina has not abandoned that essential duality of permanence and change which characterizes all existents (89). His omniscience is larger than the totality of the objects which it knows. These objects do not produce knowledge, which exists by its own nature; they merely 'instigate' (*uttejana*) it (98). Even so it is held that there could be no 'inner knowables' in the absence of 'outer objects'; hence the Vijñānavādin doctrine of *bahirarthanihnava* stands condemned. (109). Finally, the Jina's cognition, even when it illuminates an infinity of objects, is free from agitation; from the higher viewpoint the Jina cognizes the mere existence (*śanmātra*) which is one, partless, eternal and innate (113)."

"The sixth chapter returns once more to the ascetic path of the nascent Jina, discussed in the third chapter. The aspirant turns all activities into morality (*śīla*), perfect conduct. His heart is filled with profound disenchantment, and he offers his worldly life into the fire of austerities (127). Moving all alone on the holy path, he mounts the ladder of the destruction of karma (131) and arrives at the twelfth stage of progress; here arises the 'the omniscient knowledge which becomes a beautiful flame, kindled at the center of the

universe' (136). Finally, the Jina becomes a *siddha* (138), shining forth in his peaceful light and experiencing boundless bliss."

"The seventh chapter opens with the declaration that the poet takes refuge only in the Jina, i.e., in pure consciousness. It is pure in that all notions of action are absent when one sees this consciousness from the transcendental point of view: 'All existents are naturally and eternally contained within the limits of their own being; they cannot be obstructed by others' (167). The state of omniscience is one of knowing and not of doing, for even when objects are cognized the self is merely manifesting its own nature by itself, for itself, and in itself. Thus it is devoid of instrumentalities (*kāraka*); there is no agent, object, instrument, recipient, point of departure, and location (170)."

"The eighth chapter shows the Jina as supreme teacher, the *āpta*. The poet praises him for demonstrating to others (i.e., the theists, whose teachers are superhuman) the splendor of human endeavor; by his valor he has destroyed the passions and married Lakṣmī in the form of omniscient knowledge (181). Although he had achieved his goal, he used the remainder of his life for the benefit of the universe, showing the holy path by establishing a Tīrtha (182); thus the Jina is known as Tīrthaṅkara....Amṛtacandra admits the mutual dependence of the aspirant and the Tīrtha for the instruction of the former and the reestablishment of the latter. This mutual causality is like that of seed and sprout; the nascent Jina follows the "ford" and the "ford" proceeds from the Jina (183)..."

"The omniscient Jina perceives the whole of reality; yet there are no words adequate to express the universe in its totality. Therefore only an infinitesimal portion of the Jina's cognition is conveyed to gods and men, and only a few of these will have the purity of heart necessary to grasp it (186). Only through the Jina can one learn the true doctrine, that which asserts the dual nature of reality (185). The preaching

of the Jina is marked by the seal of *syādvāda* (187), the only means by which one can comprehend and fully express reality with its mutually opposed characteristics. Thus he is called the supreme teacher of all (99)."

"The ninth chapter takes us once more to the spiritual carrier of the nascent Jina...The Jina's self is filled with tranquility when he enters the holy path (201). He fearlessly vows to remain isolated, totally renouncing both internal and external attachments (202). He fills his heart with compassion for all suffering beings (203). Resolved to stay in meditation, he suffers the scorching rays of the sun by day and sits all night in the charnel ground, letting jackals crush his emaciated body (205). He fasts for two weeks, or even a month (206); thus he gradually attains to perfect conduct and omniscience. The Jina then preaches that path which he himself has practised, the path which is the very essence of the scriptures. Internally it consists in the destruction of passions, externally in the resolute pursuit of right conduct (209). Both are necessary, for although insight is the most important factor in bringing about salvation, it loses efficacy in the case of one who lacks proper conduct (210)."

"The tenth chapter opens with a solemn declaration that the poet will praise the Jina from one standpoint, that of the pure view (226). In this view, substance is identified with only one of its qualities and with only the purest of its modes. The Jina's self is endowed with innumerable qualities or powers, all manifest in their pure modes. Nevertheless, the pure view prefers to identify that self with only one of these qualities, knowledge, and only its perfect modes, knowledge. Other modes are not unreal, but they are of no relevance to the path of salvation. The aspirant therefore fixes his attention only on this goal, using the pure view as a meditational device. In omniscient cognition even knowledge of the infinity of objects is of no consequence; the pure view ignores this rather incidental aspect of knowledge and concentrates only on the aspect of self-experience (*svānubhava*). This must be so, for

from the higher standpoint the self knows only itself; it sees and experiences itself alone. The poet therefore describes the Jina as being a mass of pure consciousness which seeks no end other than manifesting its own blissful nature. It is blissful (*anākula*) because there is no room in this cognition for the net of conceptual constructions (*vikalpajāla*) which produces such distinctions as existence and nonexistence. These qualities have validity only in discussing the nature of reality; for the Jina, all conceptual constructions are at rest. (232). Despite his cognition of the innumerable objects in their infinite modes, the Jina does not deviate from his innate and unified nature; he is compared to a piece of ice which appears wet on all sides but still retains its firmness (239). The unity of his character is like that of a piece of salt, having the same flavor throughout (238). He has turned away from the cycle of instrumentalities and is free from distinctions of seer and seen; he shines forth as pure intuition (234); he is nothing but knowledge (237)."

"Chapters eleven and twelve, both in *anuṣṭubh* meter, continue the theme of the pure viewpoint initiated in the tenth chapter. According to this viewpoint, the omniscient consciousness of the Jina remains unified even when plurality of objects is cognized. This claim of unity needs further examination since the Jaina believes in the doctrine of two distinct applications (*upayoga*) of consciousness, calledd vision and knowledge (*jñāna*)."

"The poet hails the Jina as *anekāntasālin* and speaks of the infinite powers of his consciousness. This is followed by the declaration that he will "ignore the manifold nature" and "regard him as undifferentiated knowledge" (277). In this passage the word "*jñāna*" stands in the place of "*cit*" and subsumes both vision and knowledge. A little later, in verse 286, Amṛtacandra makes a similar statement, saying that Jina's "inner and outer light shine forth as nothing but intuition". This is very significant, for it appears that the poet here wishes to reduce even awarenesss of external objects (*jñāna*) to

vision, the intuition of the self...."

"The thirteenth chapter continues with the topic of the supremacy of vision according to the pure viewpoint. The concepts of contraction (*saṃhāra*) and expansion (*asaṃhāra*) of consciousness appear here. The poet characterizes vision as the quality which, lacking all other objects, has been contracted on all sides (310) and shines forth with only one object, namely the self."

"Having thus stressed the pure viewpoint and having impressed the aspirant with the true glory of the Jina, the poet returns to the task of achieving a balance between the higher and the commonsensical viewpoints. For it must be remembered that even the pure view, however exalted, is but a single viewpoint and can apprehend only one of the many aspects of the existent. Moreover, the Jina too is subject to the law which regulates the role of external causes in producing effects (322), and he cannot prevent the objects outside his knowledge from being illuminated by his omniscience....It is the very nature of (omniscient) cognition, like that of the sun, to illuminate the totality of objects, and the Jina has neither any desire to know these objects, nor any consciousness of agency pertaining to the act of their cognition (314). He should see both the unity and multiplicity of consciousness as forming the essential nature of the self. The chapter ends with the poet's call for self-realization, the state in which these manifold aspects are effortlessly subsumed (325)."

"In the fourteenth chapter the poet views the Jina both sequentially, i.e., considering each quality separately, and simultaneously, i.e., considering his substance in its unity. Looked at from the point of view of particulars, omniscience consists, for example, of both intuition and knowledge, but from the unified standpoint it is seen as pure consciousness alone (326). The chapter fashions such contrasting viewpoints into a string of riddles...But the doctrines of *anekānta* and *syādvāda* have goals beyond merely describing the nature of reality. The Jina taught them in order to produce

discrimination between self and other. The method is one of asserting what belongs to the self and negating that which belongs to others; hence it is known as *vidhipratiṣedhavidhi* (338). 'The objects of knowledge do not belong to the self and yet the knower is drawn by them; therefore an aspirant's soul should take itself as its object' (345). A person whose mind is endowed with such discrimination does not take delight in externally oriented actions (346); he attains to the immovable fruition of consciousness; for such a one there is no rebirth, for he has forcefully uprooted the seed of transmigration (347).."

"The *vidhipratiṣedha* method mentioned earlier receives further attention in the fifteenth chapter. The poet characterizes it as a weapon which has been sharpened innumerable times by the Jina during his mundane state (353). *Vidhi* and *niṣedha*, i.e., the positive and negative aspects, are mutually antithetical. But when properly balanced through the doctrine of *syādvāda*, they work together for the accomplishment of the desired goal, namely discrimination between the self and the not-self (357). By *vidhi* is understood the own-nature (*svabhāva*) of an existent, defined by its own substance, own space, own time and own modes. All existents are at all times endowed (*vidhi*) with their own fourfold nature. They are at the same time devoid of (*pratiṣedha*) the fourfold nature of other existents. Thus both the positive and the negative aspects abide equally and simultaneously in the same existent (358)."

"Although existents are well secured in their own nature and never partake of 'other nature', they do not thereby become entirely independent of each other; there also exists the law of causation which demands mutual assistance. 'Cause' is the designation for a complex situation; it involves self and other, i.e., of both material and efficient causes, which operate in mutual dependence (365). The Jina's being the embodiment of knowledge is not dependent upon any other substance; similarly, the innumerable distinctions (i.e., the reflections of

the objects cognized) within omniscience are not inherent to it; dual causality is thus clearly evident in the omniscient knowledge of the Jina (366)."

"The law of causation and the law of own-nature should both be seen in proper perspective: the two laws are properly balanced when one applies to them the conventional and higher points of view (370)."

"In the sixteenth chapter the poet applies the twin laws of causation and being to the cognition of the Jina. Just as the movement of schools of fish leaves a wake in the sea, this entire universe produces an infinitely great net of conceptual constructions in the omniscient cognition (386), constructions of the form 'this (object) is thus'. And yet, because the Jina possesses both positive and negative aspects, the distinction between his self and others is never lost (387). This is because both objects and the knowledge of these objects have their own space-points as well as their own substance, time and modes; hence there is no possibility of any defiling mixture or confusion between them."

"As if to forestall the false conclusion that the constructions in the omniscient cognition are not part of its own nature, the poet hastens to add that the Jina undergoes these infinite transformations at every moment by his innate power (391). This process is always subject to the law of dependence upon both material and efficient causes; the objects play their proper role as external and instrumental causes in the transformation of the cognition."

"In the seventeenth chapter the poet discusses the relationship between words, the qualification 'maybe; (*syāt*), and the reality expressed by them. The positive aspect (*vidhi*) by itself proclaims the object as established in its own substance, space, time and modes. But this assertion is meaningless unless it simultaneously implies exclusion (*niṣedha*) of that object from the substance, space, time and modes of others. There is no single word which can ever succeed by itself in expressing both these aspects

simultaneously. Qualifying one-dimensional assertions with '*syāt*'", however, renders them expressive of actual, multi-dimensional reality. The spoken word...itself expresses the primary (*mukhya*) aspect, whether positive or negative, which is desired by the speaker. The qualification "*syāt*" implies the other aspects, which are subordinate (*gauṇa*) insofar as they were not expressly mentioned (421). Thus the two positions abide in mutual compatibility and express the referent fully."

"It could be asked whether this *syāt* produces a power that was not present in the words or merely brings out one that was already there (417). The Jaina answer to this question conforms to *syādvāda*. The dual power of words is innate in them; no external thing can produce a power in something else which does not already exist there. But the manifestation of that dual power never occurs without the accompaniment of the expression 'maybe' (418)."

"Chapters eighteen and nineteen continue further with the dual nature of the existent and the manner in which that nature is harmonized by the device of *syādvāda*. The Jina is seen, from different viewpoints, as both substance and modes, universal and particular, eternal and momentary, existing and nonexisting, expressible and nonexpressible. The poet returns once again to his favorite theme of the material and efficient causes. He accepts objects as the efficient cause of omniscient knowledge, but asserts that the subject-object relationship is similar to that which obtains between an indicator (*vācaka*) and the thing indicated (*artha*). There is no real interpenetration, dependence, or actual mixing of one substance with another (452). Existents are always complete in their own-beings (456) and are secured within the impregnable limits of their own space-points (452). All existents are endowed with mutually opposed aspects. They are proportionately divided into substance, modes, etc. through the doctrine of 'maybe' (450). Although divisions, i.e. the modes, are real, to dwell in them is to dwell in speculations of instrumentalities, speculations which cast

blemish on the splendor of the own-being (465). Therefore the aspirant takes note of them but abides only in that aspect which is enduring, which affirms only beingness (*bhāvamātṛtā*), which is the unbroken stream, the undifferentiated subtance itself; he becomes aware of the unified light of the Jina's consciousness, free from divisions of time and space (472)."

"The twentieth chapter is of special interest as it is a critique of Buddhist doctrine, a singular honor not accorded to any other *darśana* by our author...The Jaina characterizes the other classical *darśanas* as partial expositions of reality which claim to be speaking the whole truth. This he brands as onesidedness (*ekānta*), a term which also carries the stigma of blind dogmatism. The Vedāntic doctrine of monistic absolutism or the Buddhist doctrine of momentary *dharmas* are examples of such onesided views; the former apprehends only substance, declaring the modes to be unreal, while the latter concerns itself only with the present moment and totally excludes the substance (or self) which is the underlying unity of past and future states. Both doctrines are mutually exclusive and must give a false description of reality."

"The Jaina admits that there is an element of truth in both these points of view if they are qualified by an expression like 'maybe' (*syāt*), hence asserting one view while suggesting the existence of the remaining aspects of reality. Qualified in this manner, the Vedāntic doctrine can be accepted as a synthetic (*saṃgraha*) (477) and the Buddhist momentariness as a straightforward (*ṛjusūtra*) (478) viewpoint; both are valid insofar as they represent reality as it is successively perceived. By the use of *syādvāda* the Jaina can not only transform the false, i.e., the absolutist doctrines, into instruments of knowledge (*naya*) but he can even play devil's advocate with no apparent inconsistency (476)."

"The twentieth chapter provides a fine examples of a Jaina attempt to accord validity to the Buddhist tenet of momentariness by transforming it into the *ṛjusūtranaya*. The

tenet can thus be accommodated with the rest of the Jaina doctrine and can even be presented as a teaching of the omniscient Jina, who thus deserves to be called 'Sugata' or even 'Tathāgata', two time-honored epithets of Śākyamuni Buddha (495)."

"Although momentarinesss (*kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*) is the main tenet for assimilation, the poet makes a broad sweep, bringing almost all shades of Buddhist doctrine under his purview in the brief span of twenty verses. The chapter abounds in Buddhist technical terms...."

"The twenty-first chapter is probably a criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, which regards the universal and the particular as two separate entities related to the other categories by means of inherence. For the Jaina the universal and the particular constitute reality itself and hence cannot be separated (512). What is called 'universal' is the substance, which 'becomes by way of similarity', i.e., which is the continuity among the particulars, namely the modes (513). The same rule applies regarding absence. In the Jaina system an existent is characterized by both presence and absence. It is presence from the point of view of its own being (namely, substance, space, time and modes) and its absence from the point of view of the other (524)."

"Although of miscellaneous character, chapters 22, 23 and 24 can be considered together as they touch repeatedly upon one of the author's favorite themes, omniscient cognition and its incorruptibility by the impact of the objects cognized. In the Jina all feelings have been eradicated, because he has turned his face away from attachment to external objects (526). A wondrous stream of bliss flows within him, carrying his concentrated insight (*magnāṃ dṛṣam*) even more deeply into his soul (526). It is even possible to suggest that the objects are not perceived at all, that only the knowledge is; for is it not true that the internalized objects are nothing but transformations within and of the knowledge? And yet the Jina's teaching does not consist in negating the reality of the

objective universe (536). He need not negate objects, for there is no fear either of their entering into or making actual contact with the self. This is because all existents have mutual boundaries which are innate and fixed; they never fall away from their nature (537). The Jina can in no way be contaminated by his cognitions (537). He abides forever deep in the boundless mass of innate knowledge. Because of the absence of delusion he will never again have the notion of agency. Even if it is alleged that knowing involves agency, what can the Jina do other than know? (539) Cognitions are not able to move the Jina away from the unified consciousness of his self (542). The aspirant should cast out all vitiated transformations of the soul until there shines the light of omniscience, the only thing which cannot be removed (549). Only then is the firm knot of passions totally dissolved (558), and upon this dissolution the cognition exists only as Knower."

"The twenty-fifth and final chapter deals with the integration of action and knowledge (*karmajñānasamuccaya*) (615), which would appear to be the heart of Jaina teaching. The poet, as usual, begins with the importance of knowledge. There is, he says, some subtle thing (i.e. the bond of attachment) that obscures the true nature of the Jina from the seeker (602). Ignorant persons indulge in ever more severe activities but fail to perceive the truth. As to those who dissolve the knot of subtle attachment and devote themselves to restraints, they obtain the inner light and secure their own natural state (602). Great effort should therefore be made to control the totality of desires, for there is no release for the *yogin* who undertakes merely the restraint of vibrations (*yoga*) but remains bound by inner attachments (612). Activity pertaining to perfect conduct must, however, remain the sole refuge (613) until one has attained release from internal bonds; thereafter, as in the case of an *arhat*, these activities are involuntary and have no further goal (613). As to those who, deluded by the mere touch of an occasional glimpse of self-realization, think they can dispense with the actions

pertaining to pure conduct and cease to be vigilant, they will surely fall away from their asceticism and injure themselves again (615). But those who are at all times firmly secure in sharp awareness of the self and behave with equanimity towards all will reside in their own selves, which are filled with both vision and knowledge (617). The aspirant, knowing the importance of both knowledge and action, applies himself to the entire field of scriptural knowledge with great resolution, grasps fully the nature of the self, and remains secured in the restraints which lead to perfectly pure conduct. Dispelling darkness, he destroys the bondage of karma. Such a soul, touching his own reality, i.e., the self, attains to the domain of omniscient knowledge which illuminates the whole universe; only then does he come to rest (618).

77. DEVASENA (933), *Nayacakra/Ālāpapaddhati*

H. L. Jain and A. N. Upadhye write: "The *Nayacakra* of Devasena in 87 *gāthās*...Devasena has composed the *Ālāpapaddhati* in Sanskrit on his own *Nayacakra* to supplement the latter with the discussion about *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya*."

Summary by Ratna Lahiri

"E" references are to the Bharatiya Jnanapith Moortidevi Jain Granthamala Prakrit Series 12, in which a Hindi translation of this work by Kailasacandra Shastri is found. The summary is made on the basis of that translation.

1 (E209) There are six substances: selves, not-self (i.e., matter), initiator of movement, initiator of stasis, space and time. Substance, which consists of origination, destruction and permanence, is what exists.

(E210-212) General qualities are: existence (*astitva*), actuality (*vastutva*), relative size (*agurulaghutva*), space-

pointedness (*pradeśatva*), thought (*cetanatva*), lack of thought (*acetanatva*), materiality or embodiment (*mūrtatva*) and immateriality or disembodiment (*amūrtatva*). Each substance has six of these eight qualities,

There are sixteen special qualities of substances: (1) awareness, (2) vision, (3) pleasure, (4) energy, (5) touch, (6) taste, (7) smell, (8) color (*varṇa*), (9) cause of movement (*gatihetutva*), (1) cause of stasis (*sthitihetutva*), (11) cause of accommodating space (*avagāhahetutva*), (12) cause of persistence (*vartanahetutva*), (13) thought, (14) lack of thought, (15) embodiment and (16) disembodiment. A self has (1)-(4), (13) and (14). Matter has the rest. The other four substances have three special qualities each. (13)-(16) are general in case of their own kind but special in relation to the opposite kind.

Modifications in the qualities are known as modes. They are of two types, (A) natural modes (*svabhāva*) and (B)modes of aspects (*vibhāva*). Natural modes, related to the relative size of the mode, are of twelve kinds (six stages of increase and six of decreasing space-pointedness are enumerated). Modes of aspects are four (human, hellish, celestial, animal) of 840,000 births--these are the conditioned (*vibhāvavyañjana*) modes. Immediate awareness, clairvoyance, telepathy, etc., are known as the conditioned modes. That the body in which liberation is acquired becomes slightly shrunken in size but remains of the same shape is known as its natural (*svabhāvavyañjana*) mode. The four endlessnesses, viz., endless knowledge, endless pleasure, etc., are the natural modes of a substance. The conditions of two atoms of matter making up aggregates, etc., are known as expression (*vyañjanā*) substance modes. When a condition of one taste or smell shifts to another taste or smell, then it is the conditioned expression mode. One atom of the pure state of matter is a natural conditioned mode. In this atom if one of color, one of taste and two of touch (one rough or smooth and one hot or cold) qualities occur, then it is termed a natural conditioned

mode of material quality. At all times these modes rise and fall in the substances eternally--just like waves in water.

2 (E213) An intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) is and is not, is permanent and impermanent, many and one, differentiated and undifferentiated, capable of liberation and not so capable, and it is realized; these are the eleven general (*sāmānya*) intrinsic natures of substances. There are ten specific (*viśeṣa*) intrinsic natures.

Self and matter have all twenty-one natures. Initiators of movement and of stasis along with space have sixteen; time has fifteen.

These substances can be known by instruments of true cognition and from perspectives. Knowledge is of two types, direct and indirect.

Nigama means optional. What has not yet materialized but is conceptually available in its nondiscriminated totality is the conventional perspective.

The commonsensical (*vyavahāra*) perspective is the empirical point of view. *Saṃgrahanaya* accepts the view arising out of the collection of all the substances as nondifferentiated. The commonsensical perspective accepts the meanings thus arrived at and differentiates between them. The *ṛjusūtra* perspective accepts only the reality of the moment.

Acceptance of the grammatical form and etymology, etc., is the linguistic viewpoint (*śabdanaya*). Clairvoyance and telepathic knowledge are limited direct knowledge while complete knowledge (*kevalajñāna*) is omniscience. Immediate and verbal awarenesses are indirect. Perspectives are just limbs of the instruments of true cognition.

3 (E214) Of all the perspectives the basic two are substantial (*dravyārthika*) and modal (*paryāyārthika*). They are the causes for successful ultimate realization (*niścaya*).

There are nine perspectives: substantial (*dravyārthika*), modal (*paryāyārthika*), conventional, collective (*saṃgraha*, with emphasis on the universal amidst particulars), practical (*vyavahāra*), *ṛjusūtra* (at a particular point of time), *śabda*

(with reference to the meaning, functional), *samabhirūḍha* (application of *śabda*), and *evaṃbhūta* or strict constructionist. Further subdivisions of these perspectives are called subperspectives (*upanaya*). E.g., the substantial perspective has ten subcategories, each of which is enumerated with its relative emphasis of viewpoint. Then six categories of the particular perspectives are enumerated. The conventional perspective has three sub-perspectives, past, present and future. The collective, practical and temporal each have two subperspectives, and the rest have none. Thus there are twenty-eight subperspectives.

Qualities co-exist forever with a substance; modes come and go. Qualities separate one substance from another.

4-5 (E219) The ten qualities are each explained.

Modes are transformations into natural and conditioned states. A substance never abandons its natural state, thus, it is existent by nature. It never acquires the nature of another, thus, it is nonexistent by nature. In each of its modes, it is recognized as the same in nature; therefore it is eternal. However, it continuously changes its modifications; therefore it is transient by nature. Its substratum is the same amidst different modes, therefore it is one. However, it has differences regarding qualifier and qualified, name, number, purpose and signs; therefore it is many. The qualities have a different purpose, hence a substance and its qualities are differentiated. However, the qualities and the substance owning those qualities are actually the same; hence, it is also undifferentiated. In future it may acquire another form; thus it is capable of salvation (*bhavya*). But it never changes its form, thus it is not capable of such transformation in another sense.

6 (E220) It has been said in the *Pañcāstikāyasūtra* (v. 7) that all substances are intermingled in space and give space to one another, thus though intermingled they are still different.

Due to its transformative nature, a substance has the

potential for highest transformation. This is the general nature of substance.

The nature of a substance is not its quality, but in relation to a thing's substance, area, time and state its qualities become its nature.

Transference of nature from one to another is known as transferred (*upacarita*) nature, which can be of two types. The first arises from karma, the other is innate. For example, embodiment of self or unconsciousness belong to the nature arising from karma, i.e., from acquired karmic matter. Knowledge and omniscience in the realized being is an innate transferred nature.

7 (E221) Due to false perspective, often a substance is considered real in itself, because false perspective (*durnaya*) knows only its own (one-sided) meaning. One does not look at other perspectives and considers only one's own. Being one-sided and opposing all possible viewpoints, they are in error.

If a substance is seen to be true only from a single point of view, then due to many mixed falsehoods the true meaning will not be revealed. If always every substance is considered absolutely existent, then everything will become the same: self, etc., will become identical. Similarly, if substance is considered exclusively nonexistent, then all will be empty (*śūnya*). If substance is considered eternal then, being nondifferentiated, it will have no capacity to produce action and therefore becomes nonexistent. If considered exclusively temporal (*anitya*) it will be destroyed constantly and be unable to produce action, thus again becoming nonexistent.

8 (E221) If it is considered nondifferentiated without either general or specific modes, then too with the lack of either the other will be meaningless (generalities will occur only in relation to specifics). So both general and specific will then become nonexistent like the horns of a donkey.

If considered to be merely many (instead of one), then too the substance will cease to be, as absolute differentiation will not have a unitary substratum. Without substratum and

what is supported, there will again be a lack of substance. Between general and specific, if absolute differences are accepted, then due to the inability of either to create activity, again there will be no substantiality.

If any absolute or exclusive viewpoint is accepted, then there will be no difference between the known and the knower, the seeker and the sought, everyone will be pure and perfect, there will be no difference between teacher and student.

The word "always" (*sarvathā*) can mean either in all time, or in all types or as a rule, or relative predication (*anekānta sāpekṣa*). If the last is accepted, then it proves our way. This means a substance is seen not in one way alone but from all perspectives, as it has many natures. If that is taken as the rule, then how can there be scope for both eternal, transient, one-many, differentiated/undifferentiated, etc., possibilities of all meanings? Then you will be accepting just one perspective exclusively.

If an absolutist unconsciousness principle is accepted there will arise the destruction of all conscious substance. If the self is considered corporeal, then it will not have liberation. If considered totally unformed, the world itself will disappear. If considered as occupying just one space-point or many space-points exclusively, then the undivided total self will not be able to execute its many activities. If considered totally pure, karmic matter will not be able to accrue to it. If considered impure by nature, how will it ever become pure?

9 (E225) Instruments of true cognition are of two kinds, constructionfilled (*savikalpaka*) and constructionfree (*nirvikalpaka*). Knowledge accruing with the help of the mind is known as constructionfilled, and has four categories: awareness of a present object (i.e., immediate awareness, *matijñāna*), scriptural or traditional awareness (*śrutajñāna*), extrasensory awareness (*avadhijñāna*), and telepathic knowledge (*manaḥparyāyajñāna*). Knowledge acquired without the help of the mind, by the self alone, is known as

construction-free, i.e. complete (*kevala*) awarenesss or highest omniscience.

Ascription or imposition of the instruments of true cognition and perspectives is known as the study of implications (*nikṣepa*). It is fourfold: that which refers to proper names (*nāma*), that which refers to the ascribed meaning (*sthāpana*, representations), that referring to meaning in future time (*dravya*, potency) and that referring to the meaning of the nature of the object at present (*bhāva*).

(E226-227) There are two perspectives, substantial and practical. Of these the substantial focusses on the undifferentiated, the practical on differences.

The substantial has two subtypes, pure and impure. That which finds as its subject the undifferentiated unity of the quality and the qualified is the pure substantial view, e.g., the self as omniscience. What focusses on the qualified content as the impure substantial perspective, e.g., present awarenesss, is the self.

The practical perspective has two divisions: (1) differentiating between varieties of the same substance (*sadbhūta*), (2) differentiating between varieties of different substances (*asadbhūta*). Each have two further categories of transferred (*upacarita*) and not transferred (*anupacarita*), depending upon which finer similar or different characteristics they compare or impose on the perspectives. Separating the qualified from the qualifier, with its attributes, is the practical *sadbhūta* perspective, for example, the view that present awarenesss, etc., are qualities of the self. An example of practical *asadbhūta* perspective is ascribing undifferentiated omniscience to the self.

78. DEVASENA (934), *Tattvasāra*

Summary by Jay Soni

"E" references are to the edition with commentaries by Hiralal Siddhanta Sastri, Ahmedabad 1981.

4 (E25) Devasena regards a direct meditation on nonindependent categories as a cause for merit and, through the tradition, as a cause for liberation.

5 (E27) The independent categories are of two kinds: constructionfilled and constructionfree. The constructionfilled cate-gories are those which are combined with the influx of karma and the constructionfree are those without karma.

6-7 (E28-29) Description of how the gradual transition from the fourth stage of progress to the eleventh is achieved.

8 (E30) Description of the pure nature of the soul, having right vision, right awarenesss and right conduct, being called pure consciousness.

9 (E32) One should become a monk (lit. "bondless" (*nirgrantha*) and meditate on this purity.

10 (E33) Description of the person called "bondless", namely, one who has given up the ten exterior and the sixteen interior kinds of bonds.

11 (E34) Description of the condition under which meditation on the self is possible, namely, the necessity of seeing e.g., pleasure and pain, life and death as the same.

16 (E42) If one desires the joy of liberation then attachment, aversion and delusion should be renounced and meditation should be practiced.

17-21 (E43-62) Description of the essential nature of the self from the higher standpoint (*niścayanaya*).

22 (E64) Description of the self from the commonsensical standpoint.

23-24 (E65-66) The possibility of separating the self from karma is pointed out.

25 (E67) One should strive to grasp the nature of the self.

26-28 (E69-72) Further qualities of the self described.

29 (E73) The nature of the self can be realized through

meditation.

30-31 (E74-75) Just as the sun shines fully without the veil of the clouds, so too does the true nature of the self shine forth without karma. For this a stoppage of the activities of mind, speech and body is necessary.

32 (E76) With the stoppage of these there is a stoppage of the influx of new karma, and the karma that is already bound to the soul is also destroyed.

33 (E79) Liberation is possible only through the nonattachment of karma.

34 (E80) Conversely, with attachment of karma there is bondage.

35 (E81) Difference between the knowing and the ignorant persons.

36 (E83) Superiority of taking the middle way.

37-38 (E84-85) A yogi is neither pleased nor displeased with anything.

39 (E86) The mind of one who knows the nature of things is not disturbed by attachment, aversion or delusion.

40 (E88) Such a person has a vision of the self, not those whose minds are disturbed.

41 (E49) The stillness of the mind for a glimpse of the self is compared to the stillness of a lake which enables one to see through it.

42 (E91) No sooner is the yogi free from the objects of the senses then there is a glimpse of the self and a knowledge of everything.

43 (E92) Therefore one should leave the objects of the senses and meditate on the pure nature of the self endowed with knowledge.

44 (E94) The person who meditates on the self with thorough understanding (*saṃvedana*) is freed from passions, is pure and is the bearer of the three jewels.

45 (E95) A person who has experienced the pure nature of the self is a person who has right vision, awarenesss and conduct.

46 (E98) Even though a yogi has attained unflinching concentration, if he not experienced the essential nature of the self, then this purity cannot be attained by him.

47-48 (E99-100) Through constant meditation a yogi cannot experience the pure nature of the self if attached to physical pleasure.

49 (E102) But the yogi who becomes unattached to the sicknesses of the body, meditates on the self, he becomes perfected after being freed from the five kinds of bodies.

50 (E103) When a yogi who constantly meditates on the self experiences karma there is no doubt that it is beneficial.

51 (E104) In experiencing the fruit of this karma without attachment or aversion, there is no bondage to new karma, and there is a destruction of the karma already accumulated.

52 (E105) But if the karma is experienced with good or bad feelings, then there is bondage to the new karma.

53 (E106) Even if there is a minute attachment to things of the world there is no freedom from karmic bondage.

54 (E108) Only the ascetic practice of one who is fixed in meditation without attachment or aversion leads to a destruction of karma.

55 (E113) This happens because a knower does not deviate from his essential nature; such a person not only stops the influx of new karma, but also destroys existing karma.

56 (E115) The person who is freed from dependence experiences his or her essential nature with a fixed mind. Such a person has definitive vision, awareness and conduct.

57 (E116) This is so because from the higher standpoint the self itself has vision, awareness and conduct, and is pure consciousness.

58 (E117) After having obtained one's own pure nature by destroying attachment and aversion, yogis obtain supreme bliss.

59 (E118) If one does not obtain supreme bliss during

concentration, then what should one do with concentration or yogic practice? Nothing at all.

60 (E119) Even if there is the slightest movement when one is fixed in concentration, the pleasing supreme bliss cannot be obtained.

61 (E120) But when the mind's activity has stopped and all thoughts are stilled, then the eternal nature of the self which it experiences is the cause of liberation.

62 (E122) For the yogi fixed in his own nature there is no awareness of sense objects nor the arising of karma, but only a knowledge and view of the pure self.

63 9E123) The mind of a yogi who has obtained the essential nature of the self does not roam around sense-objects but, desireless, becomes identical with the nature of the self, for they (the sense-objects) are destroyed through the weapon of concentration.

64 (E125) The mind perishes only when the entire delusion karma is destroyed. No sooner is it destroyed than the mind is also destroyed, and at the same time the *ghāṭīyakarman* also perishes.

65 (E126) The reason for this is because the delusion karma is involved with all karma. Just as in a battle when the king is killed the army disperses, so too as soon as the delusion karma is destroyed the remaining *ghātīya* karma also perishes.

66 (E127) As soon as all the four (kinds of) *ghātīyakarman* are destroyed the world and nonworld shine forth, there arises pure, knowledge in the knower of the qualities and modes of substance in the present, past and future, and this yogi becomes a supreme self.

67 (E129) As long as there exists karma responsible for life the yogi remains in the state of a Tīrthaṅkara or *samāya kevalin*, roaming around teaching the path to liberation to those selves destined for liberation, becoming an *ayogikevalin* when the length of life karma has a maximum of forty-eight minutes (*antarmuhūrta*).

68 (E130) A liberated (*siddha*) self is free of both movement and nonmovement, without activity, in bliss without disease, endowed with the supreme qualities.

69 (E131) Becoming gradually devoid of senses at this time the liberated self knows and sees all at once both the world and the nonworld and all the material and immaterial substances endowed with their eternal qualities and modes.

70 (E133) Since there is no initiator of movement beyond the world the liberated self does not move and therefore remains eternally above the world.

71 (E134) When the self becomes free from karma why does it not go downwards or diagonally when the principle of motion is still present? Here Devasena says that it is because it is the nature of the self to go upwards.

72 (E135) The liberated self is devoid of the five kinds of bodies, has a lesser form of the last body, with no future births or deaths. I bow down to such liberated selves.

73 (E136) The self that crosses this poisonous ocean of existences immersed in the mutually dependent categories should always be good to the categories which give refuge to all the selves.

74 (E138) If a person who has right vision practices concentration on the category of self through this essence of categories (*Tattvasāra*) composed by Devasena, such a person will obtain supreme happiness.

79. DEVASENA, *Darśanasāra*

Summary by Bhagchandra Jain

This work was composed by Devasena, the disciple of Vimalasena, in 933 in Dharanagari. It consists of 51 *gāthās* in Prakrit. Devasena is of the view that the first *tīrthaṅkara* Ṛṣabhadeva's son Marīci is the main originator of *ekāntavādin* philosophies like *ekānta*, *saṃśaya*, *viparīta*, *vinaya*, and *ajñāna*.

In his opinion, Pihitāśrava's disciple Buddharti was the great scholar in the Pārśvanātha tradition. But he started eating meat and refused to accept the existence of a self, established the theory of momentarinesss and became the founder of Buddhism (cf. *gāthā* no. 6). Thereafter Devasena criticises the view of Śvetāmbara Jainas, Viparītavādins, Vācanikas, Ajñānavādins, Draviḍas, Yāpanīyas, Kaṣṭhasaṅghīyas, Mathurāsāṅghīyas and Bhillakasaṅghīyas along with their origination. When speaking of Kaṣṭhasaṅgha he refers to Kundakunda, Vīrasena's disciple Jinasena, Guṇabhadra, Vinayasena and Kumārasena. He mentions Kumārasena as the preacher of Kaṣṭhasaṅgha and expressed his opinion that it was originated v.s. 753. Likewise, the origin of Mathurāsaṅgha was made by Rāmasena in Mathurā in v.s. 953, according to *gāthās* 39-40.

80. MĀṆIKYANANDIN (940), *Parīkṣāmukha*

This author clearly follows Akalaṅka in his interpretations of logical points. M. A. Dhaky ("The date of Vidyānanda: literary and epigraphical evidence", Nirgrantha 2, 1996, pp. 25-28) identifies him as "a confrère, possibly senior, of Vidyānanda". Since Dhaky shows that inscriptional evidence fixes Vidyānanda's date as in the first half of the tenth century, Maṇikyanandin's date must fall at about the same time.

"ET" references are to the edition and translation by Sarat Chandra Ghoshal in Sacred Books of the Jains 11, Lucknow 1940. The summary is by Potter.

INTRODUCTION

1 (ET1) Correct understanding of things comes from instruments of true cognition, and error from what is only apparently true (but is not). This work gives a brief account of these.

CHAPTER ONE

1 (ET12) An instrument of true cognition is an awareness which ascertains itself and objects not previously ascertained.

2 (ET30) It is an awareness which enables the obtaining of worthwhile (*hita*) things and avoidance of things that are not worthwhile (*ahita*).

3 (ET32) An instrument of true cognition such as inference ascertains definitively (*niścaya*) what contradicts mistakes (*samāropa*)

4-5 (ET36-37) "Not previously ascertained" (in 1.1 above) explained. Even something that has been ascertained correctly can become unascertained through mistakes.

7-12 (ET38-41) "Ascertainment of itself" (in 1.1) is illumination (*pratibhāsa*) of itself along with other objects. E.g., we say "I know the pot by myself" (grammatical analysis given). But cognition is also self-aware where no language is involved, analogously to the lamp lighting itself up as well as objects around it.

13 (ET44) Validity (of an instrument of cognition) may come through that instrument itself or through another instrument of true cognition.

CHAPTER TWO

1-2 (ET48-49) There are two kinds of instruments of true cognition, direct (=perception) and indirect (=inference).

4-5 (ET50-57) Perception is clear, i.e., illumination without any intervening awareness and/or through what possesses a specific property (*viśeṣavattayā*).

5 (ET60) Sensory or nonsensory awareness whose clarity is partial is called commonsensical (*saṃvyāvahārika*).

6-8 (ET65-) Neither the object (known) nor the light that illuminates it is an instrument of true cognition, since they can be discerned in the dark. This is shown through positive and negative concomitance in the case of mosquitoes, hair, etc. and by animals' ability to see at night.

9-10 (ET68-71) Though not caused by an object, like a lamp awareness illumines objects through its ability to quiesce (*upaśama*) through destruction (*kṣaya*) (things) that can obstruct it. If it (the object itself) were the cause (of perception it) could be deviating (*vyabhicāra*) because the senses, etc. (are the cause).

11-12 (ET72-75) Absolutely clear perception does not depend on any sense-organ and arises when all obstructions are destroyed through perfection of its sufficient condition. A hindrance (*pratibandhaka*) can arise through (awareness) that is caused by the senses and involves obstructions.

CHAPTER THREE

1-2 (ET78-80) The other instrument, indirect, has (five) varieties: memory (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), reduction to absurdity (*tarka*), inference and scripture. It is caused by perception, etc.

3-4 (ET81-83) Memory is an awareness of the form "it is that" resulting from the arising of a trace, as when we say "this is Devadatta".

5-10 (ET84) Recognition is a combination of vision and memory, when we say (or think) "this is that" or "this is like that", etc. Examples are provided.

11-13 (ET87) Reduction to absurdity (here, *ūha*) is awareness of pervasion arising from experiencing things together or not together, e.g., smoke occurs with fire and without fire there is no smoke.

14-30 (ET90-100) Inference is the awareness of a *sādhya* on the basis of a *hetu* (here, *sādhana*). A *hetu* is something regularly found (*niścita*) with a *sādhya*. Pervasion (here, *avinābhāva*) is the regularity of one thing following another. Concomitance (*sahabhāva*) is (the relation between) coexistents, between pervaded and pervader. The regularity of one thing following another may be causal or not, and is ascertained by reduction to absurdity (of its opposite).

Definitions of other words used in the context of

inference: A *sādhya* is something desired (to be proved) which is unsublated and not already proved--thus excluding what is doubtful, false and/or not understood. A *sādhya* may be the property (*dharma*) (to be proved) or an entity having that property. The latter is also called the *pakṣa.* When it is cognzed through conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) the *sādhya* will consist of existence or absence, as in, e.g., "(an) omniscient being exists" and "donkeys horns do not exist".

31-34 (ET100-102) When established by an instrument of true cognition or by both (such an instrument as well as conceptual construction) a property-possessor (*dharmin*) is qualified by the *sādhya*-property. But in the context of pervasion it is only the property (not the possessor) that is known as the *sādhya.*

35-36 (ET102-103) The *pakṣa*, though it is known (through perception) already, is specified in order to differentiate just which *sādhya* we are speaking of (i.e., where it is located, etc.).

37-47 (ET104-111) There are only two limbs of an inference; the "example" (*udāharaṇa*) is not (a third limb): no *sapakṣa* is needed to cause our awareness of the *sādhya,* since the *hetu* is that (cause), and no *vipakṣa* is required to prove the necessity of pervasion, since that is proved through (the absence of) a sublator. Furthermore, an example deals only with particulars, while pervasion relates general features; if it were otherwise we would need an example to prove the example, resulting in infinite regress. Nor does the example remind us of the pervasion, since providing the *hetu* has already done that. The example actually only raises a doubt as to whether the *sādhya* is in the *pakṣa*; otherwise there should be no need for an application and conclusion (as in the Nyāya five-membered version of the inference). And indeed, these two are not needed, but only because they are unnecessary once one knows what the *hetu* and the *sādhya* are. Perhaps (the three members, viz., example, application and conclusion) are only provided to help those of limited understanding.

There are two kinds of example, viz., a positively and a negatively concomitant.

52-56 (ET116-119) Inference for oneself and inference for others.

57-59 (ET121-122) There are two kinds of reason, a positive and a negative kind. Each of the two can further be subdivided into two, affirmative (*vidhi*) and denying (*pratiṣedha*). A noncontradictory affirmation has six varieties: (for which see 65-70 below).

60 (ET122) A cause can be a *hetu* when there is no other cause to prevent it. E.g., one infers fruit from juice and then infers its form from that.

61-64 (ET124-126) There are no antecedent or consequent (*hetus*) since the identity or reappearance of a thing is not known after a passage of time. Neither future nor past, nor death and awareness of waking, cause such things as omens of death, waking up in the morning, etc., for there is no causal connection between these things. Also there is no such kind of *hetu* as collocative (*sahacāra*), for the same reason.

65-70 (ET127-129) The six kinds of noncontradictory affirmation, with examples provided:

(1) (*Vyāpya*) The case where the *hetu* is pervaded by the *sādhya*.

(2) (*Kārya*) Where the *sādhya* is a result of the *hetu*.

(3) (*Kāraṇa*) Where the *hetu* is a result of the *sādhya*.

(4) (*Pūrvācāra*) Where the *sādhya* precedes the *hetu*.

(5) (*Uttarācāra*) Where the *hetu* precedes the *sādhya*.

(6) (*Sahācāra*) Where the *sādhya* and the *hetu* coexist.

71-77 (ET129-131) A parallel list of six kinds of contradictory affirmation, with examples provided.

78-85 (ET131-133) Seven kinds of noncontradictory denial:

(1) (*Svabhāva*) The bare absence of a thing ("there is no pot here").

(2) (*Vyāpaka*) Absence because of absence of its pervader ("there is no elm here because there's no tree here").

(3) (*Kārya*) Absence of effect because of absence of cause.

(4) (*Kāraṇa*) Absence of cause because of absence of effect.

(5) (*Pūrvācāra*) Absence of the *sādhya* because of absence of the *hetu*.

(6) (*Uttarācāra*) Absence of the *hetu* because of absence of the *sādhya*.

(7) (*Sahācāra*) Absence of one of a coexisting pair because of the absence of the other.

86-89 (ET133-134) Kinds of contradictory denial:

(a) (*Kārya*) Absence of effect because of absence of cause.

(b) (*Kāraṇa*) Absence of cause because of absence of effect.

(c) (*Svabhāva*) E.g., "each thing has many aspects, because they are not found to have only one aspect".

90-93 (ET135-136) A series of causes should be treated as one. Examples.

99-100 (ET137-140) Scripture is knowledge based on the words of a qualified person. Words cause us to know things through their inherent power.

CHAPTER FOUR

1-9 (ET146-151) The contents (*viṣaya*) (of an instrument of true cognition) are universal and particular corresponding to similarities and differences. There are two kinds of universal, animalic and upright, and there are two kinds of particularities, viz., modal and differential.

CHAPTER FIVE

1-3 (ET152-154) The result (of an instrument of true cognition) is the avoidance of ignorance, wrong dispensings or acquirings, and endurance.

CHAPTER SIX

1-7 (ET156-159) Fallacies of the instruments of true cognition (*pramāṇābhāsa*) include failure to recognize oneself, cognizing what is aleady known, doubt, etc., for those fail to accomplish their results. Among examples mentioned are the (Nyāya) notion of inherence in what is conjoined (*saṃyuktasamavāya*), the (Buddhist) idea of perception of fire upon a sudden vision of smoke, and the Mīmāṃsā idea of the clarity of sense-perception.

8 (ET160) A fallacy of memory occurs when one misidentifies Jinadatta as Devadatta.

9 (ET161) Fallacious recognition is misidentifying one twin as the other.

10 (ET161) A fallacy of *tarka* is to suppose pervasion between unrelated things.

11-45 (ET162-179) The fallacies of inference:

1. Fallacies of the *pakṣa* have varieties such as describing the *pakṣa* in a way denied by the hearer, etc. on the basis of contradictory experience, inference, testimony, common parlance or belief on one's own part. Examples given, including as example of the last (i.e., on one's own part) "my mother is barren".

2. Fallacies of the reason (or of the *hetu*):

a. Unproved (*asiddha*): a *hetu* that either definitely doesn't pervade the *pakṣa* or where that pervasion is doubtful.

1. Definite (*svarūpāsiddha*): Example: sound is perishable because it is visible.

2. Doubtful (*saṃdighāsiddha*): Examples: "Here there is fire because here there is smoke" said by someone who is not very smart (who can't tell smoke from steam), or when a Sāṃkhya philosopher says "sound is perishable

because it is caused" (since Sāṃkhya doesn't believe in creation).

b. Contradictory (*viruddha*): a *hetu* is pervaded by what is certainly the opposite of the *sādhya*. Example: "Sound is not perishable because it is caused".

c. Deviant (*anaikāntika*): where the *hetu* resides in the *vipakṣa*.

1. Definite (*niścita*): Example: "Sound is perishable because it is knowable, like a pitcher", since imperishable things are knowable too.

2. Doubtful (*śaṅkita*): Example: "An omniscient being does not exist, because he can speak", since being omniscient doesn't necessarily exclude being able to speak.

d. Futile (?) (*akiṃcitkāra*): where the *pakṣa*'s being a *sādhya* is either already accepted or is excluded by perception, etc.

1. Already accepted (*siddha*): Example: "Sound can be heard, because it is sound.

2. Sublated (*bādhita*) by perception: Example: "Fire is cold, because it is a substance".

(d) is not really a fourth fallacy of the reason, being covered under "fallacies of the *pakṣa*" (above).

3. Fallacies of the example: the example is not appropriate,

a. relating to the *sapakṣa* (*sādharmya*, *anvaya*):

1. Where the *sp* is unlike the *s*: Example: "Sound is not found in man (*apauruṣeya*), because it is immaterial, like satisfaction". Here satisfaction is found in man.

2. Where the *sapakṣa* is unlike the *sādhya*: Example: "Sound is not found in man, because it is immaterial, like an atom". Here an atom is not immaterial.

3. Where both 1 and 2 apply. Example: "Sound is not found in man, because it is immaterial, like a jar", since a jar is neither found in man nor immaterial.

b. relating to the *vipaksa* (*vaidharmya*, *vyatireka*):

1. Where the *vipakṣa* is like the *sādhya*: e.g., "Sound is not found in man, because it is immaterial, unlike an atom". Here an atom is like the *sādhya* (it is found in man).

2. Where the *vipakṣa* is like the *hetu*; e.g., "Sound is not found in man, because it is immaterial, unlike satisfaction". Here satisfaction is like the *hetu* (it is immaterial).

3. Where both 1 and 2 apply. Example: "Sound is not found in man, because it is immaterial, unlike space". Here space is found in man and is immaterial.

46-50 (ET188-189) A fallacy called *bālaprayoga* ("childish mistake"?) occurs when one of the members fails to get mentioned.

51-54 (ET190) Fallacious verbal authority occurs when the speaker's words are subject to passions, delusion, or error.

55-60 (ET191-192) Fallacious enumeration of instruments of true cognition is found in the Lokāyata, Buddhist (*saugata*), Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Prābhākara and Jaiminīya (Mīmāṃsā) schools, which accept instruments other than perception in increasing numbers of instruments. Given their reasoning there should be still other instruments of true cognition such as *tarka*.

61-65 (ET194) A fallacious conception of the content (of awarenesss) occurs when that content is confined to either the general or the specific. Without the general aspect nothing will get done, and without the specific distinct things will seem as one.

66-72 (ET195-196) A fallacious effect (of an instrument of true cognition) is when the effect is exclusively assimilated to the instrument, or when the effect is exclusively distinguished from the instrument. The former mistake is found in the (Buddhist) who says that an instrument of true cognition and its effect are the same.

Buddhist: An "effect" is just the absence of being noneffect, (and a "cause" is just the absence of not being a

cause).

Answer: No, for then there can be no difference between things at all.

Naiyāyika: That's why there must be inherence (*samavāya*) between an instrument of knowledge and its result.

Answer: That will result in overextension (*atiprasaṅga*).

73 (ET197) Showing one's opponent to be involved in fallacy results in a win in debate.

VIDYĀNANDA (940)

As indicated in the introduction to the previous entry, Vidyānanda's date has been shown by Dhaky to coincide with that of Māṇikyanandin. We know nothing about him, other than that he is also known as Pātrakeśavin, that he was a Digambara, and is said to have lived in Pataliputra.

This author is frequently referred to as Vidyānandin. To avoid confusion, we have changed occurrences of that name in the following summaries to "Vidyānanda".

81. VIDYĀNANDA, *Aṣṭaprābhṛta-Āptaparīkṣā/Alaṃkṛti*

Summary by Jayendra Soni and Karl H. Potter

First published, together with #83 in 1913 in Sanatana Jaina Granthamala 1; then printed again in 1930 as a single work by Biharilala Kathnera Jaina, Jaina Sahitya Prasaraka Karyalaya, Gargaon, Bombay. It was also printed in 1919 by Nyayacara Pt. Darbarilala Jaina Kothiye, Saharanapura, Vira Seva Mandira with Hindi translation and excellent scholarly preface. This last is our E. The work has 124 stanzas, with Vidyānanda's autocommentary called *Ālaṃkṛtiṭīkā*.

The summary is largely based on the description of sections found in "E". The numbers identify *sūtras*.

1-4 (E1-19) Salutation to the Jina who knows the essence of reality perfectly and who has pierced the veil of delusion. That is why he is praised at the beginning of the text, as well as for teaching the path to liberation so that I may obtain those qualities.

5 (E19-21) In what has been said the aim is to dismiss the claim to be a qualified person made by others and to establish the Jina as a qualified person.

(E21-39) Against the Vaiśeṣika categories.

6-9 (E39-43) Does the perfection (*siddha*) of the qualified person (*āpta*) involve abandoning the desire to continue acting?

(E43-66) Objection: God is the maker of the world. This refuted.

10-11 (E67-70) Refutation of one who says that it is impossible that beginningless omniscience constitutes the path to liberation.

12 (E70-83) Demonstration of the nonexistence of an inactive God capable of desire and effort.

13 (E83-85) Provision of an example of an inference showing the arising of an effect from God as merely involving the power of the knowledge of a perfected being.

14-17 (E85-87) Story giving Jinendra as an example of one who has understood Jainism.

18-21 (E87-92) Avatars of God refuted by the Ācāryas.

22-26 (E92-94) The position of Śaṃkara's school explained.

27-31 (E94-101) The Vaiśeṣika's refutation of God's awareness as being neither eternal or noneternal. The first alternative (God's awareness is eternal) refuted. Is God's awareness itself an instrument of valid awareness or is his awareness a result of such an instrument? Neither alternative is acceptable. Refutation of the second alternative (that God's awareness is noneternal).

32-36 (E101-130) Can God's awareness be either pervasive or nonpervasive? Neither is possible.

37-39 (E130-132) God's awareness can be neither valid (*visaṃvādin*) nor invalid (*avisaṃvādin*).

40-42 (E132-133) God can be neither the same as nor different from His awareness.

(E134-143) Objection: The relation between God and his awareness is inherence (*samavāya*).

43-56 (E143-161) Answer: Explanation of the qualifier "inseparable" (*ayutasiddha*) in the (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) theory of inherence. The fallacy involved in establishing separability through a different topic. Why it is not right to suppose that there is inseparability merely because separability is absent.

57-59 (E161-165) The Vaiśeṣika charge of infinite regress against the Jains answered.

60-77 (E165-187) Objection: Inherence is independent (*svātantrya*) and single. This rejected. The opponent gives a different example for his claim. This too is refuted. More vs. the Vaiśeṣikas.

(E187-193) Demonstration that inherence, like existence, is both single and many and both eternal and noneternal. But these are contradictions, so must be denied.

(E193-203) So the essential existence or nonexistence of God's inhering in an actual entity must be rejected.

78-79 (E204-210) Having refuted the Vaiśeṣikas we move on to consider the Sāṃkhya view that the path to liberation cannot be taught.

80-83 (E211-219) Since *pradhāna* must be either liberated or unliberated there is no fault in saying the same of *puruṣa*.

84 (E219-226) The Buddhist view of liberation explained and refuted.

(E226-234) Sautrāntika objection, and the Jain response to it.

(E234-239) The Yogācāra position refuted. The fallacy of the Buddhist view that the path to liberation involves knowledge of all categories, all of which are (merely) conventional (*saṃvṛti*).

85-86 (E238-257) The (Advaitin's) nonduality of perception (*saṃvedana*) refuted.

(E257-258) The unity of everything (*citrādvaita*) view refuted.

(E258-272) The fallacy in the view that the path to liberation involves knowledge of the category of a supreme (*parama*) *puruṣa*.

87-88 (E272-276) The omniscience of the perfected being (*arhat*).

89-90 (E276-277) The charge of deviating reason (*anaikāntika hetu*) repudiated.

91 (E277-278) The need for the example to be different from the *h* and the *s* is denied.

(E278-280) Objection: But the *pakṣa's* qualifiers must be unknown (to reside in examples of the *sādhya*). No, since the *s* may not exist.

92-96 (E280-285) The fallacy of the reason called *svarūpāsiddha* is eliminated (from the list of fallacies).

(E285-295) Refutation of the Bhāṭṭa argument against omniscience.

97-110 (E295-317) That *arhats* alone are omniscient is established by the absence of any instrument to refute it. That either perception, inference, comparison, presumption, verbal testimony or negation do so is rejected.

111-115 (E317-333) The contention that the *arhat* still needs to abandon the desire to continue acting is refuted.

116 (E333-336) Nature of liberation.

(E336-337) The difference between cessation of inflow (*saṃvara*) and cleansing off of traces (*nirjarā*).

117 (E337) Why proponents of other views (*nāstika*) are not capable of liberation by themselves, since they deny the very existence of liberation.

118-119 (E338-346) The nature of the path to liberation.

120 (E346-347) The three qualifiers and the rest of the categories are illustrated.

121 (E348-350) The unproductiveness of the *arhat*.
122-124 (E351-353) Concluding summary.

82. VIDYĀNANDA, *Aṣṭasahasrī* on Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭaśatī*

Nagin Shah comments on this work "Vidyānanda, in his *Aṣṭasahasrī*, adopts a unique technique; for he there so formulates his arguments that all the sentences of the *Aṣṭaśatī* (in their original order) become a natural part of the *Aṣṭasahasrī* (which, as is indicated by its name, is ten times as large as the *Aṣṭaśatī*)."[103]

"G" references are to S. C. Ghoshal, *Āpta-Mīmāṃsā of Ācārya Samantabhadra* (New Delhi 2002). "E" references are to the edition of the work by Darbarilala Kothiya, published at Jaipur in 1997. "E" references are to the entire section corresponding to the numbered passage.

Summary by Saratchandra Ghoshal

2 (E2-3; G29) Those who practice yoga say that the test of finding whether the sights of gods and goddesses are real is to look for such characteristics (as sweet scent, etc.), because a magician will not be able to reproduce these in a false show of celestial beings. It may be urged that as magicians fail to show these favorable marks they are neither false nor mundane. So we should accept these marks as identifying essentials of the omniscient. To this a reply is given that it cannot be so, for the omniscient is free from *ghātīya karmas*, but the celestial beings who possess similar specialties are not free from these, as they are possessed of the four kinds of passions, viz., anger, pride, deceit and greed. Akalaṅka's remark (quoted in our summary of his text) answers this.

3 (E3-45; G33) If we accept this view (that the Buddha, etc. are *Tīrthaṃkṛts*) the Buddha, Kapila and others will be the Lords of the Jainas and so will deserve praise.

Kumārila says: "If Buddha be omniscient, why cannot

there be correct knowledge that Kapila also is omniscient? If both of them be accepted as omniscient, why are there differences of opinion between them?"

So, we might hold that being a *Tīrthaṃkara* doesn't establish the greatness of anyone. Accordingly, we might hold that no one is omniscient.

Kumārila says that it is well-known that people desirous of welfare gain it from the *Vedas*. There is no necessity of praising any being as omniscient.

6 (E55-67; G46-47) It is mentioned that Samantabhadra in the sixth verse of his *Bṛhatsvayambhūstotra*, while praising Sambhava Jina, has said "You, O Sambhava, in this world you have suddenly appeared like a physician ministering to the cure of diseases, as a healer of people suffering from the thirst of worldly desires". This verse is accordingly explained by Vidyānanda with analogy to the above verse of praise.

It is mentioned by Vidyānanda that as a physician in mitigating a disease becomes faultless when he applies reasoning as well as medical science, so one who follows reasoning and scriptures in laying down liberation and its causes is free from blemishes. The faults such as ignorance, attachment, aversion, etc., are never present in a perfect soul.

It is urged that the omniscient Lord is free from faults and that his words, following reasoning and the scriptures, are not opposed to the celebrated *anekānta* view (or, in another sense, are not opposed to any *pramāṇa* or proof). In other words, as a physician can prove that he is faultless by using reasoning and quoting works on medical science, so the words of a perfect soul are free from faults as these follow reasoning (which is not opposed to any *pramāṇa*) and are in perfect agreement with the scriptures.

8 (E77-79; G52-53) In this verse by *kuśala* and *akuśala* (good and bad) the two varieties of *āsrava*, viz., good and bad, are denoted. "*Paraloka*" is the attainment of another state after death. By implication that which causes a particular state after death, viz., meritorious and demeritorious *karmas*, are

also indicated by this word. By the word "and" liberation, etc., are implied. All these are not possible if we accept the view of those who view everything as transient (like the momentariness belief of the Buddhists). For how can a future state of happiness or misery arising from meritorious or demeritorious *karmas* exist, if everything is transient?

9 (E80-84; G58-60) If we accept the *padārthas*, e.g., twenty-five *tattvas* of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, the result will be a denial of all the four kinds of *abhāva* as already described.

Since (prior absence, i.e.) *prāgabhāva* is not accepted, the view of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, viz., that *mahat* arises from *prakṛti,* then *ahaṃkāra,* and from it the sixteen varieties (mind, the five organs of sense, the five organs of action and the five *tanmātras*) and from the five *tanmātras* the five elements appear, cannot stand. All these become without any beginning (because we deny their *prāgabhāva* or previous nonexistence).

Since *pradhvaṃsābhāva* is not accepted all these *tattvas*, which the Sāṃkhya says arise from *prakṛti*, will become eternal. But the Sāṃkhya has laid down that the five elements, earth, etc., merge in the five *tanmātras* which again with the five organs of sense and five organs of action as well as mind merge in *ahaṃkāra*. *Ahaṃkāra* merges in *mahat* which merges in *prakṛti*. This merging will become impossible on the denial of *pradhvaṃsābhāva* described before.

Since *anyonyābhāva* is rejected, the twenty-three principles (of Sāṃkhya) leaving aside *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* will not exclude one another, but each will involve the others and thus will become all-pervading. But definitions have been given in Sāṃkhya philosophy distinguishing these twenty-three principles, which are called "evolved" (*vyakta*), from *prakṛti*, which is called "unevolved" (*avyakta*).

Since *atyantābhāva* is denied, the qualities of all the twenty-five *tattvas* cannot be distinguished each from the other; so these will lose their identity. If there is no distinction

(if evolved and unevolved be of the same kind without there being any distinction of inherent qualities) no one will be able to find out the real nature of a *tattva* because the real nature is only understood when we take into account the distinguishing characteristics which have nothing but the absence of particular qualities as the basis of differentiation.

11 (E93-98; G62) (The second line of the verse (of the *Āptamīmāṃsā*) is read differently by Vidyānanda from Samantabhadra's reading. Here is his idea:) If the qualities of one are accepted in another (by denial of absolute nonexistence of some qualities of a substance in another substance) there is *anyatra samavāya*, i.e., connection of qualities in another substance. For example, if we predicate sense of an insentient substance, the ideas "this has consciousness" and "this does not have consciousness" cannot be expressed showing their distinction.

18 (E124-125; G80) If someone says that as you accept existence inseparably connected with nonexistence, so when its opposite will come, viz., nonexistence will be predicated, you will have to accept its contrary, viz., existence. Thus when a substance does not absolutely exist, such as a sky-flower or a hare's horns, you should also accept its existence.

The reply given by Akalaṅka is that by inference we establish the reality of substances capable of our understanding, and our example of homogeneousness or heterogeneousness applies to the establishment of such substances only.

19 (E125-127; G81-82) Now the word "*vidheya*", i.e., "positively described") in the verse may be taken to mean *astitva* (existence). Its *pratiṣedhin* (opposite) will be *nāstitva* (non-existence). A substance which has these qualities, viz., *jīva*, etc., might be considered as a *pakṣa* (minor term) in a syllogism. The qualities of the *sādhya* would be its manifestation, etc. These qualities are considered *hetu* (middle term) when we desire to establish their noneternal aspect and *ahetu* (not the middle term) when we consider their eternal

aspect. The example will be "Where the substance exists, the qualities exist" or "where the substance does not exist, the qualities do not exist". In this manner, existence and nonexistence can be predicated of the same thing as can be established by process of inference as shown above....By a similar process of inference it can be established that substances, *jīva*, etc., can be known by words.

30 (E216-217; G93) If you say that everything has a separate real existence, you must accept the separate existence of knowledge from the object known. The result would be that both would become nonexistent, for how can there be knowledge if there be no thing known? There might be internal or external objects of knowledge. But every such object would become nonexistent if there be no knowledge.

33 (E219-220; G96) Someone might argue like this: Diversity is not existent because it is not connected with or related to unity. Again, unity alone cannot be in existence because it is void of diversity. Through showing the absurdity of such reasoning the opinion of those who hold the one-sided view can be refuted by our having previously displayed (in verse 24) the twofold reasoning as based (i) on unity and diversity as well as (ii) on neutrality. As fire is established from the existence of smoke, where its nonexistence in water (is the *vipakṣa*), so substances like *jīva* become one when regarded through the existence of a *pakṣa*, and they are regarded as different when they are established through difference.

A thing has different varieties and different qualities. Without a noun there cannot be adjectives such as "hare's horned". Again without qualifying adjectives differentiating a substance, we cannot have an idea of the latter. To meet both these points, acceptance of the theory of manifoldness is necessary, that is to say, unity and diversity are not absolute realities.

34 (E220-221; G97) By the word "*hetu*" employed here, the *hetu* term as employed in inference is to be understood.

Such a *hetu* is of two kinds: *jñāpaka* (that which makes a thing known, viz., smoke leading to the knowledge of fire) or *kāraka* (that from which a thing is made, viz., clay from which a pitcher is manufactured). We have different intentions when we speak of these different kinds of *hetu*. So when we intend merely to speak of existence, all substances (*jīva,* etc.) are the same, but when we wish to express the difference according to *dravya, kṣetra, kāla* and *bhāva* they are different.

50 (E248; G110) It is mentioned that want of a "tongue, etc.", i.e., lack of vocal organs, may lead to absence of power. Again, a man who has taken the vow of silence or one who does not utter any word through modesty or fear might be said to be wanting in power. But all persons at all times are not affected by such disabilities. So this cannot establish indescribability.

53 (E249-251; G112) When we see a *śiṃśapā* tree, we form an idea that it is a tree as well as that it is *śiṃśapā*. Again when we see a picture, we have an awarenesss of it simultaneously with the awarenesss of its color blue, etc. In these cases, the separate contents of awarenesss become welded together and the causes are not different.

55-56 (E25252-255; G114-115) Absurdity will arise in accepting indescribability as in the case of a man who says "I am under the vow of silence and never speak".

A wrong recognition is known as recognition without any basis (*akasmāt*).

65 (E280-281; G124) The Vaiśeṣikas hold that "formerly a thing (a pitcher, e.g.) did not exist in the place of its existence; it does not leave its former recipients after its existence and it itself occupies its place after existence. Being indestructible it is not destroyed even after the destruction of its locus, and inherence and its universal property are complete in the thing." This view is untenable, being unable to explain the destruction or creation of a substance.

69 (E283-284; G128) If you urge that the effect is embodied in the cause without having any separate existence,

and that the cause is eternal, the answer is: the use of the number "two" will become faulty in such a case. The difficulty cannot be avoided by saying that the mention of "two" is fictitious, for in that case everything will become illusory. Without number, things counted cannot exist and an object void of all qualities such as being counted, must be nonexistent.

70 (E284; G129) In *syādvāda,* however, there is no flaw, as by the adoption of different viewpoints we can say of every substance that it is describable in one sense, viz., *vyañjanaparyāya,* and indescribable in another sense, viz., *arthaparyāya.*

73 (E296-297; G132) "If they don't depend on each other..." If we take (this) Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the independence, the existence of universals and particulars accepted by them will disappear. The existence of one of these is related to the other.

75 (E297-298; G133-134) Before we speak of quality or a substance possessed of a quality, their own nature has already been established. These are established through dependence on one another. This is established by themselves, as we have knowledge of universals and particulars. We express universal concomitance in two ways, affirmatively, called *anvaya,* e.g. "wherever there is smoke there is fire", or negatively, called *vyatireka,* e.g., "where there is no fire there is no smoke." A universal is self-established and is known from *anvaya* dependent on *vyatireka.* A particular also is self-established and is known from *vyatireka* dependent on *anvaya.*

The example is of a relation expressed by a grammatical case. The function of grammatical nominative (*kartṛtva*) is not independent of the relation of the accusative towards the verb (*karmatva*) because the nominative ends in settlement of an accusative and the relationship of an accusative also is derived from the knowledge of the nominative. But the real nature of the nominative or the accusative is not dependent one on the other.

76 (E301-302; G135) Vidyānanda says that in this world the thing to be obtained is first mentioned and then the means to obtain that thing is discussed. Without necessity even a fool does not work. So the necessity is first established. To get crops we must do work like ploughing etc. To have liberation we must also pursue the proper path which, according to Jainism, consists of right vision, right awarenesss and right conduct. It is only the Cārvāka school of philosophy that does not recognise the next world or liberation.

80 (E310-312; G140) The Vijñānavādins are at fault when they try to establish the quality of nonmanifest qualificand and qualifier. For example, the word "blue" and the awarenesss arising from this word must be identical or different. Their identity cannot be accepted by them, as the Vijñānavādins maintain the difference between property and property-possessor as well as the difference between reason and example. Again, acceptance of reality of consciousness-only will be barred by the maintenance of its divisions.

86 (E316-317; G144) One utters words and another hears them. A person finds out the sense of a word by perception or inference. If the speaker has no knowledge of the words he speaks, how could he utter them? Without words, the hearer cannot have any knowledge. The man requiring proof of the word behaves in a different way from the speaker and the hearer. So we must accept the threefold nature of knowledge in such cases.

100 (E342-343; G162-163) Its power (*śakti*) is with reference to its appearance, being considered only in respect of its modification (*paryāya*). It may be said to have a beginning. According to its substantial nature it is eternal.

110 (E355; G170-171) The one-sided view of the meaning of a proposition cannot be accepted, for this will be false and how can there be realisation of truth through false propositions? So the *anekānta* view that a proposition has connection with itself as well as with its opposite must be accepted. By denying the opposite, a substance is established.

That is to say, we mention that a substance is "this, and not this" and do not hold only that "it is this", for the latter is false and cannot lead to correct knowledge.

114 (E357-358; G174) The object of this work is correct teaching (*samyagupadeśa*) which lays down that the path to liberation consists of right vision, right awareness and right conduct. Liberation cannot happen in the absence of (any) one of them. Other views regarding liberation, e.g., that liberation is attained through knowledge alone, are false teachings. These other views are refuted.

The omniscient is established, refuting the view of those, e.g., Mīmāmsakas, who deny omniscience.

83. VIDYĀNANDA, *Pātraparīkṣā*

Summary by Bhagchandra Jain

This is Vidyānanda's smallest text. It is published by the Sanatana Granthamala with our work #81 as noted. *Pātra* means the *vākya,* with the famous members or parts of an inference (*avayava),* that accomplishes the desired meaning and keeps quietly the concealed words:

asiddhāvayavaṃ vākyaṃ sveṣṭāsyārthasya sādhakam.
sādhugūḍhapadaprāyam pātramāhuranakulam. (pp. 1-2)

Then he establishes that only the thesis (*pratijñā*) and reason (*hetu*) should be accepted as members of an inference. He is also of the view that, if necessary, ten members of an inference can also be accepted. But it should be remembered that these ten types are quite different from the ten accepted in Nyāya philosophy. In this context, he also reviews the concept and refutes other philosophers' views.

84 VIDYĀNANDA, *Pramāṇaparīkṣā*

This relatively (for this author) brief work has been edited by Darbarilal Kothiya as Yugavir-Samantabhadra-Granthamala 14 (Varanasi 1977). As its name implies, it examines the views of various individual philosophers' schools on the notion of *pramāṇa*. Among the individuals referred to are Uddyotakara (p. 2), Dharmottara (p. 6), Dharmakīrti (p. 8), Śabara (p. 21), and Prabhākara (p. 23), as well as less well-known names such as Jinapati (p. 13) and Kumāranandi Bhaṭṭāraka. Extended attention is given to the Buddhists, and briefer arguments against Cārvākas, the author of the *Tattvopaplavasiṃha*, Mīmāṃsakas, and Sāṃkhyas.

85. VIDYĀNANDA, *Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā*

A compendium of the work is provided by Nathmal Tatia in the edition by Gokul Chandra Jain in Jnanapitha Murtidevi Jain Granthamala Sanskrit Grantha No. 30 (Varanasi 1964), pp. 11-48. "E" references are to that edition. "S" refers to pages of Tatia's summary.

Summary by Nathmal Tatia

(E1; S13) "It is impossible to arrive at a true doctrine. Between two contradictorily opposed doctrines, one must be true. The Law of Excluded Middle means that the negation of any proposition is an absolute alternative to it, that is, not only the proposition and its negative cannot both be true, but one or (the) other must be true. What is not contradicted by perception or logic (*dṛṣṭeṣṭāviruddha*) is true. The various doctrines taken up (below) for refutation are judged by this criterion of truth and found not to satisfy it."

(E1-2; S13) "The Monistic Vedānta is taken up first. This school makes ignorance (*avidyā*, Tatia translates it as "nescience") the prius of the subjective and the objective order of existence. Ignorance, in association with the eternal

Brahman,[1] is the material cause of the world. It is of course not real like...Brahman, because it is subject to annihilation. Only that is real which possesses existence as an intrinsic and inalienable character. Change is not predicable of the ultimate reality. It appears in and upon Brahman owing to the latter's association with ignorance. As regards the nature of Brahman, it is limitless existence, consciousness, and bliss with no difference, intrinsic or extrinsic, in its being and is a unity--perfect, solid and simple. Plurality is false. It appears so long as there is ignorance and it must disappear on the destruction of the latter. And this destruction of ignorance is spiritual liberation (*mokṣa*)."

(E3-4; S13-14) "In reply, the Jaina philosopher asserts that plurality is not capable of being repudiated as false appearance. Absolute unity and absolute plurality are both contradicted by experience. Difference is as clearly given to experience as identity. Monism is contradicted by the experience of plurality."

"The Vedāntist appeals to dream experience in support of his position that the unitary self-identical Brahman appears as the plurality of phenomena. It is argued that in dream a plurality of facts is experienced though it is one consciousness only that exists and is felt. The Jaina does not agree with this interpretation of dream experience. Even in dream, as in wakeful experience, the consciousness of action is different from that of the agent, because it is admitted even by the Vedāntist that dream contents are produced by different memory-impressions."

"The Vedāntist's appeal to illusory experience in which one single entity appears as many is also rejected by the Jaina philosopher. An illusion is not a normal experience, because it is contradicted by a subsequent valid cognition. But the cognition of plurality is a case of normal experience. There is

1 Tatia renders *brahman* as "the Absolute"; we substitute merely "Brahman"

no contradiction in the fact that the potter fashions a jar with his staff and eats his meal with his hand. There is no reason why the normal experience of plurality should be asserted (to be) erroneous."

"The Vedāntist may here assert that the normal experience also is liable to contradiction on the attainment of final enlightenment. But that is also not possible. We do not know of any proof for the existence of Brahman as different from (the) plurality which is given to our normal experience. Such proof itself, by the very fact that it proves Brahman as different from the object of normal experience, would prove the object along with...Brahman, much in the same way as the knowledge of shell as shell, while contradicting the erroneous cognition of shell as silver, proves the existence of the shell and the silver as two different entities."

"The Vedāntist in despair refers to constructionfree (*nirvikalpaka*)[1] cognition, which cognizes bare existence, as the proof of the existence of Brahman which is unity, pure and simple. But the Jaina philosopher refuses to believe in the possibility of such undifferentiated experience. What we immediately perceive on opening our eyes is specific existence determined by space, time, otherness and the like. We never perceive what is not determined by space and what is not other than the knowing self."

"Our perceptual experience thus is found incapable of proving Brahman. On the contrary, it proves difference to be as integral to reality as identity."

(E4-5; S15-16) "The Vedāntist now seeks the aid of inference to prove Brahman as pure consciousness. The unreality of an independent objective world is deduced from an analysis of even an ordinary empirical judgment. Take for instance the trite experience 'I see the pen'. What is the status of the pen? The pen is felt as an object no doubt. But what

1 We replace Tatia's "indeterminate" (*nirivkalpaka*) by our "constructionfree" throughout.

is felt as the content of, that is, coincident with, its cognition is inside, i.e., identical with the cognition. For instance the character of cognitionhood, being coincident with the cognition, is identical with the latter. All things can similarly be shown as coincident with cognition, and as such identical with it. There is thus nothing outside consciousness which alone exists."

"But the Jaina considers the argument suicidal. The Vedāntist infers 'identity' from 'coincidence'. But how can the inference be valid unless both 'identity', the probandum, and 'coincidence', the probans, are admitted as two distinct facts existing in their own right?"

"Nor can the Vedāntist postulate absolute identity between the probans and the probandum. He seeks to deduce the identity of the content and cognition from the felt coincidence of the two. The fact that they are felt as two should have made the Vedāntist pause before he drew the conclusion of their absolute identity. If experience be the determinant of the nature of things, it cannot be gainsaid that not only the probans and the probandum are felt as identical-cum-different, but also that the conclusion, viz., the integration of the content, should be regarded as a case of identity-in-difference. Even in the Buddhist philosopher's inference of the 'momentariness' of a word (*śabda*) and the like from their 'existence', the probans (viz. existence) and the probandum (viz. momentariness) are not felt as absoutely identical..."

"The Jaina, however, agrees with the Vedāntist when he asserts that the object cannot remain absolutely distinct and different from consciousness when it is cognized. The verbal proposition expressing the knowledge situation is of the form 'the pen is known'. The predicate 'knownness' proves that the pen is not absolutely different from and so unconnected with knowledge. But the negation of absolute difference does not imply that the pen is absolutely made identical with knowledge. The proposition is entirely on a par with such

factual propositions as 'the cloth is white'. In both propositions the relation of subject and predicate is one of substance and attribute. The relation cannot be absolute identity as in that case it would be reducible to one of the terms, either the subject or the predicate. The relation is *sui generis* which may be called identity-in-difference for want of a better and more expressive name."

"But the Vedantist may ask: What about the judgment 'the cognition *per se* shines' (*pratibhā svarūpam pratibhāsate*) that is, 'the cognition *per se* is known by cognition'? Here the content of the cognition is its own self, and so the position that the relation of cognition and content is one of identity-cum-difference cannot hold in the present case."

"But the Jaina philosopher avers that the content is not the act of cognition as such but its specific character. Cognition has both specific and generic attributes as constitutive of its nature. For instance, cognition is existent and this shows that it has the attribute of existence in common with all other entities. The attribute of cognition-hood is an uncommon characteristic. In the said judgment the content is the specific character of cognition, and the specific character is not absolutely identical with the cognition. There can be no judgment or proposition possible if the terms are absolutely identical or absolutely different, e.g., 'gold is gold' and 'Himalaya is the Vindhya' are not logical propositions. As regards the basic argument of the Vedāntist employed to prove the identity of cognition and content, it can be upset by the following argument: 'Whatever is coincident with cognition is somehow different from the cognition concerned, i.e., the nature of cognition itself. All the contents, internal and external, such as pleasure and the chair are coincident with cognitions. Therefore, they must be somehow different from the cognitions concerned."

(E5-6; S17-18) "With the collapse of inference as the proof of monism, the Vedāntist in the last resort falls back upon revelation (*āgama*) in support of his position. But the

question arises whether revelation is ontologically different from Brahman or not. If it be absolutely different from the Absolute, this will prove the dualism of revelation and Brahman at any rate. If on the contrary it is absolutely identical with the Brahman which it seeks to establish, then the revelation will be as much an unproved fact as the monistic Brahman which is yet to be established. Certainly the means of proof and the object of proof cannot be absolutely identical as in that case the two will be on the same level so far as they are not established facts."

"Moreover, the meaning of the proposition 'All that exists is Brahman' (*sarvaṃ vai khalvidaṃ brahma*) is not unqualified monism. In it the subject is 'all existents' which are revealed to us in knowledge and thus a known factor. The predicate is unknown. In all judgments the subject is a known fact and the predicate must be unknown. If the predicate were equally known with the subject it would not be a judgment or a proposition. So the very form of a proposition implies that the subject and the predicate cannot be identical. The Vedāntist therefore cannot establish monism even by appeal to authoritative revelation. It may be contended that the meaning of the predicate is self-identity which is realized by a subject in his own self and this self-identity is asserted of all that appears including self and not-self. The logical implication of the proposition therefore is the negation of the appearance of plurality as real. Thus interpreted the proposition is neither tautologous nor liable to signify dualism. The Jaina would observe that even if the interpretation be accepted as true, the implication of dualism is inescapable inasmuch as the duality of revelation and the world appearance respectively as the negator and the negated remains uncontradicted. If on the other hand revelation were to be regarded as the essence of Brahman, that also would not prove their identity as essence and possessor of essence must be numerically different."

"The Vedāntist cannot also regard self-intuition as proof of Brahman, because the proof must be different from the

object of proof. Nor can Brahman be taken as self-proved, for why (should) not then plurality or voidity or the doctrine of universal illusion be accepted as the ultimate truth?"

"It has been argued by the Vedāntist that our perceptual experiences are false because they are cognizant of difference, just as dream experience is. But this inference is vitiated by self-contradiction because the factors of inference such as the probans and the example must in any event be regarded as true. If they are true, their difference also is true. And if all these conditions of inference are false and thus cognition of difference be declared to be false, the inference will not prove the thesis, because no true conclusion will follow from false premises."

"The Vedāntist may contend that the conditions of inference are accepted as true by the opponent and hence they are valid so far as the opponent's refutation is concerned. But that would mean the recognition of the duality of acceptance, viz., one's own acceptance and the acceptance of the opponent...And again if this duality also is assigned to another belief of the opponent, a second duality of acceptance would be required, and so on *ad infinitum*. And the result would be the establishment of duality."

(E6-11; S18-31) "Nor can the Vedāntist assert the self-evident pure consciousness as the contradictory of our normal cognition of plurality, because that would be a case of self-contradiction, being tantamount to the acceptance of the duality of the contradicted and the contradictor. Moreover the Vedāntist, being a monist, can accept the contradicted-contradictory relation only on the authority of his opponent. For him the relation is as unreal as anything other than Brahman..."

"Furthermore, monism can be established only by the negation of dualism. In fact, Śaṃkara, the founder of the school of monistic Vedānta, has called his philosophy the doctrine of non-dualism. The expression 'non-dualism' can convey an intelligible meaning only if dualism be understood.

Now 'dualism' is a whole (*akhaṇḍa*) expression and stands for a whole concept. It can be asserted as a universal proposition that the negation of a whole concept presupposes the reality of the concept in some other context....Now monism *qua* negation of dualism is possible only if dualism be a false appearance. But dualism being a whole concept, its negation will necessarily presuppose the reality of the negatum (sc. dualism) in some context or other."

"The Vedāntist is not convinced by such linguistic arguments...The negation of dualism does not in reality belong to Brahman. The whole logical apparatus which is the creation of the professional logician is possessed of a provisional value. It is valid until the ultimate truth is realized. But what is the necessity of negation of dualism and what again is the reason for the adoption of the logical apparatus for the establishment of the monistic position by the Vedāntist? The whole order of plurality (he says) is an unreal show which has deceived the dualist and the pluralist into the belief of its ultimate reality. When the Vedāntist tries to convince the dualist of his error, he has to adopt the logical apparatus invented by the logicians of the realist persuasion. The distinction of self and not-self is necessitated by *avidyā* and is not to be mistaken as possessed of ultimate validity. So the charge of self-contradiction urged against the Vedāntist is the outcome of misunderstanding."

"But what is the nature of *avidyā*...? Let us consider the nature and relation of ignorance as expounded by Sureśvara in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika.*[104] It is possible to conceive that ignorance, if it exists at all, can exist as the content of Brahman or of the individual or as an independent entity. Now the first alternative is not conceivable. The conception of ignorance in Brahman, which is of the nature of cognition and *ex hypothesi* omniscient, involves self-contradiction. Nor can it be supposed to subsist in the individual, because the individual is not different from Brahman and as such is free from all taint of ignorance. How can ignorance exist in the individual self which also is of the

nature of pure cognition? Nor is the third alternative a tenable hypothesis, because ignorance admitted as an independent entity, like Brahman, cannot be supposed to be annihilated by knowledge, and so knowledge of the identity of the self and Brahman, which is prescribed to be the condition of liberation, being the eliminator of ignorance, will have no purpose to serve. Knowledge of identity is believed to lead to the perfect emancipation of the self, because it is assumed to be destructive of ignorance which induced bondage. But if ignorance be an independent entity like Brahman and to be coeval with Brahman from beginningless time, it will be as eternal as Brahman. And bondage also will be an eternal fact."

"Sureśvara answers that the nature of ignorance cannot be determined by an instrument of knowledge. Ignorance is not capable of being determined by logic, yet it cannot be denied that it exists. The individual feels that he is ignorant of many things. He is as certain of his ignorance as he is of his own existence. The individual is directly aware that he is a conscious being. So consciousness and existence are inalienable characteristics of the individual self. From the authority of revelation as well as the evidence of logic, the self is known to be identical with Brahman. And we have seen that ignorance is not possible in Brahman and the individual alike."

"Suresvara maintains that this is not the correct approach for determining the relation of ignorance. To deny the existence of ignorance would be contradiction of a felt fact. So, however irrational and illogical the concept of ignorance may appear to be, its actual existence has got to be admitted by all. It is true that the conception of ignorance as an independent entity is an absurd hypothesis. We find from our study of the Upaniṣads that ignorance is totally destroyed by knowledge of reality. This is also the finding of incontestable experience. Our ordinary errors such as the perception of shell for silver are found to be annihilated when followed by correct knowledge of reality. This would be

impossible and also unaccountable if ignorance were eternal verity. It must be admitted that there is no *raison d'etre* for error. It is possible only when the conditions of knowledge are given a false twist by something added to them. It is absolutely unintelligible why there should be deviation from the normal standard. Certainly this deviation cannot be the normal law as this would make the emergence of correct knowledge and cancellation of the false awareness preceding it an impossibility. What holds good of ignorance operating in the individual must be true of it in its cosmic aspects also. So ignorance cannot be eternal verity like Brahman. Nor can it be an independent entity as shown above. It is felt by us all that we are beset by limitations on all sides and we are not satisfied with our present condition. We always try to transcend it as an undesirable obsession. The Vedāntist believes that consciousness, absolute and undifferentiated, is the only reality and is the very stuff and essence of all that exists and appears. The appearance of plurality according to the Vedāntist is erroneous, and such must have a reason of its own. This reason is found in ignorance. And so ignorance is not subjective but also objective because it is co-pervasive with consciousness in its entire range."

"Now the individual is not the seat of ignorance according to Sureśvara for two reasons. In the first place, the individual is nothing different from pure consciousness in point of reality. And if the individual be regarded as ontologically different from Brahman (which is not the position of any section of the monistic school), then also the individual cannot be regarded as the locus of ignorance. The individualization of the self is itself the result of ignorance and such cannot be the determinant of the incidence of ignorance which is its very presupposition. Ignorance must have a local habitation of its own as the possibility of ignorance as a floating entity would be absurd. It must then have pure consciousness as its locus and abode and from the evidence of our own experience we find that ignorance is a felt fact. This

shows that pure eternal consciousness cannot be opposed to ignorance. On the contrary, it constitutes the only evidence of its being. (The) opposition is both *a priori* and empirical. The opposition of being and nonbeing is felt *a priori*. But other types of opposition are empirical and as such can be known only from experience. We have found that there is no opposition between pure consciousness and ignorance. Pure consciousness means consciousness which is not determined by any objective reference. It is bereft of subject-object polarization. Pure consciousness thus means unpolarized consciousness...."

"...But how to account for the opposition of ignorance as error with knowledge? It is felt beyond the shadow of a doubt that our erroneous perception of shell as silver is cancelled and corrected by knowledge of the shell in its true character. Our knowledge of shell is attended with the negative judgment 'it is not silver'. This shows that there is opposition between knowledge and error which is nothing but a species of ignorance. This has puzzled many a respectable philosopher and it has been seriously asserted that the Vedāntist is guilty of self-contradiction. True pure consciousness is an eternal and transcendental entity. As regards ignorance, it is also asserted by the Vedāntist to be associated with the absolute consciousness which is pure and transcendental and undetermined by objective reference. There can be no difference in transcendental consciousness. But the difference of one consciousness from another is possible when it is made specific and particularized by objective reference, in other words, when it is possessed of a specific content and is called knowledge. Knowledge is consciousness in its essence, but it is different as a specific determination is from the genus. The opposite of error is knowledge and not pure transcendental consciousness which is rather the proof of it. Error is also a cognition with a distinct content and it is cancelled only by a cognition with an opposite content with reference to the same situation. It is true cognition which

cancels false cognition....the opposition only holds between them."

"It has been argued by the opponent of the monist that there can be no ignorance in Brahman because of the *a priori* opposition between consciousness and ignorance. But the opposition is not *a priori*, and so the argument has no validity. The very fact that we are conscious of ignorance shows that there is no opposition between them. But though a felt fact and uncaused entity existing concurrently with Brahman, ignorance is not regarded as an eternal verity like Brahman, because it is liable to be cancelled and corrected by the unerring realization of the nature of the self as identical with Brahman. It has been shown that ignorance is destroyed by knowledge...The Vedāntist deduces from that fact the conclusion that ignorance is not a reality in the true sense of the term. A reality is not capable of death or destruction. Ignorance, being liable to extinction, cannot be regarded as a co-ordinate reality. But though not a reality, its actual existence is a felt fact and so cannot be denied without self-contradiction. The denial of ignorance as well as its assertion is possible only within the limitation of ignorance, because they are all judgments and as such have a dualistic reference. Of course, there can be no real relation between Brahman and ignorance. Brahman is unattached and unrelated to anything within or without. But whatever be the ontological or logical character of the relation of ignorance, its actuality cannot be disputed. Even an unreal relation is possible just as an unreal ignorance is...."

"...Ignorance cannot be intuited as existent if the true nature of Brahman as pure consciousness is realized...Who will be the knower of it--the person who suffers from ignorance or (one) who has emancipated himself from it? The determination of the nature of ignorance is not possible for the person who is subject to its sway, because this will mean that he is not fettered by ignorance. As regards the emancipated self, the logical distinctions of the subject, the object, and the

act of knowledge have totally vanished for him forever, and so such determination is not possible. An instrument of knowledge is not competent to gauge unreality. It is only the real that can be determined by it. But ignorance is *ex hypothesi* not a real (thing) because it does not stand the scrutiny of accredited cognitive organs. Ignorance is so-called because it is incapable of standing critical examination with success. In fact, the criterion of ignorance is nothing but this incapacity for standing trial by accepted instruments of knowledge."[105]

"Now the question may be asked 'Why are we enamoured of such an irrational concept?' You have yourself admitted that it is not capable of being determined by the accredited organs of logic. Why don't you admit that the world is both different and nondifferent from Brahman? Both you and I admit Brahman and the world, and the relation between them is asserted by us to be identity-cum-difference. The merit of this theory lies in the consideration that it does not entail repudiation of any one of the felt facts--the world and its cause, Brahman. Why should you postulate an irrational and unreal principle as the cause of the world process?"

"The Vedāntist answers that after all his theory is the simplest of all. Moreover, it makes the postulation of a large number of irrational entities uncalled for. Thus the opponent who believes in the reality of the world process has to admit that it is both different and nondifferent from Brahman. In the second place, he has to posit that bondage, though it is real and so uncaused, is liable to cessation. In the third place, he has to posit that emancipation is the product of religious and moral activity and is yet eternal. The monist only affirms ignorance as the sole and sufficient condition of all these results. And though it exists from eternity alongside of and together with Brahman, yet there is no logical difficulty in the fact that it is liable to annihilation, because it is felt to be unreal and so its disappearance does not entail logical contradiction, which would be inevitable if it were real."

"But it might be argued that simplicity is not by itself a recommendation for a theory. If a multiplicity of things is necessitated by logical thought we cannot reject it for the sake of economy alone. But the Vedāntist agrees that simplicity or multiplicity without the sanction of valid cognition is not a compelling consideration in the determination of reality. But if the multiplicity of categories asserted by the opponent is found to be contradicted by accredited instruments of knowledge, the postulation of it will be logically indefensible. Now the believer in the reality of the world has to assert that the relation between the world and its cause is identity and difference both--a conception which is repugnant to all sources of knowledge. Secondly, he admits that the worldly career is a reality bereft of beginning in time, and to say that it is annihilated by knowledge is opposed to the universally accepted proposition that a real uncaused and undated is eternal. Thirdly, it asserts emancipation to be the product of moral activity and yet to be eternal. This is opposed by the universal proposition that whatever is caused to happen at a particular time cannot but be liable to extinction. These are the major contradictions in the theory of the opponent, and there may be many more, if minor details are to be taken into account. As regards the Vedāntist's theory, it only postulates ignorance and this is not also an unwarranted assumption since it is endorsed by experience and scriptural authority alike."[106]

"The Jaina frankly confesses his inability to appreciate the argument of the Vedāntist. In the first place, the postulation of ignorance which the Vedāntist himself admits to be incapable of any proof strikes him as an unphilosophical position. It is extremely puzzling that a philosopher should subscribe to a position which is not amenable to test by any accredited instrument of knowledge. Whatever may be the subject of dispute, call it truth or untruth, science or ignorance, the matter can be finally decided by means of the accredited instruments of knowledge available to us. The Jaina

does not dispute the existence of ignorance, but he insists that this is also a matter of proof. When the Vedāntist asserts that ignorance is an actual existent he is certainly aware of its existence. And this awareness must be true. Otherwise he will not be in a position to make the assertion. The Vedāntist had to admit that ignorance is a felt fact. But he chooses to call the awareness of ignorance an alogical knowledge. The reason seems to be the opposition of ignorance with knowledge which is also a felt fact. That we commit error is not open to dispute. That this error is corrected and cancelled by knowledge of the true character of reality such as of the shell as opposed to silver is not also liable to be disputed. But the cancellation of error, which consists in the proof that the predicate does not belong to the subject in the context in spite of its reality in another context, need not be construed as evidence of the unreality of error or of its content. That we make errors is also capable of being established by veridical knowledge. This is apparent from the consideration that the Vedāntist also cannot deny that we misperceive shell as silver. This misperception is a fact which can be known by an unchallengable cognition. And this cognition is possible if an organ of cognition operates upon the fact. But the Vedāntist may urge 'Well, if error be an object of veridical cognition, it will be a real like true cognition. Not only this, it will also have to be admitted that the knowledge of error will be true knowledge, and this will amount to the assertion that there is no difference between error and truth'."

"The Jaina does not regard these objections as real difficulties. In the first place, he admits that error is as much a fact and verity as truth. In the second place, he admits that the cognition of error is true cognition. In other words, the Jaina believes that error as a psychical event is a true occurrence, and its cognition is the cognition of a true fact. It has been observed by Akalaṅka 'A cognition is true in reference to a fact which is not contradicted by another cognition'. The Vedāntist also endorses the factuality of error

as a psychical fact, and he also admits that there is awareness of such error. But he refuses to give this awareness the status of a true cognition, and he thinks the content of error, at least the predicative part of it, is neither real nor unreal, but something logically indeterminable. The reason he advances in support of his position is that it is set aside by a true cognition following upon it. Nobody denies that error is corrected by a subsequent valid experience. But that should not be interpreted as evidence of the unreality of the cognition or of the content. It may be false cognition but nonetheless it is a cognition, and true so far as its occurrence is taken into consideration. It is regarded as error because the external object is not possessed of the predicate judged to belong to it in error. The contradiction only proves that the predicate does not belong to the subject and nothing more. It has already been explained that the contradiction cannot mean that error did not happen. Error is bound to be admitted as historical event, and to be true so far as it is a real happening. The Vedāntist has affirmed that the awareness of error is effected by pure consciousness, and as such cannot be assigned any logical value. But this seems to be a distinction without difference. Granted that error is felt by pure consciousness. But should this awareness be not valid? If the awareness of error be invalid, there will be no possible means of asserting that it is a psychical occurrence. The question of validity or invalidity of a cognition is not capable of being decided by the intrinsic character of the cognition in question. The validity of a cognition can be decided by external evidence, at least in the initial stage. A cognition is regarded as invalid only when it is found to be contradicted by a subsequent cognition showing that the predicate does not belong to the subject. The awareness of error, no matter whether pure or empirical, is not contradicted by any subsequent cognition. The subsequent cognition does not annul the historicity of error as a cognition; it only shows, as we have observed, that the predicate does not belong to the subject. Thus there does not seem to be any

logical warrant for questioning the validity of awareness of error as a fact whether it be classed as empirical or metempirical."

"As regards the contention of Sureśvara that ignorance or error is not determinable by a valid cognition or an instrument of it, the Jaina does not think that it is based upon truth. It has been observed that a cognition is proved to be false when it is contradicted by a subsequent cognition having the same reference. The contradicting cognition is held to be true by all even including the Vedāntist. This shows that error is proved by truth which is based upon a true objective datum. The Jaina accordingly thinks that the Vedāntist's interpretation of error as an alogical fact is due to a hasty appraisal of the logical issues. Error as well as truth is always capable of being determined only with reference to reality. When the cognition is found to correspond to the objective situation in all respects it is called truth. When, on the other hand, it fails to conform to reality in any respect it is called false. So ignorance as error is always determinable with reference to reality, and that again by means of an accredited instrument of knowledge."

"As for the further contention of Sureśvara that ignorance is not possible for a person possessed of knowledge, it is observed that ignorance is not possible in a person who is possessed of perfect knowledge and as such is omniscient. But there is no evidence to show that it is not possible for a man whose knowledge is limited. The assertion of Sureśvara that knowledge is futile in respect of a person free from ignorance is also not based upon truth. Freedom from ignorance makes perfect knowledge possible, and this knowledge is not futile because everybody will admit that it is covetable for its own sake. So how can knowledge be futile for a person free from ignorance? The assertion of Sureśvara again that the determination of ignorance in a person is possible only so long as he is under the hypnotic spell of ignorance is entirely wide of the mark. The differentiation of ignorance from truth is possible only when a person discovers

the truth. Were a person completely under the spell of ignorance such differentiation would not be possible. The truth of the proposition asserted here is borne out by the evidence of dream. The dreaming man cannot distinguish between truth and error, because he is completely enmeshed in ignorance in dream. So Sureśvara's categorical affirmation that determination of ignorance is possible only under the sway of ignorance is entirely opposed to fact."

"It might be contended that if ignorance as error be a true awareness, then there will be no reason for its being contradicted by a subsequent awareness; but the fact that it is so contradicted shows that it is entirely false. But the Jain asserts that there is no incompatibility in the situation. Error is regarded as a true cognition only in a sectional reference. It is true so far as its reference to the subject is concerned, and also so far as it is felt by the person, that is, with reference to its own being. When the deluded person thinks that he is ignorant or in error, he does not make a false assertion. This shows how a cognition, though true so far as it goes and so far as its particular reference is concerned, can be contradicted by a subsequent experience and thus be false in some particular reference."

"The dilemma raised by Sureśvara, that ignorance is not intelligible whether the self is known or not known. proceeds upon partial appraisal of truth. There is no incompatibility in the fact that a partially illumined person is subject to error and illumination alternatively or simultaneously. Ignorance is impossible of realization only in the case of perfect knowledge and total ignorance. But the latter alternative is impossible because there is no self which is totally devoid of knowledge, which is the possible outcome of total ignorance. As regards the former alternative, the contention is only partially true. A man with perfect knowledge is not subject to ignorance. But he realizes and transcends his ignorance only with the dawn of such knowledge."

"Again, Sureśvara has asserted that ignorance is an

irrational principle and the fact that it eludes all the epistemological resources is rather symptomatic of its true character. But the Jaina would pose a simple question: 'How do you know that ignorance is not amenable to logical proof? Are you sure that it is so? If so, what is the source of your conviction?' If the Vedāntist confesses that he has no resource which enables him to make such an assertion, then he will be guilty of unabashed dogmatism. If, on the other hand, the Vedāntist is sure of the truth of his assertion, this will mean that ignorance is not altogether incapable of logical determination. At any rate the determination of ignorance as a logical principle must be based upon truth and consequently secured by an accredited organ of knowledge."

"Sureśvara has claimed that the postulation of ignorance as the *prius* of the world process makes Vedānta philosophy the simplest of all systems. It may be so. But this simplicity is more apparent than real. The plurality of entities with their infinite varieties is a felt fact. Ignorance was posited over and above the absolutely undifferentiated transcendent consciousness called Brahman because it was felt that plurality, even as appearance, cannot be deduced from a simple unity. But if ignorance be only another unitary principle, it also will not be competent to produce the appearance of plurality. For this it has been assumed that ignorance possesses an infinite plurality of powers. Thus the claim of simplicity is based upon a quibble. It has however been claimed that ignorance with its infinite resources and powers is an unreality and so the only reality is pure consciousness. But the assertion of unreality of ignorance is a puzzle which runs counter to the verdict of experience and logical thought."

"The Vedāntist says that it is not real because it exhibits self-contradiction in every stage. The things of the world are subject to constant change and this means the extinction of the old order and emergence of a new one. But if a thing is to be real in its independent capacity and right, it cannot be

supposed that it should diminish or increase or cease to be or come into being. Origin and destruction are unpredicable of a real. A real is real always and so must remain constant. The erroneous silver is unreal because it ceases to be when it is contradicted by knowledge of the shell. If a real were capable of origination and cessation like false silver, there would be no criterion possible for the distinction of real from unreal. It must therefore be admitted that constancy and continuity and consequently the absence of lapse from uniformity are true characteristics of a real. But these tests are incapable of being applied to the objects of experience. The conclusion is inevitable that they cannot be real."

"The Jaina philosopher asks: What is the source of the knowledge of this peculiar nature of reality? The ultimate nature of things can be known by experience alone. Well, what is the ground for our belief that consciousness is existent and also is the proof of the existence of other things? The answer must be that it is felt to be so. Consciousness is its own guarantor and proof of its own reality. As regards unconscious matter, its existence is established by means of consciousness. It cannot be asked why consciousness should be self-evidenced and matter be dependent upon consciousness for the proof of its existence. The question is a question of fact, and not of reason. The nature of things is inalienable and must be accepted to be what it is. Can anybody answer why fire should be hot and water cold, and not vice versa? No, because it is a question of fact. Similarly, the nature of reality is to be deduced from the testimony of experience. The existence of things which are experienced is obvious and self-evident. If you call in question their credentials, the fact of existence and consciousness which are posited by the Vedāntist to be the ultimate reality will also not be immune from such doubting interrogation. The result will be unrelieved scepticism or universal negation. The Vedāntist had the good sense and sanity not to acquiesce in this suicidal estimation. The Jaina would respectfully and earnestly ask the Vedāntist to carry his

determination of reality consistently to its natural conclusion. He accepts existence to be the ultimate truth solely on the testimony of experience. But as experience records change as the integral character of existence or rather of things felt to be existent, it beats one's understanding why change should be declared as unreal appearance. The Vedāntist has contended that change involves lapse of being into nonbeing and that this is a case of self-contradiction. Reality must not be self-contradictory. But as change is fraught with contradiction, it is to be unceremoniously thrown overboard as an unreal and unjustifiable appearance. But the Jaina is a frank realist, and is candid in his confession of faith in the verdict of experience."

"The Vedāntist thinks that there is pure being which is incompatible with pure nonbeing. But pure being is an abstraction, and we have no experience of it. So also is the case with pure nonbeing. What we find in experience, including the principle of consciousness itself, is concrete being which is a unity of different entities. Thus we never come across a pure substance denuded of qualities and actions. A substance is always a unity with the multiplicity of attributes. Why should the Vedāntist scent contradiction in it? He should take reality as a whole, and the attempt to clip away a part of its character only bespeaks unwarranted zeal for abstract thinking. It is no doubt true that the diversity of reals encountered by experience exhibits existence as their universal trait. But the universality and continuity of this trait and the discontinuity of other traits are facts alike. The former should not be vested with truth and the latter dismissed as appearance...."

"The Vedāntist...appeals to dreamless experience. He asserts that pure existence is felt in this state. He also appeals to *samādhi* (ecstasy) in which the spiritual aspirant realizes reality as a homogeneous simple unity bereft of intrinsic and extrinsic difference. But the state of *samādhi* is not attainable by all. If a gifted soul experiences it, that does not afford any

help to men of limited knowledge who are enquirers after truth. So it has no philosophical value. As regards dreamless experience, it is also not beyond dispute. So the Vedāntist has to rely upon the revealed texts of the Upaniṣads and upon pure logic. So far as the Upaniṣadic texts are concerned, the interpretation of the monist is not accepted as the last word. There are other interpretations also....As regards pure logic, the Jaina attitude towards it has been elucidated with as much clarity and precision as has been possible for us."

"The consequential objections of Sureśvara regarding bondage and emancipation do not cause much difficulty to the Jaina. The Jaina believes that bondage is a real condition of the self, and though existing from beginningless time as coeval with the individual yet it is liable to be transcended. Emancipation is nothing but the disentanglement of the self from karmic matter. Karmic matter is not destroyed but pulled out. The pure nature of self which is realized in emancipation is not a new creation in the absolute sense. It was always there. But the karmic matter served to obscure it. The Jaina believes in change because it is found to be the universal characters of all reals and if it means transition from being to nonbeing in a sectional reference, the Jaina is not frightened by it. So the objection of Sureśvara that emancipation, being a product of a process, will be liable to destruction does not cause any difficulty. The Vedāntic solution that bondage and emancipation are both illusory cannot be regarded as the only satisfactory explanation, as it has been made abundantly clear that the denial of plurality, in defiance of experience, cannot escape from fall into the abyss of universal nihilism or scepticism which Nāgārjuna and his followers have shown to be the inevitable conclusion of pure logic."

(E11-14; S31-35) "The subjective idealism of the Yogācāra Buddhist is to be distinguished from the Vedāntic Monism. The Brahman of the Vedāntists is eternal (cognizable by all kinds of cognition), and one. But the consciousness (*vijñāna*) of the Yogācāra Buddhist is momentary, subjective

or self-intuited (cognizable by self alone), and numerically different in each consciousness-stream. Vidyānanda here records the theory of knowledge propounded by the Sautrāntika Buddhists, Yaṅgas (Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas), Sāṃkhyas and the Jainas. These theories are refuted by the subjectivist who thus proves that all definitions of cognition (*vedya*) and cognizer (*vedaka*) are untenable. He proves the falsity of all instruments of knowledge by the following argument: 'Whatever is of the form of cognitum and cognizer is false, e.g., dreams and illusions; our perceptions and the like are on a par with these latter, and hence false'. Our perceptions and all other instruments of knowledge being false, there is no proof of the reality of external objects. The subjectivist however does not deny the individual units of consciousness which he admits as the source of appearance of our cognitions polarized as cognitum and cognizer. Pure consciousness alone is real. Even as paintings drawn on plane surface appear solid with depressions and elevations, so does the pure consciousness appear as subject and object to the deluded person under the influence of ignorance. The idealist proves his thesis by the argument: 'The objects--chair and the like--are not different from their cognitions, because they are cognized by them, e.g., the cognition which is cognized by itself.' And he refutes the realist's position thus: 'The chair and the like are not external material objects, because they are cognized, e.g., pleasure and the like which are internal and immaterial'."

"The Jaina philosopher observes that the subjectivist establishes his position by means of inference, and refutes the validity of all instruments of knowledge in the same breath. This is nothing but blatant self-contradiction. Without the support of an instrument of knowledge, the Buddhist cannot prove the falsity of the theories of rival philosophers who believe in extramental reality. Not only this, the subjectivist cannot prove the falsity of the differentiation of cognition into an act and a content. He holds that our cognitions are

momentary and self-intuited and that there are other epistemic subjects. Certainly all these facts cannot be proved by our intuitions. The service of inference as a valid instrument of knowledge must be requisitioned. A cognition may be felt by itself, but it is not felt as momentary, or as not cognized by another. Moreover, if the cognition has no veridical reference to a real extra-subjective fact, how can the subjectivist believe in the existence of other subjects? The denial of genuine extrasubjective reference must end in solipsism. If the entire logical apparatus including the difference of probans and probandum and the necessary relation between them be a false creation of ignorance, then the subjectivist cannot prove anything including his own position."

"The subjectivist seeks to establish the identity of content with cognition on the ground of the two being felt together. But this very assertion proves that he believes in the duality of cognition and content. Is this not a case of self-contradiction like the vocal statement of a person: 'I am an observer of the vow of silence'?"[107]

"It has however been argued in defence by the subjectivist that this line of attack on the part of the opponent is neither fair nor consistent. How can the charge of a fallacy or a self-contradiction be advanced against the subjectivist when the opponent knows that the former does not believe in the reality of anything other than consciousness? The use of logic will become superfluous after the ultimate truth viz., the reality of consciousness alone is realized. Dignāga and his followers in spite of their ultimate conviction of the truth of pure consciousness alone have elaborated logical weapons and this is not inconsistent with their philosophical convictions. They have frankly avowed that logic has its place and utility only on this side of realization of the ultimate truth and is necessary to combat the prevailing misconceptions of philosophers. So the charge of self-contradiction or inconsistency is nothing better than *argumentum ad hominem*."

"The Jaina philosopher observes that his charges could be ineffective if the Buddhist idealist succeeded in proving that his conclusion was established by an unimpeachable logical ground."

"Ḍharmakīrti asserts that the identity of cognition and content follows from the necessity of their being known together (*sahopalambhaniyama*), but what is the meaning of the expression 'the necessity of being known together' and of the term 'identity'? The former may possibly be interpreted as the absence of separate cognition and 'identity' may be understood to mean (the) absence of numerical difference. In other words, the negation of separate cognition may be made the ground for the inference of negation of numerical difference. But this is not possible because there can be no necessary relation between two negations. As regards such negative inferences as of the absence of smoke from the absence of fire, or the absence of triangle from the absence of figure, they are legitimate only because they derive their cogency from the necessary concomitance between effect and cause, and so the negation of cause leads to the inference of the negation of effect. Likewise, there is necessary concomitance between figure which is the genus and triangle which is the species. And so the negation of the former entails the negation of the latter. There is no independent relation possible between two negations. The Buddhist argument could be effective if the positive concomitance between separate cognition and numerical difference were possible. To be explicit, the Buddhist is the last person to assert that a separate cognition of the content from that of the cognition concerned is possible by means of which the numerical difference of the cognition and content can be established; for the admission of the possibility of the content, separate and numerically different from that of the cognition, will knock out the Buddhist position of identity of cognition and content. The Buddhist therefore is precluded from asserting a logically necessary relation between their corresponding negations as

negations have no independent logical relation apart from that of their opposite positives...."

(E16-19; S35-37) "The Cārvāka philosopher denounces self and the possibility of omniscience. 'The scriptures that exist contradict each other and thereby prove their own falsity'."

"The so-called self (*jīva; ātman*) is nothing but a temporary product of material elements. It was not before birth, nor will it continue to exist after death. There is no life hereafter."

"The Jaina philosopher observes that the materialist's denial of self as an independent principle of consciousness goes against the law of causality. The nature of consciousness is radically different from matter and so it cannot be the product of material elements. The effect must be essentially homogeneous with the cause and reducible to the latter in turn. The law of causality demands that the cause and its effect must be mutually reducible. Consciousness is not reducible to matter and hence cannot be a material product."

"Moreover, the existence of self is proved by self-intuition (*svasaṃvedana*). We feel pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, which presuppose a conscious substance as their substratum. The materialist cannot deny self-intuition. He must accept cognition as self-cognized in order to cognize the object. It cannot be admitted that a cognition is cognized by another cognition, because the second cognition would require a third, the third a fourth, and so on *ad infinitum*, leaving the object uncognized for ever. Nor can the materialist regard the cognition as cognized by inference, because he does not accept the validity of inference. He is therefore compelled to admit self-intuition, and consequently the existence of the self...as the substratum of that intuition."

"Being radically different in nature from the material products, the self must be eternal unlike the latter."

"The negation (*pratiṣedha*) of self entails the reality of it, because in all genuine negations the negatum must be a

positive fact. Even the negation of square-circle presupposes separate reality of square and circle elsewhere. Figurative usages like 'his pictures lack soul' also argue the existence of self. All simple words signify positive reals. The word 'self' is a simple word and so must stand for a positive fact. There is also consensus of opinion among eminent men and the testimony of omniscient selves (*jina*) in favor of the existence of self, which has been established by unimpeachable arguments of logic too."

"The obvious disparity and variation in the mental and moral faculties of different individuals must have a cause, and this cause is asserted to be merits and demerits earned in previous lives. And this is the Moral Law which is the proof of life herebefore and hereafter."

"As regards the possibility of an omniscient self, the Jaina asserts that the materialist cannot adduce any proof against such possibility. The materialist accepts perception alone as the valid instrument of knowledge. And perception, being capable of cognizing positive objects alone, cannot cognize the absence of omniscience. Even if perception is admitted as capable of cognizing the absence, the materialist should clarify whether it is capable of cognizing the absence of omniscience in a particular self at a particular moment, or in all selves at all times. The first alternative will not refute our position, while the second would prove the omniscience of the materialist himself, and land him in self-contradiction."

(E20-29; S37-42) "The Sautrāntika Buddhist is a realist in the sense that he believes in the reality of the material atoms and the psychical factors like feelings, cognitions (construction-filled and construction-free), names and concepts (*saṃjñā*) and predispositions (*saṃskāra*). These reals are discrete and momentary. They form conglomerates, but do not give up their discreteness in any way. They last only a moment giving rise to their facsimile in the next moment. The first moment is regarded as the material cause (*upādāna*) and the second the effect (*upādeya*). The combined stream of these

reals gives rise to the false notion of a permanent self, which is due to the absence of gap (*avyavadāna*) between the effect and the cause, extreme rapidity of production (*laghūtpatti*) of the former from the latter, and their close similarity (*sādṛśya*). The recognition of identity between the effect and the cause also does not prove permanence. It is an illusion which is on a par with the illusion of the identity of ever-growing nails, hairs and the like."

"Liberation (*mokṣa*) for these Buddhists consists in the disruption of the consciousness-stream by making it unproductive. 'The practice of detachment and contemplation helps one to get rid of ignorance and clinging (*tṛṣṇa*) and finally suck dry the productivity of the consciousness-stream. The aspirant to liberation should cultivate the four noble truths'."

"The Jaina philosopher considers this Buddhist view of things to be opposed to experience and logic. The objects that we perceive are massive, permanent, and composite. We never perceive the atomic, momentary and simple objects. The Buddhist philosopher cannot dismiss this perception as illusory unless he succeeds in pointing out a perception which cognizes the momentary simple atom. Dharmakīrti has defined perception as 'cognition which is free from conceptual constructions and nonerroneous'. If all our perceptions are dismissed as illusory, the definition would have no scope. We never perceive atoms and so these also cannot be regarded as the objects of such perceptions. Constructionfree perception also is not capable of cognizing atoms. Moreover, it is devoid of the certitude which is an essential condition of the cognition's being valid and nondiscrepant (*avisaṃvādaka*). Even a person ignorant of the nature of poison fails to determine the poison as poison by perception, so a constructionfree perception is *ipso facto* not capable of determining the nature of the object. Nor can the constructionfree perception determine its object by means of a constructionfilled cognition produced in the next moment,

because the constructionfilled cognition would require the production of another constructionfilled cognition for its own determination, and so on *ad infinitum*. Moreover, it is impossible that a constructionfree perception should produce a constructionfilled cognition in the next moment. An ass cannot produce a horse. If a perception free from conceptual constructions could produce a constructionfilled cognition which is conceptual, why should not the atomic real (*svalakṣaṇa*) itself be admitted as capable of generating the constructionfilled cognition directly without the intervention of constructionfree perception? The Buddhist cannot set down the conceptual constructions to the activity of predispositions and perversities influencing the constructionfree perception in the production of the constructionfilled cognition in the next moment. These predispositions and perversities will ever remain active and make the constructionfree perception itself vitiated and contaminated and incapable of cognizing the true nature of the object."

"Constructionfree perception thus is found incapable of establishing the reality of atoms. And constructionfilled cognition, being conceptual in character, is unfit to perform the function. Inference, being based on perception, is also incompetent to do the duty."

"The Buddhist might contend that composite wholes are not real. The parts constitute the whole. But what is the relation between the whole and the part? The whole cannot reside in the parts individually or jointly. The postulation of a peculiar relation called *samavāya* (inherence) is also not helpful, because *samavāya* in the ultimate analysis is nothing but another name of what we call 'residence'. The concept of a composite whole is thus an absurd notion."

"The Jain philosopher postulates the relation of identity-in-difference between the whole and its parts, which is exactly similar to the relation obtaining between a cognition and its two constituents, viz., the cognizing agent and the cognized content. The cognition, the cognizer and the content are three

distinct facts inseparably rolled into one. They are identical as well as different. The relation is *sui generis* and for want of a better name may be called identity-in-difference. The whole is as much a real unity as each of its parts. There is nothing repugnant in admitting the atoms as combining together to make one unit which is amenable to perception. And such unity must be admitted as real. Otherwise, there being no unity available at any state, the unity of (an) atom would also remain unestablished."

"The question of the reality of universals is also raised by Vidyānanda in this context. The Jaina philosopher identifies the universal with similarity or resemblance. Similarity must be admitted as real. Otherwise there could be no occasion for the erroneous cognition of shell as silver. There is similarity between shell and silver, which is responsible for the occurrence of erroneous cognition in the presence of the other relevant conditions of error. The Jaina philosopher does not admit the category of eternal and ubiquitous universals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher, for he does not believe in any valid experience of such (a) category. This similarity is called (a) horizontal universal (*ūrdhvatī-sāmānya*) which relates to the identity of a substance through time. A substance changes but does not cease to be. It is permanent and also one. This permanence and unity is called "vertical universal". The Jaina philosopher does not find any difficulty in admitting the same self running through different modes and preserving its identity. He likens this vertical identity to the unity of a cognition which has a variety of colors and forms, spread in space, as its content. Even as a single cognition can cognize a number of forms and color in one sweep and be one unitary fact, so does a substance remain one while passing through different modes in succession."

"Moreover, if causal efficiency is the criterion of reality, the real should be admitted as permanent and transitory both. The momentary is not capable of exercising causal efficiency either in succession or in non-succession and as such cannot

be real. The same is the case with an absolutely permanent entity. The Jain accepts causal efficiency as the criterion of reality, which, according to him, presupposes that the real should be both permanent and transitory."

"The Buddhist has denied a permanent self underlying the course of psychical events which happen at different times. What exists and is possible is only the present momentary unit. The past is defunct, and the present is lost after its turn. This makes the continuity of personal life impossible, and consequently the continuity of present life into the future, and the necessity of the law of karma that the performer of (a) good or bad act will have to bear the consequence of, become impossible of explanation. The Buddhist has abolished the permanent self and replaced it by a series supposed to be governed by the law of causality. The past produces the present and the present produces the future, and in the production the cause communicates its ethico-religious bias into the effect. This seems to be a solution to the difficulties involved in the breach of continuity."

"But is causation possible in the absence of a real link between the past and the present? The previous consciousness-unit is dead and defunct when (the) succeeding unit happens. But how can a defunct and nonexistent fact be the cause of anything? Nobody can think that the present occurrence is due to an event which has occurred in the remote past. The reason for this is that the past is not in existence to influence the present event. It might be contended that the immediately precedent event can be the cause of the immediately succeeding one. But how can the effect come into existence in the absence of the cause and yet be due to it? In the Buddhist theory the cause ceases to be when the effect comes into being. How can there be any relation between what is existent and what is not existent? There can be no distinction between the immediate precedent and the remote precedent when both are equally nonexistent at the time of the production of the effect. The determinant of actuality is the concomitance in

presence and absence of the effect with the cause. But in the Buddhist theory the effect does not happen when the cause is in existence, and it happens only when the supposed cause is nonexistent. How can there be concomitance? How again can the Buddhist explain that the effect should happen in (the) immediately succeeding moment and not in (the) remote future or past when the cause has no existence at the time of the effect's occurrence?...Thus causality is as inexplicable in the theory of flux as it is in the theory of eternally unchanging cause."

"There is another serious difficulty in the doctrine of flux. It is a matter of universal experience that the continuous identity of the self as well as of objects is felt by all. This felt identity is asserted to be illusion by the fluxist. But what is the basis of this illusion? Illusion presupposes a previous cognition of the object. A man who has never experienced silver cannot mistake the shell for silver. Identity is inseparable from continuity. But as there is not real continuity anywhere according to the Buddhist, how can there be such illusion of identity possible? The supposed continuity is said to be formed by discrete moments which come into being and pass out of existence. So there is no real continuity anywhere. It is affirmed by the Buddhist himself that the discrete moments when not felt as distinct create the illusion of identity. We have shown that this illusion is impossible. But even admitting for the sake of argument that such an illusion may be possible, the question arises 'How can one continuum be distinguished from another continuum?'."

"Now it is a felt fact that the chair is different from the table. It is not the discrete momentary chair that is different from the table. But we feel that the table which appears to continue is different from the chair-continuum. There is no difference between the chair and the table so far as the appearance of continuum due to the noncognition of the difference of the units is concerned. A question arises: 'How can one continuum be felt as distinct from another

continuum?' Each member of a chair-series is distinct from its other members in the same way as the members of the table-series are from those of the chair-series. Yet the chair-series is felt as distinct from the table-series. What is the reason for this? If the unbroken continuity of the emergence of the table-moments be the reason for its distinction from the chair, the same unbroken continuity is found in all the series. It is difficult to understand, firstly, how absolutely distinct entities give rise to the appearance of identity; secondly, how one series can be distinguished from another series when the same absolute difference is found to obtain between them as is found between the members of a particular series. If similarity be held to be an additional reason for this appearance of identity and continuity, then why should not the two table-series, closely similar, be not felt as identical? There is similarity and also unbroken succession between the different units. You may say that one table is felt as distinct from another table and so there is no confusion between them. But the appeal to perception is useless because what is perceived is always the moment and not the series which is an unreal intellectual construction. So again the appeal to recognition cannot be of help, because in the Buddhist theory of flux nothing continues, and there is no identity between the past and the present, which is to be known by recognition. What is felt is always the moment, absolutely distinct and discrete from another moment. So no question of identity of one moment with another moment arises. In fact a plurality of units without a binding nexus can never account for the unity felt in an entity. If an abiding unity is posited to connect and combine the different units, then recognition and also causality can be explained. This is the position of the Jaina philosopher who asserts that a reality is a permanent unity which runs through the changing moments that appear in it. The criterion of reality is thus continuity and change, that is to say, the flux and influx of states."

(E30-33; S42-44) "The Sāṃkhya philosophy admits

dualism of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. *Prakṛti* is the material cause of the universe, and *puruṣa* is the unchanging principle of consciousness. *Prakṛti* is one but *puruṣas* are infinite in number. Both are ubiquitous. *Prakṛti* evolves in a definite order and the evolutes are twenty-three in number. The evolution starts with the unbalancing of the equilibrium of the three constituents of *prakṛti*, viz., *sattva* (principle of buoyancy and illumination), *rajas* (energy) and *tamas* (inertia). The first evolute is *mahat* or *buddhi* (intellection) which is followed by *ahaṃkāra* (ego or selfhood) as the second. From the *ahaṃkāra* are evolved the following sixteen--the five *tanmātras* (fine elements), the five organs of cognition, the five organs of action and the mind. From the five fine elements again the five gross elements arise. These twenty-three evolutes together with *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* make up the twenty-five principles. If the class of emancipated *puruṣas* is added, the number comes to twenty-six. And Maheśvara is the twenty-seventh according to the Sāṃkhya school which accepts God."

"Liberation, according to this school, consists in the reinstatement of the *puruṣa* in its own nature, which is attained by means of the discriminative knowledge of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. It is likened to the state of dreamless sleep."

"The Jaina philosopher has raised objections against the Sāṃkhya concept of *prakṛti* and its evolution. *Prakṛti* is eternal, ubiquitous and partless. Being partless, it should exist in its entirety everywhere and that would mean the existence of everything everywhere. But this is opposed to experience. We perceive different objects in different places and times, and not everything everywhere at all times. But the opponent might contend that though it is admitted that everything exists everywhere, it is the presence or absence of manifestation which determines the perceptibility or otherwise of the object. But then what is this manifestation? If it stands for the cognition of the previously uncognized object, you have to state whether the manifestation is eternal or occasional. If manifestation is occasional, it must be admitted to be freshly

produced. And consequently what is the harm if objects are also admitted as freshly produced? If, on the other hand, the manifestation is eternal, the original contingency of the perception of everything everywhere would revive."

"Moreover, what is the relation between *prakṛti* and its evolutes? Are the evolutes the products of *prakṛti* or only the transformations of it? If the evolutes are the products, they must be either pre-existent or pre-nonexistent. But the production of pre-existent products is futile, and the production of pre-nonexistent products is impossible according to the Sāṃkhya philosopher. An absolutely nonexistent object cannot be produced. If, on the other hand, the evolutes are considered to be the transformations of *prakṛti*, they are either absolutely different from the latter or absolutely identical with it. In the latter case, the successive production of the evolutes would be impossible, because there is no corresponding succession in *prakṛti*. And in the former case, it would be illogical to regard them as evolved from *prakṛti*, there being absolute cleavage between the two."

"Now if the Sāṃkhya philosopher admits transformation to be neither different nor identical, and asserts that *prakṛti* transforms itself as *mahat* and the like, much like the straight or circular shapes assumed by a reptile, he would be abandoning his doctrine of absolutely eternal *prakṛti*. This would be tantamount to the admission of the doctrine of nonabsolutism sponsored by the Jaina philosopher."

"The Sāṃkhya doctrine of unchanging *puruṣa* also does not commend itself to the Jaina. The *puruṣa* should be conceived as permanent-cum-changing. We have already discussed the point in connection with our exposition of the doctrine of fluxism."

(E34-41; S44-47) "The Vaiśeṣika school postulates six categories (etc., brief statement of Vaiśeṣika categories). The self has nine specific qualities of *buddhi* (knowledge), *sukha* (pleasure), *duḥkha* (pain), *icchā* (intention), *dveṣa* (aversion), *prayatna* (effort), *dharma* (merit), *adharma* (demerit) and

saṃskāra (predispositions). On the absolute dissociation from these qualities, the self attains liberation and regains its natural state of freedom from contamination with these specific qualities. The school believes in the plurality of selves which are ubiquitous."

"The Jaina philosopher observes that the Vaiśeṣika postulation of absolute difference between the parts and the whole (*avayavin*), qualities and their substratum, action and the active, universal and the individual, is opposed to experience. We do not perceive the two terms as absolutely different from one another, though of course distinction is not denied. They must be admitted as somehow identical and different both. The postulation of the relation of *samavāya* (inherence) between the two would not solve the problem. It would rather add another category equally unamenable to perception. Moreover, the relation of inherence is accepted as eternal, ubiquitous and unitary, whereas the terms related by it are transitory and limited in extension, and different in different contexts. Again, inherence itself would require another inherence to relate itself to the terms, and this would lead to infinite regress leaving the terms unrelated. Nor would the quality of contact (*saṃyoga*) serve the purpose. Contact, being admitted as a quality by the Vaiśeṣika, can reside exclusively in a substance, and not in inherence which is not a substance. The substantive-adjective relation also is not helpful. Such relation is possible only when the terms are already related by another relation. For instance, the stick can function as an adjective if the relation of contact between the person and the stick held by him is known beforehand."

"The Vaiśeṣika might contend that inherence relates itself to the term by itself independently of any other relation. Inherence is itself a relation and therefore does not need another relation for its relation with the term. But the contention is not tenable. Even as contact and such other qualities require a relation for their residence in a substance, so inherence must also be admitted to be in need of another

relation for its residence in the terms. It cannot be accepted as self-related. The Vaiśeṣika might argue: 'Self-relatedness is the intrinsic nature of inherence, even as hotness is of fire. There is no justification for comparing the nature of contact with that of inherence. Fire is hot and water is cold. It is a question of fact. One should not ask: Why is fire not cold and water not hot?' But the Jaina philosopher does not find any substance in the argument. Had the self-relatedness of inherence been established by perception, the Vaiśeṣika could appeal to the nature of things. But it is a question of logic which can be decided only by appeal to reason. The case of contact was cited only for the sake of argument against the postulation of inherence as an independent category and not as a proof against such postulation. In fact, Praśastapāda proves inherence by inference."

"Vidyānanda has adduced a number of cogent arguments against inherence and the reader will find many interesting points in it. With the refutation of inherence the quality of contact is also refuted. The postulation of absolute difference is the besetting sin. Some sort of identity between the terms must be admitted in order to make their relation understandable. Otherwise atoms would never combine and our perception of unity by the side of difference would remain unaccounted for."

"Another important point of difference between the Vaiśeṣika and the Jaina is the question of a personal God. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, particularly in its later development, the existence of a personal God is advocated. He is not the material cause of the world. He is only the efficient cause. The body, the sense-organs, the world, etc. are known to have a definite origin in time. Who has created them? It can be inferred that they were brought into being by an intelligent person with the help of the material atoms just as articles of daily use are manufactured by persons vested with knowledge and skill. Such an intelligent person is God."

"But the Jaina advances a counter-argument: 'God is not

the creator of body, etc., because he is devoid of bodily organism. Whoever is devoid of bodily organism is not the creator, for instance, the emancipated self. God is devoid of bodily organism. And therefore He is not the creator.' The Vaiśeṣika denies bodily organism to God. Granted that God has a bodily organism, an eternal God must have an eternal body. Now as the bodily organism is a composite entity, it must *ex hypothesi* be a product created by an intelligent being, and this would prove it to be noneternal. If in order to avoid that contingency the body is admitted to be created without any intelligent creator, this would contradict the doctrine that all products must have an intelligent creator. Now if the Vaiśeṣika admits God as devoid of bodily organism, the activity of creation would be impossible of explanation. And if he accepted the possibility of creative activity by a person devoid of bodily organism, it would be a simpler hypothesis to admit karma, though unconscious, as capable of doing the function. Possession of both intelligence and bodily organism are necessary for the creation of an object, as illustrated by the instance of the potter. Now God, though possessed of intelligence, is devoid of bodily organism and so does not satisfy the full conditions of creation. Karma, though unconscious, makes up a composite material body according to the Jaina, and so it is on a par with God in this respect. Karma therefore is as much a satisfactory condition of creation as the God of the Vaiśeṣika philosopher. The Vaiśeṣika might contend that the essential condition of creation is the presence of intelligence, desire and effort. The karma of the Jaina does not satisfy these conditions and therefore creation cannot be set down to it. But the Jaina submits that God also, being devoid of bodily organism, is incapable of knowing, willing and effort, and hence of performing the function of creation. The Vaiśeṣika's postulation of intelligence, desire and effort in a bodiless God goes against his doctrine of the disembodied emancipated soul as free from the specific qualities of knowledge, pleasure, pain and the like."

"The Vaiśeṣika believes in God as the dispenser of justice in accordance with the merits and demerits acquired by a person. In other words, God grants the fruits of our own karma. The Jaina thinks karma is the sole and sufficient condition capable of producing the results of good and bad moral acts."

(E42-43; S47) "The Naiyāyikas are in essential agreement with the Vaiśeṣikas on all important philosophical issues, and so Vidyānanda refrains from giving any elaborate exposition of their philosophy. He however refers to their conception of liberation which is of four types, viz. *sālokya*, *sārūpya*, *sāmīpya* and *sāyujya*. The first is attained by *bhaktiyoga* which consists in lifelong devotedness and dedication to Maheśvara the Supreme Deity as His servant. The second and third are attained by means of *kriyāyoga* in the form of spiritual penance and scriptural study and the fourth by *jñānayoga*, that is, meditation on God by means of the eight factors of yogic discipline, viz. *yama, niyama*, etc."

(E44-47; S47-48) "The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā admits eleven categories of reals,[1] viz., earth, water, fire, air, space (*dik*), time, *ākāśa*, self, mind, sound (*śabda*) and darkness (*tamas*). *Guṇa* (quality), *karman* (activity), etc., which reside in the reals are identical with the latter. The Prābhākara Mīmāṁsaka adopts a different scheme and posits the following nine--*dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), *kriyā* (action), *jāti* (universal), *saṃkhyā* (number), *sādṛśya* (similarity), *śakti* (potency), *samavāya* (inherence) and *krama* (order)--instead of the following five of the Bhāṭṭa school--substance, quality, action, universal and nonexistence."

"Two ends of human life are recognized, viz. heaven and salvation. The duties are fourfold--*nitya* (compulsory),

1 This is how the passage reads. However, it is evident that what is intended is rather that these are eleven categories of substances. The categories of reals consists of the five at the end of this paragraph.

naimittika (to be performed on particular occasions), *kāmya* (prescribed to serve specific ends) and *niṣiddha* (forbidden). The Mīmāṃsakas do not admit renunciation as the essential condition of salvation. One can attain salvation even by following the life of a righteous householder earning his livelihood by honest means, devoted to self-enlightenment, hospitable to guests, performing oblation and truthful. The candidate for salvation should not perform the *kāmya* and *niṣiddha* duties. He should however do the other two types of duties in order to get rid of the obstacles that might obstruct his spiritual progress. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas include these two also under the *kāmya* duties and do not prescribe them for the aspirant to salvation."

"Vidyānanda selects the Mīmāṃsaka concept of universal for refutation at great length."

86. VIDYĀNANDA, *Ślokavārttika* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

Jayendra Soni, in *Aspects of Jaina Philosophy* (Madras 1996), pp. 45-53, provides the text and a translation of Vidyānanda's commentary on I. 6. He introduces this with the following comments: "The manner in which Vidyānanda proceeds...is to compose *ślokas* in the context of (a) *sūtra* by Umāsvāmi and then to write his prose *vārttika* in varying lengths in which problems are then discussed in more detail. His commentary to *T(attvārtha) S(ūtra)* I, 6 contains a total of 56 *ślokas*. The discussion of the problem of universals and particulars begins with his *vārtika* to his fifth *śloka*." (p. 47) He then goes on to provide the text of certain of the *ślokas* of I. 1 and to translate them. We offer the translations here as a sample of Vidyānanda's style throughout the work.

CHAPTER ONE

I. 6. 1 "In the (previous) *sūtra* it is established that the knowledge of reality, which may be partial or complete, is put forward (*nikṣipta*) by name, etc.; here it is (said to be

obtained) through *pramāṇas* and *nayas*.

I. 6. 2 "In the *dvandva* (compound) '*pramāṇas* and *nayas*' the word *pramāṇa* is placed first since it is more important, even though it has more syllables."

I. 6. 3 "*Pramāṇa* is comprehensive, (so it) is regarded as being more important than *naya* since it (*naya*) is limited, so is what it (*naya*) expresses (viz., the knowledge it furnishes is also partial), so it is said."

I. 6. 4 "To say that *pramāṇa* is *naya* since it determines its own object is untrue. *Naya* has the characteristic of determining its own object only partially."

Now, turning to the problem of parts and wholes, he comments:

I. 6. 8 "If the object as a whole were (produced by) a superimposed conceptual construction then it would not exist in another conceptual construction; it cannot have any causal efficiency (*artha-kriyā-śakti*) (i.e., it cannot produce the expected purpose), nor can it be known clearly through perception."

Soni in explanation comments: "In this *śloka* Vidyānanda brings in the criticism that the universal, which for him is equivalent to the object as a whole, is not a superimposed conceptual or mental construction (*kalpanā*), meaning thereby that the object as a whole exists really. In other words, the notion of a really existent object as a whole is not a figment of the imagination, as the Buddhist would regard it to be. Further, he questions the status of a mental construction when in the following moment it is overshadowed by another mental construction, taking the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness at its word. In effect, Vidyānanda is asking what use or function a mental construction can then have, namely when it in fact no longer exists, not only because of its momentary nature but also because it would be pushed aside by the next conceptual construction; further, its non-existence would imply its imperceivability."

"After raising further issues about mental concepts and

the role of ideas in practical life Vidyānanda interprets the opponent as believing that the notion of an object as a whole is an unjustified notion of the common person involved in mundane activities. (That) it is not the pot as a whole that bears water, but rather the individual atoms which make it up, is what the Buddhist contends. The notion of wholeness is not only something hidden but it does not in fact exist. Turning the argument around Vidyānanda argues that a single atom cannot itself perform the function of bearing water, apart from the fact that an atom, as an entity in itself, cannot be cognized, a point granted by the Buddhists themselves; therefore it must be admitted that the atoms together, in the form of a pot, are capable of performing the function of bearing water. Then why, Vidyānanda asks implicitly, does not the opponent regard the atoms together in the form of the pot, as being identical with the pot itself? This point is clearer when Vidyānanda probes into the question whether the atoms have something special about them which allows them to feature in community as an object such as a pot, as a whole."

Soni then quotes a passage from Vidyānanda's extensive commentary on the same section: "Atoms either have to require something special (about them) when in use, or not. It cannot be the latter position (viz., that they do not require anything special about them), otherwise all of them would be in motion perpetually. If it is said that they do indeed require something special (about them) for the actions for which they are responsible, then what is this speciality? If it is said that (an action for which the atoms are responsible) arises through 'their being in the same place' then, on account of it being agreed that the atoms occupy different places, what does 'their being in the same place' mean? 'Their being in the same place' is a position (of the atoms) suitable for the functions of carrying water, etc., and nothing else; a single atom in any place is capable (of performing the function) and any other atoms being there are also being employed (for the same function); their 'same places' cannot be explained in this way,

because (all the atoms being) in a single spot would be a contradiction--it would lead to the view that all (the atoms in one spot) would be merely a single atom, because each would merge into the other entirely, otherwise it would have to be said that 'being in one spot' would be meaningless. What else would be a single action of bearing water, etc., because even though the (other) atoms which are in a different place are also being used, they would have to have (occupy) 'the same place'? Accepting the distinctness of each atom you must also accept that it (the action performed by each atom) would then become several, otherwise there would be no difference in saying that what is to be done by the various atoms of a pot, etc., is a single action."

"(Opponent): "True, this (activity of the atoms in the form of carrying water, etc., would become many, because ordinary life takes place with their (the atoms') function, without which action is hindered. (But) the effect is metaphorically regarded as one, because the (various actions of the different atoms) cause only a single effect."

(Answer:) "Not so, because (1) even though they (the atoms) produce effects, the singleness (of their effects) is not proved; (2) it has been accepted that in fact there are many (effects of the atoms which are together); (3) each (atom) produces its own unique effect; (4) it would in fact lead to infinite regress if their effects were accepted to be a single one; (5) even after thinking about it deeply a single effect cannot be accepted (on the basis of your view). If you also accept this, then why can the effect of the various atoms (together) not be a single object as a whole?"

And Vidyānanda concludes his argument on this point by saying in his following two verses:

I. 6. 9 "If this is an error produced by the senses, showing the form of a gross (object), then prove how perception, knowledge through the senses, is not erroneous."

I. 6. 10 "If it is said that the atoms are not joined together (but) close together, then these (atoms) can never be

within the range of anyone's perception, like the supreme self."

N. L. Jain, in the course of his comments on various passages from Akalaṅka's commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, gives us some insights on Vidyānanda's views on certain matters. In what follows we provide excerpts from N. L. Jain's explanations. The quotations are from Prof. Jain's three books translating Chapters 2, 5 and 8 cited previously: they are referred to here as NLJ2, -5, and -8 respectively (with his translations of technical terms replaced by ours where appropriate). "E" refers to the edition by Manoharalal constituting Saraswati Oriental Research Sanskrit Series No. 16 (Ahmedabad 2002). LJ2, -5, -8" indicate the comments of N. L. Jain in his translations of those three chapters.

CHAPTER TWO

II. 8 (E318-322; NLJ2, p. 86) "According to Vidyānanda, the cognitive application, in general, is the differentium only for twelve types of living beings (two types with destructive volition of absolute awareness and conation out of nine and ten types with mixed (destruction-cum-substantial) volitions of four right awarenesses, three wrong awarenesses and three conations) where this property is all-pervasive and eternal. The other volitional types have specific consciousness."

II. 9 (E322; NLJ2, p.90) "Vidyānanda points out that the living being has been characterised by eight types of awareness and four types of conations--i.e., twelve types of volitions in all. The question is what type of living being is being defined here. In rejoinder, it is pointed out that living beings have a total of fifty-three volitions as mentioned in 2. 2. Out of them twelve have been mentioned as primary differentia for living beings, the remaining forty-one volitions being secondary ones. Thus the forty-one-volitional living being has been defined as with cognitive application in general. The differentia of consciousness differentiates the living from the nonliving. "

II. 10 (E322-323; NLJ2, p. 93) According to him (i.e., Vidyānanda) the word "and" *(ca)* is put in to include two more categories of living beings besides the two mentioned. They are (i) quasi-worldly beings also like those at the thirteenth spiritual state (they are going to be liberated in the same birth) and (ii) omniscients without activity (i.e. living beings at the fourteenth stage, to be liberated in an *antarmuhūrta*'s time). They are different from the worldly and liberated beings in many respects."

CHAPTER EIGHT

VIII. 3 (E476; NLJ8, p. 61 "Vidyānanda explains the varieties of bondage in a different order (from that of Akalaṅka), placing constituents first, followed by nature, duration and intensity."

VIII. 6 (E477; NLJ8, p. 87) "Vidyānanda points out a fact in support of knowledge-obscuring karma. There is difference in the degrees of the five types of knowledges among the different categories and classes of living beings despite the fact that the material cause like souls, and efficient causes like a good body, sermons and practices, etc., are commonly available. This difference could only be explained on the basis of some unseen cause which could only be the obscuring karma of knowledge."

VIII. 13 (E470; NLJ8, p. 133) "Vidyānanda mentions that besides the primary and secondary species of karmas, there are many types of tertiary karmic species, depending on the variety of karmic (1) duration, (2) intensity and (3) other observable causes."

VIII. 25 (E481; NLJ8, p. 156) "Vidyānanda has raised a good question as to how an infinite-times-infinite number of atoms could be converted to karmic aggregates, in the absence of which there could be no formation of karmic species."

"He points out that if there are no aggregates (which are normally perceptible), one cannot perceive objects, one cannot make inferences and have self-experience (in the

absence of mind-body aggregates). In fact, the atoms themselves form aggregates because of their immediate vicinity and discreteness (along with positive and negative qualities)."[108]

87. VIDYĀNANDA, *Ṭīkā* on Samantabhadra's *Yuktyanuśāsana*

The work has been edited by Indralal and Srilal in Manikcandra Digambara Jain Granthamala 25, 1919, unavailable to us.

88. ANANTAKĪRTI (950), *Jīvasiddhinibandhana*

See the Introduction (in Hindi) by V. P. Johrapurkar to his edition of Bhāvasena's *Viśvatattvaprakāśa*, Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala No. 15 (Sholapur 1964), pp. 37-38 and 75.

89. ANANTAKĪRTI, *Tātparyavṛtti* on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyastraya*

This work was edited by Kalapa Bharamappa Nitve with Akalaṅka's work and several other commentaries in Manikacandra Digambara Jain Granthamala 1, 1915. We have been unable to locate a copy.

90. ANANTAKĪRTI, *Sarvajñasiddhi*

This work was apparently also edited by K. B. Neve in the volume cited in the previous entry.

91. ANANTAKĪRTI, *Svataḥprāmāṇyabhaṅga*

Mentioned in Johrapurkar's Hindi Introduction to the work cited as #88 above, p. 75.

92. AMITAGATI I (950), *Yogasāraprābhṛta*

H. L. Jain and A. N. Upadhye, in an essay ("General Editorial") introducing Jugal Kishore Mukhtar's edition (our "E") of this work (Jnanapitha Murtidevi Jaina Granthamala, Sanskrit Grantha No. 33, 1968), have discussed the problems raised by the fact that there are two Jain authors of the name "Amitagati", of which the author of the present work seems to have been chronologically earlier. After a careful discussion they conclude that this Amitagati should be assigned to the middle of the tenth century A.D. On this basis we put this author and his work here. He is reported to have been a Digambara. They also provide a brief summary, which follows.

Summary by H. L. Jain and A. N. Upadhye

The *Yogasāraprābhṛta* is divided into nine sections (*adhikāra*) which deal respectively with (1) self, (2) not self, (3) inflow, (4) bondage, (5) cessation of inflow, (6) cleansing of traces, (7) liberation, (8) (right) conduct, and (9) an appendix (*cūlikā*). There are 540 stanzas in all.

The titles of the sections clearly indicate that this work covers the fundamentals of Jainism which are presented from the higher plane of self-realization.

Chapter I (59 stanzas) (E3-36), while exposing the nature of a self fully, propounds the concepts of vision and cognition as well as the types of cognition and its relation with what is cognized. It is for the yogi to realize the discriminated self.

Chapter II (50 stanzas) (E37-64) is a discourse on five substances other than selves, their existence and their attendant origination, destruction and permanence, and their accompaniments of qualities and modes. Every one of them is fully explained, and the Chapter is concluded with a detailed discussion of the karmic product (*pudgala*), its nature and its relation with the self.

Chapter III (40 stanzas) (E65-79) explains the causes of inflow and the various transformations in that context in a very critical manner.

Chapter IV (41 stanzas) (E80-95) deals with karmic bondage and its types, indicating how one can try to be immune from the bondage of actions, both meritorious and demeritorious.

Chapter V (62 stanzas) (E96-115) propounds the principle of cessation of inflow in its two aspects, as state and as substantial. The details are highly instructive, showing how equanimity, etc., are of great benefit for the seeker of self-realization.

Chapter VI (50 stanzas) (E116-134) sheds light on cleansing of traces of two types. How cleansing, i.e., the shedding away of karma, becomes possible for a yogi is expounded in a dignified manner with requisite illustrations and practical guide-lines.

Chapter VII (54 stanzas) (E135-155) gives the nature of liberation in the context of spiritual meditation on which a man of learning has to embark to reach this experience.

Chapter VIII (100 stanzas) (E156-196) deals with conduct, namely, the internal and external life of a Jaina monk. The whole subject is dealt with in all its details, indicating what is to be appropriated (*upādeya*) and what is to be avoided (*heya*).

Chapter IX (84 stanzas) (E197-226) presents an exhilarating exposition of self-realization in its different facets.

93. KANAKANANDIN (975), *Karmaprakṛti*

NCat III, 142 says that manuscript(s) (Prakrit) is/are listed in A Hand-List of 838 Sanskrit, Prākṛt and Kannada Manuscripts in the Dānaśālā Maṭha Śāstra Bhaṇḍāra, Moodbidri.

94. KANAKANANDIN, *Dravyasaṃgraha*

NCat III, 142 says there are both a *Bṛhat-* and a *Laghu-Dravyasaṃgraha* by this author. See N. Premi in Jaina Sāhitya aur Itihās (Bombay 1942), pp. 296, 298.

ANANTAVĪRYA (980)

There were a number of Jain authors named Anantavīrya. Mahendra Kumar in his introduction to the edition of Akalaṅka's *Siddhiviniścaya* with Anantavīrya's *Ṭīkā*, op. cit., spends many pages exploring the question of the identity--and in particular the dating--of this Anantavīrya. After a long discussion he concludes that there were in fact two other Anantavīrya's who commented on Akalaṅka's text; the earlier's work has been lost, and the second of the two is later than the period covered in this Volume. The date he arrives at for the present Anantavīrya "can be fixed as extending from 950-990 A.D." (p. 89). He is said to have been the pupil of Ravibhadra (c. 959-990) and the grandteacher of Vādirāja (Pārśvanāthacaritra) (1025), who is referred to by Prabhācandra.

95. ANANTAVIRYA (980), *Bhāṣya* on Akalaṅka's *Pramāṇasaṃgraha*

NCat I, 180 refers us to the edition by Mahendra Kumar published with the editor's commentary as Singhi Jain Granthamala 12, 1939, pp 8, 10, 13, etc.

96. ANANTAVĪRYA, *Ṭīkā* on Akalaṅka's *Siddhiviniścaya*

As previously mentioned, this Anantavīrya's commentary is the one edited by Mahendra Kumar in the work previously cited. Mahendra Kumar (ibid., p. 96) comments: "Anantavīrya composes poetic prose bordering on Campū to explain the

meaning of some sentences...he was a great terminologist."

97. ANANTAVĪRYA, *Prameyaratnāvalī* on Akalaṅka's *Laghīyastraya*

Edited by Mahendra Kumar in two volumes: Jnana-Pitha Murtidevi Jaina Granthamala 22, 1956-58.

98. ANANTAVĪRYA, *Vṛtti* on Akalaṅka's *Nyāyaviniścaya*

NCat I, 181 directs us to Jainagranthavali (Bombay 1902), p. 91; Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in Mysore and Coorg by Lewis Rice (Bangalore 1884); and A Hand-List of 407 Manuscripts in the Śrīmaccārukīrti Paṇḍācārya Jaina Bhaṇḍār at Śravanabelgola, Mysore State (no compiler or date given).

NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA or SIDDHĀNTACAKRAVARTIN (980)

Travellers in India lucky enough to visit the town of Sravana Belgola in what is now Mysore State have wondered at the immense statue of Gomateśvara which crowns a hilltop and can be seen from many miles away. This statue was erected under the direction of Chamunda Raya, a minister of King Rajamalla II. The King's reign ended in 984, but the statue could not have been erected before 978, in which year Chamunda Raya wrote a *purāṇa* which does not mention the statue. Sarat Chandra Ghoshal, in the Introduction to his translation of Nemicandra's Dravyasaṃgraha (our "T" for the summary of that work provided below), argues that in fact the statue must have been in put up in precisely 980, basing this estimate on references in literary tracts reinforced by astronomical facts.

Nemicandra mentions the statue in his Gommatasāra..

Ghoshal spends several pages showing from inscriptional evidence that the statue was in actual fact erected by Chamunda Raya and not someone else. Although Ghoshal also attempts in the same Introduction to gather more information about Ṇemicandra himself, as all too usual there is not much to go on.

A thorough account of the identity of this writer is found in "Facts about Gommatasāra" by Jyoti Prasad Jain (Vaishali Research Bulletin No. 3, 1982, pp. 53-62).[109] We pick out a few points: Dr. Jain identifies this Nemichandra as a student of Indranandin, the author of Jwalamalin-Kalpa written in 939 A.D., whose pupil Kanakanandin (see #s93-94 above) was as well. Other teachers were named Abhayanandin and Ajitasena. "It was this Ajitasena who inspired Chamundaraya to erect the world famous Bahubali colossus at the Vidhyagiri of Shravana-belagola (district Hasan in the State of Karnataka or Mysore), and presided at its consecration ceremony, most probably assisted by Nemichandra himself. Thereafter, the latter was appointed as the chief priest, pontiff and caretaker of this holy place..." The date of this remarkable happening is argued by Dr. Jain to be Sunday, 13 March, 981 A.D.! Since the Gomatasāra was written after the erection of the image it must have been composed a few years later.

99. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA or DEVENDRA GAṆI (980), *Gomatasāra*

The work has two parts, called respectively Jīvakāṇḍa and Karmakāṇḍa. There are many editions, and both parts have been edited and translated by J. L.Jain, the first part--Jīvakāṇḍa--as Sacred Books of the Jains 5 (Lucknow 1927), our "ET1", the second part itself in two parts, the first part as Volume 6 of the Sacred Books of the Jains (Lucknow 1927) (our "ET2"), the second part as Volume 10 of the same series (Lucknow 1937 (our "ET3"). Prof. Jain's Introductions to the two volumes have been reprinted by K. B. Jindal in *An*

Epitome of Jainism (New Delhi 1987), pp. 114-186 (first published Calcutta 1957).

There is a published summary of the work by Jindal in the work just mentioned. It is very long and rather rambling, so we have provided a fresh summary here. "ET" refers to the edition and translation by J. L. Jaini, Sacred Books of the Jainas 5, Lucknow 1927. The text provided is in Prakrit; Sanskrit terms are given here to match the policy elsewhere in the present Volume.

This work features many passages where very large numbers of types of things are distinguished and often laid out at length. To try to reproduce even the lists that these passages describe would make the summary impossibly lengthy. What has been attempted is to give the reader a general idea of what is being discussed in each section (a few pages) of the work. K. B. Jindal's summary can be consulted in some instances for a kind of halfway house between what we provide here and a detailed account of all the hundreds of distinctions made in the text itself.

S. C. Ghoshal, on p. xli of the Introduction mentioned above, makes the interesting comment that Cāmuṇḍa Rāya himself is supposed to have written in Kanarese a commentary on this work that he titles *Vīramārtaṇḍī*. It is apparently now lost but its existence has been noted in Keśavavarṇī's *Vṛtti* on *Gommatasāra*.

Summary by Karl H. Potter

I. ON THE SELF (*Jīvakāṇḍa*)

INTRODUCTION

1-7 (ET1. 1-5) The topics of the 20 chapters discussed in what follows are: stages of progress (*guṇasthāna*), selves (*jīva*), states of attainment (*prāpti*), breaths (*prāṇa*), recognitions (*saṃjñā*), paths (of selves) (*mārgaṇā*), and cognitive applications (*upayoga*). The basic division is between

the paths, to which fourteen chapters are addressed, and the rest, to which one chapter each is devoted.

CHAPTER ONE

9-10 (ET1. 9) The fourteen stages of progress are set forth with their standard names.

15-16 (ET1. 12-13) False view (the first stage of progress) has five varieties: one-sided (as, e.g., Buddhists), wayward (*viparīta*, as, e.g., Brahmā), wrong (e.g., wrong belief in the Vinaya), doubtful and ignorant.

19-20 (ET1. 15) The second stage is called "downfall" because some fall back into it from right belief of Stage Four due to their right beliefs being destroyed by one of the four kinds of endlessly-binding passions.

23-24 (ET1. 18-19) Someone in Stage Three, of mixed right and wrong belief, is one who has not taken vows. Also, one dying in Stages Two or Three is bound by the length-of-life karma laid down in Stages One (or Four, if he is a backslider).

25-26 (ET1. 20) From the temporary or mixed kinds of karma of Stages Two and Three may arise (Stage Four) vowless right awarenesss, i.e., right inclinations resulting from destruction and subsidence. The process of right inclinations goes from (1) lack of right inclination (Stage One) to (2) right awarenesss that is a cause of destruction and subsidence of karma (Stage Four) to (3) that right awarenesss that is destructive of karma only (Stages Twelve-Fourteen).

27-29 (ET1. 22-23) The man of Stage Four, of right vision, believes in what has been taught by the Jina but may have not been properly taught; thus his conduct is not yet right, and he allows himself to hurt living beings.

30-31 (ET1.24-25) Stage 5, of partial vows, is a state where there is some control of the passions; he vows against killing immobile selves, is entirely devoted to Jina.

33-44 (ET1.25-34) Stage 6, of imperfect vows, is also called "negligent" (*pramāda*) because though having the

twenty-eight root-qualities, moral and of full vows, his conduct is variegated (*citra*, i.e., imperfect). Negligence is analyzed at some length, the basic division being into negligence of speech, passion, senses, sleep and attachment (*praṇaya*), which are permuted.

45-49 (ET1.36-38) There is an ordinary and an extraordinary kind of perfect vows (Stage 7). The ordinary kind is one with the qualities of Stage 6 who has overcome negligence; he falls eventually back into Stage 6. The extraordinary kind is, in addition, one who has rid himself of the four kinds of endlessly-binding passions by one of three kinds of causes of activity, the first and lower of which is termed "perfect vow". It lasts for one *antarmuhūrta*.

50-55 (ET1.39-41) Thence one arrives at the 8th Stage where one is capable of different thoughts from what one had before; thus this Stage is called one of "new thought-activity". Different selves have different degrees of purity in this stage, and it lasts again a shorter *antarmuhūrta* than the previous Stage, though the number of thoughts in this Stage is greater than in the previous. It is by these ever-increasingly quick thoughts that one in this stage is removing deluding karmas. These are called "quiescents" (*upaśamaka*). If they proceed forward they are called "annihilators" (*kṣapaka*).

56-58 (ET1.41-42) The latter attain Stage 9 of advanced thought-activity. Such selves now experience one thought per moment, needing much less fruition of though-actions than previously.

59-61 (ET1.45) When the deluding karmas have subsided and only a touch of greed is still present it is Stage 10 (slight delusion); when even that is gone it is Stage 11 (subsided delusion). (This is the highest state a quiescent can achieve, but an annihilator goes on.)

62-65 (ET1.46-48) When all deluding passions are destroyed completely one is said to be in Stage 12, of destroyed delusion. As such, he reaches the 13th Stage of omniscience; he is the highest self (*paramātman*) having

attained knowledge of a sort that does not require use of the sense-organs. When his inflows stop completely, and so his vibrations have ceased, he finally reaches Stage 14 of nonvibrating knowledge.

68-69 (ET1.50-51) These are the perfected (*siddha*) selves, free from all eight kinds of karma, completely blissful, undefiled by karmic inflow, everlasting, abiding at the summit of the universe. These qualities distinguish the Jain view of liberation from the views of other schools, viz., of Sadāśiva, Sāṃkhya, Maskarī, Bauddha, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, theists, and Mandalī.

CHAPTER TWO

72 (ET1.51) Selves are now classified into fourteen sorts, as follows: (1) subtle (*sūkṣma*) selves with one sense-organ; (2) coarse (*bādara*) selves with one sense-organ; (3) two-sensed selves; (4) three-sensed selves; (5) four-sensed selves; (6) five-sensed selves without capacity for recognition; (7) five-sensed selves with capacity for recognition. Each of these seven kinds of selves can be either capable of development (*paryāpti*) or not so developable. Thus we arrive at fourteen kinds of selves.

73 (ET1.54) This enumeration of kinds of selves is reviewed under additional aspects, yielding classifications involving larger numbers of kinds. For example: single-sensed beings may be either earth, water, fire, air or subtle (*nigoda*). Each of the five may be either "subtle", i.e., too small to see, or gross. Subtle selves may be either always subtle or sometimes gross. Again, some subtle selves are parts of bodies, others are not. Then there are, as before, the two-, three-, four- and five-sensed selves, the latter being divided now into those capable of recognition or not. And since there are some selves that are potentially developable but so far not developed--in addition to the developable in principal and the not developable in principal--the resulting enumeration of kinds of selves comprises fifty-seven kinds.

74-117 (ET1.56-82) Other features by which selves can be classified involve their birthplaces, their size, and the kinds of material of which they are comprised. These are discussed in detail. For example, some selves are found on earth, some in heaven and some in hell. Among those here on earth some are "noble" (*ārya*) and some not (*mleccha*). The type, look and source of their nature differs. They are born in different ways. (Interesting details are offered about beings residing in hells and the birth of the subtle selves.) Two-, three-, and four-sensed selves are enumerated, and their possible sizes are explained, the topic of size receiving an extensive and complicated treatment.

CHAPTER THREE

118-128 (ET1.83-89) This Chapter deals with the developability (*paryāpti*) of selves. Single-sensed selves can be embodied in a way that involves only the capacities to ingest nourishment, to have bodies and senses, and to breathe. Two- to four-sensed beings, together with the five-sensed beings incapable of recognition, have those four capacities plus the ability to make noise (though irrationally) while the rational five-sensed selves have all five qualities plus the ability to recognize things. More information on developability is given: there are a vast number of nondevelopable-in-principal selves that die almost immediately. "Potentially developable" applies to bodies who are acquiring these capacities but have not completed the project. Incomprehensible numbers of these various kinds of selves are given.

CHAPTER FOUR

129-133 (ET1.90-92) The topic of this Chapter is *prāṇa*, meaning not just "breath" but the capacity to function. There are said to be ten of them: the five senses, three powers (*balaprāṇa*) of thought, speech and the body (i.e., breath), and the capacity of one's life-span. Rational five-sensed selves have all ten of these capacities, irrational five-sensed selves

have nine (they are without thought), four-sensed down to one-sensed lack respectively one more sensory capacity each. That is for developable selves; the numbers for nondevelopable selves are different: only seven (lacking breath, speech and thought) belong to five-sensed beings, whether rational or irrational, and six for the four-sensed ones down to three for the one-sensed.

CHAPTER FIVE

134-139 (ET1.93-95) There are four kinds of recognition (*saṃjñā*): hunger, fear, sexual intercourse and appropriation. When one has arrived at the sixth stage of progress (see above) one no longer desires food, but the other three kinds of recognition still apply.

CHAPTER SIX

140-163 (ET1.95-106) What are termed "paths" here are the features of the paths being followed by all or some of those selves hitherto classified. There are fourteen such features dealt with in this and the following thirteen Chapters. The present Chapter deals with species of births (*gati*), of which there are four: in hell, animal, human and as a god. Animals fall into five subtypes: general, with five sense-organs, developable, female, and nondevelopable. Humans, all having five sense-organs, can be divided among the other four subtypes. Gods (*deva*) are divided into eight varieties depending on their special capacities. The number of selves in each of these states is calculated.

CHAPTER SEVEN

164-180 (ET1.107-113) This Chapter deals with the sense-organs. They are of two main types, as a modification (*bhāva*) (of cognition) and as substance. The former is purified cognition arising from the subsiding of awarenesss-obstructing (*karman*). The latter is a bodily feature formed by bodily karma. One-sensed selves have the tactile sense only; two-

sensed have that plus the gustatory organ; three-sensed have those plus the olfactory organ; four-sensed have those plus the visual organ; and five-sensed have those plus the auditory organ. The range of these organs is calculated. Liberated beings have no sensory awareness, but they have infinite awareness and bliss not involving the senses. The number of selves of each of the one-sensed, two-sensed, etc. sorts is calculated.

CHAPTER EIGHT

181-212 (ET1.113-127) On bodies. There are six kinds of bodies: earthy, watery, fiery, airy, vegetable and mobile. Bodies of the first four kinds can be gross (i.e., obstructive) or fine (i.e., nonobstructive). Such bodies range from very small to very large. The composition of vegetable bodies is described: they may be single and inhabited by a single self, or multiple and inhabited by a single self, and the latters' bodies may involve many atoms of the same kind or of different kinds. There is a botanical analysis of them.

Nigoda bodies can also be small or may combine to form a (larger) body in which the constituent *nigodas* are constantly dying and being born. Indeed, each such body is a whole universe in itself! Innumerable *nigoda* selves have never attained mobility, remaining *nigodas* through all (past) time.

Two- to five-sense selves are classed as mobile.

The number of the various sorts of bodies is calculated.

CHAPTER NINE

216-229 (ET1.131-137) Vibration (*yoga*) is the cause of the acquisition (*āgama*) of karmas through mental, vocal and physical activities of the maturational body of karmic products. Mental vibrations may be true, false, mixed or neutral (the last occurring in irrational beings and the nonassertive speech of rational beings). Truth is of ten kinds: conventional, idiomatic, representational, nominal, figurative, relative, practical, possible, scriptural and illustrative. Neutral

speech includes sentences of moods other than declarative (e.g., imperative, exhortative, etc.) as well as doubt. Each of the three kinds of activity is caused by a relevant kind of karma. The speech of a person in the Thirteenth Stage is not an expression of his thought; his mental activity is only a presumption on our part.

230-243 (ET1.137-143) It is only animals and men that have material bodies. The material body vibrates. (The other two kinds of beings) have fluid bodies (*vaikriyaka kāya*).

Beings in the Sixth Stage develop a procuring body through which one can proceed to places, perhaps far afield, where he can consult scriptures or find an omniscient knower, ask questions, etc., and revitalize his faith.

244-270 (ET1.143-157) Body-making karmas (or karmic helpers, *nokarma*) are of four kinds: that pertinent to making of the physical body (*aurālika*), the fluid body (*vaigūrvika*), the procuring body, and the body of light (*taijasa*, lit., "fiery", body). A human being has these plus his karmic body proper (at every moment). Molecules (*vargaṇā*) of these five kinds of bodily atoms (together with those of vocal and mental molecules) comprise a self's body at any moment Each of these bodies comprises a mass of atomic components. The sizes of bodies, and the numbers of atoms in the various kinds of molecules is addressed. At each moment atoms of karma and karmic helpers flow into a self's body, and at the same time a few such are released. So at the moment of a being's death his atoms have the highest vibrations, especially atoms relating to the following features: its state of being (i.e., animal, human, etc.), age (i.e., length of life at that moment), vibration, bondage-breeders (*saṃkleśa*), decrease and increase of duration of life. This is spelled out in detail for each kind of body and each state of being, yielding an account of the life-expectancy of every being.

CHAPTER TEN

271-281 (ET1.157-161) The topic of this Chapter is

gender, of which there are three: male, female and neuter (*ṣaṇḍa, napuṃśakạ*). Among other interesting bits of information we are told that every male god has at least thirty-two celestial wives.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

282-298 (ET161-173) On the passions. They are four in number: anger, pride, deceit and greed. They are classified according to intensity (*śakti*), "coloring" and duration (*āyu*).

CHAPTER TWELVE

299-440 (ET` 1.175-230) Awarenesses, the topic of this Chapter, of the correct sort have five varieties: immediate and verbal awarenesses, extrasensory, telepathic and perfect awarenesses. Incorrect awarenesses are of three sorts corresponding to the first three correct ones; however, wrong perception is found only in rational five-sensed beings. As one progresses through the Stages one moves from error to mixed error and truth of a perceptual sort to truths of the verbal and extrasensory sorts. Telepathy is found only in Stages Six and above, and perfect knowledge only in the last two Stages.

Immediate awareness is explained, being understood as either indistinct, directed, determinative or concentrated. Perception includes both immediate sensory awareness (*vyañjana*) and awareness of objects not present to the senses (*artha*). We are told that perception is possible of whole objects when only a part is present to the senses.

Verbal awareness may involve language or not. The latter kind is the awareness of one thing on the basis of another (thus, inference, although the term does not appear here).

Extrasensory awareness is free from knowledge-obscuring karma, and is found in *nigodas* when first born. How it increases in more complex beings is explained at length, an explanation involving reference to some very large numbers, and the analysis is extended to include features of

the previous two types of awareness as well.

Coming back to the initial type of awareness, viz., immediate, further classifications are provided in terms of such awarenesses' being restricted in topic, spatial extent and temporal duration, and in their conditions. Visual awarenesses may be produced by one's state (*bhava*), i.e., whether one is a god, hell-being, etc., or by one's good or bad qualities, i.e., from the arising and subsiding of karmic traces. The former kind of visual awareness is necessarily partial and may be born of qualities; full visual awareness is always born of merit. Visual awarenesses cognize collections of material molecules acquired by the vibration of the self.

The smallest possible visible thing is what is seen by a *nigoda* in the third instant of its birth. We cannot estimate the largest possible thing. There follows a long and complex mathematical analysis of the sizes of visible things.

441-464 (ET1.230-238) Through simple telepathic awareness one can cognize past, present and future objects thought of by any one present. A more complex sort provides awareness of that has been thought of by anyone at all in the past or in the future. Telepathic awareness is possible when there is destruction of knowledge-obscuring karma in the material internal organ (*dravyamanas*), which is produced in the heart by an aggregation (*skhandana*) of mental molecules (*manovargaṇa*). This is called the senses' helper (*no indriya*) since it is not manifested as the other (external sense-) organs are. "Simple" telepathic awareness arises depending on the senses, these senses' helpers, and/or the vibratory (mental, vocal or bodily) activity (of the self). "Complex" telepathy does not depend on these, and is clearer; when extended, it leads to omniscience.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

465-481 (ET1.238-245) Restraint (*saṃyama*) includes observing vows, carefulness, subduing passions, renouncing all activities of body, speech and mind, and conquering the five

senses. It is what is worked on in the sixth-twelfth Stages of progress. The specific Stage at which each is mastered is outlined.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

482-488 (ET1.245-247) The topic of this Chapter is vision, described as the cognition of something not knowing what kind of thing it is. It can be visual or experienced through the other four senses or the internal organ.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

489-556 (ET1.1247-280) On the "colorings" of material things. A "coloring" is the vibration (of a self) "colored" by the arising of (a) passion. There are six kinds of colorings--black, blue, grey, yellow, pink and white. The colorings of bodies are a function of the colorings of their constituent molecules. Thus, hell-beings are black, watery-bodied selves are white, fiery-bodied yellow, air-bodied are variously colored depending on their respective spheres. All subtle things are grey. Transmigrating beings are white. Bodies of mixed colors are grey.

Bad places (places breeding bad passions) are black, blue and grey; good places are yellow, pink and white. There are more bad than good places. Change of color is of two sorts--increase or decrease, and replacement of one color by another. Colorings influence actions: six lost and hungry men will find six different ways of getting sustenance from a tree found in the forest. Each coloring indicates certain personality-types. E.g., a black coloring indicates an angry, wicked, stupid, etc., person, whereas a blue coloring indicates someone who is slow, deceitful and mercenary. A pink coloring indicates a person who is open, kind, patient and devoted.

The balance of one's colorings influences one's age-karma--i.e., one's length of life in the birth to come--at specified points during the last part of a lifetime. Colorings also help determine where one will be reborn in the next life,

whether as a god in *sarvārthasiddhi* (mostly white), lower heavens, (somewhat white), other heavens (predominantly pink or yellow), whereas those with maximum black go to the lowest hell, etc. Thus one can make certain generalizations about subsequent births, e.g., that one- to four-sensed beings, who are predominantly black, blue or gray, do not get reborn into hell or heaven, etc. The balance of colorings of various gods are described.

Other topics pertaining to the colorings are addressed, including the kinds of karma that cause colorings in each of the stages, the number of selves having predominantly each of the colorings, the spatial and temporal locations of the selves of each coloring.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

557-560 (ET1.280-281) Selves can be divided into those that are capable of liberation (*bhavya*), those which are not (*abhavya*), and those that are already liberated.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

561-620 (ET1.283-305) There are six substances, five collections, nine categories. One should learn which they are.

The six substances are discussed under seven topical headings, as follows:

(1) By name. Substances are either selves or nonliving matter. A self is either material (*rūpin*)--transmigrating selves--or immaterial--liberated selves. Karmic products (*pudgala*) are material nonliving matter; initiators of movement, initiators of stasis, space and time are immaterial and nonliving.

(2) By defining marks: The features of things of each of these categories is detailed.

(3) By duration: all six types of substances are of unlimited duration.

(4) By location: All except space exist in the universe (*loka*). Initiators of movement and of rest are all-pervading. A self can contract to atomic size or expand to the size of the

universe. Substances may be of any size from atomic up to universal. The universe is entirely filled with the six substances.

(5) By numbers: There are infinitely many selves, and the number of karmic products is infinite times that number. There is only one initiator of movement, one initiator of stasis and one space. There are as many times as there are places (*pradeśa*). A "place" is the space occupied by an atom.

(6) By kinds or states (*sthāna*). Immaterial substances are stable (*acala*) as well as their parts. Material selves fluctuate (*cala*) and some of their parts do too. Material substances fluctuate, but some of the atoms fluctuate and some do not. Twenty-three kinds of molecules (*vargaṇā*): atomic, countable, uncountable, infinitely-numbered, assimilative, ungrasped, fiery, (another) ungrasped (?), mental, (still another) ungrasped (?), karmic, stable, within and not within, empty, having a single body, stably empty, gross *nigoda*, (another) empty (?), subtle *nigoda*, spherical, large. These are listed in order of increasing size.

(7) By result. How substances combine. Some are smooth, some rough, and rough atoms combine with smooth ones but not with their own kind.

621-659 (ET1.306-321) The nine categories are: selves, nonselves, merit, demerit, inflow, cessation of inflow, cleansing (of traces), bondage and liberation. Meritorious selves are those of right vision and vows. Demeritorious are those with wrong beliefs, and are infinite in number. The numbers of those with good and bad vows are each calculated, along with calculations of other classes of selves.

Destructive right inclination destroys the causes of annihilation of all karmic traces. Its accomplisher is someone who begins his studies with someone of knowledge. The five attainments involved are from, first, the state of destruction and subsidence, then purity, instruction, competence and efficiency in arriving at the truth, the last being attained only at liberation. Right awareness may arise in one in any of the

four stages provided one is capable of recognition and development, pure, attentive and has gained efficiency. Right awareness is possible to attain even after one's age-karma in the next life has been bound; however, only those destined to become gods acquire the subsidiary and great vows.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

660-663 (ET1.322-323) To be capable of recognition is to achieve destruction and subsidence of the mental-covering karma (*no indriya-āvaraṇa*). One who learns to discriminate what should be done from what shouldn't be done and to be able to discriminate reality from illusion, is called "capable of learning" (*saṃjñin*).

CHAPTER NINETEEN

664-671 (ET1.323-325) The path of assimilation is the acquisition of mental-covering molecules of body, speech and mind. Nonassimilating selves are those in the course of transmigration and knowledge. All the rest of the selves are assimilative.

When a self leaves his basic body and goes out with his karmic and fiery bodies it is called "overflow" (*samudghāta*). Overflows are of seven kinds: feelings, passions, transformations, dying, fiery are among the overflows.

CHAPTER TWENTY

672-676 (ET1.326-327) Cognitive application is of two kinds, involving form (*sākāra*) and not involving form (*nirākāra*). The five kinds of true awareness and the three kinds of false awareness is cognition involving form. Cognitions without form are visions of the first four kinds (of awareness.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

677-705 (ET1.327-337) The class, attainment, breath, recognition, path and recognition attained by each of the

stages of progress are specified.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

706-734 (ET1.338-347) A few random topics are attended to.

PART TWO: KARMAKĀṆḌA

CHAPTER ONE

1-35 (ET2.1-20) Through application one or more units of bondage are expunged at each moment. Karma can be viewed as material or as modifications (of cognitive application). Material karma can be classed as of eight kinds: (1) perfect-awareness-obscuring (*kevalāvaraṇa*), (2) vision-obscuring (*darśanāvaraṇa*), (3) feeling-producing (*vedanīya*), (4) deluding (*mohanīya*), (5) length of life determining (*āyuṣka*), (6) type- (lit., "name"-) determining (*nāma*), (7) lineage-determining (*gotra*) and (8) hindering karma. (1), (2), (4) and (8) are destructive (*ghāṭīya*); the rest are nondestructive. Hindering karma is numbered as (8) because, though it is destructive, it cannot destroy one fully and operates through (3), (5) and (6).

36-51 (ET2.21-28) The karmic products or molecules associated with a self at any point in time can be divided into those in operation (*udaya*) and those in attendance (*sattā*). There are a total of 148 different varieties of attendant karmic molecules. The broad divisions are between completely destructive (perfect-awareness-obscuring, vision-obscuring passions), partially destructive (awareness-obscuring, vision-obscuring, conduct-obscuring, passions' helpers, obstructing), and meritorious (classified into different birth-species). The numbers of kinds of such karmas are calculated in various ways, e.g., in terms of their persistence; whether they pertain to the body, length of life, type of feeling,

52-86 (ET2.28-40) Karma can be located in four ways: by name, by representation, privatively and positively. "By

name", i.e., various synonyms for "karma" such as *prakṛti*, *pāpa*, *mala*, etc. "By representation", i.e., in whom it occurs. "Privatively", i.e., of two major kinds: of substance, *āgama-* and *no-āgama*. The first kind comprises those who know the scriptures but do not apply their knowledge. The second kind is of three sorts: past, future and neither. Three kinds of past bodies are: a body that has lived its allotted life-span, a body cut off by premature death through sickness, accident, etc., and the body of one who has renounced through starvation or through failure to help oneself or be helped by others. Karma located "positively" is of two varieties: karma proper and karmic helpers.

Karmic helpers are of eight varieties corresponding to the eight basic kinds of karma. E.g., the karmic helper of (1) knowledge-obscuring karma is termed a "curtain" (*paṭa*) as if thrown across cognition. The karmic helper in such cases distracts the cognizer from the pertinent kind of attention. There is no karmic helper for perfect knowledge. Karmic helpers also contribute to the different stages of sleep, good or bad food, the contents of true and false beliefs, right and wrong passions, the sex of one's body, and they play a part in practically all karmic results.

CHAPTER TWO

87-126 (ET2.40-70) There are four aspects of bondage: its material (*prakṛti*), duration (*sthiti*), intensity of fruition (*anubhāga*) and number of atomic constituents (*pradeśa*). That is, in each Stage one may have karmas representing these four kinds of bonds and in differing amounts. Examples are given of which Stages characteristically feature which kinds of karma, and a Stage-by-Stage analysis is provided of which sorts of bonds cease in which Stage. E.g., in the Second Stage one's tendency to sleepwalk, speak harshly, move awkwardly, be female, etc. cease. By the time one gets to the Sixth Stage various kinds of unwanted feelings such as pain, sorrow, laziness cease. The analysis covers all fourteen Stages. This is

followed by an account of what features are found in the various hells, in animals of various levels of advancement as well as in the gods.

127-162 (E2.71-90) Next, we are told what the maximum and minimum duration is of each of the kinds of karma, both in terms of which kind of karma it is and the kind of being--animal, human, god--that has it.

163-184 (ET2.91-103) It is explained what intensity--maximum and minimum--the fruition of different varieties of karma will involve for beings in hells to those in heavens.

185-217 (ET2.104-125) Molecules can be classed as (a) those which are of the smallest-sized body versus those which are larger, (b) those which are fit to become karma versus those which aren't, (c) those which are not bound to any self and those that are or both. Each molecule has the qualities of color, taste, smell and certain tangible qualities. The largest proportion of constituent karmic elements are those that determine feelings. Other aspects determined by karmas include delusion, obscuration of knowledge and of effort, obstruction to activity, determination of one's station and/or family, of one's kind of embodiment, and of one's natural age-length. The karmas responsible for these can be arranged in terms of their numbers.

Knowledge-obscuring karma can be distinguished according to which of the five kinds of knowledge (viz., immediate, scriptural, etc.) is obscured. Some karmas obscure totally, others only partially.

218-256 (ET2.127-148) The kinds and amounts of the vibrations (*yogasthāna*) are classified. There are three kinds: relating to birth, to growth and to change. Each of the three has fourteen kinds corresponding to the fourteen Stages of progress. And in amounts they range from minimum through medium to maximum. E.g., a birth-vibration lasts only one moment. By "change" is meant the change in bodily characteristics one has from the point his body is developed until death, during which there is maximum change. The

period between birth and that point is what is referred to here as "growth". Such changes of vibrations are classified using a special technical vocabulary.

257-357 (ET2.148-227) Matter (*prakṛti*) and the number of space-points (*pradeśa*) that are bound to a self are determined by vibrations (*yoga*); the duration and intensity are determined by passions. Beyond the Tenth Stage and short of the Fourteenth, the passions having subsided, there is no duration-bondage, and in the Fourteenth there is no bondage at all. How vibrations work and cease in the various Stages is discussed at length.

358-397 (ET2.227-255) Just which kinds of beings belong to which classes of beings generated by the foregoing classifications is now summarily set forth.

CHAPTER FOUR

398-407 (ET3.1-8) This Chapter answers nine questions concerning karma.

1-3. Some karmic traces continue to bind (i.e., to lay down karmic products) even after one is no longer bound by them, others cease before, and still others cease simultaneously with the bondage. Which are which is explained in 400-403.

4-6. Eleven kinds of karmic traces are nonbinding. E.g., the traces of one in a heaven or a hell do not bind a god to rebirth in a heaven or a being in a hell to another birth in hell. Twenty-seven kinds of karmic traces are binding only at certain stages; e.g., fourteen destructive traces, though operative up to the twelfth Stage, are binding only up to the Tenth stage.

7-9. Forty-seven kinds of karmic traces go on binding continuously until achievement of the Stage of advancement where they are no longer binding at all. On the other hand, others are binding sometimes but not at all times.

408-435 (ET3.11-27) Some kinds of karmic traces can transfer (the process is called *saṃkramaṇa*) from one self to

another, though traces of one main class (such as knowledge-obscuring, etc.) cannot transfer to another such class. There are other limitations and exceptions to this rule. Transference is classified according to the features of those involved in the transfer. 416-450 (ET3.28-35) A trace belonging to each of ten kinds of karmic traces undergoes the following processes: (1) binding, i.e., connection with another trace, (2) increase of duration or results, (3) transference, just mentioned, (4) decrease of duration/result of traces already laid down, (5) enhancement, operation out of the karma's scheduled time to do so, (6) remaining but for the time being inoperative, (7) operating, i.e., bringing about their results, (8) delay in the time at which a trace operates, (9) capable of increasing or decreasing their duration and/or results, and (10) incapable of duration or result. Illustrations are provided.

CHAPTER FIVE

451-784 (ET3.36-289) Calculation of the number of classes and subclasses of the points at which the varying types of binding occur.

CHAPTER SIX

785-810 (ET3.289-321) The causes of inflow of karma include false thinking, vowlessness, passions and vibrations, classified in various ways. Five kinds of erroneous thinking: one-sided, contrary to fact, doubting, prejudiced and guessing. Twelve kinds of vowlessness: failure to control the five senses and the internal organ, noncompassionateness of each of the five kinds of immobile as well as of mobile things. Twenty-five sorts of passions: four kinds each of the four major passions, viz., anger, pride, deceit and greed, plus nine minor passions: laughter, sorrow, indulgence, ennui, fear, disgust, female, male and neuter sex inclinations. Fifteen kinds of vibrations: four relating to the mind, four to speech, and seven to the body.[110]

CHAPTER SEVEN

811-895 (ET3.322-384) On the modifications of cognitive application. There are five kinds of these: subsiding (*aupaśamika*), destructive (*kṣayika*), mixed (*miśra*), operative (lit., arising, *audayika*) and natural (*pariṇāmika*). "Subsiding", i.e., when a trace's activity subsides, "destructive", when it is destroyed, "operative" when it is bearing its fruit, and "natural" otherwise, i.e., when none of the other four apply. The production of right awareness and conduct are the two kinds of subsidence; the production of one of nine kinds of destruction of karmic residues including, e.g., knowledge, conduct charity, acquisition, experiencing, re-experiencing and power, constitute the kinds of destructive applications. Operative applications are of twenty-one kinds: the courses, sex, passions, errors, colorings, not being liberated, lack of restraint, and ignorance. Natural applications include being a self, being worthy of liberation or not. Thoughts occurring at an instant may be single thoughts, thoughts of one sort combined with those of another, or (the reverse) of consistent sorts. These fifty-three kinds are then distributed among the fourteen spiritual Stages.

CHAPTER EIGHT

896-912 (ET3.385-394) Three ways of thinking of that which destroys deluding karma: as initial (*adhas*), new (*apūrva*) or advanced (*anivṛta*). The classification is in terms of how long it takes to achieve each way of thinking.

CHAPTER NINE

913-972 (ET3.395-426) "In Chapter IX is discussed the quantity of karmic particles, in their molecular groups, at each instant. These quantities are constantly varying, but in a fixed ratio, amenable to calculation, although the calculation is very minute and subtle, brain-racking to the beginner, but graspingly fascinating to the scholar, the thinker, the saint lost

in raptures of meditation." (E, p. 395)

100. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA, *Labdhisāra*

In the publication by Prof. L. C. Jain, *The Labdhisāra of Nemicandra Siddhānta Cakravarti*, Volume I (Jabalpur 1994), the author promises a full edition and translation in forthcoming publications (not yet seen), and provides an account of the subject-matter of the work at pp. 99-107, from which we draw in what follows. Prof. Jain's technical terms are replaced by those used in this Volume, and some necessary grammatical changes are occasioned thereby.

Summary based on that of L. C. Jain

"...(B)ond (*bandha*), state (*sattva*), operation (*udaya*), premature operation (*udīraṇā*), rising (*utkarṣaṇa*), falling (*apakarṣaṇa*), transference (*saṃkramaṇa*), quiescence (*upaśama*), reservation (*nidhatti*), preservation (*nikācana*), are the ten operational conditions (*karaṇa*)."

"There happens to be relation between the self and the new substances transformed into forms of karma. This is of four kinds, called bonds (*bandha*): material (*prakṛti*), space-point (*pradeśa*), duration (*sthiti*) and intensity of fruition."

"The transformation of matter (*pudgala*) in (the) form of functional molecules (*karmāṇa vārgaṇa*) fit to become form(s) of karma, into original or suboriginal forms of matter is the material bond, i.e., knowledge-obstructing, etc. The measured number of the transformed material, ultimate particles or atoms (*paramāṇu*) into material forms is the constituent-bond...Such is the measure of the instant-effective bond (*samayaprabaddha*). This lies between the minimal and the maximal depending on the decrease or increase in the measure of vibration. The instant-effective bond, taken as inflow at an instant (*samaya*), gets transformed into material particles in accordance with certain rules of distribution."

"Whatever atoms are bound in forms of matter the measure of their duration for which they remain in bond with the self for that period is called duration bond. After a certain well-defined time-lag period (*ābādhakāla*) there is rise of bound atoms in cells (*niśeka*) corresponding to every passing instant, there being no cell-structure in the case of the time-lag period. This process goes on from the first instant up to the last instant of the duration bond excluding the time-lag period...A cell at the lowest end of the inflow column has a duration of one instant after which it rises and decays. Similarly, the upper cells have durations of two, three, four and so on instants. Hence, they rise one by one after having descended the various columns, rise and decay after fruition of energy. The life-time of the last cell is the measure of the whole duration of the corresponding inflow...Such is the rule for all the seven originating karmas, age karma being excluded out of the eight. Duration is not counted in application to the age karma, because its duration lapses during the previous birth."

"The mathematical structure of the matrix of the cells is defined through the measure of the number of particles bound at an instant, their various life-time qualitative regressions (*guṇahāni*), mutual product-set (*anyonyābhyasta rāśi*), and cell-dividers."

"The karmic particles carry energy which is powerful enough to screen the knowledge and so on of the selves, less or more, specifically during the period of the rise of the particles. Such binding of energy is called the energy-bond. There happen to be various types of energy among the atoms bound at an instant, corresponding to the material thing. The structure of energy of karma is detailed as below."

"The indivisible part of energy is called an indivisible-corresponding-section (*avibhāgī praticcheda)*. The ultimate particle of matter (*pudgala*) associated with an assemblage of indivisible-corresponding-sections is called a variant (*varga*). The class of variants having the same number of indivisible-

corresponding-sections is called a molecule (*vargaṇā*). Assembly of molecules each of which has one more indivisible-corresponding-section than that of the minimal molecule is called second-molecule (*dvitīya vargaṇā*). In this sequence, molecules in assembly form molecules on and on increasing in an arithmetical progression...This goes to form a minimal-supermolecule (*jaghanya spardhaka*). The assembly of molecules associated with twice the number of indivisible-corresponding-sections than that of the minimal molecule is the first-variant of the second supermolecule. Similarly, the variants of the first molecule of the third, fourth, etc., supermolecules have associated with them three, four, times, etc., indivisible-corresponding-sections than those of the assembly of the variants of the first-molecule of a minimal-supermolecule."

"Here the measure of all ultimate particles is substance, lit., something that flows (*dravya*). In the karma matrix the first, second, etc. supermolecules are called the lower ones, while the later ones are called the upper ones. Corresponding to these the measure of the ultimate particles goes on decreasing, whereas the measure of the energy goes on increasing from (the) lower to the upper ones. So far the description of the karmic bondage."

"Further, the karmic particles, bound at several instants, at an arbitrary instant have an existence associated with the self, and this is called (their) state (*sattva*). This is of four kinds: substantial state, durational state, energy state, and particle state...Similarly, when the karmic particles tend to impart their fruits at the proper period they are said to rise. This is also of four types: substantial rising, particle rising, durational rising and energy-rising...Similar details are given about karma which rise prematurely. A cell lying in a trail (*avalli*) and fit to rise from its first instant to its last one is said to be on the rising trail. Those which lie out(side) of this are on the external rising trail mixed in the cells of the rising trail below it. These are the prematurely rising."

"Increase of duration or energy is called rising (*utkarṣaṇa*). In the karma matrix this is effected by transporting the lower ultimate particles upwards. Similarly, when it is required to go down (*apakarṣaṇa*) the opposite process is adopted."

"When secondary substance gets changed into another, the phenomenon is called transference (*saṃkramaṇa*). Corresponding to the transition there are five types of transferrers called: perturbation (*udvelana*), statutory (*vidhāyata*), low-tended (*adhaḥ pravṛtta*), geometric-transfer (*guṇa saṃkramaṇa*) and complete transfer (*sarva saṃkramaṇa*)."

"The atoms out of the rising trail and unfit for being in the rising trail are called quiescent substances (*upaśānta dravya*). The operation of quiescence is found in all matter. This is to be differentiated from the subsidence modification (*upaśānta bhāva*)."

"The atoms of an arbitrary piece of substance may be such that they can neither transfer nor are they fit for being brought in to the rising trail. They are called reservation-operation-substances (*nidhatti karaṇa dravya*). In addition to the above condition when they could neither rise nor fall they are called preservation-substance (*nikācana dravya*). In this way the ten operations are described in the *Gommatasāra*."

"In the *Labdhisāra* (Essence of Attainment) this theory is applied for attaining the path of optimization, which is said to be achieved through impeding and annihilating karmas as a consequence of reduction in bond and state. Here this phenomenon is related with the attainment of vision and disposition. Thus the annihilation of four types of bond is described in the following sequence:-"

"The life-time-bond is a function of passions. Hence the life-time-bond decreases as illusions, passions decrease. Sequential reduction of the life-time-bond is called life-time-bond-regression. Through such manner of reduction in sequence, at the instant of its termination, there occurs

minimal-life-time-bond. Afterwards there is annihilation of life-time-bond. This sequence occurs with regard to all types of materiality (*prakṛti*) except age. Hence the life-time-bond of three types of age (exclusive of that of hell), is large owing to elevation (*viśuddhi*). Similarly, the life-time-bond of all other gracious and non-gracious configurations is greater owing to depression, but smaller owing to elevation phases (*bhāva*)."

"Now the energy-bond of bad material things is greater owing to depression and it is smaller owing to elevation. Thus, the energy-bond increases or decreases in sequence with infinite common ratio. However, in spite of a greater amount of energy-bond of good material things, the self is not affected badly, as to live in the world is according to one's life-time-bond. The soul is affected badly owing to destructive karmas, hence they are bad. Hence, owing to attainment of vision-character, there is excess of energy-bond of good material things. When there is annihilation or absence of passions, there is complete absence of energy-bond. From the above, the law of cessation of inflow follows."

"The atoms of cells of a state disintegrate one by one, instant by instant after rising. Further, owing to the same field, the atoms of upper cells transform to become lower cells. Thus instant by instant there is disintegration of instant-effective-bonds in excess, that is, there is disintegration of many instant-effective-bonds. As there is bonding of instant-effective-bonds, one by one, hence there is ample disintegration and thus a small amount of bonding. Sometimes there is no bonding and there is only disintegration. In this way after destruction of all karmic atoms there comes about complete annihilation of atomic constituents (*pradeśa sattva*)."

"Ordinarily, duration reduces instant by instant. But owing to the field of the vision-character attainment this reduction of duration happens to be according to the law of the split duration (*sthitikāṇḍaka* and as *per* the law of the fallen (*apakṛṣṭa*). First we relate the law of split duration."

"There is a great amount of duration. There is a state of

many cells fit to rise instant after instant. In it several of the upper cells are destroyed, reducing the duration of life. After such a destruction a series of cells above is excluded, and there is injection of cells into all other cells. The injection is made up to the inter-*muhūrta* period, and atoms are introduced into the lower cells. For all the remaining atoms remaining at the last instant, as they enter into the lower cells of that duration there is annihilation of the cells fit for being annihilated. Then, whatever the amount of cells that endure, there is annihilation of the cells fit for being annihilated. Then, whatever is the amount of cells destroyed, that much of their duration gets reduced there. The law of the fallen is as follows:"

"When the state of all atoms corresponding to all the cells of an arbitrarily chosen piece of material is destroyed (*bhāgahāra*) by falling, then one part thereof, (the) set of atoms, is called fallen substance. Out of that fallen substance some atoms are mixed into a rising row (*udayāvali*), some undergo destruction of their qualities (*guṇahāni*), and the remaining are mixed into a future (*uparitana*) duration. To these, from present instant to the instants of such a row, correspond the cells called the rising row. Into those cells the substance fit for being given into the rising row is mixed, cell after cell, in a sequence of being reduced by common difference, one by one. The cells corresponding to the instants lying within the *muhūrta* lying above the rising row of cells, are named after the length of their destroyed qualities. Into those cells the substance fit to be given into the rising row is mixed, cell after cell, in innumerable sequence. The cells destined to persist during the remaining time lying above those are called the future duration. The substance fit for being given into future duration is mixed in other cells in the sequence of reducing common difference *per* cell through the structure of various geometric regressions."

"Some of the fallen substance is mixed in geometrical sequence in innumerable common ratio into the cells

corresponding to the initial instant up to the length of their future duration. The remaining are mixed into the future life, hence the rising row is included in their future duration. Hence the denomination. Many cells at the end of this time of duration are called top quality; it may contain in some cases only one cells at the end. Here by the law of the disintegration the geometric progression is to be known."

"According to the law of law of "split" (*kāṇḍaka*) the reduction of the duration of life is from the beginning on annihilation of some future-controlling cells. According to the law of subsequence (*anukṛṣṭi*) the life-time of only some atoms of the future-controlling cells is reduced and there is no annihilation of future-controlling cells from the beginning. When there remains a trail in a life-time its name is fragment-trail (*ucchiṣṭa āvali*), in which there is no premature rise, etc. There is also the function of decay of the subsequent cells. At the lapse of such a fragment-trail there is complete annihilation of the duration of life."

"In the structure of the supermolecules the lower ones are associated with small energy and the future ones with great energy. There happens to be reduction of energy of bad material owing to attainment of vision. Here also the same law of split is stated as follows:"

"After annihilating many supermolecules associated with high energy, the atoms therein are mixed into the lower supermolecules in a sequence. That is how there is reduction of intensity of fruition. The period in which there is completed the destruction of intensity of fruition is less than forty-eight minutes. During this period, having taken the atoms of supermolecules fit for annihilation, mixing is to be effected into all such supermolecules which have exhausted their frution in the past..."

101. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA, *Kṣapaṇasāra*

S. C. Ghoshal, *op. cit.*, comments "(It) treats of *bandha*,

kaṣāya, leśya, etc., and lays down the means by which *kaṣāyas* may be removed. *Kṣapaṇa* literally means 'destruction'...This work may be considered to be a continuation of *Labdhisāra...*" Ghoshal reports it to consist of 270 verses. Ghoshal is basing his comments on a manuscript contained in the Central Jaina Oriental Library in Arrah. It has apparently not been published.

102. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA, *Trilokasāra*

Another work by this author that is apparently not available in print but contained in the Library at Arrah. Ghoshal (*ibid.*, pp. xlii-xliii) says "(It) contains a description of the three *lokas* (regions of the universe), with oceans, mountains, etc., together with a description of the abodes of heavenly beings and the inmates of hell. The stars and planets, with their orbits, are described, and there is mention of how night and day are caused by the motion of the earth. Besides these, there are other subjects, such as the various kinds of measurements, methods of reckoning, etc."

103. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA, *Traivārikācāra*

NCat VIII, 281 indicates that manuscripts. of this work are available in Moodbidri II (cited above), p. 78; that five manuscripts, one with 19 *paricchedas,* are listed in the *Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Government Oriental Library* (Mysore 1922), p. 55; and in A Hand-List of 407 Manuscripts in the Śrīmaccārukīrti Paṇḍitācārya Jaina Bhaṇḍāra at Śrāvaṇabelgola, Mysore State 164 (a). Cf. L. C. Jain's article at D.J.Institute of Cosmographic Research, Hastinapur, Meerut, India, pp. 250-404 for material.

104. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA, *Tribhaṅgīsāra*

NCat VIII, 256, which cites a number of Libraries as holding mss. of this work. Cf. L. C. Jain, cited above.

105. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA, *Dravyasaṃgraha*

"ET" is the Prakrit edition and English translation found in S. C. Ghoshal's publication, Volume One of the Sacred Books of the Jainas, Arrah 1917.

1. (ET1) Salutation.

2. (ET2) A self is defined as capable of cognitive application, immaterial, an agent and enjoyer, having the size of its body, subject to rebirth and naturally moving upward.

3. (ET7) From the commensensical viewpoint a self possesses senses, force (*bala*), length of life and respiration in the past, present and future. From the higher viewpoint a self is that which possesses consciousness.

4. (ET8-9) Cognitive application (*upayoga*) is of two kinds: vision (*darśana*) and awareness (*jñāna*). Vision is (fourfold, viz.,) visual, nonvisual, extrasensory or complete.

5. (ET10-11) Awareness is (eightfold, viz.,) immediate (true and false), verbal (true and false), extrasensory (true and false), telepathy and complete. Or (it can be divided) into direct (*pratyakṣa*) and indirect (*parokṣa*).

6 (ET20) From the commonsensical viewpoint a self may have all eight (kinds of awareness), but from the higher standpoint a self is by nature just pure vision and awareness.

7. (ET22) From the higher standpoint a self is formless, not having sensory qualities. According to commonsense it is material when bound.

8 (ET24) Commonsensically a self has karmic products; from the higher standpoint it is the subject of thoughts; from the pure (*śuddha*) standpoint it (undergoes) pure modifications.

9 (ET27) Commonsensially a self experiences frustration

and satisfaction, the results of karmic products. From the higher standpoint it has thought-modifications only.

10 (ET28) Commonsensically the self is without overflow (*samudghāta*) and occupies spaces the size of its body through contraction and expansion. From the higher standpoint it occupies countless space-points

11 (ET31) Static (*sthāvara*) selves in earth, water, light (or fire), air (or wind) and plants possess one sense-organ only. Mobile (*trasa*) selves have more than one sense-organ.

12 (ET33) Selves with five sense-organs either have minds or lack them. None with a less number of organs have minds. Single-sensed selves are either coarse (*bādara*) or subtle (*sūkṣma*), and each kind has two varieties, developed (*paryāpta*) and otherwise

13 (ET36) On the commonsense view selves subject to rebirth are of fourteen kinds depending on their path (*mārganā*) and stage of progress. From the higher standpoint all selves are to thought of as pure.

14 (ET42) Liberated (*siddha*) selves are free of karma. They have eight qualities, (a body) slightly less in size than its final embodiment, they are eternal subject to the rising and falling (of modifications), and they reside at the summit.

15 (ET44) What is not self is (one of five categories:) karmic product, initiator of movement, initiator of stasis, space and time. Karmic products possess qualities such as form (*rūpa*), etc.; the others are formless.

16 (ET47) Modes of karmic products include: sounds, bonds, subtlety, grossness, shape, difference, darkness and shadow, luster, heat

17 (ET52) As water helps fish to move, the initiator of movement helps karmic products and selves to move. But it doesn't move the immobile.

18 (ET54) As a shadow helps a traveller (to rest), the initiator of stasis helps karmic products and selves to come to a stop. But it doesn't (itself) stop something moving.

19. (ET56) That which makes room for selves (etc.) is

space. It is worldly or nonworldly.

20. (ET58) Worldly space is where initiators of movement, initiators of stasis, time, karmic products and selves exist. What is other than that is not worldly space.

21 (ET59-60) Ordinary time (*vyavahāra kāla*) helps produce change in substances and is known from transformations. Ultimately real time (*pāramārthika kāla*) is characterized by persistence.

22 (ET62) Countless substances each occupy a particular space-point of worldly space, like a row of jewels.

23-24. (ET63) So these substances are of six kinds--selves and five kinds of not-self. Five of them, excluding time, are called *astikāya* because they exist (*asti*) and have many space-points, like bodies (*kāya*),

25 (ET66) The space-points in each self and in initiators of movement and initiators of stasis are uncountable, in space they are countless, and in karmic products they may be countable, uncountable or countless. Time has one space-point, which is why it is not termed a "body".

26 (ET68-69) One atom of a karmic product combines with others to form molecules, which the omniscient consider "body".

27 (ET70) A "space-point" is the dimension of one atom, but it is capable of being occupied by all.

28 (ET70-71) We now specify the selves and not-selves comprising inflow, bond, cessation of inflow, cleansing of traces (*nirjarā*), and liberation (*mokṣa*), along with merit (*puṇya*) and demerit (*pāpa*).

29 (ET71) The transformation of the self bringing on karmic inflow is called *bhāvāsrava* by the Jina, whereas the inflow itself is called *karmāsrava* or *dravyāsrava*.

30 (ET74) Varieties of the first (i.e., *bhāvāsrava*) include that arising from falsity (of belief), from indiscipline, from negligence, from activity and from anger, and each in turn has several varieties.

31 (ET79) The Jina said that *dravyāsrava* causes

obstructions of awareness, etc. and has many varieties.

32 (ET80) That by which karma is bound to the self is called *bhāvabandha*, whereas the mutual penetration of space-points of karma and the self is *dravyabandha*.

33 (ET81-82) (Karmic) bonds may be classed under four rubrics: as to their nature (as awareness-obstructing, etc.), as to their duration (i.e., the time before the karma is worked out), as to intensity, and as to size (the number of space-points involved). The nature and size derive from the kind of act performed, while the time and intensity are due to the passion involved.

34 (ET84) That transformation of consciousness creating cessation of the first kind of inflow is called *bhāvasaṃvara,* that blocking the second kind of inflow is *dravyasaṃvara*

35 (ET85-86) Varieties of the first kind include vows, observances, restraints, merits, reflection, overcoming discomfort, and various kinds of conduct..

36. (ET93) *Bhāvanirjarā* refers to the disappearing of karmic traces when the fruits are experienced, as well as to the destruction of traces through penances. The disappearance itself (is called *dravyanirjarā*).

37 (ET96) That transformation of the self involving the destruction of all karmas is called *bhāvamokṣa*; actual separation from karmas is *dravyamokṣa*.

38 (ET98-99) A self having good (*śubha*) modifications has merit, a self having bad modifications is demeritorious. "Merit" means an auspicious life, name and class while "demerit" means the reverse.

39 (ET100-101) From the commonsense point of view right vision, awareness and conduct are the causes of liberation, while from the higher standpoint oneself, which (naturally) consists of these three, is the cause.

40 (ET101-102) These three jewels exist nowhere else but in the self, so the self must be the cause of liberation.

41 (ET102-103) Right inclination (toward the seven

tattvas) is the vision of the self; it is a quality of the self's, and when it is errorfree it becomes perfect (right) awareness.

42 (ET103-104) Right awareness is awareness of both self and not-self free from doubt, confusion (*vimoha*), and illusion (*vibhrama*); there are many sorts.

43 (ET105-106) Vision is the grasping of things in general, without particularities.

44 (ET107) In ordinary beings subject to rebirth awareness is preceded by vision, which is why cognitive applications of each do not arise simultaneously. In perfect knowers they do occur simultaneously.

45 (ET107-108) Conduct is refraining from what is harmful and engaging in what is beneficial. In the commonsense view it has been spoken of by the Jina as consisting of vows, observances and restraints.

46 (ET108-109) But right conduct is, from the higher standpoint, halting action in order to destroy the causes of rebirth, so say the Jinas.

47 (ET109-110) A sage has both (commonsense and higher) points of view through meditating; thus you should practice meditation carefully

48 (ET110-111) by fixing your mind free from delusion or attachment or aversion.

49 (ET111) Repeat and meditate on the *mantras* taught by the teacher.

50 (ET113) The pure self who exists in a good embodiment, who has the vision, satisfaction, knowledge and power that has destroyed the four *ghāṭīya* karmas, should be viewed as a perfected being (*arhat*).

51 (ET115) Meditate on the liberated (*siddha*), a self free from the bodies produced by the eight kinds of karma, the seer and knower of this world and the world beyond, who has a shape like a human being and who stays at the pinnacle of the universe.

52 (ET116) A sage who addresses himself and others to practising power, conduct and penance in which vision and

knowledge are eminent, should be meditated on as one's teacher.

53 (ET117-118) That teacher who is the greatest of the sages, being possessed of the three jewels and always preaching the truth, is termed an *upādhyāya*

54 (ET118) and a *sādhu*. We bow to him.

55 (ET120) Concentration is attained by a *sādhu* whose thought is effortlessly trained on anything whatsoever.

56 (ET121) The highest meditation involves not acting, not talking and not thinking, so that the self can be fixed in itself.

106. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA, *Upadeśasiddhāntaratnamālā*

NCat II, 358 reports that the work is "printed with Hindi transl. and C. by Pannalal of Sujangarh and Marathi Transl. and C. by Jayacandra Sitarama Sraman. Nagpur 1898." We have not been able to find this publication.

107. NEMICANDRA SAIDDHĀNTIKA, *Vṛtti* on Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra*

NCat VIII, 79 locates a manuscript of this commentary at Moodbidri II (op. cit.).) 436, but says it is incomplete.

108. JAYASENA (998), *Dharmaratnākara*

This summary is taken from A .N. Upadhye's edition (our "E") of the work, Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala No. 24, Sholapur 1974, pp. 6-17. A manuscript of this work held in Byavar specifies the date of composition. We indicate here the sections of the work following Upadhye's translations, and a few of the passages: the general purport of the work is to indicate Jain moral virtues.

Summary by A. N. Upadhye

I (verses 1-57) (E3-21) Consequences of merit and demerit. *Dharma* brings merit, pleasure, and all sorts of good things, while *adharma* brings demerit, misery, torture, etc.

2 (verses 58-115) (E22-37) The fruits of fearless giving are extolled.

3 (verses 116-181) (E38-56) The giving of food is always meritorious.

4 (verses 182-287)(E57-83) Respect for monks, even when they are guilty of minor defects, is praised.

5 (verses 288-420) (E84-112) Giving further praised, and its beneficial results described.

6-7 (verses 421-564) (E113-146) The practice of conveying knowledge through teaching is lauded.

8 (verses 565-604) (E141-156) Providing medical help is praised.

9 (verses 605-722) (E157-188) The cultivation of right vision is praised.

10 (verses 723-827) (E189-214) Right vision is either natural or acquired. Its aspects are described.

11 (verses 828-923) (E215-236) The first stage (*pratimā*) of a seeker's religious life. It involves both right vision and right awareness; the former comes first. These two are followed by right conduct. The five great vows of a monk, and the proper practices of a householder are outlined. One should not sacrifice using flesh, and other such precluded types of behavior are described.

12 (verses 924-1036) (E237-264) The second stage involves the observance of the five secondary vows and cultivation of four virtues: friendliness, joy, compassion and fairness, as well as of noninjury. Various kinds of insulting, sinful, harmful and other bad sorts of speech are warned against.

13 (verses 1037-1112) (E265-283) Vices such as theft, sexual enjoyment, feelings of ownership and appropriating

things are described and monks are warned to take vows to avoid them.

14 (verses 1113-1166) (E284-297) More advice pertaining to the second stage.

15 (verses 1167-1294) (E298-325) The third stage is that of the qualified or perfected person who practices equanimity.

16-20 (verses 1295-1661) (E326-420) The remaining stages, culminating in fasting to death, are reviewed. A final chapter takes up several miscellaneous topics.

109. AMITAGATI II (1010), *Pañcasaṃgraha*

Apparently this work has been published by Darbarilal Nyayatirtha as Manikchandra Digambara Jaina Granthamala 25, 1927. We have been unable to locate a copy.

110. AMITAGATI II, *Dvātriṃśikā* or *Sāmāyikapāṭha*

The work has been edited a number of times (cf. Bibliography, Third Edition, pp. 383-384). "E" references in the following summary are to the edition (#581.4.3 of Bibliography) by Sitalprasad Brahmachari in the version published by Shri Ksullakabahubaliji Maharaj from Delhi in 1973.

Summary by Padmanabha S. Jaini

1-3 (E2-11) The work opens with a prayer to the Realized Being (Jinendra).

4 (E11-16) In the style of auspicious verses (*maṅgalavācana*) some essential concepts of Jainism are reiterated. Seven essentials are emphasized: may my time be employed in knowing the two types of life and nonliving substances, in stopping the influx of karmic matter and the

bondage caused by them, always practicing controls (*saṃvara*) resulting in gradual cleansing of traces of the not-self, and yearning for liberation (*mokṣa*). Knowing the body, etc., as different from the pure self and truly realizing and experiencing it as such, may my time be well used in the *dharma* type of meditation and equanimity.

5 (E17-20) One who is nearing the state of release shows the following signs: complete victory over anger and other passions, renouncing all acquisitions, sincere effort for good conduct, fear of worldly sorrow, service to the sages, interest in knowing the words of realized ones, and control over the sense-organs.

6-7 (E21-26) A prayer: At all times let my feelings remain the same towards those who wish me ill or those who favor me or are at peace with me....

8-10 (E26-34) Those fallen ones who indulge in low despicable actions reach despicable states; those other intelligent ones act in a praiseworthy manner to achieve higher states. Those under the spell of the senses, who indulge in physical pleasures, actually lose the welfare of both the body and the mind, the present and the hereafter. This is my wife, this other is my son, that is my mother, this, my sister; this is my foe, this the city, that the garden: these are all illusive attachments (*moha*). As long as one remains mindful of such inconsequential things, how can the Self then cut away the huge tree of the sorrows of this world towards liberation?

11 (E26-39) The one who has no bondage and is with realized selfhood constantly revels in the thought that, apart from the self that is illumined by its intrinsic nature of pure knowledge and is ever removed from substance-related fallacious actions (*nokarman*) and functional phases (*bhavakarman*), there is no other state in me nor do I belong to anyone else. Otherwise all other living beings in all three worlds are commonly bound with the shackles of *saṃsāra*.

12 (E39-42) In the world, where even the body that has been grown with such diligence from childhood to youth does

not remain mine, how can others like son, wife, daughter, etc. be of consequence since they are the result of my own bondage by past actions? Knowing thus, an intelligent human being remains ever centered in the self.

13 (E43-45) May the path (*dharma*) as told by the omniscient Lord ever save us from the difficult-to-tunnel mountain of karma and equally difficult-to-navigate sea of worldliness...

14-15 (E45-51) The words of the omniscient are repeated by the faithful thus: These sense pleasures ultimately cause fear, as they are empty and dry like straw and in the end cause anxieties and sorrows. They are always perishable and therefore denounced by scholars. They cause birth in lower states and thus great pain and sorrow. Even though I know this, it is so tragic that my mind does not dislodge from pleasure. I am so foolish. To whom should I then turn for support and what should I do?

16 (E50-55) The Jinendras have said that pleasures from the senses never totally satisfy. They are like a forest fire and only fuel further desires. They can cause only future sorrow as they are the seed thereof. Under the influence of such unholy pleasures, the living being indulges in stealing, ill-conduct, violence, etc. and thus reaps countless sorrows. Pleasure is subject to constant fear (as it can fail with the failure of the sense organs) and although it causes many sins, the desired pleasure is not always very easy to attain.

17 (E54-57) It is advised that with a steadfast mind determine within your heart the great sorrows that accrue due to repeatedly entering this forest of life that is full of death, old age, etc. Resolve to make an effort in the opposite direction so that you may never have to face such evils again.

18 (E57-60) If this body, filled with foul-smelling filth and pallor, can be used to achieve great higher states of happiness, why not use it so? If soiled useless garlands can be used to achieve priceless gems, who among the intelligent will not use it? Use the human body as an instrument for spiritual

gain.

19 (E60-62) Just as the sun immediately destroys the darkness causing night-blindness, following the Jaina teachings and way can similarly remove all fear of death, rebirth, nonfulfilment of desires, misfortune, fear, maladies, mental anxiety, and great sorrow with immediate effect.

20 (E62-65) Only that high level aspirant (*muni*), who does not entertain any kind of violence whatsoever nor any worldly desires that stop spiritual progress, can steadfastly meditate on the self and, shedding all the karmic matter, reach the highest states of realization.

21 (E65-67) The god of passions (*kāmadeva*) coexists with the world and is as inexorable as death. It is very difficult for embodied beings to elude him. Neither the old nor the clever, nor the learned, nor the ignorant, nor the brave, nor cowards, neither animals nor celestial beings or birds, no one can escape the inexorable power of passion.

22 (E67-71) These passions always lead to great sorrow. This can be controlled only through meditating on the self. It cannot be controlled merely by associating with knowledgeable persons or calm-minded people. It is to be achieved by the knowledge that discriminates between the body (not-self) and the self, and gives rise to pure, natural and steadfast nonattachment.

23 (E72-75) What is my age (appropriate for renouncing or not), which is my birth (human as opposed to animal), how should I behave according to present circumstances (in this birth that is my appropriate path) that would aid spiritual progress, and what is beneficial to my future spiritual progress (births)? Instead of debating all these important questions, most worldly people continue to indulge in acts that will further immerse them in the sea of worldliness away from the self.

24 (E75-77) Those for whom the forest is home, for them the moon is the lamp to dispel darkness, whatever is given in alms within their palms is great scrumptious food for

them, the hard earth is the most comfortable bed, and the directions are their clothes. They crave no possessions even for their basic needs. They have drunk the ambrosia of contentedness. They achieve what others cannot achieve, that is, the higher fearless states of emancipation.

25 (E78-81) The attached being continuously dwells in useless thoughts related to the body...Immersed in these dark attachments that cloud discrimination between what is really beneficial to the self and what is not, the living being runs away from right action.

26 (E81-82) It is very difficult to separate the body from the self as they are like part and whole and have been together since time immemorial. They stay together from birth to death and are difficult to part. Even so, part they must. So the discriminating person should think thus: that if even the body will have to be parted with, what of the outer relationships like wife and son? One should not lament for either. Knowing this, every day dislodge yourself from the pain of separation from these.

27 (E83-86) It is a tragedy that the creator Brahmā made the animals content to eat grass and leaves and sleep on the earth, as well as those indulging in luxuries like the celestial beings, full of riches. For the world of action he created such a hunger for daily needs in human beings that they remain immersed in actions contrary to their ultimate good.

28 (E86-88) Sometimes the mind runs after celestial women, sometimes after wealth, at other times after glory and fame. Never does it run after the peaceful sea of bliss arising from discrimination and following the path of renunciation.

29 (E88-90) The mind sometimes goes to the netherworld agitating upon the possibility of indulging in the infernal women, sometimes it worries about attaining the powerful kingship of emperors that no one else has, at other times it covets the beautiful women of the higher worlds. It remains in illusion, not knowing that in the ambrosia of the

Jina words and Jina way lies the real and ultimate happiness. It is a pity that the mind does not know.

30 (E91-93) The mind is exhorted not to roam in these false worldly attractions, as it is capable of turning its sights towards the higher goals of self-realization. Only this will give it permanent happiness.

31 (E93-95) The realized being (Jinendra) is supplicated to help the worldly soul who is aspiring to sail across the sea of the world, to help him in the path of austerities by dislodging him from the seven bad habits like gambling and sexual indulgence, aiding him to associate with the pure-minded ones, helping in overcoming the power of the senses, and in releasing him from anger and passions.

32 (E96-97) Living beings are helpless, like deer in the forest, in this world full of dangerous animals like death and old age. Immersed in sense pleasures beings are soon hunted down by death. How can such a world give peace and happiness? So the intelligent being will try to get out of this cycle.

33 (E98-99) Any doctor, son, Brahmin, Indra, wife, mother, servant, or king cannot save being embraced by death. Reflecting upon this the betterment of the self should be attained while alive.

34 (E99-101) "Even the body that has been preserved and nourished with such care will not go with me; what then of all this wealth and accumulations?"--thinking thus, the mind should remain unattached to any substance.

35 (E101-103) A dynamic (*tejasvin*) aspirant is one who has an equanimous attitude towards good or evil persons, in the forest or in assemblies, in stones and in gold, in happiness and in sadness, in gain or in loss of the desired result, and is always calm and collected, bereft of likes or dislikes. To such an illustrious being freedom (*mukti*) comes automatically.

36 (E104-107) One who practices winning over the enemies such as the senses and passions, one who has ceased to begin any worldly work, one who has renounced and does

not accumulate even a part of inner or outer belongings, and one who has controlled the mind to reject all worldly pleasures thereby attaining the highest nonattachment, those knowledgeable renunciates are the only ones who, bereft of all karmic attachments, attain blissful immersion in the self and reach the highest state (here termed "Śivālaya").

37 (E107-110) The way to that purity of self and self-meditation is not that of the *saṅgha* or methods practiced by them, nor just by revering the guru, nor by getting worshipped by one and all. Neither does it lie just in having a bed of straw, wood, stone or earth (these are outer things). The meditator of the reality of the self is the pure, steadfast self itself. Know that like milk and water, the self always knows the difference between body (not-self) and self.

38 (E110-111) Only the self-knowing can achieve salvation. Controlling the outpouring senses, one who considers the self like a traveller in transit within this body, and knows his self to be the eternal one, he alone can easily overcome worldliness to attain the ultimate wealth of salvation.

39 (E111-113) One who turns away from worldly pleasures that ultimately cause sorrow, attains the pure, eternal, beyond-compare pleasures of dwelling in the self. He closes his ears to words by others and listens to the eternal sound within.

40 (E114-116) The body is capable of producing many sorrows. Actions (karmic adhesions) coupled with this body then produce the relationships of wife, son, friend, etc., which one mistakenly considers as belonging to oneself. The person with false awareness thus considers benefits, which actually are debts and cause many misfortunes, as one's achievements and experiences false happiness.

41 (E116-119) One must reflect on the following: When I see my friend or foe's body indulging in starting various activities and talk, that body is bereft of consciousness and cannot do anything for me (ultimately). The self within them

cannot be seen by me. I am pure and not touched by things and actions. Then by whom shall I be pleased? On whom shall I show my displeasure?

42 (E119-121) I am not related in any way to this unconscious body which is destroyed by my angry enemies. The one self to whom I am eternally related cannot be destroyed. Knowing this, the intelligent man never expresses any arousal of attachment or jealousy towards anyone. This contemplation helps in overcoming animosity.

43 (E121-123) When the self, mistakenly believing the body to be permanent, indulges in many sinful activities and thereby becomes the generator of an immensely sorrowful state, then it can also reverse this by steadfastly establishing itself in nonattachment and thereby gain the ultimate wealth of salvation that even the gods like Indra and Nārāyaṇa cannot get. Definitely the self can gain freedom.

44 (E123-126) The wilfully extended feelings of friendship and love towards wife, son, friend, kingdom, riches, etc. that are of benefit to this body but ultimately immerse us in worldliness, are detrimental to selfhood. On the other hand, feelings of detachment, austerities, fasts, self-control, etc., that are beneficial to the self may be detrimental to the body (i.e., makes it shrink and controlled). Knowing thus, the person with a pure intelligent mind should abandon all mental, physical and verbal actions that are beneficial for the body but detrimental to the self.

45 (E126-129) Those who wish to achieve total knowledge and total bliss must serve the self alone. The self is of the nature of knowledge. If served, it reveals the best, purest knowledge whereas the body is ignorant and if served can give only ignorance. It is well-known in this world that people can give only what they already have. Even the most generous giver cannot give the flower of the sky (*ākāśakusuma*), since flowers don't grow in the sky.

46 (E129-131) Constantly wishing for pleasures, bereft of discrimination, passionate men continue increasing their

sorrows by indulging in violence-ridden actions. Like lepers increasing their pain by scratching their wounds with various irritants, they further aggravate their sorry condition.

47 (E131-132) One who relinquishes all other activities and practices only the three jewels is a friend of the self. One who does not do so is an enemy of the self. He continues to further denigrate his self and throws it into a prison (a situation difficult to extricate himself from). Knowing this intelligent people should streadfastly remain centered in the self.

48 (E133-135) The foolish man remains immersed in wealth and does not see the inevitable destroyers of wealth and men; (it is) like the person or bird sitting on top of a tree in the forest who does not do anything even if he sees the forest fire (inevitable death) coming.

49 (E136-137) The self, knowing itself as different from all outer things, experiences itself by itself, and in the ultimate perspective achieves the difficult-to-reach state of the highest (*paramātman*) realized state, as the thick cluster of bamboo ignites itself by rubbing against itself to cause a huge fire.

50 (E138-139) One who constantly remains busy in doing what is needed for the body is like the foolish and cowardly servant of the king who, scared of the king's displeasure, works for the king all the time without finding any time to do his own work.

51 (E139-142) It is obvious that wealth, fame, the arts, women, good fortune, and luck are all ultimately abandoned by the self (in death). In acquiring this entire world one acquires bondage that immerses the self further in worldliness. Therefore good men who covet only liberation do not aspire for these. Intelligent people do not respect anything that they will have ultimately to leave.

52 (E142-145) Aspirants on the path of the self never indulge in self-detrimental actions, just as those who wish to avoid cold never let the flames in the hearth die. Self-detrimental actions are those that do not result in the

knowledge of what is good and what is bad for the self, actions that do not encourage one to renounce worldly pleasures, activities that do not crush the karmic adhesions to smithereens to dissipate them, and actions that do not result in meditating upon the self.

53 (E145-147) Just as excessive heat melts the hardnes of gold, similarly passions, anger, lament, jealousy, pride, hatred and indolence are impure feelings that destroy the steadiness of the mind that is required for pure meditation. Therefore those who meditate should avoid these feelings by a great distance.

54 (E147-149) The great soul who has renounced the desire for pleasure, controls this mind that is difficult to subdue like a restless monkey and which has eternally been playing truant in the forest of the five sense-pleasures, removes it from these pleasures and steadfastly centers it in the self, meditating in order to get release from the expanse of worldliness. Without making this ultimate effort, other methods will not give success.

55 (E149-151) The self should be meditated upon within, as the essential reality without which even the moon, the sun, the planets and stars that are famous for giving light become like darkness. It is the self that keeps the effulgence of knowledge ever pure, and it is that self which is meditated upon by yogis. One should meditate upon such a pure steadfast self as situated within one's very own body.

56 (E152-154) The elephant of death can come anytime to destroy this house of the body. Even knowing this you keep wondering whether it will come and do not accept that one day you will have to die. You behave as if you are eternal and deathless, and continue to indulge in negative (*dhāmika*) activities.

57 (E154-156) "I will do this, I have done this, now I am doing this work": agitated thus, you continue to immerse yourself in worldly likes and dislikes and remain aloof from your real benefit of the self. Thus you waste the time of your

entire life uselessly, and yet do not dwell in the Jina teachings that tell you of the pure reality that emancipates you.

58 (E156-158) Some people continue to indulge in negative actions detrimental to the right path; even then, those established in the path (*dharma*) never retaliate or punish them. Such (misguided) people fight each other oblivious of the fact that there is another path on earth that can save the embodied self.

59 (E158-161) People who accumulate many things (and actions) by undertaking great effort to begin works that lead to more things, have to ultimately let go of them at the time of death. All those accumulations are a cause for sorrow, so let go of them. Since they have to be abandoned at the time of death anyway, why go on accumulating?

60 (E161-163) The departed relatives like brothers and sons have gone their separate ways (after death) on (completing their karmic bondage and) accruing further bondage in this life in accordance with their stages of evolution. It is futile to continue to make efforts to meet them after death or to lament for them. The atoms have been dissipated in all directions after they ceased to be, so trying to bring them together again is impossible for any man.

61 (E163-165) O mind, it is a pity that you keep returning to the pleasures that have been enjoyed and thrown away by you earlier. They merely fire your desires instead. They can never be assuaged by enjoyment, so do not crave for them.

62 (E165-168) The self is exhorted to think thus: "I am brave, with auspicious intellect; I deserve reverence, as I am full of good qualities; I am powerful, and I am the first among men." Thus negating all thoughts that may bind one further to the world, always meditate on that eternal pure self that leads to the wealth of liberation.

63 (E168-170) It is impossible for mendicants to achieve liberation by holding on to various impurities like anger, pride, acquisitions and dress. Thus both external and

internal acquisitions have to be abandoned.

64 (E170-172) It is a pity that conflicted and misguided men of wrong faith and intellect continue to expect happiness from women. It is like the deer in the desert, expecting the shining sand to be water. Therefore it becomes necessary to pont out that men should abandon such attachments (women) that increase the problems in liberation and are difficult to negate.

65 (E172-175) Violence, etc., are inevitably demerit-giving sins, the trees of the forest of this world. Sorrow and pain are the unavoidable problems one has to face to negotiate this forest. Passions and sense pleasures are the two robbers in the forest. Ignorance is like the traps set to ensnare you, into which you will inevitably fall. Thus, O intelligent men, having found the pure knowledge, destroy all the passions and sense-pleasures. It is obvious that learned men do not let go of their enemies on finding the right opportunity to kill them.

66 (E175-177) By pursuing the six types of professions, viz., scriptural activities, writing, agriculture, artwork (decorative activities), trade and crafts, you endeavor to work hard for the sake of your body, wealth and sons (family). If you were to work like that even once for the sake of controlling your desires, you would be able to enjoy eternal flawless pleasures (of freedom).

67 (E177-179) One who practices control (*saṃyama*) reaches the high stages of perfection quite soon and become a generator of happiness and self-bliss, dwelling in and enjoying the fathomless knowledge, vision, and power of the self, just as the man dwelling on the highest central mountain (Sumeru) finds everything else beneath him.

68 (E180-181) The impossible may become possible (various classic examples given), but it is impossible for the man stuck in the wheel of worldliness, which is a mine of sorrows, to achieve the bliss of the self.

69 (E181-183) Born of the fruition of different karmas, in different forms of fat, thin, tall, short, etc., this body can

never abandon its habit of running after sense pleasures. Just as red, yellow, blue, white, black, etc., colors of the clothes we wear do not color the body, similarly these outer qualities do not become the quality of the pure self which remains covered under them.

70 (E183-184) Even after knowing the eternal, indestructible nature of the pure self, which is of the quality of knowledge and bereft of the worldly sorrows, you foolishly believe in the false imaginations that I am fair, I am beautiful, I am strong, I am respectable, I am fat or thin....

71 (E185-187) One who does not begin any new activities and is untouched by anger, greed, passions, and acquisitions, who is filled with the right vision and knowledge-oriented cognitive application (*upayoga*), is bereft of all polluting aggregates arising out of karma, and has no need or expectation of any outer substance, is of the nature of the pure self. This nature should be meditated upon constantly for the achievement of freedom. Those who wish success never indulge in actions that might be opposites of and detrimental to achieving their set goals.

72 (E188-190) Those who are alive to activities of the body lack the discrimination between activities that should be abandoned and attitudes that must be cultivated. They do not keep their minds in the nature of the self. Thus those who wish to succeed in the goal of realizing the self must negate involvement in the body, since intelligent beings do not dwell in activities that oppose their goals.

73 (E190-192) Death does not excuse the frightened one, so it is useless to fear death. Desired pleasures are never achievable (in totality) so do not desire, and do not needlessly be sorrowful for what is dead and gone or cannot return. Why should a logical person do some useless thing (like lamenting for the past)?

74 (E192-194) The bliss that is within the self does not arise with the timely fruition of karmic aggregates, but it is revealed with the destruction of existing karmic particles. It is

indestructible, without impurities, and always desired by scholars. This pleasure is constantly available within you, is eternal, and is easily achieved: then why undertake sorrowful efforts for outer, sense-related pleasures that are ephemeral? O fool, why roam for alms when sanctified food (*prasāda*) is available at the Śiva-temple?

75 (E195-197) The fool who expects pure, eternal happiness from well-established sources of wealth, friends and acquisitions (that are ephemeral) is trying to overcome the waves of deluge at the time of dissolution.

76 (E197-199) When these worldly pleasures inevitably increase sources of sorrow both in this world and in the next, then how can those who desire freedom ever label them as things that actually increase happiness or even sense pleasures? Intelligent people never indulge in activities that increase the force of sorrow.

77 (E199-201) Since this being achieves the heavens as well as the wealth of liberation by actively encouraging purer states of mind and, by indulging in negative states, encourages sorrow-producing infernal states (according to the karmic law of rebirth), therefore the saintly people choose to indulge in the former and not the inauspicious latter actions. Why would intelligent beings do otherwise? Thus right mental attitudes alone can help the evolution of a being.

78 (E201-203) Impure mind-states lead to infernal regions, pure mind-states lead to higher heavenly regions and the purest consciousness-revealing mind-states help to eradicate all karmic adhesions to attain flawless freedom. Thus those who desire liberation must indulge only in the purest mind-states.

79 (E203-208) Beings in the infernal regions have to suffer unbearable and indescribable horrific sorrows inflicted on each other. Beings in animal states have to bear with fire, piercing, hunger, thirst, etc., and humans too have to put up with disease, separation and death. Beings in celestial domains have problems of the mind (due to fear of having to leave

those pleasures one day). Therefore all worldly states should be considered riddled with pain and sorrows, and the mind should be made to hanker only after freedom.

80 (E208-210) Worldly activities are achieved with great effort (like making a mud doll in water), and they are totally destroyed soon. If this is so then why, O fool, do you only indulge in worldly activities. It is indeed a matter of great shame. Intelligent beings never indulge in useless effort.

81 (E210-212) No one understands the pure eternal bliss of freedom from worldliness, which is full of many difficulties, without mental or spiritual peace and full of longings. As opposed to that, freedom is bereft of any problems. But no human being filled with passions can discriminate or understand this essential reality. Why have fondness for the world, abandoning such pure freedom beyond which there is no greater substance in this creation?

82 (E212-214) It is regretted that the people of this world engage in the six activities necessitating violence (by the sword, by the pen, trade, crafts, education, etc.) that further increase their great load of karmic adhesions and bondage. It is as if though desiring to stay healthy a sick man continues to have contra-indicated food. Then naturally it generates great pain in all the limbs.

83 (E214-216) In this deep forest of worldliness, there are ferocious karmic enemies due to whom you have been suffering greatly from time immemorial. There is no horrific sorrow that you have not suffered. By the sword of self-meditation, which occurs at the unification of right vision, right awareness and right conduct, uproot and destroy these karmic enemies, and enter the great city of freedom to attain the kingdom of faultless bliss without any further problems.

84 (E216-218) One who performs austerities to gain outer wealth like kingdom, heavenly states, etc., will achieve only these external substances. However, one who wishes to realize the self will soon find the pure self. As you sow, so shall you reap. Knowing this, the skilful intelligent one works

for his self-realization alone.

85 (E219-221) All these modes of wife, son, etc., are other than the self and deserve to be kept away as they are ephemeral and unsteady like the wind. They happen due to the rise of karmic law. Only the foolish in this world consider them to be their pleasure-giving possessions. By just imagining them to be so they pretend to have achieved the wealth of the heavens.

86 (E221-224) In this world the substance that is cause for the bondage of attached people is also the instrument for disenchanted men to erase the filth of karmic adhesions (i.e., the bondage lies in the attachment to it, not in the substance itself). The curd-butter-jaggery (a combination prescribed for the delirious patient) substances are also a tonic for healthy men.

87 (E224-225) Even if a person follows the right vision, right awareness and right conduct, should he be fired by greed in his mind, then he cannot get rid of his tensions, just as the sea, though containing various gems, still agitates due to the fire within.

88 (E226-228) Blinded by attachments, the mind perceives the 'other substances' like wife, son, body, etc., as its own self. In the mind of a man without ignorant attachments only the indestructible self without the adhesions of polluting karma appears to be always reflected as the self. If you have understood the difference of these two, then why do you not destroy this false attachment to wife and son immediately!

89 (E228-229) Those who are full of good conduct (*śīla*) and self-control, who have renounced the not-self, those who ignore even this body that is an instrument of successful meditation, such aspirants (*sādhu*) perform the greatest austerities, but even amidst those difficult states do not desire anything. They go to the desirable state of the liberated, escaping this horrific forest of worldly existence.

90 (E230-232) Karmic bondage of sins acquired earlier produces sorrows and meritorious acts result in pleasures;

knowing this, those yogis who decide to negate the sins with great austerities by adhering to the wealth of peace and self-control are difficult to find. Even rarer are those who desire to destroy both types of karma, meritorious and sinful.

91 (E230-232) Aspirants on the path must of course destroy the ripened karma automatically rising, but they must make an effort to quickly bring to fruition the karmic adhesions not due yet and destroy them too, just as a brave warrior may go out far to destroy his enemies, but certainly does not leave unharmed the enemy who has already entered his household.

92 (E234-237) Acquisitions must be abandoned in all three ways, mentally, physically and verbally, since they are the karmic baggage leading to sins and bondage. Just as the side of a physical balance goes down when substance-laden and goes up when the substances are removed from it, the aspiring soul will similarly rise higher and higher the more he rids himself of the burden of acquisitions.

93 (E237-239) Pure austerities performed without any desire for merits or fruits is the kind that will destroy the accumulations of past karma. Those who with impure minds desire results while performing austerities cannot become pure by it, just as dirty water cannot clean the filthy person bathing in it.

94 (E239-242) First of all one needs to acquire discrimination. The self and the body are intermingled like milk and water. The sage who can quickly discriminate between the difficult-to-separate body and self and then, with the fire of pure unattached meditation burn the wood of karma, becomes the seer of the highest state (*kevalajñānadhārin*). Such realized beings are worshipped in both the worlds, by the emperors of this world and the gods of the higher world. They become the realized souls who show the way. May they be there for our salvation.

95 (E242-244) Such realized beings are indeed a cause for wonder. Their knowledge is the fire which is spreading

light as it is fanned by the breeze of right vision, and after burning off the wood of karma it destroys the darkness of attachments that overcome the mind. The light of this fire reveals at once all categories of reality and continues to blaze permanently as omniscience. Indeed, such strange conduct of the realized beings is a cause for wonderment (for the laymen).

96 (E244-247) As long as there remains even a slight fondness for outer things the sorrow-producing net of karma cannot be destroyed, just as in spite of being heated by the strong sun deep-rooted trees with shady branches do not dry up because they are sustained by subsoil water.

97 (E247-249) Good men do not wonder at the fact that even emperors abandon their powers and lands to become aspirants in this path of austerities leading to unparalleled, indestructible wealth of freedom. In fact it is a cause to wonder if ever a renunciate should abandon his austere life for the sake of sorrow-producing sense pleasures that further push him into the sea of worldliness.

98 (E249-252) O fool, know that woman is the mine of sins and the cause of other problems like sons and family. This body is the abode of disease and other sorrows. All wealth is transitory and elusive like the wind. O self, while roaming these deadly forests of worldliness, what cause for happiness have you seen that you do not abandon all outer attractions and delve into the self? There is no true lasting happiness in the world, so meditate on the self.

99 (E2520254) Emancipation cannot be achieved by knowledge alone. The fool who tries to jump the fortress of this world and achieve the success that gives the unique bliss, without the three gems of right vision, right awareness and right conduct, with the help of knowledge alone, is trying for the impossible. Such want to reach their goal of swimming across the large oceans riddled with perilous water-animals and swirling with winds arising from the last deluge just with the help of their two arms!

100 (E254-256) The life and birth of only those aspirants are truly blessed who, with pure minds knowing the causes of the world as well as of emancipation, renounce the world with mind, words and body, and sharpening their mind with right conduct, vision and awareness are able to destroy the forest of worldliness.

101 (E256-258) One who abandons the three gems (right vision, conduct and awareness) and secretly enjoys the sorrow-producing pleasures, actually abandons the ambrosia that release from the cycle of birth-old age-death and accepts instead the instant-killer poison.

102 (E258-260) Past action-bondage gives rise to pleasure or pain in this life. Why should I then lament or feel pleased by it? Thinking thus, the aspirant should hold an equal view of both happiness and sadness. Such an intelligent one expiates the past ones while not creating any new bindings.

103 (E260-262) Though desiring to destroy ill-effect-producing actions, the lowly continue to increase their negative karma by remaining immersed in passions like greed and anger, just as the patient that takes the medication but does not adhere to the prescribed food or contra-indicated things, merely succeeds in increasing his disease.

104 (E262-264) Those who are on the right path never accept acquisitions. Those determined to achieve liberation adhere to the three gems and are even shy of receiving a plate on which food can be taken. Such should be their aversion to acquisitions.

105 (E265-267) This world is polluted by strong passions. The few good men who desiring to achieve the wealth of freedom read, listen or take interest in the incomparable Jina way that leads one to the true faith and is like a guide that shows the path to escape worldly sorrows, are very rare. What can be said of those who actually aspire to realize freedom based on this great knowledge--they are rarer still.

106 (E267-269) The entire corpus of Jaina literature

has been addressed as Mother Jinavāṇi, who is capable of giving the wealth of permanent emancipation and help in overcoming the ocean of worldliness. The knower of this literature is truly knowledgeable and already on the way to emancipation.

107 (E269-271) This body is surely perishable; all wealth will sooner or later go; women are not always pleasing or well-behaved; and sons and relatives show respect only when it suits them. In this huge and deep ocean of sorrowful worldliness there is no other (permanently) pleasing refuge than freedom (*mokṣa*).

108 (E271-273) Time snatches away all kinds of wealth and possessions, whether it be from humans, infernal beings or celestials.

109 (E273-274) Youthful attractions and life and acquisitions are ephemeral, like the drop of water on the leaf of a lotus. Nothing is stable.

110 (E275) For the Lord of Death who ultimately destroys even the lords of the celestials, it is no effort to destroy the pride of men.

111 (E276-277) Nothing really gives happiness. Separation comes with love of friends, old age with youth, and problems with money.

112 (E278-279) When the time of death arrives no one can save anyone. Emperors having so many ministers, soldiers and priests, and even those who have realized the highest states and who are revered by the celestials, are not spared at the time of death. What of ordinary humans! No one can escape death.

113 (E279-280) No one can save one from death as the very food that nourishes becomes like poison and takes life. There are some animal types in which the mother herself eats her young. Who can then save one?

114 (E281-283) These worldly men get so enamored with their son, wife and their own bodies that they get blindly attached and commit various sinful acts that lead to many

kinds of hellish states. They go to these hells alone and suffer.

115 (E283-284) When this body that has been carefully fed, clad, and housed, does not go with one at the time of death, what else can go?

116 (E284-285) The sense pleasures overcome the resistance of powerful celestial beings (Vidyādharas and Nāgakumāras): what can humans do against them? A lion which overcomes the pride of powerful elephants will not spare the lowly deer.

117 (E285-286) Death is coming nearer, life is ebbing, youth is going further away, old age is increasing; still the human, entrapped by the ghosts of attachments, does not endeavor to love or benefit his (own true) self.

118 (E287-288) Everybody can see this world burning in the sorrows of birth, death and old age; even then those attached to sense pleasures do not put their minds to the right path!

119 (E288-289) Even the householder who knows has right awareness, indulges sometimes in right, sometimes in wrong and sometimes in both: then how can staying as a family man cleanse his sins? So he must stay with pure-hearted mendicants on the path and with mind, body and word leave his householder status.

120 (E291-292) In order to achieve permanent happiness, those clever men who keep their sense organs under control are afraid of repeated birth and death and do not covet worldly wanderings: they must meditate upon the eternal self that is eternally all-knowing, all-seeing, bereft of the fault of birth, death, age or sorrow, and has realized its true nature.

121 (E294) In this way, by these one hundred and twenty verses, the one who contemplates on the true nature of the essential self soon finds the freedom dear to Amitagati Ācārya, well within reach.

ENDNOTES

1 The following is based on J. Soni, "A note on the Jaina *tattva/padārtha*" in *Vasantagauravam. Essays in Jainism Felicitating Professor M. D. Vasantha Raj of Mysore on the Occasion of his Seventy-fifth Birthday* (Mumbai: Vakils, Feffer and Simons, 2001), pp. 135-140.

2 For the use of *tattva* in a compound (like *tattvajñāna, tattvabhāva*) with particular reference to the Nyāya school see Walter Slaje, "Über Wahrheit (skt. *tat-tva*)" in Berliner Indologische Studien 11-12 (1998), pp. 239-258. The very helpful footnotes supply most of the relevant literature on the subject. The various translations of the term *tattva* in a compound would also apply to Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* I. 2: *tattvārtha-śraddhānaṃ saṃyag-darśanam*, in contrast to its use two *sūtras* further in the enumeration of the categories. An analysis for Jainism similar to Slaje's for Nyāya has to be a separate study.

3 It is significant to note that the categories enumerated in the *Samayasāra* are referred to as *bhūtārtha* and in his commentary called *Ātmakhyāti* Amṛtacandra uses the term *nava-tattva* to refer to them.

4 S. A. Jain, *Reality. English Translation of Shri Pūjyapāda's Sarvarthasiddhi* (Madras: Jwalamalini Trust, 1992), p. 7.

5. The points made in this section are based on J. Soni, "Basic Jaina epistemology", Philosophy East and West 50, 2000, pp. 367-377.

6 Jaina monasteries were and are the centers of learning and from early times copying of manuscripts of all disciplines is seen as an act which brings religious merit. Hence, the Jaina libraries still contain a wealth of material that only gradually is coming to light, with obvious implications for the whole of Indian philosophy.

7 For a detailed description, also concerning the different kind of assemblies which decide the outcome of the debate, see S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Volume II (Cambridge

University Press, 1952), pp. 378-388, and E. Frauwallner in *Erich Frauwallner: Nachgelassene Werke I: Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen* (Wien: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1994), p. 66. Useful in this context is also G. Oberhammer, "Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 7, 1963, pp. 63-103.

8 See also Frauwallner, ibid., pp. 69-70.

9 In his footnote to this Frauwallner, ibid., p. 70 notes: "A recognition of what the opponent says is also the important pooint included here, when one says: 'You commit the same mistake', since one acknowledges the justification of the rebuke."

10 According to Erich Frauwallner it was Vṛṣagaṇa (or Vārṣagaṇya, perhaps 300 CE) the renowned Sāṃkhya teacher, who was the first to investigate epistemological questions at the beginning of his work, the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (available only in fragments), and thereby began a tradition followed by others. See "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems" in Frauwallner, ibid., pp. 223-278. See also D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Note on Vārṣagaṇya and his *Yogācārabhūmi*", Indo-Iranian Journal 6, 1962-63, pp. 137-140, and G. Oberhammer, "The authorship of the Ṣaṣṭitantra", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 4, 1960, pp. 71-91.

11 The issue concerns the notion of *āpta*, one who can be regarded as an "authoritative person". Cf. J. Soni, "The notion of *āpta* in Jaina philosophy", The 1995 Roop Lal Jain Annual Lecture, Toronto, 25 November 1995 (Toronto: The Universityof Toronto Centre for South Asia Studies 1996).

12 I am using the 1940 edition: *Parīkṣāmukham by Maṇikyanandī (with Prameya-ratnamālā by Anantavīrya)*, edited with translation, introduction, notes and an original commentary in English by Sarat Chandra Ghoshal (Lucknow: The Central Jaina Publishing House). The text is also embodied in the two main commentaries on the work: (1) the *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* by Prabhācandra (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press), ed. with introduction, indexes, etc., by Pt. Mahendra

Kumar Shastri, (Second Edition 1941), and (2) the *Parīkṣāmukha-laghuvṛtti* (also called *Parīkṣāmukha-pañjikā* and *Prameya-ratna-mālā*) by Anantavīrya (eleventh century), ed. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1909). To this second commentary there is a commentary called *Prameya-ratnālaṅkāra* by Abhinava Cārukīrti Paṇḍācārya, ed. Panditaratnam A. Shantiraja Sastri (Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1948).

13 The point of direct knowledge taking place through the soul can be compared, e.g., with the function of *cic-chakti* in Śaiva Siddhānta. For the similarities and differences see the *āpta* article in fn. 11 above, pp. 9-13.

14 The translations are taken from *Pravacanasāra (Pavaṇasāra)*, ed. with commentaries and English translation of the text alone by A. N. Upadhye (Anand (Gujarat): Shrimad Rajachandra Ashrama), Fourth Edition, 1984.

15 The reference here is to a fundamental issue in Jaina philosophy concerning substance, quality and mode. For the philosophical context of this far-reaching problem see J. Soni, "*Dravya, guṇa* and *paryāya* in Jaina thought", Journal of Indian Philosophy 19, 1991, pp. 75-88.

16 Umāsvāti says that knowledge can also be obtained through other means: by description, ownership, cause, resting place (or substratum) and division (*Tattvārthasūtra* I. 7); by existence, number, place of abode, etc. (I. 8). These lists only broaden the scope of epistemology. I have chosen to deal only with those aspects that are clearly comparable with epistemology in other schools.

17 The translations are from the 1940 edition cited in fn. 12 above.

18 The first classification is contained in his *Pravacanapraveśa* (a work that forms part of a trilogy called *Laghīyastraya*; the other two contained in it are *Pramāṇapraveśa* and *Nayapraveśa*). The second classification is contained in his *Nyāyaviniścaya*. All these works have been published in a single volume called *Akalaṃka-grantha-trayam*, ed. Mahendra Kumar

Sastri (Ahmadabad-Kalkata: Singhi Jaina Granthamala 12, 1931). The reference to these classifications is taken from K. K. Dixit, *Jaina Ontology* (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1971), p. 146. See J. Soni, "Epistemological categories in the *Akalaṅkagranthatrayam*", in Dimitrov et al., eds., *Śikhisamuccayaḥ. Indian and Tibetan Studies* (Wien: Arbeitkreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien 2002), pp. 185-192.

19 For this point and a survey of the issues in Jaina philosophy as a whole, see J. Soni, "Jaina philosophy", *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed. Edward Craig) (New York/London 1998).

20 For this section see also J. Soni, "Kundakunda and Umāsvāti on *anekāntavāda*", a paper presented at the international seminar "Aspects of Jainism", Warsaw, 8-9 September 2000 and published in *Essays in Jaina Philosophy and Religion* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 2003).

21 For both texts I am supplying the Prakrit texts, with the Sanskrit translation (in brackets) from the commentary by Amṛtacandra (tenth century), with Upadhye's English translation.

22 A. N. Upadhye's Introduction to Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*, 1984 edition, op. cit., p. 83.

23 Tatia's translation: "The ungrasped (unnoticed) aspect of an object is attested by the grasped (noticed) one", *Tattvārtha Sūtra. That Which Is*, with the combined commentaries of Umāsvāti/Umāsvāmin, Pūjyapāda and Siddhasenagaṇi, translated with an introduction by Nathmal Tatia (United Kingdom, etc.: Harber Collins 1994), p. 136.

24 See. B. Bhatta, "*Vyavahāra-naya* and *niścaya-naya* in Kundakunda's works", Zeitschrift für die Deutsche Morgenlandes Gesellschaft Supplement II (1974), pp. 279-291.

25 He wrote the *Jainendra Vyākaraṇa*, ed. Śambhunātha Tripāṭhi and Mahādeva Caturvedī and published by Bharatiya Jnanapitha Kasi (1956). (On p. 32 Nāthurāmji Premi comes to the conclusion that "Samantabhadra and Devanandī belong to

the sixth century and were contemporaries.")

26 For the Sanskrit text see: *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanapitha Prakasana, Fifth edition, 1991). In some cases I am supplying the Sanskrit words in brackets from the Sanskrit original. All references to Pūjyapāda are from S. A. Jain's translation of Umāsvāti's *sūtras*, which he supplies.

27 This refers to the previous *sūtra*, TS I. 5: *nāma-sthāpanā-dravya-bhavatas tan nyāsaḥ* "These (categories) *jīva*, etc., (given in TS 1. 4) are installed (in four ways) by name, representation, substance (potentiality, and actual state." *Nyāsa* is a synonym for *nikṣepa*, which is a typical Jaina way of presenting a topic of discussion. *Bhāva* is a synonym for *paryāya* which refers to the object as it is at a particular moment, i.e., the mode or modification (*paryāya*) taken on by a particular substance (*dravya*).

28 For the different traditions on the types of *nayas* see *Pt. Sukhlalji's Commentary on Tattvārtha Sūtra of Vācaka Umāsvāti*, translated by K. K. Dixit (L. D. Series 44: Ahmedabad 1974), p. 56.

29 I am consulting the following two editions from the same publisher: *Sabhāṣya-tattvārthādhigama-sūtram*, Rayacandra Jaina Sastramala, published in *śrīvīranirvāṇsaṃvat* 2432, and the one published in *śrīvīranirvāṇsaṃvat* 2858 (A.D. 1932).

30 *Pt. Sukhlalji's Commentary...*, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

31 It is interesting to note that Pūjyapāda says the following about *pramāṇa* at TS 1. 6 (tr. Jain, p. 10): "*Pramāṇa* is of two kinds, namely for oneself (*svārtha*) and for others (*parārtha*). All kinds of knowledge except scriptural constitute *pramāṇa* for oneself. But scriptural knowledge is of two kinds, namely for oneself and for others." Moreover, Umāsvāti does not mention *dravyārthika-naya* and *paryāyārthika-naya*, as Pūjyapāda does.

32 Several ideas expressed here are based on section 3, "Ethics", in J. Soni, "Jaina philosophy", *Routledge Encyclopedia*, op. cit., with thanks for the permission to use them here.

33 *Sūyogaḍa* II. 1. 48-49. See also *Mahāvīra's Words by Walther Schubring*, translated from the German with much added

material by W. Bollée and J. Soni (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute, submitted for printing 2003), pp. 47-48. The German title is *Worte Mahāvīras. Kritische Übersetzung aus dem Kanon der Jaina* (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1926).

34 *Sūyagoḍa* II. 2. 4. Ibid., pp. 51-52.

35 For the lay rules see Paul Dundas, *The Jains* (London: Routledge 2002, Second Edition) Chapter Seven, especially pp. 189-192.

36 For an excellent treatment of this see Colette Caillat, *Atonement in the Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks* (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute, 1975).

37 For the *guṇasthānas* see, e.g., the list in Padmanabh S. Jaini, *The Jaina Path of Purification* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1979), pp. 272-273.

38. Dundas, op. cit., pp. 19, 24-25.

39. Dundas, op. cit., pp. 28-38.

40 Dundas, op. cit., pp. 41-44.

41 For a thorough account concerning the evidence of Jainism's spread throughout northern India and eventually throughout the subcontinent see Asim Kumar Chatterjee, *A Comprehensive History of Jainism. Volume I: From the Earliest Beginnings to AD 1000* (Second revised edition, New Delhi 2000).

42 Asok Kumar Chatterjee, ibid., p. 87.

43 Dundas, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

44 Dundas, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

45 The list is based on, and partly quoted from, Dundas, op. cit., pp. 73-76.

46 Johannes Bronkhorst, "On the chronology of the Tattvārtha Sūtra and some early commentaries", Wiener Zeitschrift für die Süd- und Ostasiens 29, 1985, pp. 155-184.

47 A quite full discussion of all the points just raised, but coming to different conclusions from ours on several of them, can be found in N. L. Jain's Introduction to *Biology in Jaina Treatise on Reals* (Chennai 1999), which contains a translation of Chapter Two of Akalaṅka's *Tattvārthasūtra-Rājavārttika*.

48 Cf. J. L. Jaini's translation, with the text, Sacred Books of the Jains 2, 1989 (first published 1920), pp. 204-210.
49 Umāsvāti's *Tattvārthasūtra* with Bhāskaranandin's *Sukhabodha*, edited by A. Shantiraja Sastri, University of Mysore Oriental Library Publications, Sanskrit Series 84, Mysore 1944, pp. 235-246.
50 Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka, *Siddhiviniścaya*, edited with Anantavīrya's *Ṭīkā* by Mahendra Kumar Jain. Two volumes. Jnanapītha Murtidevi Granthamala 22-23, 1959, p. 32.
51 For an analysis of the development of the concept of *upayoga* cf. W. J. Johnson, *Harmless Souls. Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference to Umāsvāti and Kundakunda* (Delhi 1995), pp. 97-123.
52 This Chapter has been edited and translated, with extensive comments, by G. R. Jain, *Cosmology Old and New,* Jnanapitha Murtidevi Granthamala, English Series 5 (New Delhi 1975).
53 The Digambaras read this line to justify the inclusion of time among the substances.
54 Cf. W. J. Johnson, *Harmless Souls,* op. cit., pp. 149-151 for discussion.
55 For the entire list cf. K. K. Dixit's translation, op. cit., pp. 308-312.
56 See Yajneshwar S. Shastri's Introduction to E, pp. 4-5.
57 Equals a certain number of miles--accounts vary as to precisely how many miles.
58 For such a review cf. A. N. Upadhye's Introduction to his edition and translation of Kundakunda's *Pravacanasāra*, op. cit., pp. 1-23, and more recently W. J. Johnson, *Harmless Souls,* op. cit., pp. 91-97.
59 Johnson, ibid.
60 Agas 1964.
61 Jnanapitha Murtidevi Granthamala, English Series 4 (New Delhi 1975).
62 9-16 are analyzed in W. J. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 117-120.
63 Translation by W. J. Johnson, op. cit., p. 120, with analysis.
64 Cf. W. J. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 114-116 for analysis of 63-

64.
65 77-102 are analyzed, and some passages translated, in W. J. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 124-149.
66 On this section cf. W. J. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 205-210.
67 Cf. W. J. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 217-222 for discussion of 3-5.
68 Cf. W. J. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 156-168 on *hiṃsā* in the present work, and pp. 168-184 for further discussion of *hiṃsā, moha* and *upādhi.*
69 In the Introduction to his edition of the *Pravacanasāra*, op. cit., p. 24, note 1.
70 Jagdish Prasad Jain "Sadhak" in his Introduction to *Spiritual Insights: Ishtopadesh and Samadhi Shatak by Acharya Pujyapada Svami* (New Delhi 2000), p. 1.
71 The parenthetical explanation is drawn from T, p. 71, notes 1-2.
72 E and T do not exactly correspond; the first few sentences of T have not Sanskrit equivalent in E.
73 The translations of the names of the fourteen stages of progress is that provided by S. A. Jain in T.
74 Selected from C. Krause, *Vikrama Volume* (Ujjain 1948), pp. 234-236.
75 Mahendra Kumar Jain in the Introduction to his edition of Akalaṅka's *Siddhiviniścaya*, op. cit., p. 35.
76 Ibid., p. 35.
77 Ibid., p. 36.
78 *Dvādaśaraṃ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*. Part I (1-4 Aras). Edited with critical notes by Muni Jambuvijayaji. Sri Atmananda Jain Granthamala Series No. 92 (Bhavnagar 1966), pp. 5-6.
79 Mr. R. S. Betai provided us with a summary of this work, for which we are very grateful. It being a good deal briefer than Upadhye's, the editor has decided to include the longer, printed summary for this Volume. It may also be noted that in a recent publication (New Delhi 2000), Upadhye's summary has been

republished along with the text and a translation by Rikhab Dass Jain.

80 Cf. A. N. Upadhye's Introduction to his edition of Yogīndudeva's *Paramātmaprakāśa* and *Yogasāra*, Rajachandra Jaina Sastramala 3, Agas 1973, pp. 64 and 70.

81 He adds: "Pandit Sastri points out that B. Kamta Prasad has taken the date as *śaka* 700 but it is clear from the Sanskrit verse that *vikraṃ saṃvat* is referred to herein."

82 Nagin J. Shah, *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy" A Study*. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series No. 11 (Ahmedabad 1967), p. 38.

83 Ibid., p. 39.

84 M. K. Jain's edition of *Siddhiviniścaya*, op. cit., pp. 55-62.

85 M. K. Jain's edition of *Siddhiviniścaya,* op. cit., pp. 64-65.

86 Nagin Shah, op. cit., p. 38.

87 Mahendra Kumar, *Siddhivniścaya*, op. cit., p. 66.

88 Ibid., p.66

89 Ibid., p. 32.

90 Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Collection of Manuscripts deposited in the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 4, Vol. XVII, part I, ed. H. R. Bhandarkar 1935, pp. 9-10.

91 See *Pañcasūtrakam of Cirantanācārya*, critically edited by Muni Sri Jambuvijaya (Delhi 1986), p. 33.

92 Prof. Dixit's summary ends here. We provide a summary based on the translation of the remainder.

93 Malvania's Introduction to Punyavijaya's edition of Haribhadra's *Yogaśataka* with autocommentary and of the *Brahmasiddhāntasamuccaya,* Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 4, Ahmedabad 1965, p. 6.

94 Ibid.

95 M. A. Dhaky, "The date and authorship of Nyāyāvatāra", *Nirgrantha Volume I* (Ahmedabad 1995), p. 45.

96 Quoted M. K. Jain, *Siddhiviniścaya*, p. 49.

97 Amṛtacandrasūri's *Laghutattvasphoṭa*, ed. tr. by Pamanabh S. Jaini. L. D. Series 62, Ahmedabad 1978, p. 28.

98 A. N. Upadhye's edition of *Pravacanasāra*, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

99 Ibid., p. 93.

100 Ibid., p. 95.

101 Amṛtacandrasūri's *Laghutattvasphoṭa*, op. cit., p. 29.

102 It should be mentioned that the term *paśu* comes to be used even more frequently in another of Amṛtacandra's works, the *Samayasārakalāśa*. Its occurrences there are all in the chapter dealing with *syādvāda*, where the 'false' doctrines of the *paśu* are contrasted with the Jaina position, which is characterized by the tenets of *syādvāda*. A comparison of these passages confirms the identity of authorship of these two works. (Jaini)

103 Nagin J. Shah, *Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā*, op. cit., p. 32.

104 On *sūtra* 175-181, quoted on p. 8.

105 *Sambandhavārttika* 182, quoted in E, p. 8.

106 *Sambandhavārttika* 182, quoted on p. 9.

107 Quoting *Aṣṭasāhasrṭ*.

108 For analysis of one or two other passages from this voluminous work cf. e.g. Nathmal Tatia, *Studies in Jaina Philosophy* (Banaras 1951), passages cited in the footnote under "Vidyānandi".

109 The article is essentially identical with Mr. Jain's General Editorial preface to A. N. Upadhye's edition of the Jīvakāṇḍa of the *Gomatasāra* (New Delhi 1978), pp. 5-12.

110 Taken largely *verbatim* from the comments in E, p. 290.

GLOSSARY-INDEX

The following Index attempts to provide a guide to references to names, titles and topics. It also indicates which Sanskrit words are likely to be translated by which English expressions, and vice versa. Page references in bold face indicate the primary citation of the work.